Viet Cong organization
also: VC, VCI, guerrilla forces, communist insurgency, Viet Cong Infrastructure, Vietnamese communist, Charlie, Charlies, rebels, Vietcong
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Related entities (most co-mentioned)
Vietnamcountry · 29CIAintelligence service · 26Phoenix Programoperation · 24South Vietnamplace · 15Viet Minhorganization · 12United Statescountry · 12Frank Scottonperson · 8Edward Lansdaleperson · 7Ho Chi Minhperson · 5Police Special Branchorganization · 5Ngo Dinh Diemperson · 5Mountain Scoutsorganization · 5Francecountry · 5William Colbyperson · 4Nelson Brickhamperson · 4Harry Monkperson · 4Nguyen Loc Hoaperson · 4Ralph Johnsonperson · 3U.S. Army Special Forcesorganization · 3Elton Manzoniperson · 3Robert Komerperson · 3Pierre de Silvaperson · 3Senate Foreign Relations Committeeorganization · 3Lyndon B. Johnsonperson · 2
Claims (20)
Phoenix Program targeted_for_regime_change
Viet Cong documented
“So developed in 1967 by the CIA, Phoenix combined existing counterinsurgency programs in a concerted effort to, quote unquote, neutralize the Viet Cong infrastructure. The euphemism for neutralize means to kill, capture or make defective. A…”
▶ Operation Gladio-Vietnam Phoenix Program part 2 @ 17:27
Phoenix Program assassinated
Viet Cong host_asserted
“When you zoom out to the 30,000 foot look of it versus what's happening inside the United States right now. The Phoenix program was a massive program to capture and kill the Viet Cong and the use of torture to reveal even more targets. It w…”
▶ Operation Gladio - Vietnam Finale (9) @ 29:51
Nguyen Loc Hoa carried_out_attack
Viet Cong book_quoted
“merely to fight against the Viet Cong as a religious priest. In an article in the Saturday Evening Post in February 17th, 1962, it says, quote, Father Hoa personally led his pitiful small force into the swamps nightly to strike at the enemy…”
▶ Operation Gladio - Vietnam Phoenix Program @ 48:47
Nguyen Loc Hoa carried_out_attack
Viet Cong host_asserted
“Father Hoa used CIA funds to run an intel network consisting of volunteers, of sympathetic farmers, basically paid agents, along with a slew of full-time actual paid agents. On the basis of this intel, Father Hoa mounted raids against quote…”
▶ Operation Gladio - Vietnam Phoenix Program @ 49:44
Phoenix Program assassinated
Viet Cong documented
“who could then be neutralized, murdered in this program. And of course, as I said, this was called Phoenix. And since we've spent a lot of time on Phoenix, I'm not going to go through the details of this. Just understand that this program e…”
▶ The Colonel’s Corner Presidents’ Secret Wars, chapter 15 @ 45:02
Elton Manzoni carried_out_attack
Viet Cong host_asserted
“trail, counting enemy troops and trucks. Other times they moved from one set of coordinates to another, and they also shot field-grade northern officers, kidnapped prisoners, escorted defectors from the north to the south, and demolished do…”
▶ Operation Gladio- Vietnam Part 5 Phoenix Program @ 1:01:39
Phoenix Program targeted_for_regime_change
Viet Cong host_asserted
“We don't want you affiliating with the Viet Cong. And so we're going to set this new city up, this hamlet, and we're going to surround it with a moat. And we're not going to let you move in and out of this so we can control your contact. An…”
▶ The Colonels Corner, Strange Tales of the Parapolitical Part 4 @ 1:39:33
Viet Cong carried_out_attack
Gulf of Tonkin incident host_asserted
“The Viet Cong, Ho Chi Minh, these forces have attacked our naval ships in the Gulf of Tonkin. There are hundreds of dead sailors on the shores of the Gulf. It's an outright act against, and we haven't done anything to provoke this attack, b…”
▶ The Colonel's Corner Interview w_Paul Williams author of Operation Gladio @ 1:05:40
Pat McGarvey spied_on
Viet Cong book_quoted
“For this reason, some people suggest that the Cow Day Eye of God endowed Phoenix, the all-seeing bird of prey, that selectively snatches its prey with its talons. In South Vietnam, the Eye of God trick took on a ghastly twist. CIA officer P…”
▶ Operation Gladio-Vietnam Part 6 Phoenix Program @ 16:25
CIA carried_out_attack
Viet Cong host_asserted
“with the villages believing that they had been done by the Viet Cong, was then used by the CIA to try to turn these people against the Viet Cong. And that's where they began getting informants. So on a fact-finding mission in 1965, Ohio Sen…”
▶ Operation Gladio-Vietnam Part 8 Phoenix Program @ 35:10
Anthony Herbert carried_out_attack
Viet Cong book_quoted
“Anthony Herbert, H-E-R-B-E-R-T, tells how he reported for duty with the Special Operations Group in Saigon in November 65 and was asked to join a top secret PSYOPs war program. Quote, what they wanted me to do was to take charge of executio…”
