The Colonel's Corner Safe for Democracy Part 38 (40)

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0:01 Many of these groups were shrouded in covert architecture that stayed behind units, paramilitary, and coordination at the highest levels of powerful global agencies. It is known as Operation Gladio. How are you today, Bridget? It is beautiful, beautiful, beautiful. So, I am great.

3:58 My little baby strawberry plants are popping leaves everywhere. So it is going to be a good year. Cool. Glad to hear that. All right. How are you? I just ran in the house. We were visiting John's mom with the grandbaby and had to go get milk, which is up on the other side of town.

4:25 John's weaving in and out of traffic trying to get me back here on time. So I'm a little out of breath. I'm ready for today. So we were just talking yesterday about the Pike Report and all of the machinations of the mid-1970s. So we start off with the Frank Church.

4:56 A liberal Democrat with presidential aspirations hoped to ride the intelligence investigations to national prominence, positioning himself as a dark horse for 1976 with a solid bid for a president's possibility in 1980. Be that as it may, his investigation proceeded quietly and systematically. Plenty of material was withheld from the Senate committee.

5:26 But Senator Church knew where to look. The Idaho Democrat had been a member of the Foreign Relations Committee when the CIA basically withheld information back in 1966. He participated in the Laos hearings of 1967 and 69. Church had also been chairman of the Subcommittee for Multinational Corporations, to which Richard Helms had lied.

5:55 about the CIA involvement in Chile. Ambitious or not, the senator was determined to follow up on several of these topics. For an interim report on alleged assassination plots, the church committee conducted numerous interviews, held 60 days of hearings, and accumulated more than 8,000 pages of sworn testimony.

6:20 Some witnesses were re-interviewed on the basis of later information that came to light. For its review of covert operations, the committee received 14 CIA briefings and conducted more than 100 staff interviews, among them 13 former ambassadors and a dozen CIA chiefs of station. The investigation continued past its original September 75 deadline.

6:48 60 professional staff were involved. A final report approved and released in April of 76 ran into many volumes, plus detailed staff studies. There were also seven volumes of hearings, an interim report on assassination plots, and a case study of covert action in Chile. Six additional case studies on covert operations remain classified at the request of the CIA.

7:15 The significant conclusion of all of this, Congress had failed to provide the necessary statutes. Intelligence needed a constitutional framework. Presidents had equated legislative attention to the fact that they had just gotten a budget.

7:38 The committee recommended that overall CIA budget figures be made public so annual budget debates could be realistic. The fundamental issue remained one of balancing secrecy with an American democracy. Church's committee and Pikes as well recommended the creation of a permanent oversight unit on intelligence. Both House established such committees in 1976. The CIA entered a new era.

8:09 of formal legislative oversight, which did absolutely nothing, as we know. From the millions of words in the hearings, findings, and recommendations of the church committee, one phrase in particular stuck in the minds of many who heard it. One day, Frank Church wondered out loud whether the CIA had become a rogue elephant. Government officials spent years living down that damning epitaph.

8:39 Church's opinion after the investigation by his committee was that the U.S. capabilities for covert action should be sharply circumcised. Most of his colleagues would not go that far. Referring to the secret warriors and comments appended to his committee's report, Church expressed this view, quote, Certainly we do not need a regiment of cloak and dagger men earning their campaign ribbons and indeed their promotions by planning new exploits around the world.

9:09 Theirs is a self-generating enterprise, unquote. That's very accurate. While capability in, hold on, it's not self-generating. They do it for the oligarchs. Let me just put that caveat in there. With capability in place, pressures on presidents to use it, the senator believed this pressure was immense.

9:38 Of this activism, the senator wrote, quote, I must lay the blame in large measure to the fantasy that it lay within our power to control other countries through covert manipulation of their affairs. It formed part of a greater illusion that entrapped and enthralled our presidents, the illusion of American omnipotence, unquote. Church's opinion would undoubtedly be strengthened by yet another CIA venture.

10:08 a covert action in Africa, carried out even as the investigations were going on. This was called Project AI Feature. Like the Congo, Feature intended to influence events in an African colony headed for independence. This time, the target was the Portuguese colony of Angola, which was immediately south of the Congo slash Zaire.

