The Colonel's Corner Safe for Democracy Part 45 (47)

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0:00 their resources, using terror and false flag attacks to justify authoritarian crackdowns. Many of these groups were clouded in a covert architecture that stayed behind. John, can you turn that TV off for just a second? For some reason, this thing freezes. Protecting international growing countries to steal their resources, using terror and false flag attacks to justify authoritarian crackdowns. Many of these groups...

1:02 All right, I give up. It's just going to keep freezing. I don't know why. So we'll just get started with the show. Oh, my gosh. I was outside. My hair looks like I've been in a windstorm. I turn on the camera. I'm like, oh, my gosh.

1:36 I don't know what you're talking about. Freezing, Colonel. You look fine to me. Let me warm there. No, no. The video. Not me. It's hotter than hell here. It's like 90 here. All right. Yeah. I'm talking about my computer. And it's supposed to be like the new high speed one. So anyway. All right. What can I tell you? I got my.

2:08 Cantaloupe seed saplings in. Oh, hush. I had to get dressed for the hotter than hell moment. I'm so jealous. Yeah, right? So there, I'm going to have all the cantaloupe I want. Yep. Oh, my dream. All right. We left off in Nicaragua. So we're going to continue from there.

2:41 We're on page 523 of Bill Casey's war. Even more than Afghanistan, Nicaragua became Bill Casey's war. When Reagan set the policy, Casey executed it. But for Nicaragua, Casey went to Reagan, pushing him, encouraging his worst fears. Supervising Claridge planning, Casey overrode the DO's objections. In the field, he oversaw arrangements of the case officers under Claridge.

3:11 the CIA director visited, whatever the name of that town is, Tegucigalpa in the early summer of 1982 when the machinery was just moving into gear. At the height of the controversy over human rights violation in the summer of 83, Casey again appeared in Honduras and the guerrilla manual followed him. In his determined

3:40 pursuit of Nicaragua covert actions, Casey ran afoul of Congress in a way unprecedented for a director of the CIA. Having assured legislatures that he would be open to intelligence committees, Casey progressively terminated various kinds of reportings, even on routine issues. His disdain for oversight, no doubt reinforced by his painful confirmation, became well known at Langley.

4:07 Claridge added to Casey's concern, describing the way Senator Moyhan pushed at him when the CIA man went to the Hill. Director Casey resolved to bring a new broom to deal with Congress, for which he summoned Claire George, the associate deputy director for operations. The House Select Committee.

4:29 had become essentially suspicious, still dominated by Democrats after the 80 election. The House Committee initiated the Boland Amendment in 82 and in 83. This restriction passed into law as a secret clause of the fiscal 1983 appropriation, back when we actually still did budgets.

4:52 After one of those votes in July of 1983, Reagan officials boldly answered that they had no intentions of reducing aid to the rebels, the terrorists. They weren't rebels. Twice, the House voted to terminate the Contra program, saved only because friendly senators restored the CIA money when spending bills went to the House and Senate conference committees. By 1983, especially after the fiasco of the Leahy visit,

5:22 It had become abundantly clear at Langley that the existing presidential finding needed an amendment. The Senate Intelligence Committee told the CIA that May that the finding lacked specifics on what the project encompassed. The grounds for this action and the objectives it sought. Okay, then why didn't you object to it a long time ago? The tension between the limited

5:52 goal of arms interdiction and the much more extensive actual CIA activity invited probing. The act of drafting a new finding with the briefings and solicitations of congressional opinion it required might give Congress some sense of involvement. But at the same time, Congress had promised a fresh finding to delimit the war more precisely. And the CIA

6:20 was planning fresh escalations to include mining ships in the Nicaraguan harbors. In May of 83, Washington informed Ambassador Negroponte of the quest for a new finding. On August 3rd, Director Casey appeared before the Senate committee to outline a draft. A week later, he sent the reworked paper to National Security Advisor Clark and Secretary of State Schultz.

6:50 For weeks, the secret war managers refined the document. Claridge showed it to Negroponte on September 12th. The ambassador thought it was too narrow, still focused almost exclusively on interdiction. Casey explained why. He wanted nothing that might jeopardize continued funding. Negroponte objected that a more comprehensive finding might actually attract broader support. This exchange illustrates how disjointed they were.

7:17 The NSC discussed the orders on September 16th. President Reagan approved several days later. The finding provided the U.S. support for paramilitary operations against Nicaragua. It broadened the project to include both arms and inducing the, quote, the Sandinistas and Cubans, because of course we have to have Cubans involved, and their allies, whoever the hell they are, unquote.

7:48 to cease backing insurgents in the region. Okay, who are you designating an insurgent? Nicaragua was to be robbed of the resources necessary to furnish such aid because they had already implemented an economic warfare campaign against them as well. The project was supposed to force Managua into genuine negotiations, which they had already offered to be part of.

8:23 In the short term, the CIA got what it wanted. Congress did not strengthen the Boland Amendment, though it kept spending on Nicaraguan war to the 24 million already appropriated and warned that no more would be coming until the next fiscal year. But the fresh authority contained problems of its own. Economic warfare that impoverished Nicaragua could be seen as growing much further.

8:51 than preventing Managua's help to revolutions elsewhere, which we've seen no evidence they were doing. Several elements of the finding or the attached paper revealed a commitment to open-ended war. By including the Cubans among the specified goals, authority had in fact been extended regardless of anything Managua might do, because they're just going to blame it on them.

9:22 That negotiations were to be genuine and agreements verified set the stage for war despite peace talks. The Reagan administration also made itself the sole arbiter of the fulfillment of these conditions. Did the aim of promoting democracy include targeting the public support enjoyed by the Sandinista government? Because a lot of people welcomed the Sandinista government because they had been.

9:52 persecuted under the CIA-backed Somoza. Text that remained exercised from declassified versions of this finding leaves it unclear whether it permitted unilateral CIA operations, as were about to occur, or confined the agency to supporting others. Meanwhile, the quote-unquote others had the explicit goal of overthrowing the Sandinista government, no matter what Reagan's finding might say.