▶ Operation Gladio-Vietnam Part 8 Phoenix Program @ 36:29
CIA recruited
Viet Cong book_quoted
“recruitment in place of Viet Cong. Quote, this is by far the most important program in terms of gathering intelligence on the enemy. My motto was to recruit them. If you can't recruit them, defect them. If you can't defect them, capture the…”
▶ Operation Gladio-Vietnam Part 8 Phoenix Program @ 39:27
CIA carried_out_attack
Viet Cong documented
“charged that Operation Phoenix had been responsible for indiscriminate killings of civilians and the imprisonment of thousands of others in violation of international courts in legal actions in wartime. The CIA admitted that this program in…”
▶ The Colonel's Corner Twilight of the Shadow Government #7 @ 27:37
CIA covered_up
Viet Cong host_asserted
“but still not in a coordinated way. The U.S. military went to Vietnam to fight a conventional war. However, by late 1966, it was clear that the games on the battlefield were very transitory because they were not fighting a conventional war …”
▶ Operation Gladio-Vietnam Part 8 Phoenix Program @ 1:03:42
Nelson Brickham book_quoted
Viet Cong book_quoted
“Brigham viewed the Viet Cong as a criminal conspiracy, a mafia operating under the pretense of political ideology, coercing people through the selective use of terror. We've already established they're not generally the ones, not that they …”
▶ Operation Gladio-Vietnam Part 8 Phoenix Program @ 1:10:16
Phoenix Program assassinated
Viet Cong documented
“So developed in 1967 by the CIA, Phoenix combined existing counterinsurgency programs in a concerted effort to, quote unquote, neutralize the Viet Cong infrastructure. The euphemism for neutralize means to kill, capture or make defective. A…”
▶ Operation Gladio-Vietnam Phoenix Program part 2 @ 17:27
Edward Lansdale coined_term
Viet Cong host_asserted
“So Lansdell is the one who coined the term Viet Cong as opposed to Viet Minh. So he did not. And it's all about labeling. OK, keep in mind, Lansdell is a PR guy from San Francisco. That's what he did before he went in the OSS. He is the qui…”
▶ Operation Gladio-Vietnam Phoenix Program part 2 @ 52:05
Elton Manzoni assassinated
Viet Cong book_quoted
“suspected of supporting North Vietnamese or Viet Cong soldiers like the ones targeted by Elton in his final operation. Targeting civilians is against Geneva Convention, and they did it anyway. Under Phoenix, the due process was nonexistent.…”
▶ Operation Gladio-Vietnam Phoenix Program part 2 @ 17:54
CIA covered_up
Viet Cong host_asserted
“Kidnapping these people and disappearing them, dressed up as the Viet Cong and accusing North Vietnam as doing it. And this is exactly the tenets of Operation Gladio in full view of everything. So there were there's another.…”
▶ Operation Gladio - Vietnam Phoenix Program @ 12:49
Phoenix Program carried_out_attack
Viet Cong host_asserted
“And in the Phoenix program, you had to have an enemy, and that became the Viet Cong.…”
▶ ColonelTowner-Watkins på X CIA are the terrorists @ 4:14
Mentions (120)
▶ 4:14
And in the Phoenix program, you had to have an enemy, and that became the Viet Cong. Not because the Viet Cong was communist, because they were not. They were nationalist. Ho Chi Minh was fine when the OSS was helping him during World War I…
▶ 1:15:43
About the only thing he ever said about it is we were stringing some smoke grenades on deck cord to run daisy chains once. And he said, hey, this reminds me of the time we had a bunch of Claymores on deck cord and ambushed a Viet Cong tax c…
▶ 50:34
such as in-country airlift for moving USAID supplies to rural areas and helping with the port congestion. Comer believed that eliminating the Viet Cong influence in the countryside and limiting inflation were the highest priorities. He urge…
▶ 3:40
Also, one of the major elements of the Phoenix program was the torture and assassination program. And, of course, we know that they said that they were doing it to copy the Viet Cong. And when we find out by looking at the details, as we've…
▶ 4:07
was actually these guys dressed up as Viet Cong, so they're basically copying themselves. And their crazy use of terminology, where they say that they were focusing on attacking the Viet Cong infrastructure, but yet when you read about...…
▶ 8:08
That DIM would never be able to be installed. So they begin training people for more of a guerrilla warfare kind of resolution as opposed to quote unquote installing a democracy. They create armed propaganda teams and they basically go into…
▶ 10:14
The use of brutal death squads that were trained in covert war, they called the terror counter-terror, ironically, since what they were doing was terrorism. In fact, throughout the Vietnam War, the CIA staged false flag terror attacks, some…
▶ 15:57