10:37 The Angola affair really began in Portugal in April of 74, leftist military coup that overthrew a longstanding dictatorship. Portugal had been warring against the indigenous independence movement in Angola and its other African colonies. The new Portuguese government had no stomach for this fight and Lisbon announced its withdrawal from Africa.

11:07 Angola represented a classic case of colonial underdevelopment. It would become independent on November 11th, 1975. Until then, under the Albor Agreement, Portugal negotiated with three rebel movements in January. A coalition government would prepare elections. The fact that few Portuguese settlers intended to stay in the country complicated the situation.

11:36 as did the existence of the Angolan oil production in a section of the country, Cabinda, isolated from the rest. Each of the three rebel movements had its own armed forces, and they were left to fight it out among themselves. Well, not quite, because obviously we're going to get involved. Tribal-based, the movement's political competition

12:07 had ethnic overtones. The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, MPLA, by its Portuguese initials. The National Front for Liberation of Angola, FNLA, and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, UNITA, all espoused vaguely socialist ideology. MPLA

12:40 had the strongest political organization appealing to the Mubundu tribe, which was founded in 1956 as an offshoot of the Angola Communist Party. It is also the only group that had actually occupied cities and was educated primarily in the West and had the ability to run a country. FNLA.

13:11 came from the Congo. It had about 700,000 people, many of which had fled to Zaire during the Portuguese resistance war. Holden Roberto was an educated Christian and founded the FNLA in 1954. The CIA had known him since 1953, and he had been on their payroll.

13:48 Jonas Savimbi, Roberta's chief lieutenant, broke away at that time to form UNITA among the Ovimbundo tribe, which was Angola's largest tribe. The groups waged parallel wars against Portuguese and each other. Gee, that sounds familiar. Except for Vietnam and the Cold War, Angola might have reached independence without anyone taking notice.

14:18 Kissinger credits Zambian leader Kenneth Karunda in the April 1975 visit with convincing him and Ford that the MPLA could not be permitted to win the Angola election, of course, because they're communist.

14:43 Another interpretation of U.S. intervention is that Washington, concerned with the perception of its weakness in Vietnam, chose Angola to get involved in because they felt like they could then wipe Vietnam out of the bad taste that it had left. A huge amount of juggling had concealed the record on Angola. Kissinger himself records that Karunda's claims

15:11 that African leaders agreed with his stand proved completely misleading. Karunda, in fact, had supported the MPLA, but a faction that lost out, giving him motive to then be against it. So in other words, sour grapes. But the Secretary of State learned this later, and none of this changed the basic challenge. Kissinger writes of an airlift of quote-unquote Soviet weapons.

15:42 to a nearby country for transshipment and a flow by sea. This version both fudges the chronology and is an exaggeration, making it basically a lie. Kissinger may have focused on the Soviets later, but the evidence suggests that at least initially, the affair had more to do with controlling their oil. During the Angola Revolution, the CIA was playing both sides.

16:16 They sold the Portuguese B-26 bombers and permitted them to recruit Cuban exile pilots to fly them. They were paying Holden Roberto as an intelligence source. When the Portuguese coup took place, Langley created a special task force for Portugal, not Angola. The connection to Roberto had been maintained at a low level.

16:45 But in 1974, the CIA had increased its support. At the time, the FNLA main backing had come from China, arming Roberto's troops and training them in Zaire. With a unit of more than 100 military advisors in camps, that dictator Joseph Mubatu, which is in Zaire, allowed Roberto to establish.

17:14 This became the first time when the U.S. and communist China was actually working together on a covert operation. Imagine that. I thought we didn't like them. Within days of the Albor agreement, the 40 committee approved the provision to Roberto's FNLA of $300,000, but rejected a suggestion of an additional $100,000 to Savimbi.

17:43 President Ford quickly approved this money. The project amounted to a political action, enabling the FNLA to get a leg up in the elections. The CIA funded a printing press to create a newspaper. They gave them equipment to set up a radio station. They also helped them with propaganda. Deputy National Security Advisor William Hyland argues that the cast

18:16 scarcely made a wave in Angola. But the fact that the CIA supported it and created a relationship that Roberto could flaunt, and that became a key factor. He was emboldened by that support and in February 1975, ordered his troops to attack MPLA cadre in the capital, Luanda. In one instance in early March,

18:49 50 unarmed MPLA activists were killed, gunned down in the street. These attacks, emboldened by CIA support, ended any possibility of a coalition government. Thus, both the initial CIA subsidy and the outbreak of fighting predated any appeal of Kuanda to Ford and Kissinger.