10:21 And the administration knew this because that's what they were being hired by the CIA to do. For the longer term, the September 1983 finding challenged congressional overseers of intelligence to decide they had been fooled. Already wary of the broad track finding, Casey attempted to assure Congress with his paper, but anticipate...

10:52 anticipating what soon happened, he warned that the $24 million budget would run out and he was expected to need another $14 million just to get through the year. In explaining the finding to the Senate Intelligence Committee on September 20th, Casey set one booby trap for himself, saying the new finding no longer explicitly authorized us to conduct paramilitary operations, but rather to

11:20 to provide support to Nicaraguan paramilitary resistance groups, and we have less of a leadership role and more of a passive role, which was a bold-faced lie. The booby trap finding, coupled with Casey's disastrous choice of congressional liaison, produced a bad situation. Claire George of the DO fraternity since the Korean War believed

11:48 passionately in secrecy. George promised openness and made a show of it, inaugurating weekly lunches with the staff directors of the Senate and House Committee. Robert Simmons at first thought the lunches was a splendid device, but Simmons had been a direct witness to the burning of Patrick Leahy a few months earlier, and before long, he saw himself as being played too.

12:15 Rob Simmons decided that George's idea of liaison amounted to a standard procedure of a clandestine service officer in a hostile country with Congress the country and the CIA officer saying only what seemed politically necessary or strategically desirable. Imagine that. The staffer viewed the CIA as addressing a hostile country, being the U.S.

12:47 After two years of active warfare, the Contras could show no lasting success. The CIA timetable that envisioned liberated zones before the end of 83 had gone bad, with the FDN failing to capture or hold towns. Casey did his best to gloss over those facts, telling Congress that the Sandinistas might be overthrown in a year, skirting the edge of discourse that was legal under the Bolan Amendment.

13:16 A pitfall he escaped by insisting that he had been misquoted. Casey's claim itself would also be discredited both by the American general commanding in Central Command and by a leak that no intelligence estimates agreed with this assertion. Frustrating, Casey would advocate the interdiction of Nicaraguan's foreign trade by a taxon.

13:45 and mining of the ports, an operation that took the secret war to a whole new level. As Dewey Claridge presents these events, Director Casey and he were equally concerned with the need to hit the Sandinistas harder. He quotes Casey, quote, can't we get more pressure on these people, unquote, but the resulting plan the agency, Claridge, describes was one to interdict Seabourn

14:15 shipment into El Salvador using gunboats, a measure that did not strike Nicaragua. Conversely, once Claridge had the boats, they never went after arms trade. They only were attacking Nicaragua. And Claridge muddied the water by claiming the CIA actions purported to be against the arms traffic could force Managua to negotiate.

14:45 This disingenuousness, even in retrospect, is necessary to maintain the appearance the CIA acted within the scope of the finding. Claridge called his warships Q-boats, Q-boats, after the disguised armed merchant cruisers used in both world wars. But they were not disguised at all. Others called them piranhas.

15:14 after a predatory fish native in South America. The Q-boats were manufactured in North Miami Beach by Cigarette Boat Racing, Inc., which I guess you would never be surprised was actually part of the drug running. Two craft 30 to 40 feet long with Kevlar hulls and dual inboard motors carrying grenade launchers and automatic cannons.

15:44 The boats were large enough to carry and lay mines. They were capable of incredible speed, 65 knots. Sailors trained to use them on Roatan Island off the northern shore of Honduras. Bill Shepard, a Navy SEAL assigned to the DO, CIA, designed the configuration and monitored the conversion.

16:09 After all of the work, there was no reports of Q-boats attacking vessels that were smuggling arms across the Gulf of Forensica that separates Nicaragua from El Salvador, because that was not the purpose of them at all. The U.S. Southern Command ran an operation to infiltrate the traffic using Boston whalers off the coast of Gulf of Forensica, led by Delta Force operators.

16:39 Southern Command discovered that much of the smuggling actually utilized boats belonging to Salvadorans. Weird. Claridge records a Contra Commando raid on one of the coastal staging areas used for the traffic. A second ploy was an air attack on a radio. And by the way, the discovery of those arms trafficking from El Salvador into Nicaragua.

17:08 was part of the Contra CIA operation. That's all Southcom found. They never found Nicaraguans trafficking weapons into El Salvador. That was a lie. A second ploy was an air attack on a radio post the Nicaraguans used to intercept Salvadoran military messages to help the Contras. Some contend that they were relaying their...

17:40 messages via this radio tower. Contra Air Commander Juan Gomez carried out the attack with a couple of planes flying out of the Salvadoran Air Base, Ilopango. Instead, Langley's project quickly morphed away from interdiction because it was never about interdiction. They didn't morph away from it. It was never interdiction.

18:09 Even before the September finding, into an effort to take the Nicaraguan economy to the screaming part, you know, like a normal coup, Secretary of State George Shultz recounts what happened. Shultz saw the NSC staff, not Casey, as trying to control Nicaraguan policy and believed if the United States lost the secret war, it would be due to them. In late May of 83, he went to President Reagan, who agreed that Shultz should have the leading role.

18:39 in Central America. Maybe because he's the Secretary of State. Then on May 28th, Schultz received a cable informing him that the crisis pre-planning group had decided to mine a river in Nicaragua's eastern coast and have divers place mines on ships in the port. Schultz was dumbfounded, according to Schultz. Secret warriors' frustration had its mirror at the highest levels.

19:09 Talk at the 208 committee in the National Security Planning Group focused on how to break out of the cycle of military failure. Again, this has nothing to do with military. It has everything to do with the CIA. On May 31st, the NSPG reviewed the mine project. Schultz argued against the plan and insisted that the planning group had no decision authority showing the directive that had created it.

19:37 The CIA came in with a poor representation and Reagan rejected the project. Like much that happened on Reagan's watch, the decision didn't stick. Policy activists always thought that they could go around the bureaucracy and frequently succeeded. What Frank Aikoy and Ellie Krakowski

20:04 had done on Afghanistan, Casey and Claridge was now doing in Nicaragua. Early in July, Casey went to Central America. With him, he took Claridge and John McMahon, the National Intelligence Officer for Latin America, John Horton, and another guy that was called the International Activities Division Chief, John McKee.

