The Colonel's Corner Safe for Democracy Part 19 (20)

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Transcript

0:00 Hello, Miss Bridget. How are you doing today? It's 80 degrees today. 80? Six on Monday, 80 on Thursday. How about that? I'm jealous. It's supposed to be 90 for the next, like, three days. We had to have jackets today. It's really windy down here. We're real close to the water. And it's still chilly down here. But I do have to start off with a funny.

0:30 We were down here about the same campground in about 2021, I think it was. And we went to this local winery. And we walked in and there was this Karen behind the counter. And it was before I started doing podcasts or anything. But I did post about this. That just went apeshit crazy when we walked in because we didn't have masks on.

1:00 And literally all we wanted to do was walk out to this open venue where they have food trucks and stuff like that outside. But you have to go into the gift shop to pay to get into the venue. And again, it was like she went off her rocker. So I was in my normal, you know, mode of fuck you.

1:27 I'm not putting on a mask. If you don't want my money, that's fine. So we turned around and left. So the other day, since being down here, I have cousins that live down here. We went to breakfast with them and come to find out my cousin knows the owner of this winery. And I don't know that it's the same winery. So she was telling us all about it. They have music every afternoon and a food truck. And they had a tribute band for Creedence Clearwater Revival.

1:55 And so we had all as a group, there's several of us down here, decided to go to the winery. We pull up and we went, oh my God, this is the Karen Winery. And so we went in and wonderful time. But I do want to give everybody a heads up. I've had a glass of wine at lunch. Hold your head, boy, it's going to get crazy. So if I slur my words or I'm like off the rocker more than I normally am, I'm blaming that.

2:25 So there's just so much crap going on. I do want to, I bookmarked this post because I'm going to go back and say something. So I get that there's water weather modification going on. I get that they're spraying the skies in the United States. I'm fully aware of that.

2:53 I know that NOAA has that mission. There's NOAA contracts to companies all over the United States that does that. But when somebody posts a picture of a C-135 with a oval track of flight and say that aircraft is doing weather modifications.

3:23 You literally just have to chuckle. First of all, the person making the post doesn't know anything about the Air Force, probably doesn't even know what a KC-135 is or what it looks like on a radar screen. It looks like it's flying a racetrack because that's what they do. And they have pre-designated.

3:49 flight areas for safety purposes. They sector off all of the airspace and there are restricted airspaces for known heavy military, like I'll never forget this, the sector that we flew in down on the Keys when I got to fly the F-16 was called 465. It's a sector that is cordoned off in all civil aircraft for a

4:17 particular altitude and the coordinates of that block are never vectored into that because they're literally doing dogfights. It is basically restricted for that type of, and there's several off the coast of Florida because there's one mid coast of Florida and there's one up by Pensacola where fighter aircraft can go out there and be safe from civilian aircraft.

4:47 And anybody that's ever looked at a flight map knows where those are. And I just, I think it's funny that people, they discredit their entire narrative of the fact that there's these activities going on when they put bullshit. So is it on purpose? I don't know. But if you honestly care about weather modification, don't do that. That's just retarded. Because you basically...

5:14 diminish the point that you're trying to make if you're an honest broker and worried about that by posting bullshit stuff. Does the Air Force have aircraft that have a spray mission? Yes, they do. But they're C-130s, not C-135s.

5:33 C-130s have spray packages and they have been tasked to go down to like Latin America and spray for mosquitoes and stuff like that. There are legitimate spray missions and the aircraft are equipped to do that. Those aircraft that are in the Air Force fleet are not weather modification aircraft. Sorry, they're just not.

6:00 And if you read the fine print on this little image that's on there, it's possible. Well, it's possible I'm an alien. I assure you I'm not, but it's possible. So again, if you're trying to make a point about something seriously, don't do stupid shit that discredits yourself while you're trying to do that. It doesn't help the narrative. Amen. Okay.

6:38 So since Cuba is so much in the news, which so happens like everything that we do in this space, the things that we talk about somehow crop up in the news tangentially to the time we're talking about them. It's really, really kind of freaky. So I don't spend a lot of time thinking about that. But we're talking about Cuba. We were talking about Cuba yesterday. So we're going to keep going on the story. Okay.

7:09 A different story of the vendetta against Castro is told by the Cuban exiles themselves. For the most part, the exiles ardently believed, with some justification, that they created a resistance of which the CIA took advantage. As agency reports noted, soon after Batista's fall, the romance of the revolution wore off quickly.

7:37 And by the spring of 1959, disillusioned Cubans scattered at first, but gradually building links to oppose Castro. The communist question, whether the maximum leader was one or not, predominated for them. Cuban government, repression, and property seizures drove more and more opposition. In February 1959,

8:06 50 men went back into the Sierra Matras under Manuel Artime, a former Batista military commander who had sided with Castro, styling themselves as the commandos rurales. They taught reading to illiterate peasants.

8:32 Several contingents of these workers for the revolution made progress until Havana ordered them to substitute the different educational doctrine. That became the last straw for yet more Cubans. By the summer, opponents had began to coalesce. Dominican dictator Trujillo backed a plot against Fidel in August.

9:04 But the Fidelist broke it up. They purged the army of all former Batista elements. Actually, I don't know why they didn't do that to begin with, but whatever. The October featured the Red Terror. It progressed with Havana ordering the arrest of the remaining Commando Royalists.

9:32 as well as some revolutionary leaders like Huber Matos, now accused of fomenting a revolt against Castro. Days later came the death of another admired comandante, Camillo Cienfrutos, who disappeared under mysterious circumstances after arresting Matos.

10:02 In November 59, Dr. Manuel Francisco Artime and other military men organized one anti-Castro group. A month later, Rogelio Gonzalez Corso, Hegnino Nino Diaz, and others created another umbrella organization called MRR.

10:34 which stood basically for Movement of Revolution. Soon, it would be the mainstay of the resistance. On February 5th, 1960, students in Havana mounted a popular protest against visiting Russian Minister Mikoyan, and guerrilla activities began in some nearby mountains a few weeks later.

11:04 Emilio Duex became a key rebel field commander. And Gonzales Corso, who took the name Francisco, took the movement underground in order to coordinate it. By April, the MRR network extended to all of the provinces.

11:35 plethora of rebel movements sprouting up everywhere. In July, the newly created FRD voted Francisco their chief in Cuba. Six weeks later, desperate for supplies, Francisco secretly made his way to the U.S. to try to synchronize the resistance with outside aid. Gonzalez Corso certainly encountered the CIA.