any of those were still standing because they certainly didn't point them out to us. So at first, the Viet Cong made freeing the prisoners a major goal from these interrogation centers. They would try to break out the prisoners, which requi…
▶ 16:29
Kind of rethink the whole security of them, the CIA, because they ended up having to spend a whole ton of money to go back and redesign the outside of them to be able to make them more resistant to the Viet Cong being able to overrun them a…
▶ 17:31
People would be held for months and there were very few survivors that came out of these unless they were rescued by the Viet Cong from these picks. And basically they were supposedly brought there so that they could be tortured into disclo…
▶ 18:26
Many were the victims of extortion who failed to pay proper bribes to the quote-unquote trained policemen in a village. A lot of that went on. Other people, any personal enemies that they had, they would turn their names over. And pretty mu…
▶ 27:55
That's not what the CIA wanted. So one of the very first things they had to do was demonize Ho Chi Minh. And they did that psychologically by labeling him a communist, as we now know, and changing Viet Minh, which were national heroes, to V…
▶ 33:56
kind of mimicking a CIA agent with the torture and stuff like that. And after teaming up with the PRU and their CIA advisors, these special forces guys found that their role in the war, dressed up as Viet Cong, hiding during the day and tra…
▶ 35:30
It was when a military battle here, when you refocused over there, everything that you had originally done got undone because the people were more interested in their country than a mystically created enemy that lived up north. The Viet Con…
▶ 35:59
in the South was forcing people off of their land into new built villages that look like prison camps. You just can't compete with those two scenarios. There's nothing there. The Viet Cong were acting in Vietnam under a national liberation …
▶ 36:27
the U.S. had just assumed the vehemently hated French position of occupation. Let's see. While 40,000 people were killed by specifically the Phoenix program, the CIA failed to destroy the Viet Cong, and basically the turmoil of the executio…
▶ 44:32
to traffic the guns, traffic the drugs, and fund the attack on the Sandinistas, which basically became the Viet Cong of Central America. Named the target, set up the Phoenix program, and turned the same people loose that had ran the Phoenix…
▶ 1:20:17
excuse me, charged a complete double cross by both Democrats and Republicans on the committee because they had originally told him they were going to be there to investigate this. A copy of the secret report was obtained earlier by the UPI …
▶ 1:21:16
moral considerations of U.S. support for a program that was allegedly including torture, murder, and inhumane treatment of South Vietnamese civilians, unquote. The Phoenix program began in 1968, is aimed at identifying the members of the so…
▶ 14:13
As part of the pilot program designed to induce defectors, Scotton, Walters, and Toy crossed the Nlau Valley, set up an ambush deep in Viet Cong territory and waited till dark. When they spotted a Viet Cong unit, Scotton yelled through a bu…
▶ 14:44
Vigor, he shot a flare into the night sky and hollered, walked towards the light. To his surprise, two defectors did walk in, convincing him and his CIA sponsors that a determined unit could contest the Viet Cong in terms of combat and prop…
▶ 15:13
that they had to divest themselves of, quote-unquote, untruths. Does that sound familiar? We said that certainly the U.S. perpetrated war crimes, but so did the Viet Cong. We acknowledged that the Viet Cong was a stronger force, but that di…
▶ 16:13
So from the mid 1950s. And so in early 1963, 200 lightly armed Viet Cong guerrillas routed a force of 2,500 that had been advised by John Vann and supported with U.S. bombers and helicopters, which is ridiculous.…
▶ 17:12
at a ceremony in whose commemorating the 2,587th birthday of Buddha. The demonstration was led by a Buddhist priest, Trik Trai Kwa. It erupted on May 8th and Nhu sent a contingent to put it down. In doing so, they killed nine people, mostly…
▶ 26:32
Several of the other people went into exile in France. And in the wake of the coup, according to Frank Scotton, administrative paralysis began to sit in in the South. The Viet Cong exploited this by physically dismantling strategic smaller …
▶ 28:31
Each six-member team was equipped with black pajamas, pistols, a radio, and a submachine gun. Standard procedures was to regroup at the last moment before daybreak, then shift at dawn to a fourth hamlet where the team would sleep during the…
▶ 28:57
When the Viet Cong armed propaganda teams left the Hamlet, Scott and his cadre would move in and speak to one person in each household. So the Viet Cong would have to punish everyone after we left. But that never happened. A woman Viet Cong…