20:35 McMahon, representative of career professionals at the CIA, wary about covert operations from church committee days, had learned to work in tandem with Congress, which opposed extravagant initiatives on Nicaragua, bringing McMahon created an appearance of unity. Bob McGee returned to recruit Cuban exiles and other Latin Americans whom the CIA would call unilaterally controlled Latino assets.

21:05 or U-Class. Soon afterwards, both the Contras and the U-Class began learning how to use mines on Roatan Island. Casey then took a page from the Mongoose playbook. The CIA outfitted a mothership. In the summer of 83, Langley leased a vessel built to sustain offshore oil rigs. The ship had a long, flat cargo deck sufficient for several helicopters.

21:36 A pair of Q-boats could be launched or shipped by hydraulic ramps that the agency had installed given the time required for construction and the moment the mothership went into action. Acquisition of the ship and design and the installation of its equipment had to have begun around the time that the planning group where Reagan rejected the CIA plan to do it. They didn't pay attention because they don't.

22:06 work. They just go through the motions. Edgar Chamorro records that Dewey Claridge came to Honduras in July and told the Contra High Command that the CIA had decided to cut off Nicaraguan's oil supplies, clearly unrelated to interdicting arms in El Salvador, and spoke of a plan to sink ships headed for Nicaragua. Claridge detailed several alternatives. Claridge himself recounts

22:37 going to the restricted interagency group to advocate that the U.S. begin attacking selective economic targets. According to Claridge, there was no objections, including from Secretary Shultz's representative. Given the limited activity anticipated, Claridge writes, quote, no one thought the decision needed ratification at the security planning group meeting.

23:05 To recap, the CIA division chief, aware that the president had recently rejected the mining plan, was proposing not only that plan, but an escalation of that plan, directly attacking the Nicaraguan economy and thought no higher approval was necessary. The CIA's director of intelligence also had no opportunity to comment on the plan. Claridge was...

23:35 correct in the sense that bringing Reagan on board would merely take time. At a briefing during the summer, the president himself asked what could be done to hamper Nicaraguan oil. Suddenly, the door was open. Bill Casey stood ready to recommend that the CIA attack Nicaraguan ports and ships carrying oil and anything else. Not even Schultz's resignation threat stopped the project. In the discussions at the White House, Bill Casey

24:06 Cap Weinberger and George Shultz all recognized that Managua depended on imports, especially weapons and foreign oil. Americans' military exercises in Central America had already featured naval task force all up and down the Nicaraguan coast. Now, the security planning group members, hearkening back to Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Strike crisis, began talking of a blockade.

24:36 involved open use of force. However, that was considered an act of war. An administration having so much trouble getting CIA funds for the project itself had no chance of getting a declaration of war. They didn't care. Over at least two planning meetings, Robert McFarlane recalls they settled on mining the Nicaraguan harbors rather than using US forces.

25:07 McFarland says that Casey suggested the mining. Some prep work took place between the meetings, but the analysis was drawn narrowly and did not rise to the level of a real risk-cost study. The obvious reference to mining, what would happen if mines sank a Russian ship, surfaced at the planning meeting. A Secret War member

25:37 resolved to produce mines not capable of actually sinking large ships. So we're going to have discretionary mining, just the medium and small ones. Of course, this robbed the mining of its military rationale, and it affected legality as well, since international law permits only effective blockades.

26:01 Ronald Reagan approved anyway. McFarland concedes that the scheme was not one of the happiest episodes of the Reagan administration. In the fall of 1983, Casey implemented the plan. The CIA itself carried out the attacks and mining of the ports. The mothership acted as a command post and carried raiding parties to distant targets. It also had armed helicopters to support the raids. Commando parties consisted mostly of

26:31 Latins, i.e. Cuban exiles, and CIA contract officers for underwater demolition and specialized tasks. Gosh, I wonder where they got those guys. Because, you know, underwater demo is such a large body of expertise. Contract employees piloted the helicopters while agency officers had complete command. On October 10th, 1983, the mothership conducted its first attack.

26:59 on the Nicaraguan Pacific Coast port of Corinto. The assault reinforced a campaign begun earlier. There had already been two strikes at Porto Sardino, a receiving port for oil, and the raid on a town in the Gulf of Forensica, evidently a suspected transshipment point. That action relied on FDN commandos because it involved combat on the ground inside of Nicaragua.

27:30 They all failed. When the CIA staged the attack on Corinto, the raid used the two speedboats, which crept in behind a Korean tanker and peeled off to fire at the shore. Eight storage tanks containing 3.4 million gallons of oil was blown up. A freighter loaded with cooking oil suffered slight damage. The Exxon Corporation ordered its tankers to avoid Nicaraguan waters.

27:59 On November 21st, the campaign moved to the Atlantic coast after the mothership transited the Panama Canal. Really makes you think about all of those refinery fires on the coast of all of these countries, doesn't it? The CIA then raided Porto Cabarras, known to an earlier generation of spooks as the operational Bay of Pigs training location.

28:31 Under Somoza, of course. With this CIA raid, the secret war had come full circle for the people of one Nicaraguan village. In late October, the Sandinistas countered, declaring an offshore security zone 25 miles deep. Foreign aircraft and ships were to get permission to enter two weeks in advance. While the U.S. Navy observed territorial waters in conducting the De Soto patrols, Air Force SR-71s

28:59 broke the sound barrier over Nicaragua, hitting towns with unnerving sonic booms. In the face of growing shortages, the Sandinistas increased gasoline rationing. At Corinto, 25,000 residents were temporarily forced from their homes because the CIA was burning oil in their town. The CIA designed simple but effective mines

29:26 whose prototype had been a sewer pipe stuffed with explosives, up to 300 pounds of C4 plastic. Tests took place at the Naval Surface Weapons Center and about 600 mines were fabricated and assembled in Honduras. The agency called them firecracker mines, but C4 is powerful and hundreds of pounds can do real damage. A small amount can do real damage.