12:04 not just the exile organization. For when he returned to Cuba on a US submarine, he had gifts, even for his fiance. What opposition existed inside Cuba remained uncertain. Nino Diaz had his band in the hills outside of Guantanamo. They never went into battle.

12:35 Always was complaining about the shortage of recruits. Soon turned up in Miami to make cause with the exiles. Our Times Underground dissipated after his letter of resignation appeared on the front page of the Havana newspaper. Our Time went into hiding and arranged for Americans to smuggle him off the island. Cuban engineer Manuel Rey.

13:01 who had been an M-26 underground boss for Havana and then Castro's Minister of Public Works, also claimed to be organizing a network and wanted CIA help. While Francisco attempted to coordinate with the anti-Castro forces outside Cuba, Deputy Lino Fernandez took over. He called himself Orheda.

13:32 He passed along important intelligence that MRR agents acquired. Orjeda had to deal with another rebel commander, Prito, who insisted he had contact with the Americans and direct support from the CIA. Prito wanted to be taken to the rebels in Escambray. Ojito did as he asked.

14:00 Years later, Lino Fernandez recalled this period painfully. The resistance did not call the CIA, rather the reverse. Resistance member Rafael Quintero makes the same point. He went to the U.S. to get someone, anyone, to agree to help. He had not been looking for a CIA connection. Ojeda insisted he had conversations with the agency people still in Cuba.

14:27 Jim Noel continued to head the Havana station until the U.S. withdrew the embassy in January 1961. Supposedly, he rejected their approach. Meanwhile, they're trying to find them. That's kind of weird. The CIA men wanted to put in our hands the Batista people, members of the army.

14:59 Fernandez said, we didn't like that because we didn't like him. We didn't like Batista. We didn't like his army. They were assholes. We were fighting against Batista for seven years. Why would we want them to join us? Cuban struggled to create a resistance. The former guerrilla chieftain making his point a different way, but the CIA tried to create another internal resistance without taking the trouble to find out what was already there.

15:35 The CIA tried to invent or fabricate opposition inside Cuba while there was already a growing resistant movement. Rafael Quintero recalls being asked by the CIA in March of 1960, how many Cubans were actively against Castro? He put the number at about 5,000. Outside of Miami, Manuel Artime began enlisting volunteers who trained.

16:03 hopefully but rather unrealistically, to join the Cuban resistance that somehow they weren't approaching internally to Cuba. But attitudes towards Batista and Castro's communism remained intrinsically intertwined. Not only for the Cubans, many anti-Castro activists drew the line at working with others they saw as tainted from the Batista years.

16:34 Manuel R. Time threw some of that fodder up. Conversely, others rejected figures they say was too close to Castro or socialism. Manuel Ray, a former member of the MRR, was especially controversial in that way. As a result of these fractions,

17:01 Only in the very last days before the CIA's invasion did the agency's political action people succeed in inducing the Cubans to widen their political council to include Ray. Typically, by that time, agency analyst Glitchkoff at the Miami field office had identified no fewer than 700 distinct anti-Castro groups functioning in Florida. Also, typically,

17:29 An American diplomat in Havana embassy recalls Jim Noel as keeping silent about Manuel Ray at meetings while in the corridors of the CIA station. He repeatedly tarred the man as a socialist, insisting the United States wouldn't work with him. Yet task force boss Esterling thought the station chief liked Ray. Noel himself told a historian, Peter Wyden,

18:00 of the fondness for Ray, claiming to have helped smuggle him out of Cuba and to have engineered the compromise that brought Ray into the Cuban exile community. An anti-Castro opposition certainly existed, but the Cubans themselves, both the internal resistance and the exiles, never succeeded in making it unified or cohesive. For its part, the CIA

18:28 Spurred on by Castro's government measures, Fidel finished nationalizing U.S. businesses in October, almost 550 of them. And he hastened to complete arrangements for a secret war. But the CIA succumbed to some of the cleavages among the Cuban population. It had a heck of a time trying to create the covert

18:59 Action that Eisenhower had requested. Immediate activity at CIA headquarters followed President Eisenhower's August decision. The first move became securing a Central American base to prepare the Cuban exiles for the Bay of Pigs. As Guatemalan station chief years before, Esterling knew the prominent Alejos family.

19:30 and of whom Roberto Alejos owned a mountain plantation he called Helvita, a large secluded ranch. Esterling had his successor, Robert Davis, approach him to basically offer to pay him to use his ranch as a training camp. The task force chief

19:59 cleared the move with the secret war managers. Dulles, Bissell, and others asked him to be the front man in Guatemala. Esterling met with Alejos in Miami. Then both of them flew to Guatemala City aboard an agency aircraft. They left secretly and entered illegally on a mission with the knowledge of the ambassador, but no contact with the embassy.

20:30 except through Davis. The WH4, which is the office, the task force identifier for this effort, chief negotiated an agreement with Guatemalan president Fuentes, allowing the CIA to train troops in his country. You know, because we overthrew the country less than a decade ago. It's been under the CIA's control. So, hey.

21:01 We're gonna call our debt due and we're just gonna use your country to stage a coup in Cuba. Sure, come on in. The plantation became known as Camp Trax, T-R-A-X. At the offices of the task force headquarters, Jake Esterling listened while Alan Dulles laid down the parameters of Project ATE.

21:33 Richard Bissell supplied details. Tracy Barnes, Bissell's assistant, supervised. Richard Helms sat quietly, which was rather out of character for him. Soon Helms stopped coming to project meetings altogether. Beyond his help in drafting the March project proposal, work on a few cables, the peripheral role in one of the aircraft incidents, his role was to stay away.

22:03 Helms read none of the daily message traffic, consulted no one in the staffing area, and made no comments on the plans. Whether Helms absented himself on purpose or for plausible deniability isn't known. In his memoirs, Bissell concedes his uneasy relationship with Helms and attributes his standoffishness to that.

22:36 recollections, Helms writes, only having hesitant feelings regarding the project, piggybacking off of Bissell's memoir to assert that no one ought to have needed the months it took to appreciate the difference between

22:59 creating a World War II-style resistance, as Bissell complains, and that most appropriate CIA role would have been recruiting agents in Castro's government who could have helped blunt his efforts. None of that was tried. It was immediately, we've got to do Bay of Pigs. Thomas Powers attributes Helms' silence to distance for the opposition to the plan.

23:32 Helms focused on running clandestine activities, leaving Cuba entirely to others. Bissell, blaming his own managerial style, later expressed regret at not having taken Helms' input more seriously. Unlike Helms, Richard Bissell had complete faith in Project ATE.

