Nicaraguan harbor mining event
also: mining the Nicaraguan harbors, mine project, mining plan, mining, mine campaign, harbor mining, Marlboro mining
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Related entities (most co-mentioned)
Dewey Claridgeperson · 15William Caseyperson · 13U.S. Congressorganization · 11Contrasorganization · 7National Security Councilorganization · 7Robert McFarlaneperson · 6Iran-Contra affairevent · 5CIAintelligence service · 5Barry Goldwaterperson · 5George Shultzperson · 5Nicaraguacountry · 5Ronald Reaganperson · 4Robert Simmonsperson · 3Corintoplace · 3Rudy Endersperson · 3United Statescountry · 2Edward Chamorroperson · 2Puerto Sandinoplace · 2FDNorganization · 2San Juan del Norteplace · 1Gulf of Fonsecaplace · 1Frank Aikoyperson · 1Ellie Krakowskiperson · 1John Mallettperson · 1
Claims (9)
CIA carried_out_attack
Nicaraguan harbor mining host_asserted
“And it later comes out that the CIA was conducting paramilitary operations, even though they're forbid from doing it in Nicaragua, and it's no big deal. The CIA mining constituted a flagrant violation of international law. Not only did it o…”
▶ The Colonel's Corner Safe for Democracy Part 45 (47) @ 49:02
William Casey covered_up
Nicaraguan harbor mining book_quoted
“Casey withheld the information from us. The president personally gave the go-ahead to start mining in the fall of 1983. Casey and McMahon admitted it. They claim they told us, unquote. The staffer described the limited briefings, adding the…”
▶ The Colonel's Corner Safe for Democracy Part 45 (47) @ 42:36
Barry Goldwater exposed
Nicaraguan harbor mining book_quoted
“Casey appeared combative before the Senate Intelligence Committee. Four days later, Goldwater rose on the Senate floor to deliver a speech about the mining, mistakenly referring to classified information. Simmons had to stop him mid-sentenc…”
▶ The Colonel's Corner Safe for Democracy Part 45 (47) @ 42:06
CIA funded
Nicaraguan harbor mining book_quoted
“Ronald Reagan approved anyway. McFarland concedes that the scheme was not one of the happiest episodes of the Reagan administration. In the fall of 1983, Casey implemented the plan. The CIA itself carried out the attacks and mining of the p…”
▶ The Colonel's Corner Safe for Democracy Part 45 (47) @ 26:01
CIA funded
Nicaraguan harbor mining book_quoted
“whose prototype had been a sewer pipe stuffed with explosives, up to 300 pounds of C4 plastic. Tests took place at the Naval Surface Weapons Center and about 600 mines were fabricated and assembled in Honduras. The agency called them firecr…”
▶ The Colonel's Corner Safe for Democracy Part 45 (47) @ 29:26
CIA carried_out_attack
Nicaraguan harbor mining host_asserted
“to preserve peaceful shipping and notify ship owners of danger zones. According to Claridge, the convention applies only to free floating mines, which is not true. The mining aimed at a final coup d'etat for the Nicaraguan port network. On …”
▶ The Colonel's Corner Safe for Democracy Part 45 (47) @ 32:44
CIA covered_up
Nicaraguan harbor mining host_asserted
“At least the House committee had the decency to own up to the fact that they had been briefed, which is more than I can say about the Senate. But was that true? First, the CIA used the Contras both as cover for the mining and to mislead Con…”
▶ The Colonel's Corner Safe for Democracy Part 45 (47) @ 36:54
Ronald Reagan approved
Nicaraguan harbor mining book_quoted
“Ronald Reagan approved anyway. McFarland concedes that the scheme was not one of the happiest episodes of the Reagan administration. In the fall of 1983, Casey implemented the plan. The CIA itself carried out the attacks and mining of the p…”
▶ The Colonel's Corner Safe for Democracy Part 45 (47) @ 26:01
CIA financed_via
Nicaraguan harbor mining host_asserted
“The public claims about mining made only by the Contras and on the CIA orders reinforced that. To evade the budget cap, the mothership was apparently funded directly out of the CIA director's contingency fund or, covertly, its presence at t…”
▶ The Colonel's Corner Safe for Democracy Part 45 (47) @ 37:26
Mentions (47)
▶ 10:03
For 12 months, the Contras had staggered from one public relations disaster to another. There had been a major uproar in Congress in the spring of 84 when it was revealed that the CIA was running the Contra project and had seeded Nicaraguan…
▶ 14:07
After all the meetings that he had been in with FDN Director Adolfo Calero, Enrique Bermudez, Edgar Chamorro, and Frank Arena, the resultant scandal would likely have wiped out what little Contra support was left in Washington. It would hav…
▶ 6:20
was planning fresh escalations to include mining ships in the Nicaraguan harbors. In May of 83, Washington informed Ambassador Negroponte of the quest for a new finding. On August 3rd, Director Casey appeared before the Senate committee to …
▶ 13:45
and mining of the ports, an operation that took the secret war to a whole new level. As Dewey Claridge presents these events, Director Casey and he were equally concerned with the need to hit the Sandinistas harder. He quotes Casey, quote, …
▶ 18:39
in Central America. Maybe because he's the Secretary of State. Then on May 28th, Schultz received a cable informing him that the crisis pre-planning group had decided to mine a river in Nicaragua's eastern coast and have divers place mines …
