The Colonel's Corner Safe for Democracy Part 29 (30)

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Transcript

0:00 I have to ask you something that I was asked the other day or I saw it in the chat or something and forgot to ask you. And especially since Renee is here. Renee, how is your gladiolus? They're about eight inches out of the ground. Oh, look at you go. That's awesome. Yeah. As a matter of fact, I was just out there a little bit ago.

0:31 We have not had a lot of rain, although I have sprinklers. So the last few days we've gotten showers and they just like shot up. So yes, they're back. And of course, every time I look at them, I'm reminded of all of you guys and eternally grateful to this entire community.

0:59 So yeah, they're all coming back. I have to share something with you guys because we've been on this journey together the entire time. So I want to, I just took a screenshot of it and sent it to, let me see if I can.

1:22 get it to come up without losing everybody, and oh, by the way, if there's any interference over on Rumble, we do have another storm coming through, I can hear it grumbling in the background, so just FYI, my Starlink doesn't like the rain, evidently, so I received a DM, which I did not accept, but

1:53 It's very interesting. I have no idea how to pronounce the person's name or even if it's a real name, but here's what it says. There's a video of this person saying how much they're in support of the U.S. military operation that went down in Iran. Hi.

2:20 Former Israeli cabinet member, F-16 squadron commander and pilot with SF veteran of the IDF explaining about the courage and bravery of the American operation to rescue their pilot. So I know that was my response too. I didn't accept it. So it's just over there in the request area. What's weird?

2:53 is that I have received a few before. In addition, every time I receive something odd like that, I also get several from people that say they're in the United States in all kinds of different, hey, can you help me with this? I'm fighting this in my state or I'm fighting that. And if you engage,

3:24 with those people, they want to like flood your DM with all of this information, even though you tell them that's completely outside of my expertise. I have no ability to help you with any of that. And I don't know if there's a correlation to that, but I get the distinct impression that

3:51 there, and I know lots of people need lots of help out there. I'm not saying that there's not legitimate, but I don't know why you would send it to me. I have one focus. You guys know what that focus is. And I don't know anybody outside of the military community. And I don't have access to anybody. And inevitably,

4:17 If you engage with people like that, then they send you hate mail for you not helping them. I can't help you. I don't have contacts. I don't know anybody. People avoid me like the plague because of what I talk about. So it doesn't do you any good to send me stuff like that and then hate on me because I'm not going to be able to help you because I can't. So just thought I'd share that with you guys.

4:45 You know, haters love to hate. That's what I've got to figure. Yeah, I can't help you. Sorry. I have to preface it with this. I truly believe there, okay, there is more, okay, one of the things the devil, demons, et cetera, love, and honest to God, spiritual warfare feel, love more than anything is violence and fracturing.

5:19 Yes. We've seen it a lot repeatedly through Operation Gladio. We also see it a lot in our current day. And when people like that go off and suddenly go through these fits of rage, it is possible, in my opinion, that there is demonic influence. Right now we're seeing it at epic levels. Now we're also seeing that pendulum swing the other way. We're seeing people moving towards Christ.

5:49 In this struggle session, you're going to see that. You're going to see. The devil doesn't like it when people start getting close to God. And they're going to throw everything they got at it. So anyway, not that I'm justifying or making excuses for people. But it's just something to notice, especially in today's environment. I have to read Shelley the Kiwi. I love her.

6:17 And in reality, all they have to do is read a bloody book like we are. You're right, Shelly. All they have to do is read a book. Always thought on, right? Yes, yes. So anyway, let's get started with our book. Okay, so where we left off on Friday, we were in around 1966-ish, and we were...

6:47 reading about how in Africa, the CIA was operating over there and kept finding Cubans and Che Guevara helping the indigenous people try to fight back against the CIA operations in countries over there. So that, and again, we're in the late 60s at this point. Che Guevara's ploy confronted a transformed

7:18 Western Hemisphere Division at the CIA. By 1966, it had shrunk to become smaller than the Miami station during Mongoose. There were about 100 officers serving at Langley and about 200 in the field. The largest station by far was the Mexican city station. It had been

7:42 Under the control, commanding control, of the CIA Station Chief Winston Scott, who had about 15% of the overall budget. The largest branch continued to be that for the Cuban. It had shrunk, though, to just over 30 officers. Division Chief William Breaux, B-R-O-E.

8:12 a Far East specialist by trade, had been drafted after a tour as station chief in Tokyo. Jack Esterling had now risen to deputy chief of division at the headquarters. Still on board after all these years was Jerry Droller, D-R-O-L-L-E-R, chief of the covert action staff. Thomas Polgar, P-O-L-G-A-R,

8:42 had been a European expert and most recently the CIA's boss in Vienna, Austria, which lots of stuff happens in Austria, oddly enough. He now headed the foreign intelligence staff. They had $37 million to play with in their 1967 budget. The top of the agency had been transformed also. Two directors had come and gone.

9:13 John McComb over disputes with the president, William Rayburn, perhaps for lack of them. But in 1965, when President Johnson appointed Admiral Rayburn, he simultaneously made Richard Helms deputy director of the CIA. His departure for the seventh floor left the directorate of operations in need of a chief. Rayburn let Helms.

9:42 choose who was going to be that new person. For the DO boss, the selection was between Helms' longtime associate, Thomas Karaminis, and Desmond Fitzgerald. When Desmond Fitzgerald saw what had happened, he marched into Helms' office to bid for the job. Karaminis did nothing. Helms chose Desmond Fitzgerald, who thus arrived to head

10:11 the CIA's clandestine services. Covert action. Helms exacted the promise that Desmond Fitzgerald would weed out useless covert operations. The Cuba Project was one of the first to take a hit. Subtle changes came to the special group as well. Lyndon Johnson made his own in June of 1964 with a National Security Action Memorandum that retitled it.

10:43 Again, everybody has their own name for it. Now it was going to be called the 303 Committee, named after the establishing directive. The committee met weekly and sometimes even more frequently. Occasional projects were approved in a telephone conference. The CIA sent papers in advance and members arrived prepared to discuss what was on the papers.

11:11 Primacy of the National Security Advisor as chairman of this 303 committee had become established. Until February 1966, this would be Mac Bundy. For a month or so after Robert Comer, then the chairman became Walt Rostow. The chairman informed President Johnson to an extent that only the two of them knew about.

11:40 But if the 303 committee could not agree or an operation involved great risk, LBJ would then convene what he referred to as the seniors, McNamara, Dean Rusk, and the CIA director to discuss them directly. Deputy Undersecretary of State Hugh Alexis Johnson represented the State Department during some of those periods.

12:07 He writes that he always tried to put himself in the president's shoes. For his efforts, he acquired the nickname Dr. No. But the State Department backed many of the projects. And the 303 Committee approved a large share of the proposals. Alex Johnson, quote, I would say we reached a firm decision in all but a few cases, unquote.

12:38 would be one of the easy ones. During the Kennedy years, Washington gradually began mixing itself into the politics of Bolivia. A paper prepared for the special group in September of 1962 acknowledged that a quote-unquote leftist politics was taking hold. They viewed it as a threat, primarily from local leaders wanting to maximize

13:10 their own power. In 1963, intelligence reports found Bolivia to be one of the most highly armed Latin American nations, where many had guns at home and the government handed out weapons to peasant groups. Where Washington took ombrage at the Venezuelan case, it did nothing about Bolivia, nothing except political action.

13:42 In August 1963, the special group approved secret funds for Washington's favorite party in Bolivia and began to interfere in the 1964 elections. Between 63 and 65, the CIA would spend $1.2 million to support organizations and youth groups and began a massive propaganda campaign. However,

14:12 the quote unquote leftist one anyway, but not by a lot. The MNR, which was basically a movement for national revolutionaries. That's what the MNR stood for. That was the American favorites. In November, 1964, General Rene,

14:49 Barracentos Fortuno, a vice president in the coalition, launched a military coup that swept away the democratically elected president. Two months later, the 303 committee approved more cash for the military coup leader. Records indicate that the general was aware of the CIA being the source of the money.