29:54 Claridge account of the mine campaign is highly suspect. The Latin chief, Claridge, puts the timing towards the end of January of 84, telling a story of how for once he arrived home with time to reflect. Claridge achieved sudden clarity. Quote, it hit me. Sea mines were the solution. We should mine the harbors of Nicaragua, Corinto and the oil facilities at Porto Sodino in particular.

30:26 The export season was coming up, and if we could block their shipping for even a short period, it would be an economic hardship to bring them around, unquote. The next morning, Claridge, alert to the political dangers, says he sent an officer to the library to look up the international law on mining. Claridge concluded that nothing barred his proposed course of action. Much of this made-up story is questionable.

30:55 First off, the mines already existed. The CIA and the Navy needed time to manufacture and test the mines, and they were certainly created for a concrete purpose, not an off-the-chance, someday idea that just popped into your head. There was also the timing. Mines had been exploding under ships in Nicaragua since January 3rd, and the last of the security planning

31:23 group meetings that considered mining before the fact had happened in December. The barons' claridge private skull session most likely resulted from the planning group meeting on January 6th, where the group had agreed to try to force a decision against Nicaragua as soon as possible. The January 12th

31:48 Casey informed Congress that the CIA proposed to empty its contrafunding accounts immediately. The likely truth is that Claridge merely resolved to escalate it at that time. Also objectionable is Claridge's reading of the international law on sea mines. The Hague Convention of October 18, 1907, titled Convention Relative to Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines.

32:17 The United States and Nicaragua were both party to the treaty, which makes it illegal to mine the coast or port of an enemy even during times of war for the sole purpose of intercepting commercial shipping or to lay unanchored contact mines unless configured to become inert at most an hour after they were set. The treaty requires that the perpetrator act.

32:44 to preserve peaceful shipping and notify ship owners of danger zones. According to Claridge, the convention applies only to free floating mines, which is not true. The mining aimed at a final coup d'etat for the Nicaraguan port network. On January 3, 1984,

33:09 Managua radio denounced the mines for the first time. Edgar Chamorro recalls being waken up by a CIA officer at two in the morning a couple of nights later. John Mallett, deputy chief of station in Tegu, handed Chamorro a press release the CIA had prepared in which the Contras claimed responsibilities for the mining. Several days afterwards, the FDN declared all Nicaraguan ports to be a danger zone.

33:41 no doubt to satisfy the Hague Convention. A Japanese flagship was the victim outside of Corinto on January 3rd and had to be towed back to port. This became the first of a dozen vessels of six different nations damaged due to the mining. On January 3rd, a Nicaraguan patrol boat struck another mine. There were also six raids on the port of Potosi on the Gulf of Forensica.

34:10 in at least one of which a CIA contract agent piloted an armed Hughes 500 chopper in combat. Rudy Enders, CIA paramilitary chief, directly supervised the operations, listening to a radio chatter of one of these raids at the Ops Center on March 30th, as Enders told Langley one of his Q-boats was stalled.

34:36 Claridge realized from the background noise that Enders actually was sitting in the helicopter. Dismayed, Claridge could do nothing but cuss. Porto Sandino suffered attacks by speedboats supported by three helicopters. Claridge describes the mining there on February 7th as the opening act of the mine campaign.

35:00 On March 7th, the CIA helicopters intervened again when the Q boats were nearly trapped in San Juan del Sur. About 70 mines were laid during that campaign. In view of the Boland Amendment, the CIA trod on thin ice. Throughout the years of the project, Congress had been becoming increasingly uncomfortable.

35:24 Edgar Shamaros recounts significantly that the first CIA demands that the Contra form a united front came during congressional debates over the Boland Amendment. Arizona Republican Senator Barry Goldwater, chairman of the Intel Committee since 81, had been sympathetic to the Reagan administration, but his relations with Langley soured somewhat in the controversy over Casey's appointment. Yet Goldwater, despite his qualms, had been a key...

35:54 had been a key in the restoring of CIA's secret war money, and the agency could ill afford to lose his support. The mining campaign destroyed it. When the port campaign began, the CIA became curiously circumspect about its information to Congress. Bill Casey personally conducted the important briefings, so there was no doubt he aimed to do what he did. Perhaps Casey had merely been unintelligible.

36:24 He was notorious all over town for mumbling. The standard joke at Langley was that the director had no need for a scrambler phone since his speech was constantly scrambled itself. Claire George complained to journalists that briefings upon briefing of Congress made no difference. Claridge insisted his agency made no effort to keep the mining secret, that CIA informed the oversight committees as we were supposed to. He also was quoted as saying,

36:54 At least the House committee had the decency to own up to the fact that they had been briefed, which is more than I can say about the Senate. But was that true? First, the CIA used the Contras both as cover for the mining and to mislead Congress. Early in its preparations, Langley reported that the Contras were training to use mines, then left overseers to assume the mining was done by the FDN when it would actually be a CIA project.

37:26 The public claims about mining made only by the Contras and on the CIA orders reinforced that. To evade the budget cap, the mothership was apparently funded directly out of the CIA director's contingency fund or, covertly, its presence at the big Corinto raid.

37:49 would not be disclosed for five months, while combat action by CIA contract officers in January and March of 84 also went unacknowledged for months. It is not clear that Rudy Ender's direct participation was ever admitted either. Because self-serving statements were made both by Casey in a CIA employee newsletter and by Robert McFarlane in a speech at the Naval Academy,

38:16 Confusion surrounds the issue of the adequacy of CIA notifications. A careful review is necessary. In January of 84, the Senate committee sought information. Its interest was piqued by the CIA's intention to exhaust its Nicaraguan budget. That would be weird. Senator Goldwater asked Rob Simmons to arrange a briefing for early February. Claire George, far from complying, tried and failed to get a postponement.

38:44 Whereupon Casey personally called Goldwater and got the date pushed back to March 8th. Meanwhile, Casey testified before the House Committee on January 31st, but not specifically on the mining operation. The agency also arranged private briefings for Patrick Leahy and Rhode Island Democrat Claiborne Pell, where mining was a topic. There is no evidence that officials went beyond their Contra cover story.