19:21 And combat began with the U.S.-backed FNLA movement, not the MPLA. In addition, Zaire's president, Mubato, and he's on the CIA payroll. Remember, this is the guy that Devlin, the CIA station chief, goes back and works for. He's actually buried there. So Mubato is basically a CIA stooge as well.

19:52 Mubato, who funded a separatist movement in Cabinda, began stirring up trouble there as well. It's just the CIA on a different front. As early as October 1974, Mubato's planes started flying FNLA soldiers to the capital to attack it. At this juncture, the Soviets took a hand resuming aid to the MPLA. So, so.

20:21 Kissinger's memory is faulty again. It wasn't until MPLA is under attack by the CIA stooges that they reached out to the Soviet Union for help, which again is a pattern that we've come across multiple times. But our government lies to us consistently. At this juncture, the Soviets, after resuming aid, and by the way, the Soviets...

20:59 While Portugal was in charge, years before, the Soviets had been supplying weapons to resistant forces against Portugal, but they had stopped that for several years. Now it's back on. Moscow had favored the same MPLA faction as Kenneth Kaunda, which lost out to leader Neto. So again,

21:30 This is not the MPLA of the Soviet Union. It's gone. The breakaway communist nation, Yugoslavia, with which Washington had fairly good relations, became the sole socialist country to help MPLA during this period. Moving into the post-Portuguese war struggle, Neto appealed for help, but the Russians did nothing.

22:03 Then they talked of equipping a special unit for the MPLA, but the idea embodied 2,000 troops, not Netto's whole army, of which would have been a small faction of it. In addition, the Soviets wanted to train those soldiers in Russia, not Angola. These schemes are tiny compared to the claims that were made by U.S. in justifying their activity in Angola.

22:33 As for the timing, definite records indicate that Moscow began this aid definitely after the CIA began its political action. Weapons began arriving around May. The assistance included a couple of aircraft loads to Luanda.

23:04 But most of it came on two ships, not the dozen or two dozen that Kissinger talks about. Two ships. The MPLA had long had friendly relations with Castro. And not long after the Soviets sent help, Havana followed suit with a small contingent of Cuban advisors. A few Cuban observers and negotiators reached Angola.

23:35 But the work of historian Piero Gaisis shows conclusively that Cuban military trainers arrived in August of 1975, long after the CIA is already embroiled. Washington had already swung into action at the end of April.

24:00 Henry Kissinger asked for option papers. Bill Hyland sees Kissinger's involvement as late. Yet these moves predated the Cuban advisors by months. 140 committee discussion after the January project involved arms aid. Nathaniel Davis returned from Chile and now was the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. Oh, that's convenient. He answered Kissinger with a pair of

24:31 memorandums on May 1st advising against covert aid to Zavimbi, which he felt could not remain secret, and six days later cautioning against pre-independence shenanigans in Angola. Upon returning from a visit, Davis repeated his warning. Kissinger nonetheless insisted on an interagency review.

24:59 That was conducted by a group under Davis. They submitted their option papers. The majority opposed intervention. Instead, the Davis panel held out for diplomatic efforts to encourage settlements among the factions. This reflected a basic understanding that Angola was an African, not Cold War, problem. Intervention carried high risk and exposure, along with negative effects.

25:29 in angola but across africa because it was a well-known fact that we had supported the colonial powers prior to this and the look across africa was that we were just perpetuating that colonial infrastructure and again we're on the wrong side it offered only limited benefits and

26:04 would be used, this was the caution of the State Department, would be used as justification for the Soviet Union to become more involved. Davis warned the U.S. would have to reckon with a probable disclosure and argued at most we would be in a position to commit limited resources, making it marginally influence.

26:33 The June 13th report of the Davis Group framed a stark choice for President Ford. By then, another outbreak of fighting had occurred, sparked this time by Netto increasing power in PLA. Events that had begun to move against U.S. ally Roberto.