15:21 In the face of political opposition, Baratentos jailed opponents and canceled elections. Gee, that seems like a pattern. The 303 committee nevertheless authorized even more money in July of 1965 and even more money in March of 1966 before a new election in which Baratentos triumphed. So now we have a military dictator.

15:52 and a fraudulent election to indicate that they now have a quote-unquote democracy. Meanwhile, the CIA is flooding them with millions of dollars. All of this action kept Jerry Drahler very busy. It is fair to say that by this time, the CIA had a fixation on Che Guevara because Che Guevara tried to show up and help in Bolivia. The actual peasants.

16:26 to push back against the CIA and their preferred military dictator. Slow to appreciate the emerging differences between Fidel and Che Guevara, the CIA produced an analysis of economic policy disputes between the two in the fall of 1965, when Che Guevara had already gone to Africa. The paper by analyst Brian Lattell

16:56 caught the flavor of the dispute, but the agency wouldn't accept it. There were other Che Cavera sightings too, resulting in Langley's determination to get him at all costs. But not everyone believed. As late as May 1967, Desmond Fitzgerald told the visiting U.S. ambassador to Bolivia that Che Cavera was dead and buried in an unmarked grave.

17:29 in the Dominican Republic. Despite Fitzgerald's observation to Ambassador Douglas Henderson, the CIA's secret war against Che Guevara came to a head in Bolivia. And in 1967, Che had arrived in the country late the preceding year, heavily disguised and using an Uruguayan passport for all of his theorizing on revolution.

17:57 Che Guevara chose badly in establishing this identity. Yes, Bolivia featured great poverty. Yes, the country suffered from adverse economic conditions. Its 10 exports, the main cash inflow, were greatly affected by global prices. And yes, there were other issues in Bolivia.

18:28 But all that failed to translate into readiness for revolution. Three major weaknesses crippled Che Guevara's efforts. First, in planting his guerrilla band in the countryside, Che Guevara never forged links with dissidents in the cities. Second, in the jungle, Che Guevara cut himself off from the tin miners. And also, Che Guevara's countryside, the peasantry, proved sparse.

18:57 and afraid to engage. Che Guevara's Bolivian diaries repeatedly note peasants were terrified, terrorized, because of what the government was doing to them. Tactical errors abound too. Che Guevara knew much less about the wilderness where he was operating. He remained far too optimistic. The weaknesses did not prevent Che Guevara from enjoying a period of success. General

19:37 variantos remained ignorant of the threat. Vague rumors floated around the capital of partisans in the jungle. The CIA station under John Tilton perked up among the first to believe the tales of Cuban people being there, including Che Guevara, who isn't Cuban, but spent a lot of time in Cuba. But beyond the

20:09 Warnings from Langley, it was hard to convince anybody in the local area. Through the first half of 1967, Che Guevara's small band of about 60 men feared hunger more than Bolivian troops, and their attacks succeeded. Toward the end of March, they ambushed a Bolivian patrol and inflicted severe casualties. Then the capital began to pay attention.

20:36 Barrientos called in Ambassador Henderson and handed him a request for U.S. supplies. On April 28th, the Bolivian military signed an agreement with the U.S. mission to permit a special forces mobile training team to train the Bolivian 2nd Ranger Battalion. In early July, Che Guevara captured a village and an army garrison. The key intelligence breakthroughs came in mid-March.

21:06 When two Bolivian deserted Che Guevara's band of rebels, giving the army details on his unit. And on April 20th, when security services picked up a French journalist, Regis Debray, and an American photographer named George Roth. This incident rose to the level of a Bolivian military triumph. When reported to LBJ in his...

21:36 President's Daily Brief, quote, troops have scored their first victory against the guerrillas. Twice last week, army patrols at guerrilla bands inflicting casualties and taking prisoners, unquote. The prisoners weren't actually the guerrilla band. It was the photographer and a journalist. In a way, the reported success was real for under hostile interrogation, both men

22:09 provided data. So they captured a journalist and a photographer and tortured them for information. CIA officers were present during the torture. A mysterious woman, Tania, T-A-N-I-A, reported as an East German, Russian, and Cuban agent or

22:43 A revolutionary groupie had originally conveyed Debray to Shea and stayed on the Shea Caveras within their group. Debray, a Frenchman and revolutionary theorist, later wrote at length about Shea Caveras' activities in Bolivia. And something of a cottage industry has developed around the question.

23:14 of who betrayed Che Guevara. In the mythology that surrounded these events, Debray, Debray's Bolivian lawyer, Castro, Cuban agents, and Bolivia deserters have all been charged with betrayal, similar to theories that surrounded other events.

23:38 Meanwhile, the Washington merry-go-round continued. On May 11th, Walt Rostow told LBJ that based on Debray's interrogations, that Shea Cavera could actually be in Bolivia and not dead at all. Quote, as the intelligence community with the passage of time has been more and more inclined to believe, unquote.

24:05 On May 25th, CIA cables added that Castro could open a new front where the borders of Bolivia, Peru, and Brazil met. Days later, Rostow pitched his note to Johnson as if Che Guevara had actually been in Bolivia, but may have left already. The CIA report on June 14th stated, Che Guevara is

24:31 personally directing Bolivian guerrilla activities and has been physically present with the guerrillas, unquote. But a DIA report stated that Che Guevara had recently been executed in Cuba. As of mid-July, the embassy itself remained uncertain, making the reluctance at senior levels of the CIA more understandable. The mystery solved itself over the summer.

25:01 A special assistant to Richard Helms records that his chief was another who did not credit the Che Cavera Bolivian thesis. Despite Helms and Fitzgerald's doubts, Bill Breaux ordered some special operations division people sent to the Capitol. As a result, in June, the division set up an unusual unit within Tilton Station.

25:31 to concentrate on Che Guevara. Tilton, who had been a case officer to two Latin American countries, realized the need to genuflect to Bolivian attitudes about arrogant Americans, and all three members would be Cuban contract agents, i.e. Cuban exiles from the Bay of Pigs. Not long afterwards, reacting to Che's village raid, Bolivian army troops discovered

26:02 Che Guevara's base camp. There they found photos of Che Guevara in his Bolivian disguise. When examined closely, several features resembled Che Guevara and a couple of smudged fingerprints clenched the case. Captured documents identified other Cubans too, including some thought that were linked to Che Guevara in Africa. Suddenly, everything changed.

26:32 not just in Bolivia, but in Washington. Desmond Fitzgerald had collapsed playing tennis and died. Tom Karamanis succeeded in leadership to the DO. It fell to him to take the news to Helms. Although Helms still refused to believe it, he could no longer simply dismiss the evidence that Sheik Havera may be in Bolivia.

27:05 Another Forrest Gump moment. In early August, Felix Rodriguez and Gustavo Valdado arrived in Bolivia and began their special mission, joined by a third Cuban exile agent. They met with Interior Secretary Antonio Argundas, who gave them cover identities as captains in his ministry.

27:33 At the end of the month came a true Bolivian victory. A mountain battle where Che Cavera's band was caught and lost a third of its forces. Rodriguez and a Bolivian officer question Che Cavera's aid. Question meaning tortured and interrogated because they don't just question anyone. Meanwhile, U.S. Special Forces.