39:15 By March, the harbor mining had become controversial. Yet before the Senate overseers at a previously arranged March 8th session, and again five days later, Casey focused on the new CIA budget request of an additional $21 million. Again, not mining, which the CIA referred to in a single sentence in a presentation of more than two hours. 27 words in 84 pages of text.

39:44 That reference stated merely that mines had been placed in Nicaraguan harbors by U.S.-backed groups. The CIA cover story recycled to its congressional overseers, not CIA-backed groups, the CIA. The agency tried to bypass Goldwater altogether and get the money direct from the CIA subunit of the Appropriation Committee, which had parallel responsibility. Headed by Alaska Republican Ted Stevens,

40:14 A friend to Langley, which is interesting, considered how he ended up. How good of a friend was Ted Stevens to Langley? The CIA subcommittee would have agreed except the vice chairman, William Proxmire, a Wisconsin Democrat, who insisted on enforcing the Senate rule requiring prior approval of the committee with substantive jurisdiction. When the Goldwater committee learned of the maneuver, all hell broke loose.

40:45 As for the House being told of the CIA mining, that happened on March 27th. At that hearing where Casey tried the same tact, two committee members pressed him repeatedly on who was directing the mining until Casey admitted, we are. Even today, it is still not known whether the CIA director went beyond this image of a contra operation directed by the CIA to disclose the mining.

41:12 was a 100% unilateral CIA effort. When Rob Simmons saw a March 30 Casey letter to Senator Pell that supplied additional details on questions at his private briefing, the letter contained the phrase unilaterally controlled Latino assets. Before joining the Senate staff, Simmons had done work in the DO for decades. He knew the implication instantly.

41:41 He understood plastic explosives too and figured quote-unquote firecrackers did not do justice to the power of CIA mines. Simmons went to the House Staff Chief Thomas Latimer and asked to see records of the CIA briefings there, where he immediately found Casey's admission a few days earlier. Simmons put the pieces together. On April 2,

42:06 Casey appeared combative before the Senate Intelligence Committee. Four days later, Goldwater rose on the Senate floor to deliver a speech about the mining, mistakenly referring to classified information. Simmons had to stop him mid-sentence. Later that afternoon, the staff chief entered Goldwater's office to find the chairman in darkness, the shades drawn, pondering his blunder. Simmons related his findings. Quote, the CIA was directly involved in the mining.

42:36 Casey withheld the information from us. The president personally gave the go-ahead to start mining in the fall of 1983. Casey and McMahon admitted it. They claim they told us, unquote. The staffer described the limited briefings, adding the context had been contra activity, not CIA operations. In his 1988 memoir, Goldwater confirms that he too understood Casey to be talking about the contras doing the mining, not the CIA.

43:07 Secretary of State Schultz asserts that he had also been given the impression that the Contras were doing the mining. Simmons felt the senator had been cut out because Casey feared he would try to talk Reagan out of mining. Goldwater had pulled Casey's chestnuts out of the fire many times. He was devastated and bitter. On April 9th, he fired off a letter to Casey, frankly deterring, I'm pissed off. Then that leaked. Goldwater followed with a public statement.

43:37 that the requirement of the law was not followed in this case. I told Mr. Casey that this was no way to run a railroad. So Goldwater writes a private note to Casey and the CIA immediately leaks it. Casey came to Capitol Hill the next day to denounce the complaints. Goldwater had left for a trip to the Far East and now Langley went to full court press.

44:06 A piece in the CIA's internal newsletter asserted positively that the agency had fully informed Congress of its actions. Quietly, according to the vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York, spooks went to the New York Times to insinuate that Goldwater simply did not remember, that perhaps he was too old. And where did they go? Their propaganda arm, the New York Times.

44:41 Simmons is quoted as observing that these actions can only be described as a domestic disinformation campaign against the U.S. Congress. Robert McFarland capped the effort in his speech at Annapolis where he told the assembled midshipmen that every important detail of the mining had been fully shared. A bold face lie to the academy of the future naval officers.

45:12 of the United States. The extravagant claims quickly disintegrated after Vice Chairman Moynihan resigned in protest. A slew of leaks revealed many particulars of the CIA limited briefings. Goldwater returned and convinced Moynihan to withdraw his resignation, and Director Casey appeared contrite before the committee on April 26, promising better. Both Casey and McFarlane apologized.

45:42 The intelligence annual report supplied chapter and verse on the deception. In the later Iran-Contra hearings, McFarland testified under oath that the intelligence committees were not, in fact, informed of the mining as required by law. In June of 84, prodded by the White House, CIA negotiated with Congress on the definition of reporting requirements. Langley agreed to give prior notice of covert actions that went beyond a finding of anything required.

46:12 NSC or presidential approval and on the subjects in which the committee expressed interest. These so-called Casey Accords, which the director had not wanted to sign in the first place, had to be reaffirmed a year later. So the committee has to express interest. How do they express interest in something they don't know about? To this day,

46:36 Dewey Claridge remains defiant. He claims seven separate briefings took place, implying the CIA disclosures were more than adequate. Not four of those events were part, but, sorry, four of these events were parts of the original deception. Two concerned the budget end run, and three were cases after the fact explanation. So, in fact, none of them happened ahead of time.

47:04 People are already on record apologizing because they didn't do it, even though they didn't mean the apology. Claridge wonders why those senators did not immediately tell their colleagues a fair question, but he fails to discuss the promise of secrecy the CIA extracted from them. So you're not allowed to tell. And then when you don't tell, they say, why didn't you tell? And if you tell, they'll leak that. Claridge also terms the mining just another operation consistent with a presidential finding.

47:40 Blowing up ships, no big deal, especially when they're foreign ships. That can lead to an international crisis. Just normal CIA stuff. He argues that giving it special notice would have been absurd and claiming the distinction between the contra mining and a unilateral CIA action was not a big deal.