24:02 to subvert Latin American governments. The inherent vulnerability, they called it, and CIA's wealth of know-how, which had resulted from PB's success and Ajax. It furnished the basis for the action, making Cuba just another target. By August, Esterling's people had progressed enough to uncover political

24:31 among the players. Also, the charges of Batista's taint embroiled the very first cadre sent to Florida, which was to USEPA Island for leadership training and the unpleasantness of replicating itself when the agency opened camp tracks.

25:01 So they're going to try to train all of these different factions all together. And I do find the use of Yusepa, the island off the coast of Florida. For those of you who don't know, if you find Fort Myers on the western coast of Florida, there's an island off the coast of that. There's no bridge to the island. Today, it's a beautiful island. I have friends that has a house on Yusepa. I've been there many times.

25:30 Most Floridians have never stepped foot on the island because it is very, very exclusive. It has this huge, beautiful clubhouse. It's kind of like old Florida with the croquet field outside of the clubhouse. It's got some of the biggest banyan trees you've ever seen on the island.

25:52 It's just an amazing place. It's a place where you can take your kids. They can run around the island all day on golf carts and you never have to worry about them. There's no cars on the island. The only way you get there is a boat. A very, very interesting place. Back then, when they're doing this in the 60s, almost none of the current houses that are there today were there. So it's an isolated island and not...

26:20 in the normal area where they train, which indicates to me that this was even more protected than normal because it's not in the Keys, which is a normal place. It was not in the Everglades, which is another place. It was very, very remote. Okay, the result that Richard Bissell writes of

26:54 quote, a thorough education in the difficulty of establishing an effective guerrilla organization, unquote, is what Helms thinks the DDO ought to have known beforehand. By then, Bissell was immersed up to his ears and couldn't turn back. Well, he could have, but he won't. Moreover, the onus remained on his shoulders as the secret warrior put it in an interview in 1976, quote,

27:23 In the preparation for and conduct of the Bay of Pigs, there were an awful lot of operational decisions that I couldn't possibly take back to Alan Dulles, unquote. Tracy Barnes also believed in the Cuba project. Helms saw Barnes as someone who could never quite get the hang of secret operations. Rather like...

27:56 despite endless efforts to master a foreign language. Barnes, in Helm's view, had turned in totally unremarkable performances as the station chief in Germany and London. He was promoted by Dulles, remained blissfully unaware of his inadequacies.

28:23 He was, Helms devastatingly noted, quote, a man of Allen Dulles' imagination, unquote. Similarly, the CIA official historian considers that Barnes larded the files with numerous memorandum that went over well-trodden ground, contributing little, in fact, that Barnes had engaged in verbal diarrhea. Those were his exact words. Yet with Richard,

28:53 Bissell preoccupied on many fronts, spy satellites, a new generation of reconnaissance aircraft, the U-2 affair investigation, to which Bissell had to respond. There were other, oh, and there were other CIA operations going on, you know, like in the Congo that he was in charge of as well, because it's going on simultaneously with all this shit. The Cuba project was basically relegated to Tracy Barnes.

29:24 When Cuba was over and the dust was settled, there would be an internal inquiry by the IG Lyman Kirkpatrick, different from the ones of the anti-Castro plots. One of Kirkpatrick's big criticisms would be that the project had not been staffed by the best of the agency's people, which we've heard a couple of times now. Helms agreed. So does agency historian Jack Flagfer.

29:55 It should have been simple to prevent the division chiefs, the CIA barons, from filling the Cuban task force with underproducing case officers by setting a requirement that a certain percentage of the assignees be in the top ranked performance category. You think you're going to overthrow the government? But again, this goes to what we talked about yesterday, where did they really want it to succeed? Did they really?

30:25 Because if you really, really didn't want to have a communist country off the coast of Florida, you might want to put your best people on it. Just a thought. Back in April, with the Cuba project beginning to gain momentum, Dulles had insisted on the best people, but he didn't put the best people on it. The personnel system that was created enabled Jack.

30:58 to ask for particular officers, and if denied, he could appeal that. That would have been appealed to Tracy Barnes, who would take the request to Bissell. As early as April 22nd, Barnes told the DO chief personnel officer that he believed his hiring had a priority. A month later, the official sent the higher-ups a memo demanding help.

31:30 at the DO weekly staff meeting after the president's August decision, the personnel chief reiterated the rules. Division chiefs were to bring disputes to either him or Barnes. The problem lay specifically with the DO. He says that the agency's directorate for support assigned quote unquote excellent people.

32:00 But historians blame CIA procedures for task force and notes that the entire arrangement was scrapped after the failure of the Bay of Pigs. Even by August, Esterling still had a good dozen senior officer vacancies on his task force. Paramilitary Chief Colonel Jack Hawkins joined up in September. By October, the WH-4 task force finally reached.

32:29 to within a few people of its required 235 staff. Meanwhile, they were still adding slots. The counterintelligence chief at Miami base never did get a case officer assistant. In October, there were exactly four CIA trainers at Camp Trax. Its total agency staff numbered nine.

32:59 TRAX lacked any counterintelligence officer for a long time, while Radio Swan spent months looking for an announcer. Late in October, Hawkins renewed the request for Green Beret instructors. The Special Forces trainers, whom Eisenhower approved in August, reached the CIA camps in January of 1961.

33:32 four months later. The IG would record that almost half of those in the top tier of the task force ranked in the bottom third according to performance ratings in the agency. And 20% was in the bottom 10%. Literally the dregs of the CIA.

34:01 The list of underachievers could have started with Tracy Barnes, except that given his post as associate director of the DO, Barnes was exempt from this reigning structure. Nevertheless, this criticism of the Cuba affair may be overblown. Jack Esterling led a task force, many of whose key slots were filled by people who supposedly were specialists.

34:31 And a large segment of them had participated in PB's success. But we all know that PB's success wasn't all that big of a challenge because our bins basically got scared and left. It's not like that was a really big deal. Okay, if you look at the political action staff, Howard Hunt and Dave Phillips were known political operators. And Jerry Droehler, who was...

35:05 supposedly a good guy, though despised for his ambition, he had no Latin American experience either. So he's a guy nobody likes and he has no experience in the theater. So let's just use him. The task force also included Jim Noel, former Havana station chief, his deputy, the Cuban desk officer from the White House division.