28:02 completed training the Bolivian 2nd Rangers, which took the field in mid-September. After about 10 days, they caught Che Guevara's band near a village. The CIA's Felix Rodriguez joined the Rangers to provide tactical advice. I'm sure that's all he did. Operations continued near the village until October 8th, when the Rangers caught up with the guerrilla band one more time. There, Captain Gary Prado Salmon,

28:32 company captured Shea Calvera. The guerrilla commander, wounded in the leg, could not flee. With the notorious Shea in custody, the immediate issue for the CIA became obtaining intelligence. Here, the agency's interests clashed with the Bolivians' desire to see him dead. Sure. During the long pursuit, both Ambassador Henderson and Station Chief Tilton

29:03 tried to convince Barastanos that Che Guevara captured, he would be brought to the capital for interrogation. Barastanos demurred, afraid of the unrest that could accompany Che's arrival, captive or not. When the moment came, Tilton was on leave and Henderson knew nothing.

29:27 Felix Rodriguez and the Bolivian field commander took a helicopter from their tactical headquarters. Afraid he could not convince the Bolivians to spare Che Guevara, Rodriguez left a message to retransmission to Langley through the station in Paraguay. He thought that an embassy official sent to the scene might have better luck. Langley got the word too late.

29:56 including his Bolivian diary, and talked to the Argentina revolutionary. Shea proved quite willing to discuss revolution, but refused to answer questions about the mission. Then came a call on a field phone. The Bolivian officers were away. Rodriguez answered in his cover identity as a captain of the interior ministry. He heard the code numbers that ordered Shea Cavera's execution.

30:26 Rodriguez passed the order along. Sergeant Jamie Teran did the deed. Now, again, there's a lot of controversy about all of this. The CIA wanted Sheikha Vera dead more than anybody. And Felix Rodriguez more than anybody. Later, the Bolivians moved the body to a hospital where CIA contract officer Gustavo Villadado

30:59 got in the act. Villadado appeared in pictures beside Che Guevara's body and gave journalists the impression that he had supervised the activity. Thus became the first public knowledge the CIA had anything to do with his death. This touched off the Bolivians supposedly cutting off his head and hands. Photos of the dead Che Guevara proved an embarrassing faux pas.

31:33 Washington experienced a few days of confusion while the particulars were tied down and Che Guevara identified. Walt Ristow, at a meeting where the initial cable appeared, snapped his pencil in half and beamed. His memos to LBJ over the next couple of days exhibited increasing confidence. On October 11th, he presented the event as discouraging potential guerrillas.

32:03 Resto exalted, quote, it marks the passing of another of the aggressive romantic revolutionaries. And guess who he compared them to? Aggressive romantic revolutionaries like Sukarno, Karuma, Ben Bella, all people the CIA had taken care of.

32:40 Yet, the CIA wants you to believe they didn't have anything to do with his actual execution. Che Cavera's Bolivian diary soon acquired a life of its own. Before his death, the 303 committee actually discussed the handling of documents expected to be captured and agreed upon a cover story. The Bolivians had asked the U.S. to analyze these materials.

33:10 It is a fair inference that the special group later specifically considered what to do with the diary, though evidence that might establish this remains classified. Why? Why? Why would you classify Sheik Havera's diary? Because he was documenting what the CIA was doing all over the world. That's why. And what he was doing to stop their military coups and taking over countries.

33:43 In any case, various versions of the diary appeared during the summer of 1968, including one released by Castro. How Havana might have acquired a copy of it became a mystery unraveled by Antonio Argudas, the interior minister. Argudas suddenly disappeared. He had gone to Chile and asked for asylum. But instead, the Chileans handed him over to the CIA.

34:13 and Santiago. Langley sent Nick Larundas, his original recruiter, to talk some sense into him. The CIA then followed and accommodated Larundas as he traveled to London, New York, and Lima, Peru. Talk some sense into him. Do you think the CIA talked sense into anybody? The Bolivians gave a series of press conferences.

34:47 in which he not only revealed giving the diary to Castro, but that he himself had worked for the CIA, charging the agency with interfering in the internal affairs of Bolivia. Arrudes finally returned to the capital to stand trial. He survived at least one assassination attempt before fleeing to Mexico. He would later turn up in Havana in 1970.

35:19 He had with him Che Guevara's disguise and his embalmed hands that the CIA and their operatives had cut off. Not long afterwards, John Tilton, the former CIA chief, was sent to Vietnam as the last director of the Phoenix program. The long struggle against Castro for America's Wilsonian ideals

35:52 of quote-unquote self-determination and democracy is laughable. No one elected Castro, true enough, but the confessed goals of the Cuba project had been to get rid of him, after which Cuba themselves would supposedly be able to elect a leader, except for the last time the elected one, the CIA overthrew him.

36:22 and installed Batista. And they haven't installed a democratically elected president in any of their coups. The agency supported the Cuban exiles, but the CIA had also supported Batista. And no one had elected him either. Nor were Joseph Mubato or Barantinos elected to the post they held. Democratic values did not run deep.

36:57 among the CIA and their secret wars. What remained true would be that Washington warned against socialist ideals, but what was left in the aftermath of their fixing supposed socialist ideals was not democracy. A truly democratic policy cannot exclude any political belief, and in this sense, the secret war fell.

37:30 far wide of any democracy vision. As for the Cold War issues, it was never true that all of these enemies marched to the Moscow drum. It would be more accurate to say they were countries where the CIA had intervened, then cloaked those conflicts with trappings of ideological warfare.

37:59 justifying its intervention in the name of democracy. The secret war against Castro shows that warriors at full stride created by Truman, enhanced by Eisenhower, enthused by the potential of counterinsurgency strategy, and by the 1960s, capabilities and contingencies were all in place.

38:28 The Congo became one front of a global competition. Cuba became another. Those campaigns conducted simultaneously formed quite an achievement. But even more impressive is that both went on in concert with a third sustained effort in Vietnam, as well as other CIA operations. The secret warriors were truly achieving a global reach. Crazy.

39:02 Moving on to Chapter 15, where we get into Southeast Asia. Although not cut from the same cloth as Maxwell Taylor, Ed Lansdale also considered himself something of a theorist. Managing Operation Mongoose and backstopping covert actions at the Pentagon took Lansdale away from his primary interest of counterinsurgency. For a decade after his work in the Philippines, Lansdale continued to advance psychological warfare and counterinsurgency techniques.

39:33 He expounded upon what he called a demotic strategy as approach aimed at popular will, its goal the same as quote unquote winning hearts and minds by terror. That's my addition. Lansdell occasionally got the chance to articulate his vision in 1959 after Eisenhower ordered a.

40:03 Air Force C-130s to fly construction equipment to certain upland villages in Laos, Lansdale toured, adding the Philippines and Vietnam to his itinerary, then wrote a long report on the potential of quote-unquote civic activities. A skilled harmonica player, he believed that the armed patrols would help build village disciplinaries and schools.

40:35 and provide medical help to villagers, all under the guise of helping but inserting spies along the way. General Lansdale also happened to be an American behind the rise of South Vietnamese President Diem. Despite his...

41:04 excitement, Lansdale remained a controversial strategy until the advent of JFK. Even within the CIA, where political action had become a credo, many preferred direct measures. At the beginning of 61, a few weeks before Kennedy's inauguration, Lansdale went to Saigon for a new assessment. He found that Diem's government losing its

41:34 favor in the countryside where guerrilla warfare spread and the army floundered. Diem had barely survived a coup too much earlier. The US military advisory group with which Lansdell had once served remained too hampered by restrictions. They weren't evil enough. Lansdell spent a little over two weeks in Vietnam.

42:03 He spoke with Diem and other Vietnamese as well as embassy people. Compiling in his report on the plane to Washington, he submitted it. Oh my gosh, that famous date again, January 17th. You know, the date Eisenhower told us all about the military industrial complex that he had created and the day they're murdering Patrice Lumumba. Lansdell is submitting his Vietnam report.

42:32 to the Eisenhower administration. In Saigon, he had found American and Vietnamese officials who talked like the French and Vietnamese in Hanoi in 1953 and 54. He saw Vietnam as under intense psychological attack. In 1961, that would be a fateful year.