48:06 The last point brings back the question of whether the September 83 finding provided for CIA attacks. Director Casey himself had told the Intelligence Committee at the time that the authority no longer permitted the CIA to engage in paramilitary operations. The currently available declassified version of the finding contains nothing that disputes this. In sum, Claridge's position is that this direct CIA action

48:32 which had both U.S. and international legal implications required no special mention to the overseers and no approval of higher authorities for American participation. And the question of whether it had been legal at all amounted to a side issue, according to Claridge. So you're not allowed to engage in paramilitary operations. You tell Congress that the Contras are engaging in a paramilitary operation, which is a lie.

49:02 And it later comes out that the CIA was conducting paramilitary operations, even though they're forbid from doing it in Nicaragua, and it's no big deal. The CIA mining constituted a flagrant violation of international law. Not only did it obstruct freedom of the seas, the CIA specifically aimed at merchant ships, not military, and issued no danger notices to mariners until...

49:32 mines had been exploding already and ships damaged. Even then, it released only a vague claim that the Contras had did it. Mining is clearly defined an act of war in the 1856 Treaty of Paris and the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. This in turn raised questions regarding the CIA's authority under the War Powers Act. All this came to a head outside of Corinto on March 20th when the Soviet tanker

50:02 Lugansk hit a mine, wounding five sailors. In the scramble to contain this flap, CIA John Mallett told the FDN leader Chamorro to deny the Contra's mines could have caused the damage, giving the statement substance necessarily forced an end to the mining. A year later, Director Casey tried to assure Senator Goldwater when a professional group awarded the senator an achievement medal

50:32 technologist William Baker, the CIA director, went out of his way to give the speech honoring Goldwater. So we did a whole bunch of illegal shit, caused a whole bunch of, but we're going to give you a medal for discovering that we lied to you. It's like a shit show. Dewey Claridge asserts that one month of mining would have driven Managua to the, one more month of mining would have driven Managua to the negotiation table.

51:09 The claim is reminiscence of U.S. officials talking about one more month of bombing in North Vietnam, one more month of bombing in North Korea. It's the old adage. If we just had one more chance. And it harkens back to the book, The Determined Spy, where we didn't do that book, but it goes into excruciating detail about.

51:33 The Albania operation, which we've covered in other books, where Wisner kept sending team after team after team of people into Albania and every single one of them were murdered. And he didn't stop. They don't care. They were trying to set up stay behind units and they went on and on and on. Just one more team, one more team. Same thing in Ukraine. One more team, one more team. Romania, one more team. People are being slaughtered.

52:03 They didn't care. That a Soviet vessel could be mined had been perfectly predictable. Blaming Congress or the press is what is suspicious. International fervor plus danger of confrontation with Russia, not Barry Goldwater, are what made the mining unsustainable. They didn't give a shit about Congress. Not at all.

52:38 Domestic criticism gained a fierce intensity. Congress overwhelmingly passed a resolution condemning the U.S. action. Nicaragua brought suit against the U.S. in the International Court of Justice. The Reagan administration suddenly felt compelled to reverse longstanding U.S. policy recognizing the International Court of Justice jurisdiction with further adverse effects on world opinion. Among countries lodging protests, in addition to the Soviet Union,

53:08 were allies, the UK and France. The French debated sending a mine sweeper to help Nicaragua clear it up. The mining caused Managua real damage. Toward the end of June, Nicaraguan fisheries minister Alfredo Alas stated that five fishermen had been killed because of the mines. 30 of them, 30 more were injured and 13 fishing boats were blown up.

53:36 With trade volume reduced, Nicaragua estimated that it lost $4.3 million in export income. Nicaraguan fishermen took the greatest risk as they swept the mines. The U.S. didn't even go back and take them out. They just left them to blow up Nicaraguans. At Corinto in May, damage was estimated at $9 million. More than 30 mines had been detonated with a pair of improvised minesweepers sunk.

54:09 At the UN, only a veto by U.S. Ambassador Vernon Walters prevented passage of a Security Council condemnation of the U.S. How convenient. The U.S. can counter its own condemnation. They should have had to recuse themselves from that vote. And none other than Vernon Walters, Mr. CIA himself, I might add. At the Hague, Nicaragua filed suit.

54:41 with the International Court of Justice on April 9th, 1984, charging U.S. violations of international law with the Contra program in general and the Marlboro mining in particular. Although the U.S. renounced the court's jurisdiction, it nonetheless submitted material condemning Nicaragua, such as reports from the Propaganda's Office of Office of Public Diplomacy on Latin America and the Caribbean.

55:08 an NSC CIA political action unit housed within the State Department. It's a CIA front. The court accepted those materials into evidence, but the American offering did not overcome the testimony of witnesses like Contra leader Edgar Chamorro or former CIA analyst David McMichael. The evidence of the mining or the Contra manual psychological operations in guerrilla warfare.

55:39 The court found in favor of Nicaragua. The court determined that the U.S. had no right to seek the overthrow of the Sandinista government, no right to attack Nicaragua in the name of self-defense of El Salvador, and no right to mine or attack ports. Only the American, British, and Japanese justice dissented from the portions of the 11-3 decision rendered on June 27, 1986.

56:09 The Reagan administration dismissed the decision and vetoed a UN resolution designed to enforce the court's findings, of course. This blow underlined how little the U.S. action had to do with supporting democracy. The huge consequence compared to the limited risk the CIA planners envisioned in adopting the mining project shows how delusional the concept had been. Secretary of State George Shultz records straightforwardly, the mining episode was a political

56:40 disaster for the administration. Dewey Claridge disagrees with that assessment. They're psychopaths. They're literal psychopaths inside one of the most dangerous organizations in the world that is spelt CIA. Okay, almost done with that chapter, but I'm going to stop there.

57:16 As usual, Colonel, you hit the nail on the head today. Thank everyone for being here on Rumble and on Spaces. George Shultz himself is a character in himself. The only thing that saved him was the fact that he was against the Iran-Contra arms deal. He didn't want anything to do with it. But if you look further into it, his major complaint was after the Bolin Act.

