The Colonel's Corner The U2 Program

1:55:06 · recorded 2026-02-22 · ▶ watch on Rumble

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0:25 Trying to figure out how to play this. It's not letting me play my video. It keeps spinning. So I'm going to cancel that. I have to figure out how to do that. We'll figure it out. I'm going to try to do an exclusive premium show. So if it kicks you guys out, after I get this done, I'm going to download it.

1:38 put it on the regular one as well. So you'll have to bear with me. Says, please note, this can't be done. Okay. Oh, well, I wanted to do a show about the YouTube program. I got this from all along. He included it in a link. So I crossed some of the craziest things in here.

2:11 I'm not sure other people will get this, and it's going to take a couple of shows to do it because it's really long. But let's get started. I need to share my screen. This is just literally crazy. And one of our Forrest Gumps. I'll give you a heads up. One of our Forrest Gumps shows up. All right. So what we're looking at is this document.

2:45 that was declassified about the u2 and oxcart programs that ran classified from 1954 to 74 and it has a whole bunch of this is the outline it is a very long we'll we'll get through it but it's crazy it might get boring for you guys i i'm fascinated by this um it talks here about

3:15 what this document is. And it's a history documentation about the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program, which ran from 54 to 74, developed and operated two extraordinary aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 Oxcart. It describes not only the program's technical and bureaucratic aspects, but it also talks about the political and international context.

3:46 which is obviously our focus. It talks about the formation of a directorate of science and technology in the 1960s to develop and direct reconnaissance programs. The authors tells an engrossing story. The struggle between the CIA and the Air Force to control the U-2 and A-12 Oxcart projects reveals how the reconnaissance program confronted problems that

4:14 are still present today when they're dual use by the CIA and the air force. It talks about the program managers eager to, um, for coverage repeatedly urged the president to authorize frequent missions over the Soviet union. President Eisenhower from the onset doubtful of the prudence and propriety of invading Soviet airspace only reluctantly allowed. Yeah. Okay. Um,

4:42 After the Soviets shot down Francis Gary Powers on the 1st of May 1960, President Eisenhower forbade any further U-2 flights over the Soviet Union since the agency must always assess a covert program's potential payoff against the diplomatic and military class if it fails. This account of the U-2 employment over the Soviet Union.

5:03 offers insights that go beyond overhead reconnaissance program. Indeed, the study should be useful for a variety of purposes. It's the only history of this program based upon full access to CIA records and extensive classified interviews of its participants. The authors have found records that were nearly irretrievably lost and have interviewed participants whose personal recollections gave information available nowhere else.

5:31 Although the story of the manned reconnaissance program offers no tidy model for imitation, it does reveal how resourceful managers coped with unprecedented technological challenges and the implications for intelligence and national policy. For this reason, the program's history provides profitable reading for intelligence professionals and policymakers. And you can see that when this was declassified, they still had redactions in it.

6:01 Many people made important contributions to the production, the history staff, preparation of the manuscript. Gerald Haynes did the final revision. Blank, again, demonstrated her high talent as a copy editor. And for some reason, we're not allowed to know who edited it. And Blank provided secretarial support. I assume that's because they weren't main players and they don't want their name attached to it.

6:30 So probably the most important part of this down here is it names some of the people here that were involved in it. And it says they revised the entire manuscript before leaving CIA to become NATO historian in 1989, talking about this Dr. Pedlow. So I find it very interesting.

6:56 that he's working for the cia and going to nato just based on our work so this was signed off on in 1992 this whole report so keep in mind that this report was finalized in 1992 and this is the guy kenneth mcdonald who is the cia history staff chief the preface when the cia became

7:27 came into existence in 47, no one foresaw less than a decade it would undertake a major program of overhead reconnaissance, whose principal purpose would be to fly over the Soviet Union. Traditionally, the military services had been responsible for overhead reconnaissance. And flights deep into unfriendly territory only took place during wartime by the early

7:53 1950s, however, the U.S. had an urgent and growing need for strategic intelligence into the Soviet Union and its satellite states. You know, because we're still at war, evidently. A great risk, U.S. Air Force and Navy aircraft had been conducting peripheral reconnaissance and shallow penetration overflights, but these missions were paying a high price and lives lost and increased international tension. Furthermore,

8:19 Many important areas of the Soviet Union lay beyond the range of existing reconnaissance. The Air Force had therefore begun to develop a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft that could be able to conduct deep penetration reconnaissance missions over the Soviet Union. President Eisenhower and his civilian scientific advisors feared that the loss of an aircraft deep in Soviet territory could lead to war and therefore authorized the development of a new non-military aircraft.

8:48 first the U-2 and later the A-12 Oxcart, to be manned by civilians and operated only undercover and in the greatest secrecy. Primary responsibility for this fell to the CIA. The agency maintained overhead reconnaissance program lasting for 20 years. It began with President Eisenhower's authorization of a U-2 project in 54 and ended with the transfer of the remaining U-2s to the Air Force in 74.

9:16 During this period, the CIA developed a successor to the U-2, an A-12 Oxcart, but this advanced aircraft saw little operational use and the program was canceled in 68 after the Air Force deployed a fleet of similar aircraft named the SR-71. So keep in mind during this presentation that the A-12 Oxcart is basically the SR-71.

9:47 Neither of these aircraft remain secrets today. A great deal of information about the U-2 and its overflight program has become known and was public after 1960 when the Soviet Union shot one of them down. And what's interesting about that and all along's point was that this is supposedly when Lee Harvey Oswald was there.

10:17 They publicly tried Francis Gary Powers four years later at a press conference in February and July of 1964. President LBJ revealed the existence of the Oxcart-type aircraft, although only in its military form, an interceptor, and SR-71 strategic reconnaissance versions.

10:40 The two CIA reconnaissance aircraft have also been the subject of a number of books, beginning with David Weiss's and Thomas Ross's The U-2 Affair in 62, and then Francis Gary Powers' memoirs Operation Overflight in 1970. The two recent books give many details about the U-2 and Oxcart aircraft. Another book, Mayday Eisenhower Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair,

11:05 and William Burroughs' Deep Black, Space, Espionage, and National Security. Although well-written and generally accurate, these books suffer from their author's lack of access to classified documentation. No, duh. By drawing upon the considerable amount of formerly classified data, the U2 now available to the public.

11:27 Riechloss has provided an accurate and insightful depiction of the U-2 program in the context of Eisenhower's administration and overall foreign policy, but his book does contain errors and omission on some aspects of the U-2 program. Burroughs' broader work suffers more from the lack of classified documentation, particularly in the Oxcart SR-71 section, which concentrates on the

11:52 Air Force aircraft because little information about the agency's use of that had been released. After the present study of the agency's overhead reconnaissance projects were completed, a new book on the U-2 was published in the United Kingdom. Chris Pocock's Dragon Lady, the History of the U-2 is by far the most accurate unclassified account of the U-2 program.

12:15 Pocock has been able to compensate for his lack of access to classified documents by interviewing many former participants in the program, especially former pilots. Pocock also quite familiar with the aircraft itself, for he had worked with Jay Miller on the latter's excellent technical study of the U-2 produced by Lockheed. There has been a classified official study of the U-2 and Oxcart program.

12:44 In 1969, the Directorate of Science and Technology published a history of the Office of Special Activities by Helen Cayla and Robert O'Hearn. This 16-volume

12:57 top secret code word study of the agency's reconnaissance aircraft provides a wealth of technical and operational information for the two projects but does not attempt to place them in historical context without examining the international situation and bureaucratic pressures affecting the presidents and other key policy makers however it is impossible to understand the decisions that were made

13:20 In preparing the study, the CIA's overhead reconnaissance program, the authors drew on published sources, classified documents, and interviews with key participants, Air Force contractors, scientific advisory committees, and the Eisenhower administration. The interviews were particularly important for piecing together the story of how the CIA became involved in the overhead reconnaissance in the first place because the agency documentation of the prehistory of the U-2

13:50 project is very sketchy and there are no accurate published accounts research on the period of actual reconnaissance operation included the rector's records of the director of intelligence the office of special activities and the directorate of science and technology in the intelligence community staff along with documents from the eisenhower presidential library both authors are grateful for the assistance

14:18 They received from many individuals in important roles. To ensure that the study of the agency's involvement in overhead reconnaissance reaches the widest possible audience, the authors have kept it at the secret classification level.

14:32 As a result, some aspects of the overhead reconnaissance program, particularly those involving satellites and related interagency agreements, have been described in very general terms. The omission of such information is not significant, which focuses on the agency reconnaissance aircraft. So again, originally, even when this was written, it was not available to the general population because it was still classified secret.

14:59 At the secret level, you would have been able, had you been in the military and interested in this, you would have been able to access it as long as you had a secret clearance. The need for reconnaissance at the high level. For centuries, soldiers in wartime have sought the highest ground or structure in order to have a better view of the enemy. At first, it was tall trees, then church steeples.

15:25 bell towers, and by the time of the Civil War and the Franco-Prussian War, 1870 to 71, observers used hot air balloons to get into the sky for a better view. With the advent of dry film, it became possible to carry cameras into the sky to record disposition of enemy troops. Indeed, photo reconnaissance proved so valuable in World War I that in 1938, General Warner von Fritz

15:55 commander-in-chief of the german army predicted the nation with the best aerial reconnaissance facilities will win the next war by world war ii lenses film and camera had undergone many improvements as had the airplane which could fly higher faster and than the primitive aircraft used in world war one now it is possible to use photo reconnaissance to it

16:19 information about potential targets before a bombing rate and to assess the effectiveness of the bombing afterwards. Peacetime application of high altitude photography at first included photo mapping, surveying, and transcontinental highways and mineral and oil exploration. And what's critically important about what they just said is that we know this was used

16:44 primarily in our research by Nelson Rockefeller, when they were flying over Latin America, South America specifically, looking for oil minerals because there are distinctive geological displays that indicate their presence. And that's a large impetus behind the development of this capability.

17:14 There was little thought given to using photography for peacetime espionage until World War II, when the Iron Curtain rained down, right, and cut off all forms of communication between Soviet bloc nations and the rest of the world. By 1949, the Soviet Union and the states of Eastern Europe had been effectively curtained off from the outside world, and the Soviet military carried out

17:41 its planning, production, and deployment activities with the utmost secrecy. That must have driven them nuts. All Soviet strategic capabilities, bomber forces, ballistic missiles, submarines, nuclear, were concealed from outside observation. The Soviet air defense system, a prime consideration in determining US retaliatory policies, was largely unknown.

18:07 Tight security around Soviet borders severely curtailed the movement of human intelligence sources, and we've been through that. How many times did they insert stay-behind unit into all of the Eastern Europeans only to have them slaughtered? In addition, the Soviet Union made it conventional means of communication, telephone, telegraph, and radio telephone.

18:32 more secure, thereby greatly reducing the intelligence available from these sources. They couldn't get their capability into the Soviet Union and therefore had no access to their systems.

18:53 Indeed, the entire...

19:13 array of intelligence tradecraft seemed ineffective, but they kept trying. Although at the end of World War II, the U.S. had captured large quantities of German photos and documents on the Soviet Union, thanks to Reinhard Galen, this material was rapidly becoming outdated. The main source of current intel on the Soviet Union military installation was interrogation of prisoners of war returning from Soviet captivity.

19:42 to obtain information about soviet scientific projects progress the intelligence community established several programs to debrief german scientists who had been taken to the soviet union at the end of the war but were now allowed to leave and this footnote says at the end of world war ii the british had established project dragon to gain information from german scientists

20:09 who had worked in the rocket project, and the term Dragon later was used to refer to individuals processing scientific or technical information. In 1948, the U.S. Air Force set up a program, Ringer, in Germany to gather intelligence on Soviet from defectors and refugees. This project was later absorbed and combined into the CIA Defector Reception Center.

20:37 which began operations in February of 51. Now, of course, we know they were doing this the entire time to include in the immediate aftermath of the war when they were setting up all of these camps. In October of 51, a separate organization to exploit individuals with scientific and technical backgrounds, especially German scientists, had been worked inside the Soviet Union.

21:00 and had worked inside the Soviet Union came into existence. This organization was known as the Returnee Exploitation Group and was located in Frankfurt. In 1958, the flow of scientists was so small that it was merged with the formerly created DRC. All right. Interrogations of returning Germans offered only fragment.