35:34 The air boss was Colonel Stanley Beerly, CIA's top airman and the mastermind behind the U-2 operation. His field assistant, Gar Tonsit, Thors Ruck, came from the Tibetan Project and Indonesian before that, where that was another failed coup. Esterling's deputy, Ed Stanulis,

36:05 had been a top planner for the western hemisphere division dick drain was the chief of operations fresh from the service in greece which we destabilized greece from post world war ii right up until the like 1960s coup um and the psychological operation experience

36:34 So let's see, Dick Drain also had psychological operations experience, but he didn't know how to speak Spanish. The closest he'd ever been to Latin America was Arizona. The top trainer at Camp Trax was an Army Special Forces Lieutenant Colonel Frank Egan, E-G-A-N, and Field Commander Hawkins.

37:05 who had participated in World War II amphibious landings and had been a guerrilla commander against the Japanese in the Philippines. In Korea, he had led a battalion during the conflict there. Esterling could navigate the system and ask for people by name. One was Rip Robertson. He had been Pernsada Nangrata to J.C. King after sinking the British freighter.

37:37 During the Guatemalan operation. But enlisting Rip. As a contract officer. Didn't require King's approval. Esterling thought highly of Robertson. And didn't mind bringing him back. Anticipating the need to embark. The exile force. As well as. Needing an airfield. Close to Cuba. CIA planners decided. Nicaraguan.

38:06 Nicaragua offered the best possibilities. Robertson used his connections with the dictator Somoza to obtain a base on Nicaragua's Atlantic coast. The contract officer became the amphibious warfare trainer. Another fresh base was Grayston Lynch. He was a special forces captain. Lynch had been on his way to Laos.

38:38 With another program, when an army friend, a liaison with the CIA, put him in contact with Desmond Fitzgerald. The CIA's Far East Baron began the process of recruiting Lynch. But somewhere in the bureaucracy, the hire simply got lost. Returning from Laos in late 1960, Lynch saw his friend who immediately pulled him into the Cuba group.

39:07 Lynch jumped through all the personnel hoops to enter duty at the CIA in less than a day. He worked for Field Commander Jack Hawkins. Hawkins employed Lynch to train Cuban frogmen and later as a case officer on the landing ship Blagar. Action began in the air. Colonel Beerly managed overhead imagery of Cuba. That meant the U-2.

39:39 Beerly slated a first mission for the same weekend that Francis Gary Powers was shot down in Russia. In early August, the CIA acquired cheaply for exactly $300,000, a little over $300,000, all outstanding shares of Southern Air Transport, another proprietary airline.

40:11 The air cargo firm had four acres of property in Florida, owned one C-46 aircraft and leased another. Planes and crews from Air America, which had just been given birth to out of the ashes of the civil air transport, arrived to beef up the aviation unit. They shuttled between Guatemala and a former Navy airfield at Opelika, Florida.

40:41 where the CIA had set up a massive operation. Bob Davis prepared the airstrip near Camp Trax to be the base for the exile training. He contracted an American company active in Guatemala. Eventually, the strip, slowed by rain through the summer, received its first airplanes. The work completed cost almost $2 million.

41:12 That's double what it was originally budgeted for. Esterling discounted profiteering. The construction had been a fine job completed during the worst season and the airstrip became active in time to receive the first armed shipment. It would be called the Hilton to distinguish it from the other facilities. Esterling's air staff eventually numbered 14. Cuban exiles were recruited as pilots and air crew.

41:44 Almost 100 were screened, but not all signed up. Thorsrud put together five transport and 17 bomber crews. After August, the CIA hired almost 80 Americans from Major General George Doster's Alabama Air National Guard. 80, eight, zero.

42:15 If you look at the number of pilots in a normal state guard, that's like almost all of them, especially in Alabama. 80 is a lot because I don't know how many air wings for the guard had back then in Alabama, but do you normally only have like 30? That would be like three wings worth of pilots. That's a lot.

42:47 And they weren't flying on military duty. They were flying as contractors. That's a lot. I mean, I know about the one crew that eventually the four guys that get shot down, but this is the first time reading this book that I realized it was a lot. It's like almost all of the pilots in the Alabama Guard. The CIA wanted B-25s considering the other aircraft inferior, but couldn't find any.

43:21 For maritime activities, the CIA required another proprietary, a company in the Florida Keys called Mineral Carriers, Inc. Some early sea missions encountered Cuban patrol boats, leading to demands for a well-equipped mothership for small boats plying the Cuban waters. The agency used mineral carriers to cover for two landing ships,

43:52 which it bought for $140,000. Then they spent twice that making modifications to it. The ships were converted to landing craft, basically configured like the World War II landing craft. Their primary purpose was to carry at least 200 people per boat. The CIA bought its first boat.

44:25 the Matusa time in the summer and made it a nautical foray on September 28th, landing several hundred pounds of equipment on a Cuban beach and picking up two men and bringing them back to the United States. A second boat, Sea Grill, became a nightmare. Bought from an oil rig service for $100,000, the boat broke down within yards

44:53 of its dock and then spent months under repair, consuming the full effort of one of the Miami base maritime specialists, repaired just in time for a diversionary mission in conjunction with the invasion. The Seagull did little for the Miami base, but it took up a lot of money. The third CIA boat was 110 foot Tahuna?

45:28 It became the workhorse, though she became active duty in February of 1961. In one month, she carried more material to Cuba than all the previous cruises put together. Eisenhower's August decision upped the ante across the board. Cuban exiles began arriving at Camp Trax, only to have to build facilities to live in.

45:58 Thus, little actual field training occurred initially because they were basically used as labor to build barracks and classrooms. Looking at Castro's large military versus this small CIA force, they decided they needed something more.

46:24 They were told to set up a dozen infiltration teams to link up with Cuban resistance. Colonel Hawkins now got orders to form a larger conventional armed unit to back up the teams. On August 22nd, the lead group of infiltration trainees from Panama, including Manuel Artime, Jose Perez San Ramon, Rafael Quintero, and others arrived at TRAX base.

46:54 By the 27th, quite a few exiles were present. Soon, there was 160. Weapons arrived in late September along with a shadowy staff that included Eastern Europeans, Mexicans, KMT, and Filipinos. Oh, what? Are you telling me they used all of these Gladio operators?

47:27 from all of these other programs in the Bay of Pigs? Are you kidding me? And that's why people who don't understand what this big program is out there, when they read something like this, they can't put it in context. The Eastern Europeans were basically Turkish gray wolves. The Chinese were actually Taiwanese KMT people.

47:57 And we know all about the Philippines and all of their stay behind units that Lansdale and all of those other people created. So they just go pluck them and say, hey, we got a new project over here. Just like you had the Cuban exiles in Angola and all over the world doing all of these other things. They're like a cadre of paramilitary mercenary people that they can deploy on any operation anywhere.