▶ 29:27
erase any good that they thought they were doing. The mission of these survey teams, according to Scotton, was, quote, intelligence, not an attack on the Viet Cong. But Longan, L-O-N-G-A-N, proved the viability of small units. I felt confid…
▶ 38:13
basically encouraged the snitching on neighbors. That sounds familiar too. Soon after the coup, the Viet Cong controlled most of the countryside and the Vietnamese bureau investigations had little role to play outside of Saigon proper.…
▶ 38:36
In the countryside, counter-terror and armed propaganda teams aided by secret agents in the village gathered intelligence and attacked the Viet Cong infrastructure through these CIA six-people teams. Meanwhile, the U.S. airplanes, artillery…
▶ 43:02
The impetus for Scotton's Phoenix-like program on the Vietnamese side came from a police chief called Colonel Pham Thong, T-U-O-N-G. He was a longstanding CIA asset, and he anted up a platoon of volunteers, all of whom had been victimized b…
▶ 44:26
chosen by his peers through what Scotton referred to as the only honest elections ever held in South Vietnam. The morale officer's job, he said, was to keep people honest and have them admit mistakes if they made them. Not only did Scotton …
▶ 46:49
So we bumped it up to 40 and started a second group immediately. Then it talks a little bit about the tactics on how they were used, but basically goes on to say that there were two functions assigned. First was pacification, and second was…
▶ 47:14
pacification to pacify everybody that was in the particular village that was going to be the target and then have those people identify who they would rat out as Viet Cong, whether or not they were, because they had no way of verifying any …
▶ 49:14
In an autobiography called Sub Rosa, Da Silva describes arriving in Vietnam in December 1963 and says he was introduced to Viet Cong terror by one of the officers. Two Viet Cong cadres had basically stabbed a village chief and his pregnant …
▶ 50:08
is these weren't done by the Viet Cong. I had found repeatedly where we did this to terrorize these villagers and then claimed, just like in Operation Gladio, they actually had killed Viet Cong, got their uniforms, and would dress up using …
▶ 56:27
to bring danger and death to the Viet Cong functionaries themselves, especially in the areas where they felt secure. We had obtained descriptions and photographs of known cadres who were functioning as committee chiefs, recruiters, province…
▶ 56:57
by virtue of prior residents to go into the areas in which we knew the Viet Cong senior cadre were active and eliminate them. Here Da Silva is describing the Phoenix program because oftentimes these pictures and the identification again cam…
▶ 1:02:06
counter-terrorist units whom Manzoni described as a combination of deserters, Viet Cong turncoats, and bad MF-er criminals from the South who they couldn't deal with in prison, so they put them under the command of these guys to kill people…
▶ 1:02:34
If they killed so many designated Viet Cong, they actually got years off of their prison sentence. Not kidding. The counter-terrorists taught Manzoni and his SEAL comrades the secrets of PSYOP's campaigns, which in practice meant exploiting…
▶ 16:55
psychological warfare guy in Washington thought of a way to scare the hell out of villagers. When we killed a Viet Cong there, they wanted us to spread eagle the guy, put out his eye, cut a hole in the back of his head, and put his eyeball …
▶ 26:06
and with no oversight. It was isolated and accessible only by Air America. Vu Tu was the perfect place for a, they call it a covert action, I'm going to call it Camp Gladio. Vu Tu became the seedbed of the CIA's political cadres, where they…
▶ 35:58
Donahue's pet program was the thing called the census grievance, the most sophisticated program in the whole country, the most effective political tool if you accept the fact that the government really didn't care what people thought and wh…
▶ 38:56
Giving you a hard time. Are the police at the checkpoints charging you a toll every time you take your wares to market? Number three, is there anything you want to tell me about the Viet Cong? If the answer was no, the whole thing wasn't pu…
▶ 53:03
So when Robert Kelly joined the CIA and took his team of instructors to duplicate this program in other provinces, a guy by the name of Harry Monk, M-O-N-K, took over Ben Dem province and began working as a case officer to one of the local …
▶ 53:34
And from the Viet Cong, he is said by these CIA people over there that he was basically a visionary and wanted the rural construction to be more than an attack on the Viet Cong. He wanted to provide services to the people as well. And basic…