21:27 information, and this source could not be expected to last much longer. As a result, in the late 40s, the U.S. Air Force and Navy began trying to obtain aerial photograph of the Soviet Union. The main Air Force effort involved Boeing's RB-47 aircraft, a reconnaissance version of the B-47, which was a bomber, equipped with cameras and electronic ferret equipment.

21:54 that enabled air crews to detect tracking of Soviet radars. And that's where you get the RC-135 was doing the same thing. They would fly up to the border and get the Soviets' radars to alert on them so they could map where the radar systems were. And that caused lots of antagonism and resulted in several of them getting shot down because they would go over the border to get the radars to light up. At the end of the Soviet...

22:23 At the time, the Soviet Union had not yet completely ringed its borders with radars, and much of the interior also lacked radar coverage. Thus, when the RB-47 found a gap in the air warning network, they would dart inland to take photographs of any accessible targets. These penetration photography flights called SINCENT

22:49 Sensitive intelligence missions occurred along the northern and Pacific coast of Russia. One RB-47 aircraft even managed to fly 450 miles inland and photograph the cities of Igarta and Siberia. Such intrusions brought protests from Moscow, but at the time, no Soviet response. In 1950, there was a major change in Soviet policy.

23:20 Air defense units became very aggressive in defending their airspace, attacking all aircraft that came near the borders of the Soviet Union. On 8 April 1950, Soviet fighters shot down U.S. Navy privateer patrol aircraft over the Baltic Sea following the outbreak of the Korean War in June of 1950.

23:40 The Soviet Union extended this severe air defense policy to the Far East. In autumn of 1951, Soviet aircraft downed a twin-engine U.S. Navy Neptune bomber near Vladivostok. An RB-29 lost in the Sea of Japan on 13 June 1952.

24:02 was probably also a victim of the Soviet fighters. The U.S. was not the only country affected by the new aggressive Soviet air defense. British and Turkey also had attacks on their aircraft. Now I find it interesting in this supposedly declassified that they want us to believe that they didn't know whether or not the B-29 was lost due to Soviet. They of course knew.

24:30 whether it was or not. Okay. These footnotes are just substantiating where they got the information from, but I find it funny that this case study here is a RAND study, goes to the point that I've been making all along that RAND is basically just a CIA front. They have all of the same information given to them from...

25:01 the cia the soviet union air defense policy became more aggressive in august of 52 when its reconnaissance aircraft began violating japanese airspace so they're basically going to start doing what the us and turkey and britain were doing the two months later on 7 october 1952 soviet fighter aircraft stalked and shot down an rb-29 flying over

25:34 Hokkaido. Aerial reconnaissance of the Soviet Union and surrounding areas had become a very dangerous business. Despite the growing risks associated with reconnaissance, senior Air Force officers strongly believed that such missions had to keep going. The lack of information about the Soviet Union, coupled with the perception of its now aggressive nature, not that we provoke that or anything, gave a perception.

26:03 that there was a greatly strengthened effort by Soviet-backed North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950, which of course we've talked about, definitely was provoked using stay-behind units. It increased the U.S.'s determination to obtain information. So we provoke something like that, and then we use it as a justification to build more.

26:33 military-industrial complexes. While existing Navy and Air Force aircraft were flying their risky reconnaissance missions over the Soviet Union, the U.S. began planning for a more systematic, less dangerous approach using new technology. One of the leading advocates of the need for the new high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft was Richard Leghorn, an MIT grad and employee of Kodak.

27:00 who had commanded Army Air Force's reconnaissance group in Europe during World War II. How convenient. After the war, he returned to Kodak, but maintained his interest. So they have a product they want to sell. So we just create the need. Leghorn strongly believed in the need that he called pre-D-Day reconnaissance. Reconnaissance of a potential enemy.

27:25 before the outbreak of actual hostilities, in contrast to combat reconnaissance during wartime. In papers presented in 46 and 48, Leghorn argued that the U.S. needed to develop this capability, you know, because we have it, which would require high altitude aircraft and high resolution cameras. The outbreak of the Korean War gave Leghorn an opportunity, oh my gosh, to put his efforts into effect.

27:54 Recalled to active duty by the Air Force, Lieutenant Colonel Leghorn became the head of the reconnaissance systems branch at Wright-Patt, which is where we do all of our aircraft reconnaissance. And I love the fact that they have pictures of these people in here. This is Richard Leghorn. In Leghorn's view, altitude was the key to success for overhead reconnaissance, since the best Soviet interceptors at the time, the MiG-17, had to struggle to get above 40.

28:23 or to reach 47,000 feet. Leghorn reasoned that an aircraft that could exceed 60,000 feet would be safe, recognizing that the fastest way to produce a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft was to modify existing ones. He began looking for the highest flying aircraft available in the free world. This search soon led him to Britain's twin-engine medium bomber, the Cambara.

28:53 Canberra. It was built by English Electric Company. The Canberra had made its first flight in May of 1949. Its speed was basically 469 knots and its service ceiling was 48,000 feet. It made it a natural choice for a high altitude reconnaissance. The Royal Air Force quickly developed a reconnaissance version of it.

29:23 called the PR-3, which began flying in March of 50. At Leghorn's insistence, Wright-Patt invited English Electric representatives to Dayton in the summer of 51 to help find ways to make the Canberra fly even higher. By this time, the Air Force had already adopted the bomber version of the Canberra, which the Glenn L. Martin aircraft, Martin,

29:51 which is now martin marietta aircraft was to produce under license as the b-57 medium bomber leghorn and his english electric colleagues designed a new canberra configuration with a very long high lift wings new rolls-royce avon 109 engines a solitary pilot and an airframe that was stressed to less

30:19 than the standard military specifications. Leghorn calculated that a Camara so equipped might reach 63,000 feet early in the long mission and as high as 67 on declining fuel supply lightened the aircraft. He believed that such a modification could penetrate Soviet Union and China for a radius of 800 miles from bases around the periphery.

30:49 Leghorn persuaded his superiors to submit his submission to the Pentagon for funding. He had not, however, cleared his idea with the Air Research and Development Command. Now, for those of you who don't know, at the time this was written, you had an aircraft procurement numbered Air Force. You had eventually a space procurement of munitions.

31:17 basically communications or electronics acquisition. These were at the numbered Air Force or division level. Then you had what eventually became, they're calling it the Air Research and Development Command. All of these different were subcommands. He was working at the aircraft and he's going directly to the Air Force outside of his command.

31:45 That's a big no-no in the military. There's a picture of the Royal Air Force Canberra aircraft. The body you can tell looks very much like a U-2. The wings obviously are much shorter than what the eventual U-2 will look like. And it says that this command was located in Baltimore. No.

32:19 whose reconnaissance command division was in Baltimore, headed by Lieutenant Colonel Pellegrini. He had to approve all new reconnaissance aircraft designs. Pellegrini's units reviewed Leghorn's design and ordered extensive modifications. According to Leghorn, Pellegrini was not interested in a special purpose aircraft that was only suitable for covert peacetime reconnaissance, for he believed that all aircraft

32:49 All Air Force reconnaissance aircraft should be capable of operating under wartime conditions. Pellegrini therefore insisted that Leghorn's design meet the specification for combat aircraft, which required heavily stressed airframes, which defeats the entire purpose of the U-2. He wanted armored plates and other apparatuses that would be too heavy for it to fly that high.

33:13 The final result of Leghorn's concept, after its alterations by Pellegrini's staff, was the RB-57D in 1955, whose max altitude was only 64,000 feet. Meanwhile, Leghorn, frustrated by the rejection of his original concept, had transferred to the Pentagon in early 1952 to work for Colonel Bernhard Schriever.

33:42 is kind of like the outside-the-box guy. There's actually Schriever Air Base in Northern California was eventually named after him. Big, big guy. He goes on to be intimately involved in Space Systems Division, an icon.

34:05 In his new position, Leghorn became responsible for planning Air Force reconnaissance needs for the next decade. He worked closely with Charles Budd Weinberg, a colleague who had followed him from Wright-Patt, and Eugene Kiefer, a Notre Dame aeronautical engineer who had designed reconnaissance aircraft at Wright-Patt during World War II.

34:28 All three of these reconnaissance experts believe the Air Force should emphasize high altitude photo reconnaissance. Underlying their advocacy of high altitude photo reconnaissance was the belief that Soviet radars could not track aircraft flying above 65,000 feet. This assumption, because they had no facts to back it up, was based on the fact that the Soviet Union used

34:55 American-built radar sets that had been supplied during the land lease time of World War II. Although the SCR radio core radio target tracking radar could track targets up to 90,000 feet, its high power consumption burned out a key component quickly. So this radar was normally not turned on until an early warning radar had been detected.

35:23 The SRC-270 early warning radar could be left on for much longer periods and had a greater horizon, but was limited to the curvature, which maxed it out at about 40,000 feet. As a result, Leghorn, Kiefer, and Weinberg believed that the aircraft could ascend to 65,000 before entering an area being swept by the early warning and not activated.

35:53 The problem with this assumption was that the Soviet Union, unlike Britain and the U.S., had continued to improve their radar technology after World War II. Even after evidence of improved Soviet radar capability became available, many advocates of high altitude overflight continue to believe that the aircraft flying above 65,000 was safe from detection. And again, this is symptomatic of so much about the military.

36:21 So you assume that the Soviet Union, even though they had their fair share of very brilliant people, that they're stuck with World War II technology and you make assumptions on the development of your military capability on an unknown assumption that may or may not be true.

36:51 Obviously, it was not true in this case. With interest in high altitude reconnaissance growing, several Air Force agencies began to develop an aircraft to conduct these missions. In 1952, the Air Research and Development Command gave Martin Aircraft Company a contract to examine high altitude potential of a B-57 by modifying a single aircraft to give it long

37:17 high-lift wings in the American version of the new Rolls-Royce engines. These were the modifications that Leghorn had suggested the previous year. At about the same time, another Air Force office at Wright-Patt Air Force Base in Dayton was also examining ways to achieve sustained high-altitude flight. Working with two German aeronautical experts, Waldmar Voigt

37:46 and Richard Bott, who had come to the United States as part of Papercliff. Air Force Major John Seberg advocated the development of a new aircraft that would combine high-altitude performance of the latest turbojet engines with high-efficiency wings in order to reach ultra-high altitudes. Seberg, an aeronautical engineer,

38:13 for the chance vought corporation until his recalled active duty during the korean war was serving as an assistant chief of a new developments office at right path by march of 53 seberg had expanded his idea for a high altitude aircraft into a complete request for proposal of an aircraft weapon system having an operational radius of a hundred and a thousand

38:40 500 nautical miles and capable of conducting pre and post strike reconnaissance missions during daylight, good visibility conditions. The requirement stated that such an aircraft must have the optimum subsonic cruise altitude of 70,000 feet and carry a payload of 100 to 700 pounds of reconnaissance aircraft and have a crew of one. Right, Pat?

39:08 decided not to seek proposals from major airframe manufacturers on the grounds that a smaller company could give a new project a higher priority to produce a better aircraft more quickly. In June of 53, the Bell Aircraft Corporation, which is very interesting, in Buffalo, New York, Buffalo, New York, where Wild Bill Donovan is from,

39:37 and the Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corporation in Hagerstown, Maryland, received study contracts to develop an entirely new high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft. In addition, Glenn Martin Company of Baltimore was asked to examine the possibility of improving the already exceptional B-57 Canberra aircraft as well. By January of 54, all three firms had submitted proposals. Fairchild's entry

40:07 was a single engine plane known as an m195 which had a maximum altitude of 67 200 feet bell's twin engine aircraft called model 67 or x16 which had a maximum altitude of 69.5 and martin's design with a big wing version of the b-57

40:36 called Model 294. It had a max cruise of 64,000. In March 54, Seberg and other engineers at Wright-Patt, having evaluated the three contenders, recommended the adoption of both the Martin and Bell proposals. They considered Martin's version of the B-57 an interim project that could be done quickly, while the more advanced concept from

41:05 Bell was still being developed, so they didn't rule Bell out completely. The Air Force headquarters soon approved Martin's proposal to modify the B-57 and was very much interested in Bell's design. But word of the competition for a new reconnaissance aircraft had reached other aircraft manufacturers, including Lockheed. They submitted a totally unsolicited design. Lockheed had first become aware.