43:00 And Vietnam is in a critical condition. This is his quote. Vietnam is in a critical condition and we should treat it as a combat area, as an area requiring emergency treatment, unquote. Lansdale Report presented his vision of an operation changed sufficiently to free these Americans to do the job that needed doing. Another quote.

43:31 His answer was to elect, quote, the best people you have, unquote, a hardcore of experienced Americans who know and really like Asians and give them a free hand. A new ambassador should be sent immediately as well as a mature American to conduct, quote, political operations to start creating a Vietnamese style.

44:01 Foundation for more democratic government. Not the democratic government you and I think about. One controlled by these guys. The report created a stir in Washington. Walt Rostow showed it to the president days after he entered office. Busy, Kennedy didn't want to read it. Rostow told him he should. Kennedy looked up when he was finished. This is the worst one we've gotten, isn't it? JFK asked.

44:35 You know, Eisenhower never mentioned any of this. He talked in length of Laos, but never said a word about Vietnam. The Secretary of Defense wanted to hear from the author himself. Robert McNamara asked Lansdell, quote, somehow I found him very hard to talk to, recalled Lansdell later. Watching his face as I talked, I got the feeling he didn't understand me.

45:06 Maybe because he thought you were crazy. Several attempts to assign Lansdell to Vietnam were blocked until 1965 when none other than Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge overrode all opposition. In the meantime, Ed Lansdell had been occupied with Mongoose.

45:35 In Vietnam, psychological warfare would be strictly an adjunct to conventional force. Hold on just one second. I was just asked to go live on someone else's show and I had to tell him, I can't, I'm in the middle of mine. Okay, President Kennedy formed a committee to canvas Vietnam alternatives.

46:17 Given the Pentagon's status as the biggest player, McNamara's deputy, Roswell Gilpatrick, chaired the group. The Gilpatrick committee faced a difficult task. Many of its members had entered with the new administration and were just finding their balance.

46:37 Again, you guys have to understand this is all on purpose. They do these during these transitions so that they can basically bombast their way through and bully their way through and make everything a critical crisis so they can get what they want. Then once they get what they want, they use that in future dealings.

47:02 well, you already started it. Do you want us to just tell everybody what you were doing? This is the kind of stuff that they do on purpose. We've read about this in many of these situations. They stage these crisis events during transition periods. They did exactly the same thing with Trump, with Russia.

47:28 And that's what got General Flynn. They basically did the whole Russia, expel the people out, created a crisis, got everybody staged, implicated, and then tried to coerce them into doing something that they didn't necessarily wanna do. And if you reach out and try to deescalate, they tape your phone call, they release it,

47:58 they basically blackmail you with it. Kennedy's decision, hold on a second. Okay. Gilpatrick's own recollection is that none of us who were charged with the responsibility for this area had any preparation for the problem. What we didn't comprehend was the inability of the Vietnamese to absorb our doctrine, to think or to organize the way we did.

48:34 Still, the Gilpatrick group came to President Kennedy with a list of 40 items. Kennedy's decision set a course for the American experience in Vietnam. Between doing nothing and committing U.S. forces, JFK chose a gradual expansion of effort, beginning a cycle repeated many times. On May 11th, Kennedy approved some of Gilpatrick's recommendations. The U.S. expanded its advisory group.

49:04 And paid to increase South Vietnamese forces of particular importance were the Secret Warriors. The program included deployment to Vietnam of a provisional special forces group of Green Parades, plus a mandate to expand present operations in the field of intelligence, unconventional warfare, and psychological warfare. Kennedy also searched for a strategic concept he could use.

49:34 As an approach, counterinsurgency theory suggested population resettlement, leading to strategic hamlets and many subsequent variants. Geography suggested sealing off South Vietnamese borders, preventing infiltration from the north and from Laos. The border control approach touted in early May of 1961 by Robert Comer, a CIA analyst on duty at the NSC staff.

50:04 Gosh, where have we seen that before? Became a pillar of the U.S. concept. With its twin pacification, it provided the foundation for U.S. strategy throughout the Vietnam War. North Vietnam countered with the Ho Chi Minh Trail. That began in 1959, which moved cadres to the battlefield of the South. Supplies traveled down the trail and went by sea. In November of 61,

50:33 Kennedy faced a recommendation for a commitment of regular U.S. troops, this time from Maxwell Taylor, you know, the guy that was supposed to be the conservative, and Walt Ristow. He had just returned from a survey trip. General Taylor tried to prevent Ed Lansdell from participating, but McNamara insisted he go to perform a special assignment. Yeah, his special assignment is to make sure it happens.

51:02 Helping the Bissell study of resources for unconventional warfare, the Taylor-Rustow report included options for a radical increase in the number of Green Berets and increased covert offensive operations in the North, as well as Laos and South Vietnam. Kennedy rejected the troop request while approving covert action. Indeed, more secret warriors were reaching South Vietnam anyway.

51:31 almost like they ignored him. The same day he sent Taylor and Rostow to Saigon, JFK ordered a training squadron to be operational on November 16th, 1961. It flew missions under code name Farmgate. The deployment figured in a wider expansion. America's assistant group grew from

52:02 700 to more than 12,000 by mid-1962. There were U.S. supply units to support the Vietnamese, U.S. helicopter units to fly them to battle, and special forces with Navy, Air Force, and Marine detachments. Farmgate retained its clandestine status while semi-clandestine air units followed.

52:31 to fly short-range air transport, ranch hand, which dumped toxic chemicals to defoliate the countryside, the Vietnam contingent could hardly be called a group anymore. It had become a military assistance command Vietnam and continued to grow. Despite the support conditions in South Vietnam,

53:01 continued to deteriorate. The Vietnamese never seemed to catch the National Liberation Front rebels. It was evident by 1963 that Diem had lost most of his remaining political support, in particular when his brother, Ngo Dan Nhu, began using force to quell demonstrations of the Buddhist, the majority religious movement in South Vietnam.

53:31 South Vietnamese army officers felt the crisis made it impossible to prosecute the war. In Saigon, coup talk filled the air. Those early days in Vietnam, much like Korea in years past, were an adventure for Americans. In the beginning, it had been Ed Lansdell who established the close U.S. relationship with the Vietnamese authorities. When he left at the end of 1956,

54:01 The liaison role remained a major activity of the CIA station in Saigon. Later, that role grew. The CIA wanted its own sources among the South Vietnamese politicians. By 1960, the agency had the best information outside the presidential palace. Indeed, in the 1960 coup attempt, CIA officers were in contact with both sides throughout.

54:30 This caused some difficulty for the station chief, William Colby, when Diem's brother found out. Threatened with arrest or worse, CIA officer George Carver had to be spirited out of Saigon. A second officer, Ed Regan, was pulled out temporarily until the Vietnamese cooled off. In other words, the CIA got caught planning a coup and the Vietnamese

54:58 quote-unquote politicians they're propping up got pissed off. Another task on the CIA's list was to infiltrate North Vietnam using Vietnamese special forces, people that the CIA had trained as early as 1958. Also, paramilitary teams that were set up by the CIA. Alan Dulles briefed Kennedy on the initiative in early 1961. Bill Colby created Project

55:33 Tiger for the mission. The agency quickly gave up on Saigon Special Forces. They ran operations only inside South Vietnam. Instead, the CIA recruited its own Vietnamese commandos outside of the Vietnamese government. Colby, with his experience and with the OSS in France and Norway, because Colby is the guy that set up all the stay-behind units in the Scandinavian country.

56:06 as well as some of the beginning ones in Europe. He ought to have been the first one to question the feasibility here, but he didn't. He just kept going. North Vietnam had excellent security services. Colby tried to send agents by air, by sea. Nothing worked. Ed Regan and Russ Miller, Trade Commandos,

56:37 Navy detallees to the CIA prepared boat crews. South Vietnam Air Force manned CIA planes for airdrops. But Hanoi swept up every team and even mounted a show trial in late 1961 of a Saigon air crew captured when their plane crashed. More than 200 commandos were lost as part of Project Tiger. Sound familiar?