48:30 Among the Filipinos were Jose Valerano, who had begun his CIA contract work with who? Yes, Ed Lansdale. Esterling calls being knocked off his original timetable in August or September for not having this whole crew ready.

48:57 In the fall of 1960, CIA analysts reported Soviet bloc deliveries of equipment to Cuba, including tanks, armored personnel carriers, field guns, and mortars. Castro increased the size of the Cuban army by half and had an additional 200,000 militia. You know, almost like somebody's briefing Castro about all of what's going on so he can be prepared.

49:28 Richard Bissell spoke to Esterling and Jack Hawkins, arguing several times that if the project relied so much on a landing force, this needed to be much larger. Colonel Hawkins agreed. I would talk to Esterling and Hawkins, and I don't think Esterling bought that view, either as completely or as soon as I did, Bissell later told a CIA interviewer.

49:58 Quote, I remember the feeling that I was well ahead of King, perhaps certainly Jake, in the belief that we had to place nearly exclusive reliance on the initial phase of whatever force was possible to land, unquote. Esterling also worried about Castro's military, preferred to go immediately to the active phase, sending in as many Cubans as the CIA had ready.

50:27 perhaps landing them and marching them towards Escambray. Even if they failed, it would simply have been more round of a resistance war and not an obvious CIA operation. Bissell wanted another 1,000 or 1,500 exile troops and eventually forced that change. But the expansion meant you needed more CIA people. Bissell said,

50:57 By late fall 1960, I was greatly concerned that senior officers involved in the operation were overworked and that they were running out of the appropriate personnel to fill the necessary positions. Cuban invasion actually occurred. The higher headquarters would be staffed by almost 600 CIA officers. 600. Those aren't the fighting force.

51:30 They're just going to send the Cubans. On Halloween, over Dulles' signature, headquarters sent revised orders. They contained a new concept. No more than 60 in the infiltration teams. Everyone else would join an assault force. That would consist of one or more infantry battalions. Its mission was to seize and defend lodgements and targets.

52:01 with amphibious and airborne assault. Instructed to count on 1,500 men and told that higher headquarters knew the larger operation needed more time in preparation. Colonel Hawkins should tell the Cubans that a bigger scale strike would be better.

52:23 A reserve unit of several hundred Guatemalans with their own officers who could be landed behind the Cuban assault team also figured into the scheme. The cable noted that the concept was tentatively approved by Dulles and the White House was pending approval. On November 3rd, a few days before the 1960 presidential election, the 5412 group went over the Cuba project. General Cabell

52:52 attended for the CIA. Guess who else was there? General Lansdale. He represented the Office of Special Operations at the Pentagon. Mr. Lansdale himself. Gordon Gray pushed members to report status. The Pentagon worried about the large Castro militia. The State Department's man conjured up the image of a ticking time clock.

53:26 He could foresee that there would occur a time beyond which covert intervention would no longer be feasible. The group also mulled over assassinating Castro, though for security or because he did not know or for other reasons, General Cabell gave the impression the agency had nothing afoot in that area, which again was a bold-faced lie.

53:53 There can be no doubt the revised CIA plan amounted to an invasion. The 5412 group resisted it, making the issue one of the CIA's operations as against a combined agency military one. Because they know they can't do it with this small force. But the invasion plan went forward anyway. It was restricted to about half the several thousand Bissell had...

54:26 pushed for. Eisenhower approved the smaller force. Trax learned the news on November 4th when CIA first briefed the Navy on the plans just before 5412 group. It was the combat unit option that the secret warriors described. Dwight D. Eisenhower, not JFK, holds the responsibility. You know, we're going to blame the new guy. So typical. Okay, that's it for

54:58 We will probably get through this chapter tomorrow. And this chapter just goes through the preparation for it. Chapter 12 actually talks about the actual invasion in a lot of detail. It'll take us a few days to get through that because he spends a lot of time on it. Doesn't that job blending all this and showing the context of how?

55:34 like Air America, how this whole thing just kind of boiled together, you know, like a big stew. They just kept adding to it and adding to it and tweaking it and adding to it. Yeah. And just as a heads up, when we get done with Cuba, which probably will take most of next week, we're going to go on to the Congo. That's one of the next places.

56:02 That we go. He'll come back to Cuba with some of the long-term actions against Castro before we go on to Southeast Asia. But this book is like...

56:19 What we did originally when we first came over to X and did that round the world tour, he's basically taking us through that, but adding a lot more names than we had available for us at the time. Go ahead, SR. Thank you, Colonel. And thank everyone for attending here today on Spaces and on Rumble. The bottom third of graduates.

56:47 tells me that what they were really looking for is these people were going to be sacrificed. They really wanted the U.S. for a land invasion. But the other thing that struck me was Brayston Lynch and what he contributed here and where he went after he was done with all of this. Not only did he holler and complain about Kennedy not giving him the troops he needed.

57:18 But he wound up in the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. He wound up in BNDD. Of course, later it became the DEA. But by then he retired. He passed away in 2008 at 85. So I'm looking at this dude and I'm saying, now, wait a minute here. He even gets.

57:49 uh, recognized by the CIA and, and gets a medal from the CIA to go along with it. And you sit here and say, Oh my God. Yeah. He led the invasion onto the beach. He was the one that started the firefight. If you listen to what was going on or read what was going on, he's got a book out there. I haven't read it, but.

58:16 I'm wondering how much of that really tracks with what really went down. Yeah. Well, their version of everything, despite what's actually been declassified, is that Kennedy's held the responsibility for the entire thing being botched, which, as you guys can tell, just in the research we've done,

58:44 There's no way you can draw that conclusion. I mean, if you were to walk into a situation as an investigator and you didn't know that the entire staffing mechanism of the CIA was basically take all of the dregs of all of these different offices, throw them over in this Bay of Pigs bullshit thing.

59:13 do it basically as an ad hoc operation, which was by design in order to bait JFK into a much bigger land invasion and the use of the military. You could look at the surface pieces of this and the rhetoric.

59:32 and come away with that conclusion. But once you understand the sequence of events, and as we've discovered, and I don't recall, because I read this part probably a couple months ago in the book, if he goes into the same detail that that one book that we were reading did, where it was clear that on the first day of the Bay of Pigs,

1:00:00 The mission was compromised because their idea to have that one bomber land in Miami, like he was confused on where he was. And it was supposedly dressed up like a Cuban Air Force bomber. And this guy was actually pretending to be a Cuban, a no kidding Cuban pilot out of the Cuban Air Force.

1:00:26 And that he had fled the island when, in fact, he was one of these guys. They were training down in Guatemala and Nicaragua to basically add credence to the fact that there was indigenous resistance in Cuba. And with the expectation that the land force was going to succeed that.