57:45 He was afraid that what was really going to happen was it would be considered illegal for third countries receiving U.S. aid to fund the Contras. And that's what he was more concerned about. He was concerned about U.S. aid. So are you suggesting that they were laundering American tax dollars through U.S. aid to support the Contras?

58:15 Absolutely, Colonel. Yes. Yes. That's what they do. It's just another CIA slush fund of our tax dollars. So they don't have to go to Congress. You know, because we're supporting poor people, not the war machine. Except it's not for poor people. It's for the war machine. Absolutely. All right.

58:46 Let's look over here, SR-71. You guys cracked me up. Pin the tail on the donkey. Insurgents, certainly not the paramilitary invention on behalf of the CIA. Yeah, exactly, SR. Okay, so that'll get us through another session. Our normal talkative people I don't see up here.

59:16 We're going to go ahead and close this up. And I did another recording today with some foreigners that as soon as that's ready, I will post it on my account for you guys. It was a very interesting conversation. There was several different people there. It's hosted by a nurse. There's a guy that lives in Serbia. We were later joined.

59:45 by a PhD doctor that is Iranian by birth and has lived a couple of different places. The UK, I think he said he's in Oman now. So it was a very interesting conversation. They're all fellow podcasters that were just kind of getting together to pick my brain about Operation Gladio. So it was an interesting conversation. Travis, go ahead.

1:00:14 I just wanted to say I posted a video and tied you and Richard and Renee and a few other people that was taken on J6 that shows, well, if you watch it, you'll see what it shows. I think it's probably, in my opinion, I think it's the most important video clip that's been shown.

1:00:42 on j6 concerning the murder of uh ashley babbitt okay all right um thank you for posting that okay um you guys have a good evening and i will see you back here tomorrow at four o'clock take care everybody

Entities here

Nicaraguan harbor mining43 William Casey25 CIA25 U.S. Congress25 Nicaragua25 Dewey Claridge23 Contras18 Barry Goldwater12 George Shultz10 Ronald Reagan10 United States10 National Security Council10 Corinto9 Iran-Contra affair8 Sandinistas8 Robert Simmons7 Robert McFarlane7 El Salvador6 Cuba5 Claire George4 International Court of Justice4 Edward Chamorro4 Gulf of Fonseca4 Soviet Union4 Honduras4 U.S. Navy3 Rudy Enders3 Puerto Sandino3 John McKee2 John Mallett2 United Kingdom2 United Nations2 Daniel Patrick Moynihan2 Korea2 Anastasio Somoza2 John Negroponte2 U.S. Southern Command2 John McMahon2 Japan2 Roatan Island2

Claims made here

William Casey headed CIA book_quoted ▶ 2:41

“We're on page 523 of Bill Casey's war. Even more than Afghanistan, Nicaragua became Bill Casey's war. When Reagan set the policy, Casey executed it. But for Nicaragua, Casey went to Reagan, pushing hi…”

William Casey recruited Contras book_quoted ▶ 2:41

William Casey visited Tegucigalpa book_quoted ▶ 3:11

“the CIA director visited, whatever the name of that town is, Tegucigalpa in the early summer of 1982 when the machinery was just moving into gear. At the height of the controversy over human rights vi…”

William Casey visited Honduras book_quoted ▶ 3:11

William Casey appointed Claire George book_quoted ▶ 4:07

“Claridge added to Casey's concern, describing the way Senator Moyhan pushed at him when the CIA man went to the Hill. Director Casey resolved to bring a new broom to deal with Congress, for which he s…”

U.S. Congress funded Contras book_quoted ▶ 4:52

“After one of those votes in July of 1983, Reagan officials boldly answered that they had no intentions of reducing aid to the rebels, the terrorists. They weren't rebels. Twice, the House voted to ter…”

CIA supplied_arms_to Contras book_quoted ▶ 7:17

“The NSC discussed the orders on September 16th. President Reagan approved several days later. The finding provided the U.S. support for paramilitary operations against Nicaragua. It broadened the proj…”

William Casey ordered_assassination_of Sandinistas book_quoted ▶ 7:48

“to cease backing insurgents in the region. Okay, who are you designating an insurgent? Nicaragua was to be robbed of the resources necessary to furnish such aid because they had already implemented an…”

U.S. Congress funded Contras book_quoted ▶ 8:23

“In the short term, the CIA got what it wanted. Congress did not strengthen the Boland Amendment, though it kept spending on Nicaraguan war to the 24 million already appropriated and warned that no mor…”

CIA covered_up Iran-Contra affair book_quoted ▶ 14:45

“This disingenuousness, even in retrospect, is necessary to maintain the appearance the CIA acted within the scope of the finding. Claridge called his warships Q-boats, Q-boats, after the disguised arm…”

CIA supplied_arms_to Contras book_quoted ▶ 15:44

“The boats were large enough to carry and lay mines. They were capable of incredible speed, 65 knots. Sailors trained to use them on Roatan Island off the northern shore of Honduras. Bill Shepard, a Na…”

Bill Shepard trained Contras book_quoted ▶ 15:44

Juan Gomez carried_out_attack Nicaragua book_quoted ▶ 17:40

“messages via this radio tower. Contra Air Commander Juan Gomez carried out the attack with a couple of planes flying out of the Salvadoran Air Base, Ilopango. Instead, Langley's project quickly morphe…”

CIA trained Contras book_quoted ▶ 21:05

“or U-Class. Soon afterwards, both the Contras and the U-Class began learning how to use mines on Roatan Island. Casey then took a page from the Mongoose playbook. The CIA outfitted a mothership. In th…”

CIA supplied_arms_to Contras book_quoted ▶ 21:05

CIA supplied_arms_to Contras book_quoted ▶ 21:36

“A pair of Q-boats could be launched or shipped by hydraulic ramps that the agency had installed given the time required for construction and the moment the mothership went into action. Acquisition of …”

Dewey Claridge visited Honduras book_quoted ▶ 22:06

“work. They just go through the motions. Edgar Chamorro records that Dewey Claridge came to Honduras in July and told the Contra High Command that the CIA had decided to cut off Nicaraguan's oil suppli…”