▶ 54:03
who were graduates of their little camp down there. And with the help of Monk, combined mobile census grievance cadres and political action teams and counterterrorism teams and came up with 59-man revolutionary development team program. So …
▶ 55:28
was trying to create a climate to make the Viet Cong blunder into ambushes and fear the unpredictable, unquote. His goal was to neutralize the Viet Cong, but his style was basically to be nice to them, giving gifts and lure them in, get the…
▶ 1:04:04
And again, when you're doing something like this in a foreign country and you start making decisions like that and you start pissing off the internal people, do you know how easy it is for him to then go to the Viet Cong and sell your ass o…
▶ 13:43
The CIA had learned the names of many people that through torture had been identified as Viet Cong members. So again, you don't know whether any of this is true because they're getting it out of torture. So then the CIA would go in and appr…
▶ 14:14
supposedly the idea was to weaken the insurgency and get those people to come over to the south side or use them kind of as a double agent to send them back north. Thompson's method was successful, but only to a point because many of the Vi…
▶ 15:09
They were seen as very honorable in their villages, and so they didn't want to arrest them in their villages and heighten the hate against the U.S. forces. Thompson's dragnet technique engendered other problems. Mistakes were made and innoc…
▶ 19:54
forces in the area immediately around Saigon. And so basically they're setting up a cop structure that matches that same thing so they can work better together. Okay. And this is a quote from Scott. He said,…
▶ 30:15
already pacified Korea, Vietnam was still in a transitional period, and they couldn't quite get it as pacified, if you will, as South Korea. And Muldoon explained, quote, the South Vietnamese wanted information they could turn around and us…
▶ 55:27
and doing searches and all kinds of things. So making matters worse was the fact that province chiefs, eager to foster local initiatives on their own, made deals with the CIA officers who they had been on their payroll anyway. So at the dir…
▶ 1:03:11
the way the agency ran their counterterrorism teams. Under Cherong and the CIA, the field police program was not for the benefit of the Vietnamese. The major principal, Greaves, felt obligated to run his program legitimately. But now Cheron…
▶ 1:07:51
It goes on and talks about them setting up a Marine police force as well so they could peruse the border. Because remember, they're setting up prisons and the basically paramilitary training camps on these islands. So it's vital that they c…
▶ 34:11
bread and butter activity. It was designed specifically to gain information from and on the people who lived in these hamlets. The problem, he writes, was in recruiting informants in as many hamlets as possible. This task was made difficult…
▶ 34:39
other motivational factors in order to get these people to begin informing. Now, I'm going to save you some of the details, but I will tell you that basically what they did was like what we've talked about a little bit before. They dressed …
▶ 35:10
with the villages believing that they had been done by the Viet Cong, was then used by the CIA to try to turn these people against the Viet Cong. And that's where they began getting informants. So on a fact-finding mission in 1965, Ohio Sen…
▶ 36:29
Anthony Herbert, H-E-R-B-E-R-T, tells how he reported for duty with the Special Operations Group in Saigon in November 65 and was asked to join a top secret PSYOPs war program. Quote, what they wanted me to do was to take charge of executio…
▶ 36:57
The rationale was that other Vietnamese would see the Viet Cong had killed another Viet Cong and would be frightened away from becoming a Viet Cong. Of course, the villagers would then be inclined to be some type of informant and potentiall…
▶ 37:54
So anyway, informants who clearly fabricated information, which they thought their special branch case officers wanted to hear, and that when this information was compiled and produced in the form of a blacklist of these people, a distinct …
▶ 38:27
At all. The special branch kept records of the people who had been victims of the Viet Cong atrocities and acts of terrorism so that they could basically try to turn them. So if they were just terrorizing them and not killing them or the su…
▶ 38:57
That's what they were doing over there. The special branch then constructed sometimes elaborate, sometimes simple plans to bring in the informants in the sphere of the people that they had just terrorized. Anyway, another major program that…
▶ 39:27