57:06 This is exactly what happened in Eastern Europe. They don't care. These people are all expendable to them. Just keep throwing bodies. McGeorge Bundy warned Kennedy in 63 that the missions involved most of the danger common to those in denied areas. But the U.S. military took over and continued for five more years, losing almost 500 more Vietnamese quote-unquote special forces.

57:37 It made no difference. They were just sending these people to their death. Colonel Gilbert Layton of the Army ran the Combined Services Division of Colby CIA Station, controlling Project Tiger and other paramilitary efforts. Chink Layton, that's what his nickname was, originally detailed to the CIA, had joined the agency in 1950 and participated in many of the projects.

58:07 Like Colby, he had set up stay behind networks in Germany. Gilbert Layton, stay behind units in Germany. Literally, you can't make this shit up. He had been an instructor in Saipan. Remember when we were talking about Saipan and that being the place where they trained all of the KMT army at terrorist training camps?

58:42 Yeah, that's Saipan. He had also set one up in Turkey. You know, Operation Gray Wolf. Yeah, he had been a liaison between the army and the CIA's Tibetan training center at Camp Hell. Again, another stay-behind program in Tibet to attack mainland China. Layton seems to be everywhere.

59:21 The 50-year-old Layton knew a losing proposition when he saw one, but kept on going with Project Tiger. Layton, Colby, and other CIA officers had greater success with a paramilitary effort in South Vietnam's Central Highlands, organizing armed forces among tribal minorities.

59:49 For self-defense, an upland counterpart of strategic hamlets. Then for border control, the tribal units became the basis for a striking force called the Village Defense Program by the CIA and civilian irregular defense groups by the military. The units were base camps and had Green Beret leaderships.

1:00:17 Until November 62, this program was entirely a CIA project. Therefore, operational command, after that operational command, shifted to the military advisory command group. Though the agency continued to pay for all of it, all responsibility went to the military in a 1963 phase out of the CIA activity.

1:00:45 known as Operation Switchback. By the time Colonel Layton transferred to Thailand in 65, the program was well-established. They had up to 80 camps. And he goes to Thailand, where they're going to run all of the drugs out of. And then Colby left too. At Langley, he succeeded Desmond Fitzgerald as chief of the DO's Far East Division.

1:01:17 John Richardson followed Colby in Saigon. From the Army's Counterintelligence Corps, Richardson had an authentic espionage. He had been a espionage hero during World War II. He had been instrumental in capturing a notorious German spy in Italy. Jaco Richardson stayed at the...

1:01:48 Army's counterintelligence corps after the war. He switched to the CIA afterwards. It was Richardson who in the denouncement of the Albanian project had shut down the operating bases. And the Albanian project is where they were trying to set up, stay behind units in Albania that kept getting everybody killed.

1:02:19 He had worked in Vienna and Therese and moved to Saigon from Manila, Philippines. You know, another terrorist training place. Colby introduced Richardson to Nguyen Dinh Ngu, now head of Diem's intelligence services. Richardson had been a classmate of Richard Nixon at Whittier.

1:02:50 college. Isn't that interesting? His nickname was Jocko. And like Leighton, spoke four or five languages, including French, which was indispensable in Saigon since everybody there spoke French because they'd been a French colony for so long. Richardson got on well with Diem's brother. He had moved into a house that had been the headquarters for the torturers of

1:03:28 the French and had thought it was haunted. He then wondered why the Vietnamese wouldn't visit him there because so many of them had been killed in the house. With a style not unlike John McCone, who let subordinates carve out entire empires as long as they didn't cross him, Richardson waded in.

1:03:56 The Saigon station was no longer a homogenous unit of 40 that Bill Colby had been in charge of. The paramilitary crowd made up one circle, the espionage crew another. And in 61, there had been a communications intelligence circle while the demands of the war swelled the station with a growing cadre of analysts. Then there were the political action people.

1:04:26 One of the agency's political specialists played a key role in the demise of Diem, Lucien Koenig. His cover as a lieutenant colonel assigned to the Vietnamese Interior Ministry, but whose real function involved contact with the Vietnamese generals who had been a member of the Lansdale Group from the mid-1950s. So he's there to orchestrate the coup.

1:04:57 The greatest empire within the CIA station was Richardson's own. His problem lay not with the Saigon, but with the U.S. authorities. Convinced that Diem's time had run out, Washington tried desperately to get him to broaden his government. The Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East Affairs, Roger Hilsman, evidently with preliminary authorization, was out of town.

1:05:27 drafted a cable backing a coup that was suggested by the Vietnamese generals, or so they say. No special forces had just made bloody, widely condemned attacks on a Buddhist pagoda. That became the last straw. A cable on August 26, 1963, instructed Koenig,

1:05:56 and CIA officer Alfonso G. Sparrow to tell the generals the U.S. was fine with the coup. Richardson reported the maneuver through CIA channels. McCone went on to oppose, supposedly, the coup initiative. Washington scuttled the Hillsman Cable. McCone, Colby, and others spiked the initiative.

1:06:29 But supposedly, according to all of the CIA that had orchestrated the coup and prepared everybody, it was JFK that gave the final okay. And then supposedly everybody else was against it, even though they set it up. If Diem could not fire his brother, the U.S. would look for alternatives. But dear old Ambassador Henry Cabot Lott felt that John Richardson

1:07:01 had undermined him. The ambassador insisted on transferring the station chief. He specifically wanted Ed Lansdell to replace Jocko. Yeah, like Ed Lansdell's any better, because he's not. Then, no, two sold out the CIA boss having a newspaper identify him as the station chief. Abruptly recalled in October, Richardson was done.

1:07:29 For a time, the Vietnamese generals backed down. But two days before Richardson's hurried recall, they told Koenig of a new coup plan. That coup took place on November 1st, 1963. The CIA put up $40,000 to pay for it. You know, because they were all against it. Diem and Nhu died in custody of the plotters the next day, thanks to Koenig.

1:08:01 The CIA had a front row seat to the coup planning. And supposedly the embassy received just minutes of warning, although they had planned the entire thing. Assassination seemed endemic in November of 1963. Three weeks later, of course, Kennedy would be killed. Ask almost...

1:08:30 Two decades later, for his opinion, the U.S. support for the Diem coup, Ed Lansdale replied, quote, I think we should never have done it. We destroyed the Vietnamese constitution. I'm sorry, I did that out loud. Not we, of course, but the people we were working with. They threw it in the wastebasket. No, you did, asshole.

1:08:56 Indeed, the CIA's support flew in the face of Americans' commitment to democracy and left the U.S. embroiled in a war. Washington's search for military effectiveness revealed deeper problems. Those who argued that JFK would have withdrawn from Vietnam have never been able to get past the consequences of the Diem coup.

1:09:27 JFK made it well known that he was going to withdraw the military from there. The maneuver eliminated all possible flexible U.S. policy, which is probably why it was done when it was done is because they didn't want to withdraw. As for the suggestion that the CIA ought to be excused on the basis of its opposition to the coup, this is based on secret records.

1:09:57 Policy roles rather than discoverable ones of its agents on the street in Saigon. As a practical matter, public and world opinion would be dictated by the discoverable record, not the secret one. Several more coups occurred before 1967 when General Nguyen Van Thro and Air Marshal Nguyen K. Kai consolidated control in Saigon.

1:10:27 Langley's political action people made numerous efforts to deepen political support for the regime. Washington repeatedly encouraged Thao and Cai, as it had Diem, to broaden their base and construct a democracy. They're not interested in a democracy. But the South Vietnamese institutions created in 66 and 67 didn't blossom. Saigon's regime's failure

1:10:59 never resulted in sanctions from Washington. That too says everything about how much they wanted democracy. Because again, they're not interested in democracy or they would have had the unifying election at the end of World War II like they signed the piece of paper saying what happened. So that's it for today. Anybody got anything? No more democracy. That's what they're always...