26:58 According to the Pike Committee, which studied Angola in some detail, the Davis Group's prime recommendation disappeared from its report at the direction of the National Security Council. The course was presented to the National Security Council as merely one policy option, others being to do nothing or make a substantial intervention.

27:25 In preparation for the NSC meeting, Kissinger sent two senior Africanists to the front lines states to survey the situation. They returned to tell the secretary that Mubato favored intervention in support of the FNLA and would commit his own forces, which of course are being ran by the CIA. The Kissinger memoirs artfully describes his encounter with the diplomats without mentioning

27:54 At all, the NSC meeting, the fateful one that took place the same afternoon. Secretary Kissinger's briefing memorandum for Ford conceded that U.S. interests were important but not vital. And noted Mubato's push for intervention. Contrary to Kissinger's other annotations of Zambian leader Kenneth Karunda's position.

28:26 In this paper, he noted that Zambia and Tanzania can be expected to continue to work for a peaceful settlement. The Kissinger briefing made out the diplomatic option as only an opening move. Everyone agreed on that, but afterwards, the choice would still need to be either a neutral position or stepping up intervention. Kissinger's discussion of the latter.

28:56 meaning increasing involvement, is recorded here. Quote, active support of the FNLA and UNITA could enable us to check the momentum of quote unquote leftist forces and to facilitate assertion of control by pro-Western moderates. The guys that's mowing down people in the streets and started the whole shit are Western.

29:26 but would involve considerable risk. Assistance would have to be covert or channeled through third parties. We would be involving ourselves in a match with the Soviets, yet we do not enjoy the same freedom to raise the level of support as do the Soviets. In addition to, and by the way, the Soviets are still not involved yet. In addition to our substantive interest in the outcome,

29:56 where there's no vital interest. Playing an active role would demonstrate that events in Southeast Asia have not lessened our determination to protect our interest. What interest do we have in Angola? Weird that he mentioned Southeast Asia, though. In some, we face an opportunity, albeit with substantial risk, to preempt the probable loss to communism. No Soviets.

30:29 of a key developing country at a time of great uncertainty over our will and determination to remain the preeminent leader and defender of freedom in the West. You're not interested in freedom. You're not defending freedom. You've got the Congo sitting up there with a military dictator in charge of it. So what kind of freedom are you talking about here? You're interested in the oil.

31:01 You just can't say that. The NSC meeting itself opened with Director Colby describing the situation in Angola. Colby warned that the MPLA-FNLA standoff in Luanda. New fighting could break out at any time, he said. It was a 10-box where MPLA had the edge, but Mubato's supported separatists also figured in the equation. The text

31:33 on Soviet military aid is deleted from the currently available declassified version of the document. But its placement and length suggests that the CIA had no evidence of the huge arms shipment that Kissinger kept insisting had already been made because they hadn't. There is no mention at all of Cuban troops in Angola. President Ford's questions show that he knew very little.

32:05 about the West African nation. Kissinger jumped in, raised the specter of the Congo from early 1960s, where, as seen earlier, the Soviets had been misrepresented as meddling. Again, then remarked that Soviet arms shipments have reversed the situation. No, no, they haven't.

32:30 The Secretary of State expressed himself as not in wild agreement with any of the proposed options, but he discounted neutrality as giving away the game and a diplomatic approach as a sign of weakness. So if we don't overthrow governments or interfere in new sovereign countries, it's a sign of weakness to Kissinger. Kissinger's comments on covert action is deleted.

33:01 but probably favorable since immediately after, President Ford asked if there are specific proposals for providing them weapons. Ford also asked that diplomacy would be naive. The group does recognize Kaunda's encouragement of U.S. intervention. Secretary of Defense

33:27 James Schlesinger then cautions that if we do something, we must have some confidence that we can win or we should just stay neutral. Schlesinger saw Holden Roberto as not a strong horse. Those were his exact words. The consensus bypassed this point to agree to keep Roberto and Savimbi viable and keep the options open. Bill Colby promised action proposals.

34:01 in five days. Kissinger and Colby agreed that in Africa wars those who controlled a nation's capital usually won. The CIA chief added that the educated classes in Angola were concentrated in the capital meaning the MPLA and tended to support the MPLA. For Kissinger this was one of the reasons to ramp up.