1:00:55 it would just add another layer of confirmation that there were rebels among the military willing to leave the country. The problem was when they used the aircraft that the CIA had given him to fly into Miami, it was the wrong model. It was not the same model that Cuba had.

1:01:22 That was noticed as soon as the plane land. The photographers were there and took pictures of it, which of course that was stage two, but someone immediately reported that that's not an actual Cuban airplane. They don't have that model there. That message got immediately broadcasted to everyone paying attention, to include Washington DC, to include the security group.

1:01:50 Kennedy knew at that moment he couldn't authorize a second air campaign because it was already discovered and they were trying to hush it up that the entire air campaign was basically CIA US attacking a foreign country. So at that point, because their OPSEC sucked, Kennedy's hands were tied. He couldn't authorize the second attack.

1:02:21 And everybody leaves that out of the story. Go ahead, SR. The other thing that maybe I misinterpreted what was said or heard it wrong, but the Guatemalan troops, they were going to bring in Guatemalan troops? Yes. Is that the way I understood it? Yes. So not only did they want the U.S. in there, they wanted Guatemalan troops in there as well. Not overtly. They were going to be part of the covert operation.

1:02:53 Oh, okay. Yeah, so we brought the KMT guys in, we brought the Turks in, we brought in the Filipinos, and we were going to bring in some Guatemalans along with all of the Cuban exiles to create this battalion-size invading force. Yeah. It's quite remarkable, actually. But it makes it, again,

1:03:27 The same thing that Bridget and I keep saying all the time, it's a pattern. And when you start digging down into these stories and you get all of these different viewpoints, which is why we don't just read one story about an operation and think we have a handle on the operation, because every author has researched some particular different angle to...

1:03:51 the operation and you learn all of these bits and pieces along the way. There's been several new pieces of information that I picked up when I read this book. And that being one of them, that it operated as a typical Gladio style operation using these pockets of paramilitary capability that has been set up all over the world.

1:04:20 So if you need new people, you've got people in your Rolodex. You can already been trained. They know how to go in and do covert operations. They're good to go. Renee, go ahead. Hey, good afternoon, everybody. Just wanted to share that I posted in the Purple Pill AD class document I found recently that is quite juicy. It's from the JFK assassination files.

1:04:50 And this one particularly really breaks down. The subject of it was Tasks Assigned to the CIA and General Lansdale's Program Review. And it lists the tasks of all the ways they're going to sabotage Cuba, like really from propaganda to sabotaging.

1:05:16 The farms or, you know, the plants. I mean, it's really eye-opening, but it's quite juicy. I highly recommend taking a peek at it. Yeah, I've seen this particular one because this is the one that they talk about destroying the sugar plantations, right? I don't think so, actually. I have seen some of those. That was kind of before.

1:05:42 I think before this, this one. Okay. This one is, let's see, the specific area where it talks about it. I think it's task 21. Yeah. Plans. Yeah. Plans for inducing the failure of crops will be submitted by the 15th of February. These plans will end.

1:06:11 I don't know. Okay. Yeah. The controlled assets who can be infiltrated. Yeah. It's like, I mean, when I read that one, this one, I was like, uh, there you go. And there's another one. And this is the other countries. They're gonna, you know, uh, uh, spook communism. It's yeah. It's really great. It's well-rounded.

1:06:37 Yeah, this one they're talking about the, this is the, I think this is the same one because they're talking about bringing in saboteurs and destroying the plantations. And this one, it says that they're focusing particularly on the rice in the task 21. But yeah, you know what this reminded me of?

1:07:06 This looks like the document Operation Northwood, where it's giving you all of the ways in which they're going to propose to destroy it, or to justify, basically sabotage the country so they can weaken it so that they can overthrow it. And it's interesting to your point, Renee,

1:07:37 That they put all this shit in writing, just like Operation Northwood. Hey, we don't have any problem writing on a piece of paper that we're gonna bomb US cities in order to justify a full ground scale invasion into Cuba. What's a few dead bodies of Americans laying on the ground in major cities if we get to do what we wanna do? 100%, 100%.

1:08:04 And that's the same thing with the sabotage of food supplies in a country like Cuba. You basically have a blockade on it. You are going to purposely go in and destroy their food crops so they can starve, so you can get your shit back. They literally don't care about human life. Speaking of that, I just noticed that,

1:08:34 I'm going to do another one of those off the deep end post. So I'll just warn you guys. I just saw Governor DeSantis. He was making fun of the fact that the Cuban government has offered people, offered up investment opportunities into Cuba. And he made one post earlier today saying something to the effect that

1:09:02 He doesn't think anybody in Hialeah will, which is a predominantly Cuban expat place, would be interesting in investing in Cuba because basically they don't trust the government, which I completely agree with. But then he says in a later post that until the Cuban government gives all of the stuff back that they took,

1:09:30 that basically there's not going to be a favorable investment atmosphere in Cuba. So what I want to ask the good governor is, is he advocating giving United Fruit, which is now Chiquita Banana, all of their plantation back that they got through corrupt land deals?

1:10:02 Is he advocating that William Polly, who had the bus in the air thing there and was paying people pennies on the dollar and got it through giving kickbacks to Batista, how are you going to do that again? How are you going to give the Cuban airline back to a deceased multimillionaire who,

1:10:30 Is he gonna have to pay the kickbacks back that he paid to the Batista government once he gets the airline back? How's all that gonna work? And who's gonna arrange all that stuff? Do you wanna hire Sullivan and Cromwell now that the Dulles brothers are gone to arrange all of those corrupt deals like they did back in the day?

1:10:51 for United Fruit and the oil company and all of them? Do you want Rockefeller Standard Oil back in there after they exploited the people and paid God knows how many kickbacks? Oh, and do you want to bring the mafia and the drug traffickers back too? Do you want them to get their drug networks back? I mean, for Pete's sake, that's such a stupid, stupid thing to say.

1:11:22 I just saw that before I came on the show and I'm like, I'll be late if I do it now. Plus I'll say something I shouldn't. So, which I'm going to anyway, you guys know me better than that. But yeah, come on. Hopefully he hasn't deleted it before I get an opportunity to respond. Crazy ass people. It's obvious they don't read or look back at.

1:11:57 what's really transpired before they open their mouths. Nope. They believe all of the historical talking points. All of these evil dictators were just in it for themselves, stole all of the U.S. oligarch shit, and for no good reason. There was no reason why any of them did any of it.