Dewey Claridge ordered_assassination_of Nicaragua book_quoted ▶ 22:37

“going to the restricted interagency group to advocate that the U.S. begin attacking selective economic targets. According to Claridge, there was no objections, including from Secretary Shultz's repres…”

William Casey member_of National Security Council book_quoted ▶ 24:06

“Cap Weinberger and George Shultz all recognized that Managua depended on imports, especially weapons and foreign oil. Americans' military exercises in Central America had already featured naval task f…”

Caspar Weinberger member_of National Security Council book_quoted ▶ 24:06

George Shultz member_of National Security Council book_quoted ▶ 24:06

Robert McFarlane member_of National Security Council book_quoted ▶ 24:36

“involved open use of force. However, that was considered an act of war. An administration having so much trouble getting CIA funds for the project itself had no chance of getting a declaration of war.…”

CIA carried_out_attack Nicaragua book_quoted ▶ 26:01

“Ronald Reagan approved anyway. McFarland concedes that the scheme was not one of the happiest episodes of the Reagan administration. In the fall of 1983, Casey implemented the plan. The CIA itself car…”

Ronald Reagan approved Nicaraguan harbor mining book_quoted ▶ 26:01

CIA funded Nicaraguan harbor mining book_quoted ▶ 26:01

CIA carried_out_attack Corinto book_quoted ▶ 26:31

“Latins, i.e. Cuban exiles, and CIA contract officers for underwater demolition and specialized tasks. Gosh, I wonder where they got those guys. Because, you know, underwater demo is such a large body …”

CIA carried_out_attack Puerto Sandino book_quoted ▶ 26:59

“on the Nicaraguan Pacific Coast port of Corinto. The assault reinforced a campaign begun earlier. There had already been two strikes at Porto Sardino, a receiving port for oil, and the raid on a town …”

CIA carried_out_attack Puerto Cabezas book_quoted ▶ 27:59

“On November 21st, the campaign moved to the Atlantic coast after the mothership transited the Panama Canal. Really makes you think about all of those refinery fires on the coast of all of these countr…”

CIA funded Nicaraguan harbor mining book_quoted ▶ 29:26

“whose prototype had been a sewer pipe stuffed with explosives, up to 300 pounds of C4 plastic. Tests took place at the Naval Surface Weapons Center and about 600 mines were fabricated and assembled in…”

Dewey Claridge ordered_assassination_of Nicaragua book_quoted ▶ 29:54

“Claridge account of the mine campaign is highly suspect. The Latin chief, Claridge, puts the timing towards the end of January of 84, telling a story of how for once he arrived home with time to refle…”

CIA covered_up Iran-Contra affair book_quoted ▶ 29:54

CIA funded Contras book_quoted ▶ 31:48

“Casey informed Congress that the CIA proposed to empty its contrafunding accounts immediately. The likely truth is that Claridge merely resolved to escalate it at that time. Also objectionable is Clar…”

CIA carried_out_attack Nicaraguan harbor mining host_asserted ▶ 32:44

“to preserve peaceful shipping and notify ship owners of danger zones. According to Claridge, the convention applies only to free floating mines, which is not true. The mining aimed at a final coup d'e…”

John Mallett member_of CIA documented ▶ 33:09

“Managua radio denounced the mines for the first time. Edgar Chamorro recalls being waken up by a CIA officer at two in the morning a couple of nights later. John Mallett, deputy chief of station in Te…”

Rudy Enders headed CIA documented ▶ 34:10

“in at least one of which a CIA contract agent piloted an armed Hughes 500 chopper in combat. Rudy Enders, CIA paramilitary chief, directly supervised the operations, listening to a radio chatter of on…”

CIA covered_up Nicaraguan harbor mining host_asserted ▶ 36:54

“At least the House committee had the decency to own up to the fact that they had been briefed, which is more than I can say about the Senate. But was that true? First, the CIA used the Contras both as…”

CIA financed_via Nicaraguan harbor mining host_asserted ▶ 37:26

“The public claims about mining made only by the Contras and on the CIA orders reinforced that. To evade the budget cap, the mothership was apparently funded directly out of the CIA director's continge…”

Barry Goldwater exposed Nicaraguan harbor mining book_quoted ▶ 42:06

“Casey appeared combative before the Senate Intelligence Committee. Four days later, Goldwater rose on the Senate floor to deliver a speech about the mining, mistakenly referring to classified informat…”

William Casey covered_up Nicaraguan harbor mining book_quoted ▶ 42:36

“Casey withheld the information from us. The president personally gave the go-ahead to start mining in the fall of 1983. Casey and McMahon admitted it. They claim they told us, unquote. The staffer des…”

CIA spied_on U.S. Congress book_quoted ▶ 44:41

“Simmons is quoted as observing that these actions can only be described as a domestic disinformation campaign against the U.S. Congress. Robert McFarland capped the effort in his speech at Annapolis w…”

CIA carried_out_attack Nicaraguan harbor mining host_asserted ▶ 49:02

“And it later comes out that the CIA was conducting paramilitary operations, even though they're forbid from doing it in Nicaragua, and it's no big deal. The CIA mining constituted a flagrant violation…”

Allen Dulles carried_out_attack Albania Operation host_asserted ▶ 51:33

“The Albania operation, which we've covered in other books, where Wisner kept sending team after team after team of people into Albania and every single one of them were murdered. And he didn't stop. T…”

Nicaragua carried_out_attack CIA documented ▶ 52:38

“Domestic criticism gained a fierce intensity. Congress overwhelmingly passed a resolution condemning the U.S. action. Nicaragua brought suit against the U.S. in the International Court of Justice. The…”

Vernon Walters member_of CIA host_asserted ▶ 54:09

“At the UN, only a veto by U.S. Ambassador Vernon Walters prevented passage of a Security Council condemnation of the U.S. How convenient. The U.S. can counter its own condemnation. They should have ha…”

CIA targeted_for_regime_change Nicaragua documented ▶ 55:39

“The court found in favor of Nicaragua. The court determined that the U.S. had no right to seek the overthrow of the Sandinista government, no right to attack Nicaragua in the name of self-defense of E…”