34:31 the CIA program. In early July, just as Langley completed options for Project Feature, another round of fighting erupted in the Capitol. The MPLA drove its adversaries out for good. That presence in the Capitol, the condition for success that Kissinger himself had framed for the president, had now been lost, and it made no difference to Kissinger at all.

35:00 Action now moved to the 40 committee. Assistant Secretary Davis prepared a fresh dissent paper. The oil in Cabinda, in which golf had a $300 million interest, golf as in the company, remained the only significant American stake in the entire country, which means we're going to try to overthrow it.

35:33 He agreed with Kissinger's view that if the U.S. did anything at all, it had to do it quickly and massively. Davis simply doubted that it could be done, pointing to the CIA's own paper, which had made clear that the U.S. could not win in the best of circumstances and argued that in these particular ones, the Soviets were freer to escalate while the U.S. involvement had to remain covert.

35:59 The diplomat warned against leaks, raised questions regarding the legality of weapons delivery. They would be given to Mobato, who would then hand them over to the UNITA and other group. He also questioned a premise in the CIA paper that arming Holden, Roberto, and Savimbi would discourage them from engaging in a civil war.

36:32 Yeah, we're going to give you weapons and then that somehow is interpreted as they would have less likelihood of conducting a civil war. What the heck? Nate Davis's colleague, William Hyland, who now headed the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, which again is in the State Department, but it's the belly button for the CIA into the State Department, dismissed the paper outright.

37:03 as the usual State Department carping. So the guy in the State Department serving on behalf of the CIA thinks the State Department is wrong and advocates for CIA involvement. This is my shock-faced. Meeting on July 14th, Kissinger's 40 committee directed the CIA to finalize details within 48 hours.

37:31 Langley should use the CIA director's contingency fund so to avoid asking the Ford administration or Congress for money. That would have meant explaining a paramilitary intervention to the same legislature that is investigating the CIA for their interference in foreign affairs. The top leadership at Langley opposed Project Feature.

38:01 The CIA, like the State Department, worried of exposure while estimating a $100 million price tag, an amount not available in the contingency fund. While Langley refined details, the press reported FNLA forces completely driven from the Capitol, and the CIA received new data on Soviet arms shipments. Assistant Secretary Davis made one more try at turning Kissinger away.

38:32 from covert action. On July 17th, the 40 committee blessed the project. He failed. Henry Kissinger took the proposal to Ford, along with Davis's dissent paper. Kissinger quotes himself as favoring action and urging the president to study the dissent. Ford merely wondered why Davis was so vehement. Kissinger warned that he had massive problems within state.

39:01 over the program and expected Davis to resign and the program to leak. Ford approved the initial $7 million the next morning. A million of that went directly to Mubato and Zaire, the corrupt CIA-controlled dictator. Not to any of the Angolan rebel groups. Nathaniel Davis indeed resigned. Then he learned of the go-ahead in a replay of the Hague.

39:36 Kissinger ploy with a quarry in Chile, Kissinger kept Davis on the reservation and out of the media hands by convincing him to become an ambassador to Switzerland. The CIA, which had advised against track two in Chile, and the Kurdish operation again received marching orders. Yeah, I'm not buying that part either.

40:03 that it proposed a plan at all was used by Kissinger in 1976 Senate testimony to argue that the CIA recommended the operation and supported it. And I do believe that part. This is in contrast to Kissinger's recollections where he takes every available opportunity to castigate the agency. Put another way,

40:31 Kissinger's constant riling about the CIA plus Langley's operations demonstrated maybe a differencing of opinions between the CIA and Kissinger. One reason director Colby was lukewarm is that he knew the difficulties involved project feature just a few months after the final.

41:05 Actions in Vietnam found the agency still licking its wounds. The Special Operations Group paramilitary experts had been reduced under James Schlesinger, and they had no recent African experience. As of late 74, the agency had fewer than 10 black case officers. Some saw the African division of the DO still the smallest as having

41:33 its hands full of watching dozens of nations. In 71 policy review chaired by the State Department, according to a subordinate officer, concluded that the CIA had been useless in Africa and recommended closing the division. James Potts was in charge. He strongly supported feature. Potts came to the Africa division from a four-year tour.