1:12:25 It's not like there were people being killed. It's not like they were prostituting the kids down there. It's not like the mafia was running the island or anything. Come on, retards. And the worst part about having that conversation is the very first words out of their mouth every single time is, oh, you're a communist sympathizer. No, no, I'm not. Two things can be true at the same time.

1:12:56 I don't think we should have communist governments around the world, but I also don't think you should be exploiting people. Two things can be true at the same time. Well, I think that's gonna do it for today. And so just so that you guys know, we're traveling tomorrow back home. So instead of at noon for War Hamster Show, we're going to do it.

1:13:34 probably closer to one o'clock or 1.30. That'll give me enough time to get home and get set up because I will be joining that army guy that's working in the oil industry over in Russia first thing in the morning on a podcast. And that reminds me, I need to have him send me the link to the first one that we did. So I'm gonna be doing that one at,

1:14:03 Like nine o'clock. It's not a live one. It's recorded. And then we will do our secret society one around one o'clock. It may be closer to one 30, depending on how much traffic going home. And then we'll be back here at four o'clock. So I can't believe it's already Friday, but it is. All right, you guys have a nice day. On the alien perspective.

1:14:34 I'm voting for my favorite Martian. Yeah, I agree. And we do have two shows on Saturday on Tommy's podcast. So again, I will post them like you guys know. He records them and then he puts them out and I repost them. So we have two scheduled for Saturday morning, two different ones with two different groups of people. So that'll be interesting.

1:14:59 with all the stuff that's happened between now and then, the last one I've done with them, which was last weekend. But anyway, all right, guys, I'll see you tomorrow. Take care.

Entities here

Cuba50 CIA26 Richard M. Bissell Jr.25 Florida16 Operation Pluto15 Fidel Castro15 Guatemala10 Richard Helms10 United States10 Fulgencio Batista8 Jack Hawkins8 Allen Dulles8 Tracy Barnes8 Task Force 1577 Grayston Lynch6 Esterling6 Manuel Ray5 Manuel Artime5 Miami5 John F. Kennedy4 MRR4 Lino Fernandez4 South Africa4 Camp Tropicana4 Edward Lansdale4 Dwight D. Eisenhower4 Camp Tzacal4 Rogelio Gonzalez Corso3 J.C. King3 U.S. Air Force3 Jim Noel3 U-2 Affair3 Kuomintang3 William A. Robertson Jr.3 Air America3 Rafael Quintero3 Nicaragua3 Colonel Stanley Beerly3 Operation Mongoose3 Philippines3

Claims made here

Fidel Castro overthrew Fulgencio Batista book_quoted ▶ 7:09

“A different story of the vendetta against Castro is told by the Cuban exiles themselves. For the most part, the exiles ardently believed, with some justification, that they created a resistance of whi…”

Rafael Trujillo attempted_coup_against Fidel Castro book_quoted ▶ 8:32

“Several contingents of these workers for the revolution made progress until Havana ordered them to substitute the different educational doctrine. That became the last straw for yet more Cubans. By the…”

Fidel Castro ordered_assassination_of Huber Matos book_quoted ▶ 9:04

“But the Fidelist broke it up. They purged the army of all former Batista elements. Actually, I don't know why they didn't do that to begin with, but whatever. The October featured the Red Terror. It p…”

Fidel Castro covered_up Camillo Cienfuegos book_quoted ▶ 9:32

“as well as some revolutionary leaders like Huber Matos, now accused of fomenting a revolt against Castro. Days later came the death of another admired comandante, Camillo Cienfrutos, who disappeared u…”

Rogelio Gonzalez Corso founded MRR book_quoted ▶ 10:02

“In November 59, Dr. Manuel Francisco Artime and other military men organized one anti-Castro group. A month later, Rogelio Gonzalez Corso, Hegnino Nino Diaz, and others created another umbrella organi…”

Nino Diaz founded MRR book_quoted ▶ 10:02

Manuel Artime member_of MRR book_quoted ▶ 10:02

Rogelio Gonzalez Corso recruited CIA book_quoted ▶ 11:35

“plethora of rebel movements sprouting up everywhere. In July, the newly created FRD voted Francisco their chief in Cuba. Six weeks later, desperate for supplies, Francisco secretly made his way to the…”

CIA supplied_arms_to Rogelio Gonzalez Corso book_quoted ▶ 12:04

“not just the exile organization. For when he returned to Cuba on a US submarine, he had gifts, even for his fiance. What opposition existed inside Cuba remained uncertain. Nino Diaz had his band in th…”

Lino Fernandez member_of MRR book_quoted ▶ 13:01

“who had been an M-26 underground boss for Havana and then Castro's Minister of Public Works, also claimed to be organizing a network and wanted CIA help. While Francisco attempted to coordinate with t…”

Lino Fernandez spied_on Fidel Castro book_quoted ▶ 13:32

“He passed along important intelligence that MRR agents acquired. Orjeda had to deal with another rebel commander, Prito, who insisted he had contact with the Americans and direct support from the CIA.…”

Jim Noel headed CIA book_quoted ▶ 14:27

“Jim Noel continued to head the Havana station until the U.S. withdrew the embassy in January 1961. Supposedly, he rejected their approach. Meanwhile, they're trying to find them. That's kind of weird.…”

CIA trained Manuel Artime book_quoted ▶ 15:35

“The CIA tried to invent or fabricate opposition inside Cuba while there was already a growing resistant movement. Rafael Quintero recalls being asked by the CIA in March of 1960, how many Cubans were …”

Jim Noel covered_up Manuel Ray book_quoted ▶ 17:29

“An American diplomat in Havana embassy recalls Jim Noel as keeping silent about Manuel Ray at meetings while in the corridors of the CIA station. He repeatedly tarred the man as a socialist, insisting…”

Jim Noel recruited Manuel Ray book_quoted ▶ 18:00

“of the fondness for Ray, claiming to have helped smuggle him out of Cuba and to have engineered the compromise that brought Ray into the Cuban exile community. An anti-Castro opposition certainly exis…”

CIA funded Operation Mongoose book_quoted ▶ 18:59

“Action that Eisenhower had requested. Immediate activity at CIA headquarters followed President Eisenhower's August decision. The first move became securing a Central American base to prepare the Cuba…”

Richard M. Bissell Jr. recruited Roberto Alejos book_quoted ▶ 19:30

“and of whom Roberto Alejos owned a mountain plantation he called Helvita, a large secluded ranch. Esterling had his successor, Robert Davis, approach him to basically offer to pay him to use his ranch…”

Roberto Alejos provided_bridge_financing_for Camp Tzacal book_quoted ▶ 21:01

“We're gonna call our debt due and we're just gonna use your country to stage a coup in Cuba. Sure, come on in. The plantation became known as Camp Trax, T-R-A-X. At the offices of the task force headq…”