1:11:43 You know, it shouldn't surprise us anymore, but the patterns are just so rigidly ingrained through all these stories. Yep. It's shocking. Yep. Looks like we got Travis coming up. Go ahead, Travis. I just wanted to let you know the video you posted earlier today.

1:12:20 was claiming it was Israelis dumping bioweapons on Lebanon and Syria. First thing, there are absolutely no electric windmills in Lebanon or Syria, let alone a full wind farm. I have no idea what you're talking about. What are you talking about? There's a video that you reposted.

1:12:52 Showed actually what was a crop duster, but the person that originally posted it was claiming it was Israeli defense forces using biochemicals in Lebanon and Syria. Okay. But the landscape is in California, as are the wind farms that are shown in the video. Okay. I just wanted to let you know that. Sure. That that was fake news. Okay.

1:13:23 Did you put that on your post or I need to go find it? I'll go find it. Yeah, just put it in my DM so I can look at it. Okay. I'd appreciate it. Thank you. Okay. Why are you so mad? Go ahead, and then we'll go to Renee. Okay. I have a quick question if you've actually heard of this book called Killing Hope.

1:13:54 U.S. Military and CIA Intervention Since World War II by William Blum, B-L-U-M. I've used it repeatedly. Is it good? Oh, yeah. We used that when we first came to X and we did our Around the World tour. Every place that we went, we started with the stuff that he put in that book and then added all of the local media that Bridget and Cousin It found that supported.

1:14:24 But that was basically our guide for that entire world tour. Okay. And that was the, because apparently there's an updated 2022 version of that book because he added more to it. Okay, good. Because I'm going to go and pick that up. That's a good reference. If you're saying it's a good reference, then I'm going to go ahead and pick that up. Yeah, I have. Thank you. Sure. I have the most recent version of it.

1:14:51 The original one was in 2014, and then it was reprinted in 2022, 2023, and 2024. Yeah, it's an excellent book. It does not go into as much detail, but it is an excellent overview. As a matter of fact, we copied...

1:15:15 when they did our video, I copied the two pages and emailed it to the guy. So he had an overview of the, at the end of the video where it's scrolling, he got a lot of those dates from that book. So yes, it's an excellent book. I use it all the time. As a matter of fact, I use it so often. It's not even out in my studio. I keep it here in my office because I use it.

1:15:44 at least once or twice a week when I'm doing research. So yeah, it's like of the, and again, of the top three books, Operation Gladio by Paul Williams, Danielle Ganser's NATO Secret Armies, and Killing Hope by William Bloom. Those are my top three books that I use the most. Renee, go ahead. Hey, good afternoon, everyone. I hope,

1:16:14 Everyone had a lovely Easter weekend. And I wanted to bring up a little more. I posted in the Purple Pill about the figure when Che Guevara was in Bolivia, the Tanya girl. It's an interesting story. I haven't dug too deeply into it. But best I can tell so far, Tanya was her handle name. She was originally from Argentina.

1:16:41 And though her parents were from, I believe, Europe or whatnot, her last name may have been Bonk or German sounding, whatever. But the best I can tell so far is that they used her, the CIA, in their books and stories as...

1:17:02 They were spinning the story on her saying she was a lover and she was a spy and she was a this and she was a that. As they do, it kind of reminded me of some other stories how the CIA spins it to blur the truth. But it looks like they're through Chase Diaries and another account by a Cuban man.

1:17:34 that was not accurate. So it's a really interesting perspective or another, I guess, pattern example of how the CIA tries to steer the narrative in the story so it covers their tracks. So you almost, when I was researching her a long time ago,

1:17:59 I got the impression that the reason why they were spreading all of that crap about her is because she was one of them. She was actually inserted into the Shea Cavera operation to keep operational tabs on him. I'd have no proof of that. But that was kind of my takeaway, just based on things that other...

1:18:29 operations that we've read about them using women to do that. It's definitely a distinct possibility. But if you do research, always keep that kind of thing in the back of your mind because when they go overboard on something like that, it's usually because they're covering their shit up. Just one of my takeaways.

1:18:55 Yeah. Okay. Thank you. Yeah. It's all, it's kind of all over the place and I haven't done a thorough digging on it, but I, yeah, I, it can possibly be both ways as everything is because they, it reminded me of well, it reminds me of the book you're doing with

1:19:16 Yeah. With CanCon and Ash. Yes. And then it reminded me of the book. I read a book on In Search of the Jackal. Yes. Because these authors get led in the wrong direction and twisted and turned. But it's because of the propaganda and the story spinning of the propaganda by the CIA. Some of them willingly.

1:19:45 do that. Some of them are misled. Others are helping them craft the story. Yeah, it's crazy confusing. And if you think about it from a CIA's perspective, and I hate that I've gotten really good at seeing how they operate, where else but Argentina, because that's Shea Cabrera, would you go to get someone that you're going to insert into his operation?

1:20:15 that would have the most credibility of being able to get into his inner circle, you would go to Argentina. True, true, true, true. Yeah. Thank you. It is really scary. Sean, go ahead. Hi, Colonel. I just wanted to know if you've seen that TV show, Netflix show, Narcos. Have you seen that? No. Okay. It's a story about two CIA agents.

1:20:45 And their involvement in the war against drugs in Colombia against Pablo Escobar. Basically, it was a big hit on Netflix. And it's basically the opening credits of the show are very interesting because they the pictures in there, they show two people, pictures of two people. I guess they are the guys, the actual guys, CIA agents who are involved in.

1:21:12 the war on drugs in Columbia. And, um, these two guys apparently wrote this story and it's their story basically. And, uh, I was just wondering about, could you elaborate on that about the CIA's involvement in the media and in Hollywood and in Netflix and so on, they, um, create these TV shows that glorify themselves in their, their operations. They do. Um, you know,

1:21:40 Probably the one that's most relevant to our story that we've come across lately was the A-Team. You know, because in the United States in the 1980s, the A-Team was, you know, basically these military people that ironically was in Vietnam and supposedly went rogue and were on the run.

1:22:07 And they hide out in downtown Los Angeles and do good things. Well, the A-teams that were in Vietnam didn't do good things. And so, again, you come across, you come away from watching that show as these former military guys being the good guys.

1:22:31 And we have talked, I mean, a couple of years ago, and I've done shows with Alpha about this, that we found out by name several of the CIA agents that were actually stationed in Hollywood. They wrote scripts. They edited scripts. The CIA paid for production of scripts.

1:22:58 At one point, and that was revealed in the congressional commissions in the mid-1970s, is they basically owned ABC Studios through a proprietary. And so the CIA has been embedded in the whole movie industry for a very, very, very long time.

1:23:23 They do the exact same thing with Hollywood that they do with the mainstream media. And this has been proven all over the world. They go into countries that they're gonna overthrow and they will buy media. The whole running of Radio Free Europe and the Swan Island radio station where they were doing all of the propaganda into Latin America and Cuba specifically.

1:23:52 This is the business they're in. And they've been doing it this entire time. So there's literally nothing off limits. The Congress for Cultural Freedom was 100% a CIA operation. And it basically co-opted artists and like the...

1:24:18 Not Hollywood, but like the second order film festivals and stuff like that. It was 100% CIA and they paid people to do whatever it was that they wanted to culturally influence. That was done decades ago. So you have, that's why I.

1:24:42 at this point, make the comment that our entire world is a hologram. We literally today, if you reached out and touched anything in your world, whether it's a radio station, a social media platform, a movie, you have no idea what's real and what's not real because of their almost total control of the operational environment that we all live in.

1:25:11 You have no idea what's real. They have literally touched everything. And by touch, I mean like owned it. So entire airlines, Pan America, TWA was, what's the other one? Eastern. So I found out that Eastern Airline had a lot of interplay with.