recruitment in place of Viet Cong. Quote, this is by far the most important program in terms of gathering intelligence on the enemy. My motto was to recruit them. If you can't recruit them, defect them. If you can't defect them, capture the…
▶ 40:00
IV Corps, between 67 and 69, noted that the special branch kept dossiers on all suspected Viet Cong in a particular area of operations, and that evidence was gathered through interrogations, captured documentations, and what was called walk…
▶ 40:28
When the accumulated evidence indicated that there was someone that looked to be high-ranking Viet Cong, that person was targeted for recruitment like a double agent. First, you had to figure out how you could get access to them, and that w…
▶ 41:01
It's like criminals recruiting criminals, using criminality to do it. Special branch case officers were used to handle penetrations into the Viet Cong network. And by 1967, Brigham told the author that the CIA had several hundred penetratio…
▶ 44:40
um worked um for brickham and was given the job of trying to find some of these higher level vietcong to penetrate them and again they don't exist because they're those people are they're not going to turn um they've been at this way too lo…
▶ 45:59
training schools for these province senior people representing the Viet Cong nationalists at all of the levels. And the ones that they had, especially the ones they had penetrated in the South, they kept them supplied. They kept them morall…
▶ 50:33
By 66, the problem was back in Washington, where it was determined that the pacification was failing. And as a result of the combination of poor management and the resistance of the Viet Cong, the nationalistic tendency. So as a way of reso…
▶ 51:33
So it kind of was like a dual hat, have one of the civilian NGO kind of people here and then the commander up top. Although the civilians continued to object, Johnson wanted quick results, the kind the military could provide. And therefore,…
▶ 1:04:10
that we were fighting communists. We were never fighting communists in Vietnam, ever. We were fighting nationalists fighting for the survival of their country. Those are two very different, if you want to call one of them even an enemy. I d…
▶ 1:04:40
The military, the entire time they're over there thinking they're actually fighting communists, were fighting nationalists who would gladly give their blood for their country, as would all of us. Those are two very different enemies, milita…
▶ 1:05:12
Basically reincorporating the national police because the military wasn't able to hold ground because they weren't identifying the enemy properly. And the conclusion of that was basically that they needed to work closer with the police. And…
▶ 1:05:44
It began, let's see, the people wanted to know what you meant when you said attack the against the Viet Cong. OK, so this came out of a briefing. What do you mean by attack the Viet Cong? Are you going to go in and like militarily attack th…
▶ 1:06:42
written memorandum in November 1966. Attack is significant for three reasons. First was its definition for the Viet Cong as the Viet Cong organizationally, hierarchically, the management structure as opposed to the guerrillas and the foot s…
▶ 1:07:13
impressed or seduced into the Viet Cong and cannot in any way be considered hardcore communist. Now, what's interesting about that is if I stopped right there, that's the CIA admitting that we're not fighting the communist, but they kept te…
▶ 1:07:45
party members, and front organization officers, as opposed to the rank and file. Thus, all members of a village chapter, all district committees, and province committee cadres could be included as being a target for an attack. We would also…
▶ 1:08:14
hardened Viet Cong troops. They were organized in military formations and basically carried out the sabotage against our military. They also staged bombings and, you know, that type of thing. It says these latter are not casual acts of terr…
▶ 1:09:45
There is only a headless body. If you destroy the infrastructure, you destroy the insurgency. And that just shows you kind of the craziness of the way these people, they're trying to behead something that doesn't exist. There was never a co…
▶ 12:20
All the Can Lao people there watching me. And in those days, it was just impossible to resign. Many others had tried. They were just let off in the middle of the night by Dems men dressed as Viet Cong. They were taken to P-40 or the prison …
▶ 12:49
Kidnapping these people and disappearing them, dressed up as the Viet Cong and accusing North Vietnam as doing it. And this is exactly the tenets of Operation Gladio in full view of everything. So there were there's another.…
▶ 13:23
entity that the CIA produced an annual report, which was basically labeled as the Viet Cong Order of Battle. And it was compiled for the most part from notes taken by secret agents that had been infiltrated into the Viet Cong. And they asse…