42:02 as the station chief in Athens, where Langley's headaches were from Greek colonels who had taken over the government. Another CIA collusion story. That had been his second Greek assignment. Potts had tired of political action, but Angola offered fresh terrain for him. Project Feature proceeded under very high priority, so urgent, in fact, that a first plane load of weapons

42:34 went off to the FNLA via Zaire before Langley even formed a task force and before the Portuguese withdrew from the airfields to receive them. By August 9th, two more loads had been sent on C-141s, while the CIA assembled shiploads of supplies. Director Colby chaired an interagency group to oversee feature. Kissinger objected to that procedure.

43:08 The National Security Advisor observes that he and Ford ought to have put someone in the White House in charge. CIA management would have been okay for espionage or political action, but it made no sense with respect to military operations on the scale it was unfolding. So we're going to run the war from the National Security Council? These are interesting objections. Langley had just ended.

43:39 a secret war in Kurdistan, Laos, and Vietnam, all of which had been long-term over a decade and a half. And it had worked against, and the CIA had been working against Cuba for years. They had been working in Tibet. Except for Project Mongoose, the standard was always for CIA management. And if Angola had,

44:10 been intended as a new mongoose, Kissinger and Ford would have been in real trouble. But for the kind of effort was simply not possible amid the controversies during the year of intelligence. If that seemed problematic, the problem should have been apparent to the White House at the time. So again, Congress is all over investigating the CIA while the CIA is drumming up.

44:39 an operation in Angola. If the White House had been in charge, this would not have freed Ford from clearing a more muscular approach with Congress. Kissinger quotes himself telling the 40 committee that there were no rewards for losing by way of explaining that he held a liberal interpretation of formal directives. They were established to

45:12 create a balance of power in Angola, according to Kissinger, as a prelude to negotiations. In other words, Kissinger's notorious posturing should be taken as guidance rather than actual directive, except he was directing it. And he was sabotaging anybody that didn't go along with him. On one level below Colby's management group, Langley's Angola task force was somewhat unusual.

45:47 Appointed Chief John Stockwell was a 12-year veteran and old African hand who had served in other areas such as Southeast Asia, the agency's equivalent of a colonel, relatively junior for the job. Stockwell held a slot normally reserved for the equivalent of a general officer. Judging from Stockwell's account, Jim Potts ran it, the division chief rather than the deputy.

46:16 Director of Operations William Nelson. Potts, his deputy George Costello, and Stockwell prepared the detailed plans right up to the last minute. On July 27th, President Ford upped the ante, giving them $8 million. The CIA principals gathered in Nelson's

46:42 office to review plans for the Colby Working Group. When Costello suggested that the moment had come to determine how far the CIA should go, the deputy director of operations, Nelson, spoke up. Gentlemen, we've been given a job to do. Let's not sit around and wring our hands. Colby carried the latest plan to the 40 committee on August 8th. John Stockwell sent on a fact-finding mission to Zaire in Angola.

47:11 visited both Holden Roberto and Jonas Zimbimbi. The latter, Zimbimbi, seemed by far more credible as an opponent for the MPLA. French Intelligence Chief Alexander de Marcenas agreed. So did the British. Apparently, a British corporate aircraft flew the CIA officers to Zimbimbi's headquarters.

47:42 No one should be surprised by that. DeMarc Marincas, not so fortunate, had to send one of his SDECE officers on a trek of more than a thousand miles just to put key questions to the UNITA leader. And again, SDECE was the entity in France that ran Operation Gladio from the government's perspective.

48:18 Zavimbi had the strongest movement. He was a leader. His political organization was competent and had grassroots. Much of Roberto's support resided in Zaire. On August 20th, while Stockwell observed the FNLA and UNITA, President Ford authorized an additional almost $11 million. By the time the task force chief reappeared at Langley, the project

48:49 had taken on momentum of its own. In all, Langley had put 100 secret warriors into the battle. Mubato would be critical. When the MPLA in control of Angola's main seaports and railroads, the CIA supplies had to enter through Zaire or South Africa, which they used as well. In addition, Holden Roberto had his FNLA base camp.