41:37 of the competition in the fall of 53. john jack carter who had recently retired from the air force to become assistant director of lockheed's advanced development program which later basically becomes the skunk work secret part of lockheed was in the pentagon on business and dropped by to see eugene keifer an old friend and colleague

42:04 from basically the Air Force's version of that. Kiefer told Carter about the competition for the high-flying aircraft and expressed the opinion that the Air Force was going about the search in the wrong way by requiring the new aircraft to be suitable for both strategic and tactical reconnaissance. So, see how this whole works? It all works this way, guys. Immediately after returning to California, Carter proposed to Lockheed's vice president,

42:34 L. Eugene Root, previously the top civilian official in the Air Force Office of Development Planning. So this is a guy who's actually been in there. And let's just look real quick at L. Eugene Root. L. Eugene Root. There's his obituary.

43:09 I'm wondering, okay, oh, Eugene, he is, they're not going to let me see it. Let me see if I can get it in archives because I think this is very interesting. One archived version of it. Let's see if we can open it. No, it doesn't have any that we can actually see. It's coded in yellow and those don't work.

43:47 All right, so we're not going to be able to see that one. Let's go back one. I'm trying to see if this is the same guy that eventually becomes, if he's part of the whole Brown and Root family, but it's not going to. Let me see this. Let's see if the,

44:26 New York Times one has been archived on a working one. They did a, I mean, it shows you how big of a guy this was if his obituary, yeah, we can look at this one, is in the New York Times and the LA. All right. Let's pull that up real quick. Come on. It's not going to let me look at it. Oh, come on. Let's go find another one.

45:23 They don't want me to look at it for some reason. I just get the little... Okay, there we go. All right. Aircraft designer, missile builder, and guided the development of the Polaris, the world's first submarine-launched strategic missile. Says he worked at Lockheed Missile and Space Company in Sunnyvale, California, which is where Schriever Air Base eventually is set up.

45:55 Before going to Lockheed, he helped organize the Air Force Development Planning Office in the Pentagon beginning in 51. During the 30s and 40s, he was the top designer at Douglas Aircraft, which becomes part of McDonnell Douglas. At Lockheed, he was instrumental in expanding the contracting into missile and space. He worked on the Polaris missile as vice president at Lockheed. That's basically all it says.

46:24 The Brown and Root family is from California, so I'll do a little bit more digging on that later. But anyway, let's get back to where we're at. Okay, so moving on. So Lockheed eventually submits their own design. Carter noted that the proposed aircraft would have to reach altitudes of between 65 and 70,000 feet.

46:56 If extreme altitude performance can be realized in a practical aircraft at speeds in the vicinity of Mach 0.8, it should be capable of avoiding virtually all Soviet defenses until 1960. Again, this is just based on assumptions. To achieve these characteristics in an aircraft, which will have reasonable, useful operational life during the period before 1960,

47:22 Of course, requires very strenuous efforts and extraordinary procedures, as well as non-standard design philosophy. In other words, you need to think outside the box. Some of the design characteristics suggested by Carter were the elimination of landing gear, the disregard of military specifications, and the use of very low load factors. Carter's memorandum closed with a warning. That time was of the essence.

47:49 In order that the special aircraft can be reasonably long and useful, it is obvious that its development needs to be accelerated. Lockheed senior officials approved Carter's proposal, and early in 54, the corporation's best designer, Clarence Kelly Johnson, began working on the project, then known as the CL-282, but later to become the famous U-2.

48:15 Already one of the world's leading aeronautical engineers, Kelly Johnson, had been successful military and civilian designs to his credit. He created the P-38, the P-80, and the F-104 and Constellation. Johnson quickly came up with a radical design based upon the fuselage of the F-104, but incorporating high speed ratio cell plane wings, much like a glider.

48:43 to save weight and thereby increase the aircraft's altitude. Johnson decided to stress the airframe to only 2.5 units of gravity instead of the military specifications of 5.3. Talking about, um, geez. For the power plant, he selected the General Electric J73 non-afterburner turbojet engine with 9,300 pounds of thrust.

49:15 which is the same engine he had chosen for the F-104, which had been the basis for the U-2 design. Many of the design features were adapted from gliders. Thus, the wings and tail were detachable instead of a conventional landing gear. Johnson proposed using two skis and a reinforced belly rib for landing, a common sailplane technique, and a jettisonable

49:44 wheeled dolly for takeoff. Other features included an unpressurized cockpit and a 15 cubic foot payload area that could contain up to 600 pounds of sensors. This aircraft's maximum altitude was 70,000 feet and had a 2,000 mile range. That's huge. It basically was a jet propelled glider.

50:14 Early in 54, Kelly Johnson submitted this to Brigadier General Bernard Schriever, Office of Development and Planning. Eugene Kiefer and Bud Weinberg studied the design and recommended it to General Schriever, who had asked Lockheed to submit a specific proposal. In early April, Kelly Johnson presented a full description and a proposal for construction and maintenance of 30 aircraft to a group of senior Pentagon officials.

50:42 which included Lieutenant General Donald Putt, who was deputy chief of staff for development, and Trevor Gardner, a special assistant. Afterwards, Kelly Johnson noted that civilian officials were very much interested in his design, but the generals were not because they're in this like stovepipe. They see only like...

51:03 fast bombs, all of that other stuff. It's almost impossible to get general officers to look outside the box because they didn't get to be general officers by looking outside the box. The CL-282 design was also presented to the commander of SAC, General Curtis LeMay, the guy that wants to nuke everything. In early April, by Eugene Kiefer, Bud Weinberg, and Burton Klein,

51:31 of the office of, here's what it looked like, basically. And that's basically what the U-2 looks like. Development planning. And according to Weinberg, General LeMay stood up halfway through the briefing, took out a cigar and told the briefers that if he wanted a high altitude photograph, he would put cameras on his B-36 bombers and added that he was not interested in a plane that had no wheels or guns. See?

51:59 I can tell you what they're going to say before they say it. This is the way they think. The general then walked out and said it was a waste of his time. Meanwhile, the design proceeded through the Air Force development channels and reached Major Seberg at Wright-Patt. Major Seberg and his colleagues carefully evaluated the Lockheed submission and rejected it in early June. One of their main reasons for doing so was Kelly Johnson's choice of an unproven GE engine.

52:30 The engineers at Wright-Patt considered the Pratt & Whitney to be the most powerful engine available, and the designs of Fairchild, Martin, and Bell all incorporated this engine. Again, they just have these stovepipe perspectives. The absence of conventional landing gear also was a perceived shortcoming in their mind. Another factor in the rejection of Kelly Johnson's submission was the Air Force preference for a multi-engine aircraft.

52:58 Air Force reconnaissance experts had gained their practical experience during World War II where multi-engine bombers were used. In addition, aerial photograph experts in the late 40s and 50s emphasized focal lengths as the primary factor in reconnaissance photography and therefore preferred large aircraft capable of accommodating long focal length cameras. Obviously, long aircraft weigh more.

53:28 and can't fly as high. It's a trade-off. This preference reached an extreme in the early 50s with the development of a cumbersome 240-inch Boston camera, a device so large that the YC-97 Boeing Stratocruiser that carried it had to be partially disassembled before the camera could be installed. Finally, there was a feeling shared by many Air Force officers that two engines were always better than one.

53:58 You still hear that with the F-16 versus the F-15 crowds. In reality, however, aviation records show that single engine aircraft have always been more reliable than multi-aircraft planes. Therefore, a high altitude reconnaissance aircraft deep in enemy territory would have little chance of returning if one of the engines failed, forcing the aircraft to descend. On 7 June 1954,

54:26 Kelly Johnson received a letter from the Air Force rejecting his proposal because it only had one engine and was too unusual and because the Air Force was already committed to the Martin B-57. By this time, the Air Force had also selected the Bell X-16, the formal contract calling for 28 aircraft to be signed in September.

54:48 Despite the Air Force selection of the X-16, Lockheed continued to work on their aircraft and began seeking new sources of support. Guess where they're going? Although the Air Force uniform hierarchy had decided in favor of the Bell and Martin aircraft, some of the high-level civilian officials continued to favor the Lockheed. The most prominent proponent was Trevor Gardner, Special Assistant for Research and Development.

55:17 in the Air Force Secretary Harold Talbot. Gardner had many contacts on the West Coast aeronautical circles because before coming to Washington, he had been in charge of High Cone Manufacturing Company, which made aerial cameras in Pasadena, California. He had been present at Kelly Johnson's presentation at the Pentagon in April of 54 and believed this design, this is Trevor Gardner here,

55:45 had the most promise for reconnaissance for the Soviet Union. This belief was shared by Gardner's special assistant, Frederick Ayers, Jr., and Garrison Norton, an advisor to the Secretary. According to Norton, Gardner's tried to interest SAC Commander LeMay in the Lockheed aircraft because Gardner envisioned it primarily as a collector for strategic targeting, but General LeMay had already shown that he was not interested.

56:13 He didn't want anything that you could put nuclear weapons on. Gardner and Norton then decided to seek CIA support for the high-flying aircraft. At the time, the agency's official involvement in overhead reconnaissance was limited to advising the Air Force on problems of launching large cameras carrying balloons for reconnaissance flight over hostile territories. Chief of Operations in the Office of Scientific Intelligence, Philip Strong, however,

56:42 served on several Air Force advisory boards, and kept himself well-informed of reconnaissance aircraft. Gardner, Norton, and Ayers met with Strong in the Pentagon in 1954, six days before Wright Pack began to evaluate the Lockheed proposal. Gardner described Kelly Johnson's proposal and showed the drawings to Strong. After this meeting, Strong summarized his impressions of the Air Force search for this aircraft.

57:11 Proposals for special reconnaissance aircraft have been received from the air staff from Lockheed, Fairchild, and Bell. The Lockheed proposal is considered to be the best. It has been given the type designation of CL-282, and in many respects is a jet-powered glider based essentially on Lockheed's Dayfighter XF-104. It is primarily supersonic, but can attain

57:38 transonic speeds over the target with a um consequent loss of range with an altitude of 73 000 feet over the target it has the combat radius of 1400 nautical miles the cl-282 can be manufactured mainly with the xf-104 jigs and design which is critical if you want the aircraft fast

58:06 The prototype of this plane can be produced within a year from the date of order. Five planes can be delivered within two years. Again, critical. The Bell proposal is more conventional, giving normal landing gear. As a result, the max altitude over target is 69,500 feet and the range and speed is as good as Lockheed. Gardner's enthusiasm for the CL-282

58:33 had given Strong the false impression that most Air Force officials supported the Lockheed design. In reality, the Air Force uniformed hierarchy was in the process of choosing a modified version of the Martin B-57 and the new Bell X-16 to meet their needs. During their meeting, Strong, Trevor Gardner, Frederick Ayers, and Garrison Norton explained that they favored the CL-282 because it gave promise of flying higher.

59:02 than any other design because of its maximum altitude its smaller radar cross section might make it invisible to soviet radars the three officials asked strong if the cia would be interested in the aircraft strong promised to talk to the director newly hired special assistant richard bissell richard bissell had already had an active and varied role before he joined the cia

59:31 He's a graduate of Groton, Yale. Bissell studied in the London School of Economics. You know, he is the prototype of the international syndicate CIA guy. He taught economics first at Yale and then in 42 at MIT, where he became a full professor. During World War II, Bissell had managed American shipping.

59:59 at the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board. After the war, he had served as a deputy director of the Marshall Plan from 48 until 51. And the Marshall Plan had the covert element of funding Operation Gladio. So Bissell is well read in on all of this. And he went on to be a staff member of the Ford Foundation, which is basically a CIA front.

1:00:23 His first association with the agency, not including all of that, which was all agency already, was 53. And I love how the CIA tries to tell us that his first affiliation was in 53, even though he had done all of this other stuff from 1948, all CIA, but they're not going to tell you this. So he undertook the study of possible responses from the United States.

1:00:52 that might be used against the Soviet Union in event of another uprising like the East Berlin riots of June of 1953. Bissell quickly concluded that there was not much hope for clandestine operations against the Soviet bloc. As he remarked later, I know I emerged from the exercise feeling that very little could be done. This belief would later make Bissell a leading advocate of technical rather than human means.