Richard Helms covered_up Operation Mongoose book_quoted ▶ 21:33

“Richard Bissell supplied details. Tracy Barnes, Bissell's assistant, supervised. Richard Helms sat quietly, which was rather out of character for him. Soon Helms stopped coming to project meetings alt…”

Richard M. Bissell Jr. headed Operation Mongoose book_quoted ▶ 21:33

Tracy Barnes headed Operation Mongoose book_quoted ▶ 28:53

“Bissell preoccupied on many fronts, spy satellites, a new generation of reconnaissance aircraft, the U-2 affair investigation, to which Bissell had to respond. There were other, oh, and there were oth…”

Jack Hawkins member_of Task Force 157 book_quoted ▶ 32:00

“But historians blame CIA procedures for task force and notes that the entire arrangement was scrapped after the failure of the Bay of Pigs. Even by August, Esterling still had a good dozen senior offi…”

Richard M. Bissell Jr. headed Task Force 157 book_quoted ▶ 34:01

“The list of underachievers could have started with Tracy Barnes, except that given his post as associate director of the DO, Barnes was exempt from this reigning structure. Nevertheless, this criticis…”

David Atlee Phillips member_of Task Force 157 book_quoted ▶ 34:31

“And a large segment of them had participated in PB's success. But we all know that PB's success wasn't all that big of a challenge because our bins basically got scared and left. It's not like that wa…”

E. Howard Hunt member_of Task Force 157 book_quoted ▶ 34:31

Jim Noel member_of Task Force 157 book_quoted ▶ 35:05

“supposedly a good guy, though despised for his ambition, he had no Latin American experience either. So he's a guy nobody likes and he has no experience in the theater. So let's just use him. The task…”

Jerry Droller member_of Task Force 157 book_quoted ▶ 35:05

Colonel Stanley Beerly member_of Task Force 157 book_quoted ▶ 35:34

“The air boss was Colonel Stanley Beerly, CIA's top airman and the mastermind behind the U-2 operation. His field assistant, Gar Tonsit, Thors Ruck, came from the Tibetan Project and Indonesian before …”

Gar Tonsit member_of Task Force 157 book_quoted ▶ 35:34

Dick Drain member_of Task Force 157 book_quoted ▶ 36:05

“had been a top planner for the western hemisphere division dick drain was the chief of operations fresh from the service in greece which we destabilized greece from post world war ii right up until th…”

Edward Stanulis member_of Task Force 157 book_quoted ▶ 36:05

Frank Egan member_of Task Force 157 book_quoted ▶ 36:34

“So let's see, Dick Drain also had psychological operations experience, but he didn't know how to speak Spanish. The closest he'd ever been to Latin America was Arizona. The top trainer at Camp Trax wa…”

William A. Robertson Jr. recruited Grayston Lynch book_quoted ▶ 38:38

“With another program, when an army friend, a liaison with the CIA, put him in contact with Desmond Fitzgerald. The CIA's Far East Baron began the process of recruiting Lynch. But somewhere in the bure…”

Jack Hawkins trained Grayston Lynch book_quoted ▶ 39:07

“Lynch jumped through all the personnel hoops to enter duty at the CIA in less than a day. He worked for Field Commander Jack Hawkins. Hawkins employed Lynch to train Cuban frogmen and later as a case …”

Grayston Lynch member_of CIA book_quoted ▶ 39:07

CIA financed_via Southern Air Transport book_quoted ▶ 39:39

“Beerly slated a first mission for the same weekend that Francis Gary Powers was shot down in Russia. In early August, the CIA acquired cheaply for exactly $300,000, a little over $300,000, all outstan…”

CIA funded Camp Tropicana book_quoted ▶ 40:41

“where the CIA had set up a massive operation. Bob Davis prepared the airstrip near Camp Trax to be the base for the exile training. He contracted an American company active in Guatemala. Eventually, t…”

CIA recruited Alabama National Guard book_quoted ▶ 41:44

“Almost 100 were screened, but not all signed up. Thorsrud put together five transport and 17 bomber crews. After August, the CIA hired almost 80 Americans from Major General George Doster's Alabama Ai…”

CIA financed_via Mineral Carriers, Inc. book_quoted ▶ 43:21

“For maritime activities, the CIA required another proprietary, a company in the Florida Keys called Mineral Carriers, Inc. Some early sea missions encountered Cuban patrol boats, leading to demands fo…”

CIA recruited Jose Perez San Ramon book_quoted ▶ 46:24

“They were told to set up a dozen infiltration teams to link up with Cuban resistance. Colonel Hawkins now got orders to form a larger conventional armed unit to back up the teams. On August 22nd, the …”

CIA recruited Rafael Quintero book_quoted ▶ 46:24

CIA recruited Manuel Artime book_quoted ▶ 46:24

Edward Lansdale recruited Jose Valerano book_quoted ▶ 48:30

“Among the Filipinos were Jose Valerano, who had begun his CIA contract work with who? Yes, Ed Lansdale. Esterling calls being knocked off his original timetable in August or September for not having t…”

CIA recruited Jose Valerano book_quoted ▶ 48:30

CIA targeted_for_regime_change Cuba book_quoted ▶ 53:26

“He could foresee that there would occur a time beyond which covert intervention would no longer be feasible. The group also mulled over assassinating Castro, though for security or because he did not …”

Richard M. Bissell Jr. ordered_assassination_of Fidel Castro book_quoted ▶ 53:26

Dwight D. Eisenhower approved Operation Pluto book_quoted ▶ 54:26

“pushed for. Eisenhower approved the smaller force. Trax learned the news on November 4th when CIA first briefed the Navy on the plans just before 5412 group. It was the combat unit option that the sec…”

CIA covered_up Operation Pluto host_asserted ▶ 1:01:50

“Kennedy knew at that moment he couldn't authorize a second air campaign because it was already discovered and they were trying to hush it up that the entire air campaign was basically CIA US attacking…”

CIA recruited Guatemala host_asserted ▶ 1:02:53

“Oh, okay. Yeah, so we brought the KMT guys in, we brought the Turks in, we brought in the Filipinos, and we were going to bring in some Guatemalans along with all of the Cuban exiles to create this ba…”

CIA recruited Cuba host_asserted ▶ 1:02:53

CIA recruited Philippines host_asserted ▶ 1:02:53

CIA recruited Kuomintang host_asserted ▶ 1:02:53

CIA recruited Grey Wolves host_asserted ▶ 1:02:53