▶ 19:09
Talk at the 208 committee in the National Security Planning Group focused on how to break out of the cycle of military failure. Again, this has nothing to do with military. It has everything to do with the CIA. On May 31st, the NSPG reviewe…
▶ 19:37
The CIA came in with a poor representation and Reagan rejected the project. Like much that happened on Reagan's watch, the decision didn't stick. Policy activists always thought that they could go around the bureaucracy and frequently succe…
▶ 21:36
A pair of Q-boats could be launched or shipped by hydraulic ramps that the agency had installed given the time required for construction and the moment the mothership went into action. Acquisition of the ship and design and the installation…
▶ 22:37
going to the restricted interagency group to advocate that the U.S. begin attacking selective economic targets. According to Claridge, there was no objections, including from Secretary Shultz's representative. Given the limited activity ant…
▶ 23:05
To recap, the CIA division chief, aware that the president had recently rejected the mining plan, was proposing not only that plan, but an escalation of that plan, directly attacking the Nicaraguan economy and thought no higher approval was…
▶ 24:36
involved open use of force. However, that was considered an act of war. An administration having so much trouble getting CIA funds for the project itself had no chance of getting a declaration of war. They didn't care. Over at least two pla…
▶ 25:07
McFarland says that Casey suggested the mining. Some prep work took place between the meetings, but the analysis was drawn narrowly and did not rise to the level of a real risk-cost study. The obvious reference to mining, what would happen …
▶ 25:37
resolved to produce mines not capable of actually sinking large ships. So we're going to have discretionary mining, just the medium and small ones. Of course, this robbed the mining of its military rationale, and it affected legality as wel…
▶ 26:01
Ronald Reagan approved anyway. McFarland concedes that the scheme was not one of the happiest episodes of the Reagan administration. In the fall of 1983, Casey implemented the plan. The CIA itself carried out the attacks and mining of the p…
▶ 29:54
Claridge account of the mine campaign is highly suspect. The Latin chief, Claridge, puts the timing towards the end of January of 84, telling a story of how for once he arrived home with time to reflect. Claridge achieved sudden clarity. Qu…
▶ 30:26
The export season was coming up, and if we could block their shipping for even a short period, it would be an economic hardship to bring them around, unquote. The next morning, Claridge, alert to the political dangers, says he sent an offic…
▶ 30:55
First off, the mines already existed. The CIA and the Navy needed time to manufacture and test the mines, and they were certainly created for a concrete purpose, not an off-the-chance, someday idea that just popped into your head. There was…
▶ 31:23
group meetings that considered mining before the fact had happened in December. The barons' claridge private skull session most likely resulted from the planning group meeting on January 6th, where the group had agreed to try to force a dec…
▶ 31:48
Casey informed Congress that the CIA proposed to empty its contrafunding accounts immediately. The likely truth is that Claridge merely resolved to escalate it at that time. Also objectionable is Claridge's reading of the international law …
▶ 32:17
The United States and Nicaragua were both party to the treaty, which makes it illegal to mine the coast or port of an enemy even during times of war for the sole purpose of intercepting commercial shipping or to lay unanchored contact mines…
▶ 32:44
to preserve peaceful shipping and notify ship owners of danger zones. According to Claridge, the convention applies only to free floating mines, which is not true. The mining aimed at a final coup d'etat for the Nicaraguan port network. On …
▶ 33:09
Managua radio denounced the mines for the first time. Edgar Chamorro recalls being waken up by a CIA officer at two in the morning a couple of nights later. John Mallett, deputy chief of station in Tegu, handed Chamorro a press release the …
▶ 33:41
no doubt to satisfy the Hague Convention. A Japanese flagship was the victim outside of Corinto on January 3rd and had to be towed back to port. This became the first of a dozen vessels of six different nations damaged due to the mining. On…
▶ 34:10
in at least one of which a CIA contract agent piloted an armed Hughes 500 chopper in combat. Rudy Enders, CIA paramilitary chief, directly supervised the operations, listening to a radio chatter of one of these raids at the Ops Center on Ma…
▶ 34:36
Claridge realized from the background noise that Enders actually was sitting in the helicopter. Dismayed, Claridge could do nothing but cuss. Porto Sandino suffered attacks by speedboats supported by three helicopters. Claridge describes th…
▶ 35:00
On March 7th, the CIA helicopters intervened again when the Q boats were nearly trapped in San Juan del Sur. About 70 mines were laid during that campaign. In view of the Boland Amendment, the CIA trod on thin ice. Throughout the years of t…