▶ 13:53
It basically became a CIA biography of the VCI and the basis for the anti quote unquote infrastructure operation, which was basically the murdering of all the educated people and all that other stuff. So, again, they're using the Viet Cong.…
▶ 15:09
beat people and used water treatment, literally waterboarding because the CIA had taught them how to do that. But there was nothing anyone could do. Everyone was terrified, unquote. Another official went on the record saying, quote, during …
▶ 15:36
what the government told me to. If not, the secret police, the VBI, would come pick me up and torture me to death. Thus, I was the only one who rigged the election here, unquote. It was apparent that Dinh's security forces terrorized all of…
▶ 16:04
the BCI carried out an official policy of nonviolence. Quote, by adopting the almost entirely defensive role during that period and by allowing the government to be the first to employ violence, the party, at great cost, allowed the governm…
▶ 18:01
Because that, for them, was the last straw. Viet Minh cadres moved into villages from secluded base camps in central highlands. And after four years of Dems-style, quote-unquote, democracy, the rural population had basically embraced insurg…
▶ 30:55
The Michigan State University group advisors were all over South Vietnam conducting studies and reporting on the village dynamics going on at the time. They had found themselves stumbling over secret policemen that were posing as village ch…
▶ 31:22
And even though these poise helped security forces catch people that were basically part of the Viet Cong, they also put the Michigan State University advisors in as targets for the Viet Cong, which they probably should have been. So it was…
▶ 36:40
These ragtag squads were targeted against the VCI using intelligence provided by their VBI. However, in 1960, at the end of the year, the U.S. Military Advisory Group seized control of the constable groups and began organizing them into com…
▶ 40:35
agro-villas was to control the rural population by physically moving the sympathetic people away from the guerrilla forces. By making relocated persons build these agro-villas, i.e. tent cities protected by moats, mud walls, and bamboo stak…
▶ 44:26
He and another CIA officer that was disguised as a special forces colonel by the name of Gilbert Lawton, L-A-W-T-O-N, launched a program called Civilian Irregular Defense Group. This program was a means of preventing the North and the rovin…
▶ 47:50
that had been embedded in the CIA to bring his church group to South Vietnam. And the deal was that Father Hoa was appointed chief of a district where 90% of the people were Viet Cong supporters, Viet Minh. So now keep in mind, they already…
▶ 48:18
and settled them in the South. And so they are assigning a religious Catholic priest to be in charge, basically spy, on a village that are all sympathetic to the Nationalists trying to kick these bastards out. He was given quantities of mil…
▶ 49:44
Father Hoa used CIA funds to run an intel network consisting of volunteers, of sympathetic farmers, basically paid agents, along with a slew of full-time actual paid agents. On the basis of this intel, Father Hoa mounted raids against quote…
▶ 50:14
whom he used as slave laborers for himself to harvest food that they then sold. In the evenings, sea swallow cadre indoctrinated their captives with religious and political propaganda, prompting the weaklings to defect and join the ranks of…
▶ 17:27
So developed in 1967 by the CIA, Phoenix combined existing counterinsurgency programs in a concerted effort to, quote unquote, neutralize the Viet Cong infrastructure. The euphemism for neutralize means to kill, capture or make defective. A…
▶ 17:54
suspected of supporting North Vietnamese or Viet Cong soldiers like the ones targeted by Elton in his final operation. Targeting civilians is against Geneva Convention, and they did it anyway. Under Phoenix, the due process was nonexistent.…
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Can't keep track of my own notes. Abuses by corrupt security officers, policemen, politicians, and racketeers, all of whom extorted innocent civilians, as well as the Viet Minh. Legendary CIA officer Lucien Koenig, which is the French guy, …
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vci and what is vci it basically um is a farmer in a field with a hoe and um a grenade in his pocket a deranged subversion using um women and children as a shield question mark or was it a patriot a freedom fighter…
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made up the Viet Cong infrastructure, which is VCI. That's what it stands for. Also, it's interesting that he used the word pretended because it basically distorts the entire nature of what these people were doing. And to understand Phoenix…