1:25:38 the CIA back in the day. So it's, again, you have no idea. You look at Congress in the United States, you have no idea who's real and who's not. There are people that are sitting in Congress that are, and I'm not just talking about the ones that we know were quote unquote former CIA. You have no idea. You have no idea who's running the government that is or is not either bought

1:26:08 100% by the CIA or influenced by them. It's literally like you're living in a hologram. Yes, Evergreen. You don't have to remind me every single time. Somebody over in Rumble said, yes, Evergreen. I know, I worked for Evergreen. And again, I worked for Evergreen Airlines as a maintenance troop. And I thought it was a little fishy where they had all of these weird countries they flew into, but I had no idea that that airline,

1:26:38 was intimately involved in flying guns down to Latin America and drugs into the United States into their primary maintenance location just outside of Tucson, Arizona. And because they had UPS contracts, they legitimately flew everywhere. And the entire thing was basically fake.

1:27:06 They had a whole helicopter division that was contracted to the CIA off and on. So we literally have no idea what's real and what's not real in our world. Okay, Renee, go ahead. Yeah, I have one more pattern I was kind of unfolding. I recognized recently.

1:27:38 Starting off with Cuba and the Guantanamo Bay. And I'm just curious if you ever ran under the pattern of the locations internationally of the YMCAs. Oh, yeah. Yeah. Okay. That's a big rabbit hole. Yeah. I didn't realize.

1:27:55 I never knew that they were in the Philippines and Hong Kong and et cetera, so forth. Okay. Well, I just wanted to throw that out there and see what your response was. Yes. All right. Thank you. That is its own rabbit hole. Yeah. And the fact that it was among initially, I guess, back in the 1800s, among the first NGOs and was connected.

1:28:24 I guess the treasurer was J.P. Morgan and Eli High Root and the Carnegie Foundation, yada, yada, Pilgrim Society. Okay. Just was checking. Was just checking. Thank you. Yes. Yes. And that's why I say there's literally nothing around you that is real. Nothing. You just, you, after all.

1:28:49 All of these years, it's like you just stumble across the whole religious organizations. You know, we've learned so much about so many of them and their affiliations with intelligence. And if you think about it, it makes sense, especially in the Catholic church where you're going to confession. They literally know everything about you.

1:29:15 And I think it was William Colby, himself a Catholic, that made the comment that the Catholic Church has the largest intelligence gathering capability of anything in the entire world, and there's not even a close second. So it's crazy. All right, guys, that's it for today.

1:29:49 We're going to stop there and we will keep going tomorrow. Let's take a look at the schedule. It doesn't, it looks like everything's on normal glide slope for this week. So we don't have any.

1:30:20 conflicts or anything like that. So it should be just a normal week, four o'clock. All right. Take care, everybody. I will see you tomorrow. Have a nice evening.

Entities here

CIA50 United States25 Bolivia25 Vietnam25 Che Guevara25 South Vietnam20 Ngo Dinh Diem16 Edward Lansdale16 William Colby15 John F. Kennedy15 1963 South Vietnamese coup12 Cuba12 John Richardson11 Walt Rostow9 René Barrientos Ortuño8 Lyndon B. Johnson8 208 Committee7 Fidel Castro7 France6 Richard Helms6 John Tilton5 Felix Rodriguez5 Dwight D. Eisenhower5 Regis Debray5 Tania Parajón5 Gilbert Lawton5 Bolivian Diary5 Desmond Fitzgerald5 Lucien Conein4 Laos4 Robert F. Kennedy4 Maxwell D. Taylor4 Douglas Henderson4 Antonio Arce4 Project Tiger4 Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group3 Roswell Gilpatric3 John McCone3 Gustavo Villada3 Philippines3

Claims made here

Lyndon B. Johnson appointed Richard Helms book_quoted ▶ 9:13

“John McComb over disputes with the president, William Rayburn, perhaps for lack of them. But in 1965, when President Johnson appointed Admiral Rayburn, he simultaneously made Richard Helms deputy dire…”

Lyndon B. Johnson appointed William Raborn book_quoted ▶ 9:13

Richard Helms appointed Desmond Fitzgerald book_quoted ▶ 9:42

“choose who was going to be that new person. For the DO boss, the selection was between Helms' longtime associate, Thomas Karaminis, and Desmond Fitzgerald. When Desmond Fitzgerald saw what had happene…”

Lyndon B. Johnson retitled 208 Committee book_quoted ▶ 10:11

“the CIA's clandestine services. Covert action. Helms exacted the promise that Desmond Fitzgerald would weed out useless covert operations. The Cuba Project was one of the first to take a hit. Subtle c…”

McGeorge Bundy headed 208 Committee book_quoted ▶ 11:11

“Primacy of the National Security Advisor as chairman of this 303 committee had become established. Until February 1966, this would be Mac Bundy. For a month or so after Robert Comer, then the chairman…”

Walt Rostow headed 208 Committee book_quoted ▶ 11:11

208 Committee funded Movement for National Revolution book_quoted ▶ 13:42

“In August 1963, the special group approved secret funds for Washington's favorite party in Bolivia and began to interfere in the 1964 elections. Between 63 and 65, the CIA would spend $1.2 million to …”

208 Committee funded René Barrientos Ortuño book_quoted ▶ 14:49

“Barracentos Fortuno, a vice president in the coalition, launched a military coup that swept away the democratically elected president. Two months later, the 303 committee approved more cash for the mi…”

208 Committee funded René Barrientos Ortuño book_quoted ▶ 15:21

“In the face of political opposition, Baratentos jailed opponents and canceled elections. Gee, that seems like a pattern. The 303 committee nevertheless authorized even more money in July of 1965 and e…”

CIA produced_analysis_of Che Guevara book_quoted ▶ 16:26

“to push back against the CIA and their preferred military dictator. Slow to appreciate the emerging differences between Fidel and Che Guevara, the CIA produced an analysis of economic policy disputes …”

Desmond Fitzgerald asserted Che Guevara book_quoted ▶ 16:56

“caught the flavor of the dispute, but the agency wouldn't accept it. There were other Che Cavera sightings too, resulting in Langley's determination to get him at all costs. But not everyone believed.…”

Che Guevara arrived_in Bolivia book_quoted ▶ 17:29

“in the Dominican Republic. Despite Fitzgerald's observation to Ambassador Douglas Henderson, the CIA's secret war against Che Guevara came to a head in Bolivia. And in 1967, Che had arrived in the cou…”

Che Guevara used_passport_of Uruguay book_quoted ▶ 17:29

Tania conveyed Regis Debray book_quoted ▶ 22:43

“A revolutionary groupie had originally conveyed Debray to Shea and stayed on the Shea Caveras within their group. Debray, a Frenchman and revolutionary theorist, later wrote at length about Shea Caver…”

Walt Rostow asserted Che Guevara book_quoted ▶ 23:38

“Meanwhile, the Washington merry-go-round continued. On May 11th, Walt Rostow told LBJ that based on Debray's interrogations, that Shea Cavera could actually be in Bolivia and not dead at all. Quote, a…”

CIA asserted Che Guevara book_quoted ▶ 24:31

“personally directing Bolivian guerrilla activities and has been physically present with the guerrillas, unquote. But a DIA report stated that Che Guevara had recently been executed in Cuba. As of mid-…”

Tom Karamanenis succeeded Desmond Fitzgerald book_quoted ▶ 26:32

“not just in Bolivia, but in Washington. Desmond Fitzgerald had collapsed playing tennis and died. Tom Karamanis succeeded in leadership to the DO. It fell to him to take the news to Helms. Although He…”

Felix Rodriguez arrived_in Bolivia book_quoted ▶ 27:05

“Another Forrest Gump moment. In early August, Felix Rodriguez and Gustavo Valdado arrived in Bolivia and began their special mission, joined by a third Cuban exile agent. They met with Interior Secret…”