1:01:20 of intelligence collections now keep in mind they they created this impression by sending hundreds of people into the eastern bloc and them all getting killed they're not going to tell you that in this that is absolutely true bissell joined the agency in 54 as if he wasn't part of it before and soon became involved in coordination of the operation aimed at overthrowing guatemala president arbenz

1:01:53 He was therefore very preoccupied when Philip Strong approached him in May of 54 with the concept of a spy plane. Bissell said that the idea had merit and told Strong to get some top flight scientists to advise on the matter. Afterwards, he returned to the final planning of his coup. Meanwhile, Strong went about drumming up support for high altitude overflight.

1:02:19 In May of 54, he persuaded Alan Dulles to ask the Air Force to take the initiative in gaining approval for an overflight of the Soviet Union guided missile test range. Dulles' memorandum did not mention the CL-282 or any of the other proposed high-altitude aircraft. CIA and Air Force officials met on several occasions to explore the possibility of an overflight potential. The Air Force finally turned it down in October of 54.

1:02:48 Although Alan Dulles was willing to support an Air Force overflight of the Soviet Union, he was not enthusiastic about the CIA overtaking such a project. Bull crap. Again, just keep in mind, this is their official story. Few details about Dulles' precise attitude towards the proposed Lockheed reconnaissance are available, but many who knew him believe that he did not want the CIA to become involved in projects that belonged to the military. Bull.

1:03:19 crap and they he didn't want to be involved in the ones that belonged to the military per se he wanted to have his own capability because he didn't like to ask permission for for anybody his view was that the lockheed um model had been designed for air force requirements which we know is not true it met none of the air force requirements which is why they didn't want it it didn't have two engines it didn't have a landing gear um

1:03:48 The high-altitude reconnaissance of the Soviet Union did not fit well into Allen Dulles' perception of the role of an intelligence agency. This is just comical. Absolutely comical. They're literally sending people in to get this information that are dying, and they want you to believe that he didn't think this was their job. They have an entire technology division to come up with how to kill people.

1:04:22 all kinds of nefarious things, all types of capability on a paramilitary. And they want you to believe he wasn't interested in using aircraft to spy. Okay. Although the design had strong backers among some Air Force civilians and CIA officials, the key decision makers in both this

1:04:45 Air Force and CIA were unconvinced. To make Kelly Johnson's revolutionary design a reality, one additional source of support was necessary, prominent scientists on government advisory boards. Scientists and engineers from universities and private industry had played a major role in advising governments on technical matters. At the end of the war, most of the scientific advisory boards had been disbanded. But within a few years, the growing tension of the Cold War gave them all a job again.

1:05:13 In 1947, the Air Force created the Scientific Advisory Board, which met periodically to discuss current issues and advise the Air Force on useful new technologies. The following year, the Office of Defense Mobilization established the Scientific Advisory Committee, but the Truman administration had little use for it.

1:05:35 In 1951, the Air Force sought even more assistance from scientists because the Strategic Air Command's request for information about targets behind the Iron Curtain could not be filled. To look for new ways of conducting reconnaissance against the Soviet bloc, the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Development, Major General Gordon Seville, added 15 reconnaissance experts to an existing project on the air defense known as Project Lincoln.

1:06:06 then underway at the MIT. By the end of the year, these experts had assembled in Boston to begin their research. Their headquarters located over a secretarial school on Beacon Hill, which soon became the code name for the reconnaissance, Beacon Hill Study Group. The study group chairman was Kodak physicist, Carl Overhag.

1:06:33 And its members included James Baker, Edward Purcell from Harvard, Seville Davis from Christian Science Monitor, Alan Dullivan from the Cornell Aeronautical Lab, Peter Goldmark in Colombian Broadcasting System Laboratories, Edwin Land, founder of Polaroid, Stuart Miller of Bell,

1:07:03 Richard Perkins of Perkin Elmer Company and Louis Ridenour of Ridenour Associates. The Wright-Patt Development Command sent Lieutenant Colonel Leghorn to serve as the liaison officer.

1:07:20 During January and February of 52, Beacon Hill Study Group traveled every weekend to various air bases, laboratories, and firms for briefings on the latest technology. The panel members were particularly interested in new approaches to aerial reconnaissance, high-flying aircraft, and cameras. One of the more unusual, albeit unsuccessful, proposals examined by the panel was an invisible, like an airship,

1:07:50 like a blimp, that had blue-tinted non-reflective coating. It would cruise at an altitude of 90,000 feet above the border of the Soviet Union at very slow speeds while using large lens cameras. After completing these briefings, at the end of February of 52, the Beacon Health Study Group returned to MIT where the panel members spent the next three months writing a report detailing their recommendations. Published as a classified

1:08:22 document in 15 June 53, the Beacon Hill Report advocated radical approaches to obtain the information needed for international intelligence estimates. Its 14 chapters covered radar, radio, photographic surveillance, examined the use of passive infrared and microwave reconnaissance, and discussed the development of advanced reconnaissance vehicles. One of the report's key

1:08:50 recommendations called for the development of a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft. The Air Force did not begin to implement the ideas of the Beacon Hill Report until the summer of 53. By this time, interest in reconnaissance had increased after Eisenhower became president in 53 and soon expressed his dissatisfaction with a quality of intelligence estimates on Soviet capability. The President Eisenhower and other U.S.

1:09:19 political and military leaders the soviet union was a dangerous opponent that appeared to be moving toward a position of military parity with the u.s particularly alarming was the soviet progress in nuclear weapons in the late summer of 1949 the soviets had detonated an atomic bomb nearly three years sooner than anyone estimated then in august of 53

1:09:48 Nine months after the first US test of a hydrogen bomb, the Soviet Union detonated their hydrogen bomb. This new and extremely powerful weapon was coming into the hands of a government who they actually didn't like. Only two months before the successful hydrogen test bomb, Soviet troops had crushed an uprising in East Berlin, and at the UN, the Soviet bloc seemed bent on causing

1:10:15 dissension between the Western Europe and the U.S. and between the developed and undeveloped nations. This aggressive Soviet foreign policy, combined with the advances in nuclear weapons, led John Foster Dulles to see the Soviet Union as a menace to peace and their world order. Soviet Union's growing military strength soon became a threat, not just to U.S., but to the continental United States itself. In the spring of 1953,

1:10:46 Rand rushes in and points out the vulnerability of all of our SAC bases by a surprise strategic Soviet attack. Rand, always to the rescue. Concerned about the danger of Soviet attack on the continental United States grew after American military attache sighted a new Soviet intercontinental bomber at an airfield south of...

1:11:12 Moscow in 1953. The new bomber was the Meshavits 4, later designated the Bison by NATO. Powered by jet engines rather than turboprops of Russia's other long-range bombers, the Bison appeared to be the Soviet's equivalent of a B-52, which was only then going into production. Pictures of the Bison taken at the Moscow

1:11:40 Mayday air show in 54 had an enormous impact on U.S. intelligence community. Unlike several other Soviet post-war aircraft, the Bison was not a derivative of U.S. or British design, but represented a native capability that surprised U.S. intelligence experts. This new long-range jet bomber, along with Soviet's large numbers of older propeller,

1:12:06 And turboprop bombers seem to pose a significant threat to the U.S. And in the summer of 54, newspapers, magazines, you know, all of the things that the CIA uses for their propaganda, began publishing highlights of this growing air power threat. That's a picture of it right there.

1:12:31 Even before the publication of photographs of the Bison ray spheres, the Soviet bomber force might eventually surpass that of the U.S., and the Air Force had already established a new advisory body to look into this. The construction of high-flying aircraft and high-acuity cameras. Created in 1953, the Intelligence Systems Panel, ISP, included several experts from the Beacon Hill study, like Overage,

1:13:03 Donovan, and Miller. At the request of the Air Force, the CIA also participated, represented by Edward Allen of the Office of Research and Report and Philip Strong of the Office of Scientific Intelligence. Chairman of the new panel was Dr. James Baker, a research associate at Harvard.

1:13:23 Baker had been involved in aerial reconnaissance since 1940 when he first advised the Army Air Corps on ways to improve its lenses. He then established a full-scale optical lab at Harvard, the Harvard University Optical Research Laboratory, to produce high-quality lenses. Since the university did not wish to continue manufacturing cameras and lenses after the end of the war, the optical lab was moved to Boston University, which agreed to sponsor the effort.

1:13:53 as long as the Air Force paid for it. Baker decided to remain at Harvard, so his assistant, Dr. Duncan McDonald, became the new head of what was now called the Boston University Optical Research Lab. Baker's association with the Air Force did not end with the transfer of the optical lab to Boston because he continued to design lenses to be used in photo reconnaissance.

1:14:20 The ISP first met in Boston University on 3 August 1953 to provide background for the poor state of U.S. knowledge of the Soviet Union. Philip Strong informed the other panel members that the best intelligence then available on the Soviet internal was photography taken by German Luftwaffe during World War II, since the German photography covered only the Soviet Union west of the Urals.

1:14:49 primarily west of the Volga River, many vital regions were not included. The ISP would therefore have to look for ways to provide up-to-date photography of all of the Soviet Union. Several Air Force agencies then briefed the panel members on the latest developments and future projects for aerial reconnaissance, including new cameras, reconnaissance projects, discussed sensors they could use on already existing aircraft.

1:15:19 for adapting giant 10-engine B-36 bombers to enable it to launch and retrieve a Thunder Flash reconnaissance aircraft, reconnaissance versions of the Navajo and SNARC missiles, balloon programs, blah, blah, blah. The wide variety of programs discussed at the conference were all products of the Air Force.

1:15:45 all-out effort to find a way to collect intelligence. Some of the schemes went beyond the existing level of technology. Others, like camera-carrying balloons, were technically feasible, but involved dangerous political consequences. The British were also working on this. In 1952, the Royal Air Force began Project Robin, which was designed to modify the Canberra bomber. This project was probably inspired by Richard Leghorn's

1:16:14 collaboration with English electric company designers in 51 when they calculated ways to increase the altitude. The RAF equipped new Cambraro PR7 with Rolls-Royce engines and gave it long fuel wings. The range of the variant was now 4,300 miles. It could achieve an altitude of 65,880 feet. Sometime

1:16:42 During the first flight in 1953, the Royal Air Force employed a high-altitude Camarara on a daring overflight of the Soviet Union to photograph missile range. Because of the advanced warning from either radar or agents inside British intelligence, the overflight did not catch the Soviet Union by surprise. Soviet fighters damaged and nearly shot it down.

1:17:07 Rumors about this flight reached Washington during the summer of 53, but official confirmation from the UK did not come until February of 54. While on a six-week tour of Europe to study aerial reconnaissance problems, the Air Force Scientific and Advisory Board, James Baker, was briefed by the RAF intelligence officials on that overflight. On 22 and 23 March 54, he reported it to the full board at Langley Air Force Base.

1:17:36 Baker also chaired the next meeting of the Air Force Intelligence Systems Panel in April of 54, but could not tell its members about the British overflight because they were not cleared for the information. So you have an intelligence panel that is supposed to be considering new capability, which in and of itself would be classified, but you can't tell them about the classified information that would directly bear.

1:18:05 on their decisions okay so um they're actually talking about the modifications to the aircraft to make it do what that did and failed but they're not allowed to know it's already failed totally dysfunctional the next intelligence systems panel meeting took place in may at boston university and the polaroid corporation panel member alan dollivan donovan

1:18:37 from Cornell Aeronautical Lab evaluated the changes made to the B57 by Martin. Even without Martin's specifications or drawings, Donovan was able to estimate what could be done to the B57 by lengthening the wings and lightening the fuselage. He had determined alterations to the B57 airframe could not solve the reconnaissance need.

1:19:06 dictated in the Beacon Hill report. Theoretically explained to the panel, any multi-engine aircraft built according to military specifications, including the B-57, was too heavy, especially above 65,000 feet, and therefore would be vulnerable to Soviet interception. To be safe, Donovan said, it had to fly above 70,000 feet. Development of such an aircraft was already underway, Donovan continued.