▶ 35:54
had been a key in the restoring of CIA's secret war money, and the agency could ill afford to lose his support. The mining campaign destroyed it. When the port campaign began, the CIA became curiously circumspect about its information to Co…
▶ 36:54
At least the House committee had the decency to own up to the fact that they had been briefed, which is more than I can say about the Senate. But was that true? First, the CIA used the Contras both as cover for the mining and to mislead Con…
▶ 37:26
The public claims about mining made only by the Contras and on the CIA orders reinforced that. To evade the budget cap, the mothership was apparently funded directly out of the CIA director's contingency fund or, covertly, its presence at t…
▶ 37:49
would not be disclosed for five months, while combat action by CIA contract officers in January and March of 84 also went unacknowledged for months. It is not clear that Rudy Ender's direct participation was ever admitted either. Because se…
▶ 38:16
Confusion surrounds the issue of the adequacy of CIA notifications. A careful review is necessary. In January of 84, the Senate committee sought information. Its interest was piqued by the CIA's intention to exhaust its Nicaraguan budget. T…
▶ 38:44
Whereupon Casey personally called Goldwater and got the date pushed back to March 8th. Meanwhile, Casey testified before the House Committee on January 31st, but not specifically on the mining operation. The agency also arranged private bri…
▶ 39:15
By March, the harbor mining had become controversial. Yet before the Senate overseers at a previously arranged March 8th session, and again five days later, Casey focused on the new CIA budget request of an additional $21 million. Again, no…
▶ 40:45
As for the House being told of the CIA mining, that happened on March 27th. At that hearing where Casey tried the same tact, two committee members pressed him repeatedly on who was directing the mining until Casey admitted, we are. Even tod…
▶ 42:06
Casey appeared combative before the Senate Intelligence Committee. Four days later, Goldwater rose on the Senate floor to deliver a speech about the mining, mistakenly referring to classified information. Simmons had to stop him mid-sentenc…
▶ 42:36
Casey withheld the information from us. The president personally gave the go-ahead to start mining in the fall of 1983. Casey and McMahon admitted it. They claim they told us, unquote. The staffer described the limited briefings, adding the…
▶ 43:07
Secretary of State Schultz asserts that he had also been given the impression that the Contras were doing the mining. Simmons felt the senator had been cut out because Casey feared he would try to talk Reagan out of mining. Goldwater had pu…
▶ 44:06
A piece in the CIA's internal newsletter asserted positively that the agency had fully informed Congress of its actions. Quietly, according to the vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York, spo…
▶ 44:41
Simmons is quoted as observing that these actions can only be described as a domestic disinformation campaign against the U.S. Congress. Robert McFarland capped the effort in his speech at Annapolis where he told the assembled midshipmen th…
▶ 45:42
The intelligence annual report supplied chapter and verse on the deception. In the later Iran-Contra hearings, McFarland testified under oath that the intelligence committees were not, in fact, informed of the mining as required by law. In …
▶ 46:36
Dewey Claridge remains defiant. He claims seven separate briefings took place, implying the CIA disclosures were more than adequate. Not four of those events were part, but, sorry, four of these events were parts of the original deception. …
▶ 47:04
People are already on record apologizing because they didn't do it, even though they didn't mean the apology. Claridge wonders why those senators did not immediately tell their colleagues a fair question, but he fails to discuss the promise…
▶ 47:40
Blowing up ships, no big deal, especially when they're foreign ships. That can lead to an international crisis. Just normal CIA stuff. He argues that giving it special notice would have been absurd and claiming the distinction between the c…
▶ 48:06
The last point brings back the question of whether the September 83 finding provided for CIA attacks. Director Casey himself had told the Intelligence Committee at the time that the authority no longer permitted the CIA to engage in paramil…
▶ 48:32
which had both U.S. and international legal implications required no special mention to the overseers and no approval of higher authorities for American participation. And the question of whether it had been legal at all amounted to a side …
▶ 39:01
Because he didn't know too much about what was going on. The episode led to his first appearance before the Senate Intelligence Committee. Fires felt like a cat being thrown into a clothes dryer. Of course, by then, the CIA operation had be…
▶ 45:01
John McMahon had told the Senate Intelligence Committee in 91 that he had recommended the CIA hand off the Contra project to the Pentagon even before the harbor mining. McMahon felt the secret war exceeded CIA capability. Sure. Similarly, a…