Gustavo Villada arrived_in Bolivia book_quoted ▶ 27:05

Antonio Arce provided_cover_for Felix Rodriguez book_quoted ▶ 27:05

Bolivian 2nd Ranger Battalion captured Che Guevara book_quoted ▶ 28:02

“completed training the Bolivian 2nd Rangers, which took the field in mid-September. After about 10 days, they caught Che Guevara's band near a village. The CIA's Felix Rodriguez joined the Rangers to …”

René Barrientos Ortuño refused Douglas Henderson book_quoted ▶ 29:03

“tried to convince Barastanos that Che Guevara captured, he would be brought to the capital for interrogation. Barastanos demurred, afraid of the unrest that could accompany Che's arrival, captive or n…”

Douglas Henderson tried_to_convince René Barrientos Ortuño book_quoted ▶ 29:03

Felix Rodriguez passed_order_to Jaime Terán book_quoted ▶ 29:56

“including his Bolivian diary, and talked to the Argentina revolutionary. Shea proved quite willing to discuss revolution, but refused to answer questions about the mission. Then came a call on a field…”

Jaime Terán assassinated Che Guevara book_quoted ▶ 30:26

“Rodriguez passed the order along. Sergeant Jamie Teran did the deed. Now, again, there's a lot of controversy about all of this. The CIA wanted Sheikha Vera dead more than anybody. And Felix Rodriguez…”

CIA interfered_in Bolivia book_quoted ▶ 34:47

“in which he not only revealed giving the diary to Castro, but that he himself had worked for the CIA, charging the agency with interfering in the internal affairs of Bolivia. Arrudes finally returned …”

Antonio Arce fled_to Mexico book_quoted ▶ 34:47

Antonio Arce fled_to Havana book_quoted ▶ 34:47

Antonio Arce worked_for CIA book_quoted ▶ 34:47

John Tilton sent_to Vietnam book_quoted ▶ 35:19

“He had with him Che Guevara's disguise and his embalmed hands that the CIA and their operatives had cut off. Not long afterwards, John Tilton, the former CIA chief, was sent to Vietnam as the last dir…”

CIA overthrew Fulgencio Batista book_quoted ▶ 35:52

“of quote-unquote self-determination and democracy is laughable. No one elected Castro, true enough, but the confessed goals of the Cuba project had been to get rid of him, after which Cuba themselves …”

CIA supported Fulgencio Batista book_quoted ▶ 36:22

“and installed Batista. And they haven't installed a democratically elected president in any of their coups. The agency supported the Cuban exiles, but the CIA had also supported Batista. And no one ha…”

Edward Lansdale managed Operation Mongoose documented ▶ 39:02

“Moving on to Chapter 15, where we get into Southeast Asia. Although not cut from the same cloth as Maxwell Taylor, Ed Lansdale also considered himself something of a theorist. Managing Operation Mongo…”

Edward Lansdale appointed Ngo Dinh Diem documented ▶ 40:35

“and provide medical help to villagers, all under the guise of helping but inserting spies along the way. General Lansdale also happened to be an American behind the rise of South Vietnamese President …”

Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered_assassination_of Patrice Lumumba host_asserted ▶ 42:03

“He spoke with Diem and other Vietnamese as well as embassy people. Compiling in his report on the plane to Washington, he submitted it. Oh my gosh, that famous date again, January 17th. You know, the …”

Walt Rostow showed Edward Lansdale documented ▶ 44:01

“Foundation for more democratic government. Not the democratic government you and I think about. One controlled by these guys. The report created a stir in Washington. Walt Rostow showed it to the pres…”

Robert F. Kennedy asked Edward Lansdale documented ▶ 44:35

“You know, Eisenhower never mentioned any of this. He talked in length of Laos, but never said a word about Vietnam. The Secretary of Defense wanted to hear from the author himself. Robert McNamara ask…”

John P. Cabot Lodge overrode Edward Lansdale documented ▶ 45:06

“Maybe because he thought you were crazy. Several attempts to assign Lansdell to Vietnam were blocked until 1965 when none other than Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge overrode all opposition. In the meanti…”

John F. Kennedy approved Roswell Gilpatric documented ▶ 48:34

“Still, the Gilpatrick group came to President Kennedy with a list of 40 items. Kennedy's decision set a course for the American experience in Vietnam. Between doing nothing and committing U.S. forces,…”

John F. Kennedy ordered Operation Farm Gate documented ▶ 51:31

“almost like they ignored him. The same day he sent Taylor and Rostow to Saigon, JFK ordered a training squadron to be operational on November 16th, 1961. It flew missions under code name Farmgate. The…”

William Colby created Project Tiger documented ▶ 54:58

“quote-unquote politicians they're propping up got pissed off. Another task on the CIA's list was to infiltrate North Vietnam using Vietnamese special forces, people that the CIA had trained as early a…”

Gilbert Lawton ran Project Tiger documented ▶ 57:37

“It made no difference. They were just sending these people to their death. Colonel Gilbert Layton of the Army ran the Combined Services Division of Colby CIA Station, controlling Project Tiger and oth…”

CIA organized Village Defense Program documented ▶ 59:49

“For self-defense, an upland counterpart of strategic hamlets. Then for border control, the tribal units became the basis for a striking force called the Village Defense Program by the CIA and civilian…”

William Colby succeeded Desmond Fitzgerald documented ▶ 1:00:45

“known as Operation Switchback. By the time Colonel Layton transferred to Thailand in 65, the program was well-established. They had up to 80 camps. And he goes to Thailand, where they're going to run …”

John Richardson followed William Colby documented ▶ 1:01:17

“John Richardson followed Colby in Saigon. From the Army's Counterintelligence Corps, Richardson had an authentic espionage. He had been a espionage hero during World War II. He had been instrumental i…”

William Colby introduced John Richardson documented ▶ 1:02:19

“He had worked in Vienna and Therese and moved to Saigon from Manila, Philippines. You know, another terrorist training place. Colby introduced Richardson to Nguyen Dinh Ngu, now head of Diem's intelli…”

Roger Hilsman instructed Lucien Conein documented ▶ 1:05:56

“and CIA officer Alfonso G. Sparrow to tell the generals the U.S. was fine with the coup. Richardson reported the maneuver through CIA channels. McCone went on to oppose, supposedly, the coup initiativ…”

John P. Cabot Lodge transferred John Richardson documented ▶ 1:07:01

“had undermined him. The ambassador insisted on transferring the station chief. He specifically wanted Ed Lansdell to replace Jocko. Yeah, like Ed Lansdell's any better, because he's not. Then, no, two…”

Lucien Conein involved_in Assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem host_asserted ▶ 1:07:29

“For a time, the Vietnamese generals backed down. But two days before Richardson's hurried recall, they told Koenig of a new coup plan. That coup took place on November 1st, 1963. The CIA put up $40,00…”

CIA funded 1963 South Vietnamese coup documented ▶ 1:07:29

Edward Lansdale regretted 1963 South Vietnamese coup documented ▶ 1:08:30

“Two decades later, for his opinion, the U.S. support for the Diem coup, Ed Lansdale replied, quote, I think we should never have done it. We destroyed the Vietnamese constitution. I'm sorry, I did tha…”

Paul L. Williams founded Operation Gladio (book by Paul Williams) book_quoted ▶ 1:15:44

“at least once or twice a week when I'm doing research. So yeah, it's like of the, and again, of the top three books, Operation Gladio by Paul Williams, Danielle Ganser's NATO Secret Armies, and Killin…”

Danielle Ganser founded NATO Secret Armies book_quoted ▶ 1:15:44

William Black founded Killing Hope book_quoted ▶ 1:15:44

William Colby spied_on Catholic Church host_asserted ▶ 1:29:15

“And I think it was William Colby, himself a Catholic, that made the comment that the Catholic Church has the largest intelligence gathering capability of anything in the entire world, and there's not …”