1:19:36 Furr Philip Strong of the CIA had told him that Lockheed had designed this very aircraft. ISP Chairman Baker then urged Donovan to travel to Southern California and evaluate it. When he was finally able to make the trip in late summer, Donovan found the plane that he and other ISP members had been seeking. On the afternoon of 2 August 54, Donovan met with L. Eugene Root, an old Air Force acquaintance who is now the Lockheed Vice President, and learned,

1:20:06 about the air force competition for the high altitude reconnaissance aircraft kelly johnson then showed donovan the plans for lockheed's unsuccessful entry a lifelong cell plane enthusiast donovan immediately recognized that the cl282 design was essentially a jet propelled glider capable of attaining the altitudes he thought were necessary upon his return

1:20:34 East, on 8 August, Donovan got in touch with James Baker and suggested an urgent meeting of the Intelligence Systems Panel. Because of other commitments by the members, however, the panel didn't meet until 24 September 1954 at Cornell's Aeronautical Lab. Several members, including Landon Strong, were absent. Those who did attend were upset to learn that the Air Force had funded a closed competition for a tactical reconnaissance plane without informing them.

1:21:02 But once Donovan began describing Kelly Johnson's rejected design, they quickly forgot their annoyance and listened intently. Again, you've got this entire body of stuff, people that are supposedly providing advice and the Air Force is over here doing whatever the hell he wants. Donovan began by stressing the high altitude reconnaissance aircraft must fly above 70,000 feet to be safe. Next, he set out.

1:21:28 what he considered to be three essential requirements for a high-altitude spy plane, a single engine, a cell plane wing, and low structural loads. Donovan strongly favored the single-engine aircraft because it was both lighter and more reliable. Although the twin-engine aircraft could theoretically return to base with only one engine, Donovan explained, it could only do so at a much lower altitude.

1:21:57 about 34,000 feet, where it would be shot down, so it didn't matter if you have the extra engine if it's going to get shot down because of it. The second of Donovan's essential factors, a cell plane wing, was needed to take maximum advantage of reduced thrust of an engine operating at that high altitude.

1:22:23 because of the thinness of the atmosphere above 70,000 feet. Engineers estimated the power curve of a jet engine would fall off to about 6% thrust of what it had at sea level. Finally, low structural load factors, like those used in transport aircraft, were necessary to reduce weight and therefore thereby achieve maximum altitude. Donovan explained.

1:22:53 That's strengthening wings to withstand high speeds and sharp turns mandated by standard military airworthiness rules did not apply. The U-2 isn't going to be like trying to dodge missile attacks or trying to shoot somebody. It's just like common sense. It's just going to go up, fly a route and come home. It doesn't need all of the, but you cannot talk to.

1:23:23 fighter pilots about non-fighter pilot stuff. You can't talk about bomber stuff to non-bomber stuff because they all think their shit's the best. In short, it was possible to achieve altitudes in excess of 70,000 feet, but only by making certain that all parts of the equation were balanced. Thrust, lift, weight. The only plane meeting all of those requirements was the CL-282. It was essentially a sailplane.

1:23:53 In Donovan's view, it did not have to meet the specifications of a combat aircraft. Duh! Donovan's arguments convinced the Intelligence Systems Panel of the merits, but this panel reported to the Air Force, which had already rejected it. Thus, even though the Lockheed CL-282 had several important sources of support, the members of the Intelligence Systems Panel and high-ranking Air Force civilians

1:24:20 They could not offer funds to Lockheed to pursue it because the Air Force was already committed to something else that didn't meet those requirements. The Eisenhower administration was growing increasingly concerned over the capability of the Soviet Union to launch a surprise attack. Early in 54, Trevor Gardner had become alarmed by RAND Corporation study warning that a Soviet surprise attack might destroy 85% of the SAC bomber fleet. See?

1:24:49 how they do it back and forth. Okay, so the CIA is going to produce a product via Iran that says any minute the Soviets are going to attack. And if they attack, they're going to eliminate 85% of our SAC bomber force. So we have to do something. And their something is always what they want over here. But you have to create the whole fear.

1:25:18 in order to justify it being funded. So they have a couple more meetings and they decide to approach Eisenhower on the matter. On 27 March 54, the president told them about the discovery of the Soviet Bison bombers and his concern that the new aircraft might be used as a surprise attack.

1:25:44 Stressing the high priority he gave to reducing the risk of military surprise, the president asked the committee to advise him on the problem. The president's request led Chairman Dubridge to ask one of the prominent members, MIT President Killian, which is this guy right here, to meet with the science advisory committee members in Boston to discuss the feasibility of a comprehensive scientific assessment of the nation's defenses. We already know what it's going to say.

1:26:14 At the meeting, MIT, on 15 April 54, the group called for the recruitment of such a task force. July 54, President Eisenhower authorized Killian to recruit and lead a panel of experts to study the nation's technological capabilities to meet some of the current problems. Killian quickly set up shop in the old executive office and organized 42 of the leading

1:26:41 scientists in these special project groups investigating U.S. offensive, defensive, and intelligence capability with an additional communications work group. The technical capabilities panel group began meeting in September of 54. For the next 20 weeks, the members met on various panels.

1:27:02 attended a whole slew of briefings because that's what Washington does best. After receiving the most up-to-date information available on the nation's defense and intelligence program, they drafted a report to the National Security Council. Even before the final technological capability panel report was ready, one of the three working groups took action that would have a major impact on the reconnaissance program. Project three. Now,

1:27:32 i i got to show you guys this or let me go ahead and finish this sentence and then we'll come back to this the task was investigating the nation's intelligence capability its chairman edwin land the inventor of the polaroid filter for instant cameras when james killian asked land to head project three

1:27:53 Land had to make a major decision about his career. At the time, the 45-year-old millionaire was on leave of absence from Polaroid and living in Hollywood advising Alfred Hitchcock on technological aspects of making 3D movies. Land decided to give up his interest in cinema, 3D, and return to East Polaroid and the panel appointment. That's Edward Land right there. Let's go back to this chart. This is Eisenhower's

1:28:24 Technological Capabilities Panel. The President. Office of Defense Mobilization. Look at this guy sitting right here. Who is that? Lieutenant General Lyman frickin' Lemitzer. Lyman Lemitzker. He's like the Forrest Gump of everything I do. Lyman Lemitzker.

1:28:54 is part of the military advisory committee to Eisenhower. Now, keep in mind, Lemitsker, he has no background. He's an army guy. He has no background in photography, aircraft, intelligence, none of that. How'd he get on this? He was Eisenhower's chief logistics officer.

1:29:21 during world war ii he's the guy that shows up at operation sunrise sitting next to alan dallas arranging for the rat lines out of germany and the creation of operation gladio and he's on the military advisory panel that is set up specifically to address basically the intelligence threat of the soviet union i just find that fascinating um

1:29:51 Here's the other people over here. This is kind of like the admin element of it. You know, the ones that will play in the meetings, get people's hotel arrangements, that kind of stuff. This is the technical capabilities panel science people. You see Kelly in there, Dubridge, James Doolittle right here, Land. So those are some names that we recognize. I just find this fascinating here.

1:30:21 And then they have the different projects by number. And I don't see any notable names on these. The comm people here, a subcommittee, and these are the agency people. And I find it fascinating. They still have one of the CIA people redacted.

1:30:55 Wonder who that is. But anyway, Lands Project 3, which is talking about this thing right here, was the smallest of the three capability projects. He was referred, he called it the Taxi Cab Committee. Committee small enough to fit into a single taxi cab. The Project 3 committee consisted of Liam James Baker, Edward Purcell of Harvard, chemist.

1:31:26 Joseph Kennedy of Washington University, St. Louis, mathematician John Turcay of Princeton, Bell Telephone Labs, and Alan Latham Jr. of Author D. Little, Inc., an engineer and former treasurer of Polaroid.

1:31:51 August 54, Landon Baker went to Washington to arrange various intelligence organizations to brief Project 3 study group. As the briefing progressed, the panel members became more and more distressed at the poor state of intelligence resources. We could go in and interview generals and admirals in charge of intelligence and come away worried. Here we are, five or six young men asking questions to these high-ranking generals. They couldn't answer it. Three members were

1:32:20 Also not overly impressed with the CIA, Land learned the details of Lockheed's aircraft soon after he arrived in Washington. Philip Strong showed him Kelly Johnson's concept drawing of the plane and told him that the Air Force had rejected it, although Land had heard Alan Donovan's briefing mention the Lockheed design of high-flying aircraft at a May meeting.

1:32:44 Baker's intelligence systems panel, he did not realize that the plane and the one in Strong's drawing were the same. As soon as Land saw Strong's copy of the drawing, he telephoned Baker and said, Jim, I think I found the plane you want. A few days later, when Land showed Kelly Johnson's concept drawing to Baker and the other three project, three members, they all became enthusiastic about the aircraft possibilities. Although Baker had heard Alan Delabate.

1:33:15 Donovan's brief mentioned that Lockheed designed in May, he had not seen the concept drawing. Baker began designing a camera and a lens system that would fit on the Lockheed craft. At the end of August, Land discussed the CL-282 with Alan Dulles' special assistant, Richard Bissell, who came away from the meeting without any definitive ideas as to what Land wanted to do with the aircraft. Right.

1:33:45 overhead reconnaissance was not the most in Bissell's mind at the time, and it was unclear to him why he'd even been contacted. Bissell's outstanding academic credentials, his acquaintanceship with James Killen through his previous teachings at MIT and his direct access to Dulles may have led the technical capabilities panel members to consider him the best CIA point of contact. Although surprised,

1:34:14 that he had become involved in it, Bissell's interest was piqued, and he set out to learn what he could about the reconnaissance system. In early September 54, Bissell had, you see how they love to make the CIA people seem like they're dumb? He had Douglas Ashford, a young Air Force officer on his staff, put together a general status report on the air reconnaissance programs. Bissell followed the 16-page study.

1:34:44 to the deputy director of CIA, Lieutenant General James Cabell. This guy is the one that ends up being the, he's been in the CIA for a while. In covering the memorandum, Bissell called Cabell's attention to the section that said stripped or specialized aircraft called the Lockheed CL-282.

1:35:21 By September 54, Land's Project 3 study group had become very much interested in the Lockheed aircraft, and their interest grew even stronger when James Baker told them of Alan Dullivan's strong case for it at the September meeting. It was not possible to determine exactly when Land Committee decided to back it. In fact, there may have never been a formal decision.

1:35:48 In the view of Land's impulsive nature, he probably seized upon the design as being a workable concept and immediately began developing it. During September and October, the Project 3 study group met frequently to discuss the Lockheed design and reconnaissance equipment it would carry. Meetings were small, generally with fewer than 10 participants. Garrison Norton was often the only government official in attendance. At times, outside experts joined the proceedings.

1:36:16 When the discussion turned to the camera and film, Land invited Dr. Henry Yutze, Eastman Kodak's film expert, and Richard Perkins, president of the Perkin Elmer Company, to participate. For discussions of the J57 engine, the panel members asked Perry Pratt of Pratt & Whitney to attend. By the end of October, Project 3 meetings had covered every aspect of the Lockheed design.

1:36:47 The aircraft was to be more than an aircraft with a camera. It was to be an integrated intelligence collection system with the members confident that it could find and photograph the Soviet Bison bomber fleet and thus resolve the growing bomber gap controversy. It was not just the Lockheed aircraft that had captured the land group's fantasy.

1:37:09 The plane was seen to be a platform for a whole new generation of aerial cameras that several members had been discussing since Beacon Hill. By October 54, the Project 3 study group had drafted a complete program of an overhead reconnaissance effort based on this aircraft. One remaining question was who would conduct the overflights. The committee members, particularly Land, were not in favor of Air Force conducting such missions in peacetime. Firmly believing that the military overflights

1:37:40 an armed aircraft could provoke a war. They argued that civilian overflights in unarmed, unmarked aircraft. In their view, the organization most suitable to do that was the CIA. In October 54, Project 3 panel discussed the CL-282 system concept with DCI Alan Dulles and the Secretary of the Air Force. Dulles was reluctant to have the CIA undertake the project. I still can't believe we're doing this.

1:38:10 Are you kidding me? We know too much about Dulles at this point to believe any of this garbage. He did not like to involve the CIA in military projects, even ones the military had rejected. That's just horseshit. They tried to use the military to overthrow the government of Cuba. They use the military every opportunity they get. This is such dog crap. All right. Furthermore.

1:38:42 Dulles strongly believed that the agency's mission lay in the use of human and secret communications. Yeah. Land came away from the meeting with the impression that Dulles somehow thought overflights were not fair play. Project 3... I'm sorry, I can't even do this. Members were nevertheless convinced the technology part...