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Basically, all they're doing by doing this is increasing the amount of people that hate them. So the VCI leadership was molded in the Kangsang prison as they're imprisoning all of these people. And the locals called that prison where they w…
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who had been over in the Philippines assassinating people over there to install their fake president there. He was a confidential advisor to Alan Dulles and John Foster Dulles. Lansdale defeated the United Sec Front in the Philippines, so h…
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So Lansdell is the one who coined the term Viet Cong as opposed to Viet Minh. So he did not. And it's all about labeling. OK, keep in mind, Lansdell is a PR guy from San Francisco. That's what he did before he went in the OSS. He is the qui…
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that if you could find a disgusting term or you could make a term disgusting, like Viet Cong, then because at the time, Viet Minh were heroes throughout the entire peninsula. That was a unifying factor in Vietnam at the time because everybo…
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induce enemy soldiers to defect, to organize rural people into self-defense forces to insulate their villages from the dreaded Viet Cong, to create political cadres who would sell the idea that Dem, not the Viet Minh, represented national a…
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But it was easy to do because you've got the U.S. behind you to go in and assassinate everybody that won't do what you want them to do. So, Dem could literally do anything as far as dictatorship, kill people, whatever, and the U.S. was behi…
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So terror was not one of Viet Cong's tactics. According to Iran Corporation, and believe me, they do a lot of CIA work, so this is saying something. J.J. Zaloff, who worked in Vietnam, quote, origins of the insurgency in South Vietnam from …
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political warfare as conceived by the North and then copied by the CIA revolved around arming propaganda teams. In the South, a Viet Cong armed propaganda team would enter a village at dusk. The cadre, being friendly, would go to all of the…
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In the CIA's, they called them yards and their Vietnamese officers were then organized into 15 man teams. And like the VC armed propaganda teams, they had paramilitary and political action capabilities. Their job was to make the GVN.…
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If possible, the team returned with defectors and left people in the village to be informers. And if they found any Viet Cong there, they documented cases where they would behead them and put their head on a pole. The latter was basically c…
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and was done by their paramilitary element. Now, a special assistant to the vice president for the Center of Naval Analysis, Methin, the guy that was in charge of all of this, co-managed the Mountain Scout program with Ralph Johnson from 61…
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Methven began extracting the most aggressive individuals from mountain scout teams and hiring mercenaries, often Vietnamese criminals or Chinese criminals, to act as counter-terrorists and to do to the Viet Cong and their propaganda teams w…
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foundations was set in place. Ralph Johnson defines the counterterrorism team as small teams, particularly well-trained, aggressive, and consisting of a large percentage of former Viet Cong who had become disillusioned and were now violentl…
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were constituted of 5 to 20 people whose mission was to collect intelligence and arrest Viet Cong leaders. The max strength, the counterterror team, never totaled more than 3,500 people all over the South. But because of the CIA support and…
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And gathered intel, conducted kidnapping and assassination, snatch and grab operations. Now, this is what we started the whole thing off with, with that guy telling about his mission. And he killed the wrong people in that. This is the prog…
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So these hunter teams, which performed the quote-unquote counter-terror missions, stumbled on large enemy troop concentrations. They called in the killer teams in black, unmarked helicopters provided by the CIA. Although they worked in tand…