1:39:06 particularly in the form of this aircraft, was the new camera design would solve the nation's intelligence. So they have a meeting. Alan Dulles reluctantly did not stop them from briefing the president. Imagine that. Having participated in Beacon Hill study and the intelligence service panel, several Project 3 members had definite ideas on how to improve intelligence collections.

1:39:39 See, I love the fact here that they have these code words assigned to this information that's here. When it was originally classified, that's a big deal. That means it would have normally been redacted, that whole section. Okay, so they're going to have a meeting. Early November 54, Land and Killian met with President Eisenhower to discuss this.

1:40:12 Killen's account of the meeting. Land described the aircraft using the unarmed plane and recommended the development be undertaking. After listening to the proposal and asking many hard questions, Eisenhower approved the development of the system, but he stipulated that it should be handled in a non-unconventional way so that it could not be entangled in the bureaucracy of the Defense Department or troubled by rivalries among other services. In other words, don't put it in the military.

1:40:40 The scientists from the advisory committee and the president were thus in agreement that it was going to happen, and it was going to happen by the CIA and not the military. Meanwhile, Edwin Land and the Project 3 colleagues were working to convince Alan Tullis that, hey, here's a new program. We get to spy on everybody from way up in the clouds, like he's going to require some arm twisting.

1:41:08 Okay, so then it says why this activity is appropriate for the CIA with Air Force assistance, always with Air Force assistance. So the letter had two attachments, a two-page summary of the complete operational plan and the deployment of it within 20 months at a cost of $22 million and a three-page memorandum talking about the unique opportunity to get comprehensive intelligence.

1:41:38 Aware of Dallas's preference for classical intelligence work, they stress the superiority of this, like they're trying to have to convince them. One additional advantage of the Lockheed design over the Air Force proposal was it had a faster completion time. The strong advocacy of Killian and the other scientists is what helps sway the program. But a project of this magnitude also required support of the Air Force.

1:42:08 Air Force officials feared that a decision to build this might jeopardize their own projects. Always about turf. Just one month earlier, in October 54, Wright Patt had appealed to the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Development, Donald Putt, to oppose the adoption of the Lockheed design. The officials argued that Bell X-16 was a better design because it had been airworthy. It was more airworthy.

1:42:37 and could be used throughout the Air Force in different types. Again, nobody cares. Having heard of the Wright-Patt attack on the Lockheed aircraft, Alan Donovan of the Intelligence Systems Panel met with General Putt to argue in favor of the Lockheed design. This discussion led General Putt to meet with 15 scientists from the panel on 18 November 54 to discuss the merits of the four proposed.

1:43:06 reconnaissance aircraft. Also present was Major John Seberg of Wright-Patt. He later recalled, what I did was present the results of my comparative analysis of all four designs. I showed the relatively high altitude performance capabilities of all four. I pointed out that aerodynamically, the Bell, Fairchild, and Lockheed designs were close. Martin's B-57 being a modification was not as capable.

1:43:35 I stated that, in my opinion, the General Electric engine could not be good enough to do the job in Johnson's airplane. And further, I overlaid a curve showing that the Pratt & Whitney engines installed, it would then be competitive with the Bell and Fairchild design. This meeting, along with the knowledge of President Eisenhower, also supported the Lockheed aircraft. Help went over the Air Force.

1:44:02 To be on the safe side, however, the Air Force did not abandon the X-16 program until Lockheed's aircraft had begun flying. What a total waste of money. On November 19th, the day after Seabird's briefing, the final decision on the Lockheed came at a luncheon hosted by the Air Force Secretary Talbot. Participants was Dallas Cabal.

1:44:27 from CIA Gardner, General Putt from the Air Force, Kelly Johnson, Edward Land, all agreed the special item of material described by the Lockheed was a practical and desirable and would be sought. It was agreed that the project would be a joint Air Force-CIA one, but that regardless of the source of funds, whether Air Force or CIA, CIA unvouchered channels would need to be used to pass the funds.

1:44:54 You've got to love it. It's interesting to note that Lockheed, which had originally developed the aircraft design on its own and had devoted considerable effort to promoting it, had to be persuaded to undertake the project because the company had become heavily committed to several other civilian and military projects. When Kelly Johnson received a call, his instructions from Lockheed senior management was not to commit to anything.

1:45:22 When he returned to California, Johnson noted that his project log, I am impressed with the secrecy aspect and was told by Gardner and I was essentially being drafted for the project. It seemed, in fact, that if I didn't talk quietly, I might have to leave, take a leave of absence from my job at Lockheed to do the special project. Of course, Kelly Johnson did not need to be drafted or persuaded because he was in it lock, stock and barrel. Four days later, the Intelligence Advisory Committee approved.

1:45:51 Dulles' request to undertake this project. Following day, Dulles signed a three-page memorandum drafted by the deputy asking Eisenhower to approve the overhead reconnaissance project. The same afternoon, at a meeting attended by the secretaries of state and defense and senior Air Force officials, they presented the document to the president and received verbal authorization to proceed.

1:46:17 Eisenhower told Dulles that the project had to be managed by the agency and that the Air Force was to provide any assistance needed. Thus it was that the CIA entered the world of high technology primarily because of decisions and actions taken outside the agency. Again, I don't believe most of that. They have people embedded in all of these different places. The universities, I mean, they were already in Harvard.

1:46:46 They were already in MIT. This is a narrative. But I think it's critical that when we read through these documents like this, that they're telling us a story, not the story. There's a lot of information in here that is very true. The names of all the people involved in this, the timelines, the different competitiveness, obviously all of the garbage about.

1:47:12 the air force and its procurement it's true today as it was true in the 1950s all of that stuff is true it's crazy true um i spent three years in space systems division i was on the air staff i've watched these conversations in person i know how they operate um it's absolutely insane um the crazy

1:47:38 conversations that they have about the different aircraft and i mean the conversations when i was at the pentagon around the a-10 and keeping it in the air force inventory was would blow your mind so that's the part that i find most fast most fascinating about this

1:47:55 they're always, in any CIA historical document like this, going to paint the CIA. Oh my gosh, it just landed in our lap. We didn't really want it, but President Eisenhower told us we had to do it, so we're going to do it. That kind of thing. But despite that, very interesting. Obviously, this is a very long document, and we are going to get to the rest of it, but I need to run for now.

1:48:22 The next part is just fascinating to me, especially since it's about the Air Force and the development of the U-2. And I have a few very close friends that are U-2 pilots. So I'm going to, when we get through this, eventually ask one of them to come on my show. They're very hesitant to talk publicly about their U-2 experiences. So I don't know if he'd do it or not, but I'm going to ask him.

1:48:50 But I want to know all this stuff first. So also the U2, because of all the stuff we're going to learn about the U2 during the series, is of all of the communities. Now, every community has a cohesive. So if you are in a fighter squadron, especially ones that deploy together to actually fight a war,

1:49:25 It's more sporadic and not like every single year. That is not true with the U-2 program. The U-2 program of all of the aircraft that we've flown in the Air Force, the U-2 program is the most cohesive unit. And you're going to know why when we get to this part here.

1:49:53 Every year, the U-2 pilot get together and they will drop everything to go spend wherever they decide to go and meet on an annual basis. It's such a crazy phenomenon. And the dedication they have, I have a picture of the inside wall of the squadron out at Beale Air Force Base.

1:50:25 um where they honor all of the people that they lost in the u2 program it's just an amazing community um like i said i've had the pleasure of meeting several of them um when they're not flying so they only fly the u2 for missions so when they're not flying the u2 to keep up their qual pilot qualifications they have a squadron of t-38s um that they fly and so they would

1:50:55 routinely come to Randolph, which is the kind of the advanced tactics of the T-38 there. It's a training base at San Antonio, Texas. And so on any Friday night, you would have a lot of the U-2 guys there going through, you know, like if they were modifying a T-38 system.

1:51:23 They would come there to get qualified on the new modifications or whatever. They also have all of the T38 simulators there. So there's certain amount of training requirements that they had to come to San Antonio for. And because of my friends that was in the U2 community, they would always look me up. I got to know several of them there through that experience.

1:51:50 And just an amazing group of people. And I loved it because my house in Shirts, Texas, was right on the final approach, given if they were landing north to south in the afternoons when I'd get home from work. We could sit out in the backyard and eat dinner, and you'd just see T-38s coming in for landing.

1:52:18 Randolph. It was so awesome. But anyway, a wonderful community. I love them to death. And I'll dig up the picture of the aircraft that I saw over at Cape Canaveral when we went to the RV park at Patrick Air Force Base. I know it's called something else now that it's Space Command, but whatever.

1:52:47 So we were coming around. If you guys haven't heard this story, I'll show you the pictures next time. But we were coming around the flight line and there's an aircraft that is flight sitting there. And I'd never seen it before. It looks like a U-2. I knew it wasn't a U-2. And I took a picture of it and I sent it to my favorite U-2 pilot. He goes, his call signs egg. He's also flew F-16s.

1:53:12 And worked for me when I was at CENTCOM. And I sent it to him and I said, hey, what is this? I've never seen this before. And it's a very distinctive aircraft because it has this huge nose cone with this ginormous camera. Hence what we're talking about here.

1:53:31 He sends me the picture back and he tells me what it is. And then he blows it up. And the pilot just so happened to be standing next to the aircraft when we were driving by. And it's one of his best friends who he flew U2s with. So it was an aircraft that NASA uses to fly when Elon Musk, all of their ships go up or rockets go up. They take photos.

1:54:01 of them like almost constantly the whole way up and in case something happens to them they can catch what it is to be able to diagnose what the problems are and they don't just do it with elon's anything that goes up from and they're actually stationed out of houston um the space center there but they fly over to um patrick anytime there's something major being launched that they want to capture so

1:54:31 just cool stories. Okay. So I'm going to run for now. I might be back this evening and do another one, but I'm going to get through all of this and hopefully we'll learn something. But I couldn't believe when I saw that chart in Lyman-Lemonsker again. Anyway, you guys take care.

Entities here

Claims made here

CIA operated_in Oxcart Program documented ▶ 3:15

“what this document is. And it's a history documentation about the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program, which ran from 54 to 74, developed and operated two extraordinary aircraft, the U-2 and …”

CIA operated_in U-2 program documented ▶ 3:15

Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered_assassination_of U-2 program documented ▶ 4:14

“are still present today when they're dual use by the CIA and the air force. It talks about the program managers eager to, um, for coverage repeatedly urged the president to authorize frequent missions…”

Dwight D. Eisenhower removed_from_power U-2 program documented ▶ 4:42

“After the Soviets shot down Francis Gary Powers on the 1st of May 1960, President Eisenhower forbade any further U-2 flights over the Soviet Union since the agency must always assess a covert program'…”

Eastern Soviet Union carried_out_attack Gary Powers documented ▶ 4:42

Kenneth McDonald headed CIA documented ▶ 6:56

“that he's working for the cia and going to nato just based on our work so this was signed off on in 1992 this whole report so keep in mind that this report was finalized in 1992 and this is the guy ke…”

Dr. Pedlow member_of CIA documented ▶ 6:56

Lyndon B. Johnson exposed Oxcart Program documented ▶ 10:17

“They publicly tried Francis Gary Powers four years later at a press conference in February and July of 1964. President LBJ revealed the existence of the Oxcart-type aircraft, although only in its mili…”

Gary Powers founded Operation Overflight documented ▶ 10:40

“The two CIA reconnaissance aircraft have also been the subject of a number of books, beginning with David Weiss's and Thomas Ross's The U-2 Affair in 62, and then Francis Gary Powers' memoirs Operatio…”

Thomas Ross founded The U-2 Affair documented ▶ 10:40

David Weiss founded The U-2 Affair documented ▶ 10:40

William Burroughs founded Deep Black Space Espionage and National Security documented ▶ 11:05

“and William Burroughs' Deep Black, Space, Espionage, and National Security. Although well-written and generally accurate, these books suffer from their author's lack of access to classified documentat…”

Chris Pocock founded Dragon Lady: The History of the U-2 documented ▶ 11:52

“Air Force aircraft because little information about the agency's use of that had been released. After the present study of the agency's overhead reconnaissance projects were completed, a new book on t…”

Jay Miller member_of Lockheed documented ▶ 12:15

“Pocock has been able to compensate for his lack of access to classified documents by interviewing many former participants in the program, especially former pilots. Pocock also quite familiar with the…”

Chris Pocock did_business_with Jay Miller documented ▶ 12:15

Directorate for Science and Technology founded Helen Cayla documented ▶ 12:44

“In 1969, the Directorate of Science and Technology published a history of the Office of Special Activities by Helen Cayla and Robert O'Hearn. This 16-volume…”

Directorate for Science and Technology founded Robert O'Hearn documented ▶ 12:44

“In 1969, the Directorate of Science and Technology published a history of the Office of Special Activities by Helen Cayla and Robert O'Hearn. This 16-volume…”

Reinhard Gehlen spied_on Eastern Soviet Union documented ▶ 19:13

“array of intelligence tradecraft seemed ineffective, but they kept trying. Although at the end of World War II, the U.S. had captured large quantities of German photos and documents on the Soviet Unio…”

United Kingdom founded Dragon Project documented ▶ 19:42

“to obtain information about soviet scientific projects progress the intelligence community established several programs to debrief german scientists who had been taken to the soviet union at the end o…”

Project Ringer merged_with CIA Defector Reception Center documented ▶ 20:09

“who had worked in the rocket project, and the term Dragon later was used to refer to individuals processing scientific or technical information. In 1948, the U.S. Air Force set up a program, Ringer, i…”

U.S. Air Force founded Project Ringer documented ▶ 20:09

Returnee Exploitation Group merged_with CIA Defector Reception Center documented ▶ 21:00

“and had worked inside the Soviet Union came into existence. This organization was known as the Returnee Exploitation Group and was located in Frankfurt. In 1958, the flow of scientists was so small th…”

Returnee Exploitation Group located_in Frankfurt documented ▶ 21:00

Boeing founded U.S. Air Force documented ▶ 21:27

“information, and this source could not be expected to last much longer. As a result, in the late 40s, the U.S. Air Force and Navy began trying to obtain aerial photograph of the Soviet Union. The main…”

Eastern Soviet Union carried_out_attack U.S. Air Force documented ▶ 23:20

“Air defense units became very aggressive in defending their airspace, attacking all aircraft that came near the borders of the Soviet Union. On 8 April 1950, Soviet fighters shot down U.S. Navy privat…”

Eastern Soviet Union carried_out_attack U.S. Air Force documented ▶ 23:40

“The Soviet Union extended this severe air defense policy to the Far East. In autumn of 1951, Soviet aircraft downed a twin-engine U.S. Navy Neptune bomber near Vladivostok. An RB-29 lost in the Sea of…”

Eastern Soviet Union carried_out_attack United Kingdom documented ▶ 24:02

“was probably also a victim of the Soviet fighters. The U.S. was not the only country affected by the new aggressive Soviet air defense. British and Turkey also had attacks on their aircraft. Now I fin…”

Eastern Soviet Union carried_out_attack Turkey documented ▶ 24:02

Eastern Soviet Union carried_out_attack U.S. Air Force documented ▶ 25:01

“the cia the soviet union air defense policy became more aggressive in august of 52 when its reconnaissance aircraft began violating japanese airspace so they're basically going to start doing what the…”

North Korea carried_out_attack South Korea documented ▶ 26:03

“that there was a greatly strengthened effort by Soviet-backed North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950, which of course we've talked about, definitely was provoked using stay-behind units. It incr…”

Richard Horn member_of Kodak documented ▶ 27:00

“who had commanded Army Air Force's reconnaissance group in Europe during World War II. How convenient. After the war, he returned to Kodak, but maintained his interest. So they have a product they wan…”

Richard Horn member_of U.S. Air Force documented ▶ 27:00

Richard Horn headed U.S. Air Force documented ▶ 27:54

“Recalled to active duty by the Air Force, Lieutenant Colonel Leghorn became the head of the reconnaissance systems branch at Wright-Patt, which is where we do all of our aircraft reconnaissance. And I…”

English Electric Company founded U.S. Air Force documented ▶ 29:23

“called the PR-3, which began flying in March of 50. At Leghorn's insistence, Wright-Patt invited English Electric representatives to Dayton in the summer of 51 to help find ways to make the Canberra f…”

Glenn L. Martin Company founded U.S. Air Force documented ▶ 29:23

Lieutenant Colonel Pellegrini headed U.S. Air Force documented ▶ 32:19

“whose reconnaissance command division was in Baltimore, headed by Lieutenant Colonel Pellegrini. He had to approve all new reconnaissance aircraft designs. Pellegrini's units reviewed Leghorn's design…”

Lieutenant Colonel Pellegrini ordered_assassination_of Albert M. "Leghorn" Boyd documented ▶ 32:19

Albert M. "Leghorn" Boyd worked_for Bernard Schriever documented ▶ 33:13

“The final result of Leghorn's concept, after its alterations by Pellegrini's staff, was the RB-57D in 1955, whose max altitude was only 64,000 feet. Meanwhile, Leghorn, frustrated by the rejection of …”

Albert M. "Leghorn" Boyd worked_with Charles Budd Weinberg documented ▶ 34:05

“In his new position, Leghorn became responsible for planning Air Force reconnaissance needs for the next decade. He worked closely with Charles Budd Weinberg, a colleague who had followed him from Wri…”

Eugene Kiefer designed U.S. Air Force documented ▶ 34:05

Albert M. "Leghorn" Boyd worked_with Eugene Kiefer documented ▶ 34:05

U.S. Air Force gave_contract_to Martin Aircraft Company documented ▶ 36:51

“Obviously, it was not true in this case. With interest in high altitude reconnaissance growing, several Air Force agencies began to develop an aircraft to conduct these missions. In 1952, the Air Rese…”

John Seberg advocated U.S. Air Force documented ▶ 37:46

“and Richard Bott, who had come to the United States as part of Papercliff. Air Force Major John Seberg advocated the development of a new aircraft that would combine high-altitude performance of the l…”

Waldmar Voigt came_to United States documented ▶ 37:46

Richard Bott came_to United States documented ▶ 37:46

John Seberg worked_at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base documented ▶ 38:13

“for the chance vought corporation until his recalled active duty during the korean war was serving as an assistant chief of a new developments office at right path by march of 53 seberg had expanded h…”

Martin Aircraft Company asked_by U.S. Air Force documented ▶ 39:37

“and the Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corporation in Hagerstown, Maryland, received study contracts to develop an entirely new high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft. In addition, Glenn Martin Company …”

Bell Aircraft Corporation received_contract_from U.S. Air Force documented ▶ 39:37

Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corporation received_contract_from U.S. Air Force documented ▶ 39:37

John Seberg recommended Martin Aircraft Company documented ▶ 40:36

“called Model 294. It had a max cruise of 64,000. In March 54, Seberg and other engineers at Wright-Patt, having evaluated the three contenders, recommended the adoption of both the Martin and Bell pro…”

John Seberg recommended Bell Aircraft Corporation documented ▶ 40:36

U.S. Air Force approved Martin Aircraft Company documented ▶ 41:05

“Bell was still being developed, so they didn't rule Bell out completely. The Air Force headquarters soon approved Martin's proposal to modify the B-57 and was very much interested in Bell's design. Bu…”

Lockheed Corporation submitted_design_to U.S. Air Force documented ▶ 41:05

L. Eugene Root worked_for Lockheed Corporation documented ▶ 42:04

“from basically the Air Force's version of that. Kiefer told Carter about the competition for the high-flying aircraft and expressed the opinion that the Air Force was going about the search in the wro…”

L. Eugene Root worked_for U.S. Air Force documented ▶ 42:34

“L. Eugene Root, previously the top civilian official in the Air Force Office of Development Planning. So this is a guy who's actually been in there. And let's just look real quick at L. Eugene Root. L…”

L. Eugene Root worked_for Douglas Aircraft documented ▶ 45:55

“Before going to Lockheed, he helped organize the Air Force Development Planning Office in the Pentagon beginning in 51. During the 30s and 40s, he was the top designer at Douglas Aircraft, which becom…”

Douglas Aircraft merged_with McDonnell Douglas documented ▶ 45:55

Eugene Kiefer recommended_design_to Bernard Schriever documented ▶ 50:14

“Early in 54, Kelly Johnson submitted this to Brigadier General Bernard Schriever, Office of Development and Planning. Eugene Kiefer and Bud Weinberg studied the design and recommended it to General Sc…”

Charles Budd Weinberg recommended_design_to Bernard Schriever documented ▶ 50:14

Burton Klein presented_design_to Curtis LeMay documented ▶ 51:03

“fast bombs, all of that other stuff. It's almost impossible to get general officers to look outside the box because they didn't get to be general officers by looking outside the box. The CL-282 design…”

Eugene Kiefer presented_design_to Curtis LeMay documented ▶ 51:03

Charles Budd Weinberg presented_design_to Curtis LeMay documented ▶ 51:03

U.S. Air Force selected Bell Aircraft Corporation documented ▶ 54:26

“Kelly Johnson received a letter from the Air Force rejecting his proposal because it only had one engine and was too unusual and because the Air Force was already committed to the Martin B-57. By this…”

Trevor Gardner worked_for U.S. Air Force documented ▶ 54:48

“Despite the Air Force selection of the X-16, Lockheed continued to work on their aircraft and began seeking new sources of support. Guess where they're going? Although the Air Force uniform hierarchy …”

Trevor Gardner worked_for High Cone Manufacturing Company documented ▶ 55:17

“in the Air Force Secretary Harold Talbot. Gardner had many contacts on the West Coast aeronautical circles because before coming to Washington, he had been in charge of High Cone Manufacturing Company…”

Trevor Gardner tried_to_interest Curtis LeMay documented ▶ 55:45

“had the most promise for reconnaissance for the Soviet Union. This belief was shared by Gardner's special assistant, Frederick Ayers, Jr., and Garrison Norton, an advisor to the Secretary. According t…”

Trevor Gardner sought_support_from CIA documented ▶ 56:13

“He didn't want anything that you could put nuclear weapons on. Gardner and Norton then decided to seek CIA support for the high-flying aircraft. At the time, the agency's official involvement in overh…”

Philip Strong worked_for Office of Current Intelligence documented ▶ 56:13

Garrison Norton sought_support_from CIA documented ▶ 56:13

Trevor Gardner met_with Philip Strong documented ▶ 56:42

“served on several Air Force advisory boards, and kept himself well-informed of reconnaissance aircraft. Gardner, Norton, and Ayers met with Strong in the Pentagon in 1954, six days before Wright Pack …”

Philip Strong served_on U.S. Air Force documented ▶ 56:42

Garrison Norton met_with Philip Strong documented ▶ 56:42

Trevor Gardner showed_drawings_to Philip Strong documented ▶ 56:42

Frederick Ayers Jr. met_with Philip Strong documented ▶ 56:42

Philip Strong talked_to Richard M. Bissell Jr. documented ▶ 59:02

“than any other design because of its maximum altitude its smaller radar cross section might make it invisible to soviet radars the three officials asked strong if the cia would be interested in the ai…”

Richard M. Bissell Jr. managed Combined Shipping Adjustment Board documented ▶ 59:31

“He's a graduate of Groton, Yale. Bissell studied in the London School of Economics. You know, he is the prototype of the international syndicate CIA guy. He taught economics first at Yale and then in …”

Richard M. Bissell Jr. worked_for Ford Foundation documented ▶ 59:59

“at the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board. After the war, he had served as a deputy director of the Marshall Plan from 48 until 51. And the Marshall Plan had the covert element of funding Operation Gl…”

Ford Foundation front_for CIA host_asserted ▶ 59:59

Marshall Plan funded Operation Gladio host_asserted ▶ 59:59

Richard M. Bissell Jr. served_as Marshall Plan documented ▶ 59:59

Richard M. Bissell Jr. studied_responses_against Eastern Soviet Union documented ▶ 1:00:23

“His first association with the agency, not including all of that, which was all agency already, was 53. And I love how the CIA tries to tell us that his first affiliation was in 53, even though he had…”

Richard M. Bissell Jr. worked_for CIA documented ▶ 1:01:20

“of intelligence collections now keep in mind they they created this impression by sending hundreds of people into the eastern bloc and them all getting killed they're not going to tell you that in thi…”

Allen Dulles headed CIA host_asserted ▶ 1:03:48

“The high-altitude reconnaissance of the Soviet Union did not fit well into Allen Dulles' perception of the role of an intelligence agency. This is just comical. Absolutely comical. They're literally s…”

Gordon Seville headed Beacon Hill Study Group documented ▶ 1:05:35

“In 1951, the Air Force sought even more assistance from scientists because the Strategic Air Command's request for information about targets behind the Iron Curtain could not be filled. To look for ne…”

Carl Overhag headed Beacon Hill Study Group documented ▶ 1:06:06

“then underway at the MIT. By the end of the year, these experts had assembled in Boston to begin their research. Their headquarters located over a secretarial school on Beacon Hill, which soon became …”

James Baker member_of Beacon Hill Study Group documented ▶ 1:06:33

“And its members included James Baker, Edward Purcell from Harvard, Seville Davis from Christian Science Monitor, Alan Dullivan from the Cornell Aeronautical Lab, Peter Goldmark in Colombian Broadcasti…”

John Stuart Mill member_of Beacon Hill Study Group documented ▶ 1:06:33

Edward Purcell member_of Beacon Hill Study Group documented ▶ 1:06:33

Alan Donovan member_of Beacon Hill Study Group documented ▶ 1:06:33

Edwin Land member_of Beacon Hill Study Group documented ▶ 1:06:33

Richard Horn member_of Beacon Hill Study Group documented ▶ 1:07:03

“Richard Perkins of Perkin Elmer Company and Louis Ridenour of Ridenour Associates. The Wright-Patt Development Command sent Lieutenant Colonel Leghorn to serve as the liaison officer.…”

Richard Perle member_of Beacon Hill Study Group documented ▶ 1:07:03

“Richard Perkins of Perkin Elmer Company and Louis Ridenour of Ridenour Associates. The Wright-Patt Development Command sent Lieutenant Colonel Leghorn to serve as the liaison officer.…”

Louis Ridenour member_of Beacon Hill Study Group documented ▶ 1:07:03

“Richard Perkins of Perkin Elmer Company and Louis Ridenour of Ridenour Associates. The Wright-Patt Development Command sent Lieutenant Colonel Leghorn to serve as the liaison officer.…”

Beacon Hill Study Group produced Beacon Hill Report documented ▶ 1:07:50

“like a blimp, that had blue-tinted non-reflective coating. It would cruise at an altitude of 90,000 feet above the border of the Soviet Union at very slow speeds while using large lens cameras. After …”

Dwight D. Eisenhower expressed_dissatisfaction_with CIA documented ▶ 1:08:50

“recommendations called for the development of a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft. The Air Force did not begin to implement the ideas of the Beacon Hill Report until the summer of 53. By this time…”

Eastern Soviet Union detonated Meshavits 4 documented ▶ 1:09:48

“Nine months after the first US test of a hydrogen bomb, the Soviet Union detonated their hydrogen bomb. This new and extremely powerful weapon was coming into the hands of a government who they actual…”

John Foster Dulles viewed_as_menace Eastern Soviet Union documented ▶ 1:10:15

“dissension between the Western Europe and the U.S. and between the developed and undeveloped nations. This aggressive Soviet foreign policy, combined with the advances in nuclear weapons, led John Fos…”

RAND Corporation warned_about Eastern Soviet Union documented ▶ 1:10:46

“Rand rushes in and points out the vulnerability of all of our SAC bases by a surprise strategic Soviet attack. Rand, always to the rescue. Concerned about the danger of Soviet attack on the continenta…”

U.S. Air Force created Intelligence Integration Systems, Inc. documented ▶ 1:12:31

“Even before the publication of photographs of the Bison ray spheres, the Soviet bomber force might eventually surpass that of the U.S., and the Air Force had already established a new advisory body to…”

Philip Strong member_of Intelligence Integration Systems, Inc. documented ▶ 1:13:03

“Donovan, and Miller. At the request of the Air Force, the CIA also participated, represented by Edward Allen of the Office of Research and Report and Philip Strong of the Office of Scientific Intellig…”

Edward Allard member_of Intelligence Integration Systems, Inc. documented ▶ 1:13:03

James Baker headed Intelligence Integration Systems, Inc. documented ▶ 1:13:03

U.S. Air Force initiated Project Robin documented ▶ 1:15:45

“all-out effort to find a way to collect intelligence. Some of the schemes went beyond the existing level of technology. Others, like camera-carrying balloons, were technically feasible, but involved d…”

Richard Horn collaborated_with English Electric Company documented ▶ 1:16:14

“collaboration with English electric company designers in 51 when they calculated ways to increase the altitude. The RAF equipped new Cambraro PR7 with Rolls-Royce engines and gave it long fuel wings. …”

U.S. Air Force carried_out_attack Eastern Soviet Union documented ▶ 1:16:42

“During the first flight in 1953, the Royal Air Force employed a high-altitude Camarara on a daring overflight of the Soviet Union to photograph missile range. Because of the advanced warning from eith…”

Clarence "Kelly" Johnson designed Lockheed CL-282 documented ▶ 1:20:06

“about the air force competition for the high altitude reconnaissance aircraft kelly johnson then showed donovan the plans for lockheed's unsuccessful entry a lifelong cell plane enthusiast donovan imm…”

Alan Donovan evaluated Lockheed CL-282 documented ▶ 1:20:06

Trevor Gardner alarmed_by RAND Corporation documented ▶ 1:24:20

“They could not offer funds to Lockheed to pursue it because the Air Force was already committed to something else that didn't meet those requirements. The Eisenhower administration was growing increas…”

Dwight D. Eisenhower authorized James Killian documented ▶ 1:26:14

“At the meeting, MIT, on 15 April 54, the group called for the recruitment of such a task force. July 54, President Eisenhower authorized Killian to recruit and lead a panel of experts to study the nat…”

Edwin Land headed Project 375X documented ▶ 1:27:32

“i i got to show you guys this or let me go ahead and finish this sentence and then we'll come back to this the task was investigating the nation's intelligence capability its chairman edwin land the i…”

Lyman Lemnitzer participated_in Operation Sunrise host_asserted ▶ 1:29:21

“during world war ii he's the guy that shows up at operation sunrise sitting next to alan dallas arranging for the rat lines out of germany and the creation of operation gladio and he's on the military…”

Lyman Lemnitzer involved_in_creation_of Operation Gladio host_asserted ▶ 1:29:21

James Baker member_of Project 375X documented ▶ 1:30:55

“Wonder who that is. But anyway, Lands Project 3, which is talking about this thing right here, was the smallest of the three capability projects. He was referred, he called it the Taxi Cab Committee. …”

Edward Purcell member_of Project 375X documented ▶ 1:30:55

John Turcay member_of Project 375X documented ▶ 1:31:26

“Joseph Kennedy of Washington University, St. Louis, mathematician John Turcay of Princeton, Bell Telephone Labs, and Alan Latham Jr. of Author D. Little, Inc., an engineer and former treasurer of Pola…”

Alan Latham Jr. member_of Project 375X documented ▶ 1:31:26

Joseph Kennedy Sr. member_of Project 375X documented ▶ 1:31:26

U.S. Air Force rejected Lockheed CL-282 documented ▶ 1:32:20

“Also not overly impressed with the CIA, Land learned the details of Lockheed's aircraft soon after he arrived in Washington. Philip Strong showed him Kelly Johnson's concept drawing of the plane and t…”

Philip Strong showed Edwin Land documented ▶ 1:32:20

Edwin Land discussed_with Richard M. Bissell Jr. documented ▶ 1:33:15

“Donovan's brief mentioned that Lockheed designed in May, he had not seen the concept drawing. Baker began designing a camera and a lens system that would fit on the Lockheed craft. At the end of Augus…”

Richard M. Bissell Jr. appointed Douglas Ashford documented ▶ 1:34:14

“that he had become involved in it, Bissell's interest was piqued, and he set out to learn what he could about the reconnaissance system. In early September 54, Bissell had, you see how they love to ma…”

Richard M. Bissell Jr. member_of CIA documented ▶ 1:34:44

“to the deputy director of CIA, Lieutenant General James Cabell. This guy is the one that ends up being the, he's been in the CIA for a while. In covering the memorandum, Bissell called Cabell's attent…”

Campbell James member_of CIA documented ▶ 1:34:44

Edwin Land headed Project 375X documented ▶ 1:35:21

“By September 54, Land's Project 3 study group had become very much interested in the Lockheed aircraft, and their interest grew even stronger when James Baker told them of Alan Dullivan's strong case …”

Edwin Land recruited Henry Yutze documented ▶ 1:36:16

“When the discussion turned to the camera and film, Land invited Dr. Henry Yutze, Eastman Kodak's film expert, and Richard Perkins, president of the Perkin Elmer Company, to participate. For discussion…”

Edwin Land recruited Richard Perle documented ▶ 1:36:16

Project 375X recruited Perry Pratt documented ▶ 1:36:16

Project 375X targeted_for_regime_change Eastern Soviet Union documented ▶ 1:36:47

“The aircraft was to be more than an aircraft with a camera. It was to be an integrated intelligence collection system with the members confident that it could find and photograph the Soviet Bison bomb…”

Allen Dulles member_of CIA documented ▶ 1:37:40

“an armed aircraft could provoke a war. They argued that civilian overflights in unarmed, unmarked aircraft. In their view, the organization most suitable to do that was the CIA. In October 54, Project…”

Project 375X proposed Lockheed CL-282 documented ▶ 1:37:40

CIA attempted_coup_against Cuba host_asserted ▶ 1:38:10

“Are you kidding me? We know too much about Dulles at this point to believe any of this garbage. He did not like to involve the CIA in military projects, even ones the military had rejected. That's jus…”

Edwin Land proposed Lockheed CL-282 documented ▶ 1:39:39

“See, I love the fact here that they have these code words assigned to this information that's here. When it was originally classified, that's a big deal. That means it would have normally been redacte…”

Dwight D. Eisenhower approved Lockheed CL-282 documented ▶ 1:40:12

“Killen's account of the meeting. Land described the aircraft using the unarmed plane and recommended the development be undertaking. After listening to the proposal and asking many hard questions, Eis…”

Alan Donovan member_of Intelligence Advisory Committee documented ▶ 1:42:37

“and could be used throughout the Air Force in different types. Again, nobody cares. Having heard of the Wright-Patt attack on the Lockheed aircraft, Alan Donovan of the Intelligence Systems Panel met …”

John Seberg member_of Wright-Patterson Air Force Base documented ▶ 1:43:06

“reconnaissance aircraft. Also present was Major John Seberg of Wright-Patt. He later recalled, what I did was present the results of my comparative analysis of all four designs. I showed the relativel…”

Philip E. Talbot member_of U.S. Air Force documented ▶ 1:44:02

“To be on the safe side, however, the Air Force did not abandon the X-16 program until Lockheed's aircraft had begun flying. What a total waste of money. On November 19th, the day after Seabird's brief…”

U.S. Air Force funded Lockheed CL-282 documented ▶ 1:44:27

“from CIA Gardner, General Putt from the Air Force, Kelly Johnson, Edward Land, all agreed the special item of material described by the Lockheed was a practical and desirable and would be sought. It w…”

George W. Gardner member_of CIA documented ▶ 1:44:27

CIA funded Lockheed CL-282 documented ▶ 1:44:27

Donald Putt member_of U.S. Air Force documented ▶ 1:44:27

Edwin Land recruited Clarence "Kelly" Johnson documented ▶ 1:44:54

“You've got to love it. It's interesting to note that Lockheed, which had originally developed the aircraft design on its own and had devoted considerable effort to promoting it, had to be persuaded to…”

Clarence "Kelly" Johnson member_of Lockheed documented ▶ 1:45:22

“When he returned to California, Johnson noted that his project log, I am impressed with the secrecy aspect and was told by Gardner and I was essentially being drafted for the project. It seemed, in fa…”

Intelligence Advisory Committee approved Lockheed CL-282 documented ▶ 1:45:22

Allen Dulles proposed Lockheed CL-282 documented ▶ 1:45:51

“Dulles' request to undertake this project. Following day, Dulles signed a three-page memorandum drafted by the deputy asking Eisenhower to approve the overhead reconnaissance project. The same afterno…”

Dwight D. Eisenhower approved Lockheed CL-282 documented ▶ 1:45:51