49:22 in Zaire and resided there as well. He's not even in the country. In fact, Roberto showed no inclination to leave his villa to be on the front, something the U.S. was well aware of. Roberto had not been in Angola for years. Jim Schlesinger even mentioned this at a meeting with President Ford. Mubato had Roberto in tow and to some extent used FNLA

49:55 as a cat's paw to advance his own interest in Angola. When we were looking into this, there's some family relationship between Roberto and Mubato. And I don't remember exactly what it is, but that's the reason why he was actually living in Zaire. Stuart Methvin, chief of station in Kinshasa.

50:23 Handled relations with the FNLA in Mobato. Matt's been a covert project man par excellence. A member of the first class to graduate from Camp Perry was a Langley legend. His exploits in Southeast Asia ranged from training DM spooks in 1950s to work on the Montegard scout program in Laos.

50:52 involving counter-terrorism teams, pacification teams, and political action. But Methvin had earned the greatest acclaims for recruiting Vang Pao for the secret war in Laos. He had been controller of the Vietnamese officer and politico Tran Nolk Cha, who became the political thorn to Nguyen Vinh Thao, the Saigon leader.

51:21 eventually jailed him. The CIA failed to protect Chow, and the young Turk blew Methvin's cover. That upset the spy's son, who learned his father's occupation in the New York Times. By then deputy chief in Indonesia, Methvin watched General Suharto begin secretly helping Nixon in Cambodia with supply shipments to pro-U.S. side.

51:51 John Stockwell fought alongside the Hmong in Laos and had also been in service with Methvin. But their relations soured over Project Feature. Stockwell saw Methvin as far too willing to pander to Joseph Mubato, presiding over payoffs and barely concealing bribes to the Zairen officials.

52:20 while standing aside as Mubato used FNLA aid for his own military. Imagine that. This is exactly what happens later on in Afghanistan, right? They're getting money and all of these arms. And in Pakistan's case, they go through the ISI. So they keep all of the modern stuff and gave the Buja Hadin in Afghanistan to fight the Soviets all the old shit. This is exactly it again.

52:50 This is the precursor because Afghan's next. So no one should be surprised. This is what always happens. Stockwell also saw Jim Potts as weak. Meanwhile, Methvin solved the problems of an Air Force by simply expedient, rewarding defectors who brought airplanes with them. Eight assorted light aircraft were contracted, commandeered, or diverted.

53:23 In one instance, Methvin went along with Mubato's demands for $2 million from the CIA to buy a Ziaran C-130 worth less than a third of that, though Langley rejected the scam. The Americans also acquired a pair of swift boats for the FNLA to run off Cabenda.

53:47 The boat's 140 trucks, several hundred radios, and 70 mortars sailed on August 30th from Charlestown for Africa aboard a freighter. Project delivery to Zaire also included a dozen M113 armored personnel carriers and about 20,000 automatic rifles. Soon there would be munition stockpiles in Kashasha of

54:17 1,500 tons. But corruption reigned. Imagine that. Zairen shipments to the rebels included no armored vehicles. They kept them. Fewer than half the number of modern rifles the CIA gave to Mobato and more than 12,000 old M1 carbines. The FNLA ultimately received supplies at a rate of 10 tons per day. Much of it was old.

54:45 not the stuff the CIA had actually bought. As on other occasions, the agency made its cash go farther by undervaluing the weapons. For example, an M1 carbine was valued at $7. So where are they actually getting the money? Oh, I don't know. BCCI was just set up in 72, maybe there.

55:11 And we do know that Nugent Hand Bank in Australia is part of this whole thing because Nugent Hand, part of his charges was using Nugent Hand. Hi, buddy.

55:42 Nugent Hand Bank for financing of them into South Africa to bring across the border into Angola. We found that out when we were researching the Nugent Hand Bank. Langley fooled itself, supposing the Zairean weapons somehow hit his hand. Mubato's involvement simply invited attack on the rebel rear base in Zaire while reducing the effectiveness of the rebel forces.

56:15 Meanwhile, China continued to train the FNLA almost until Independence Day. When Roberto's troops failed to show much striking power in northern Angola, Mubato sent two of his paracommando battalions. After 1,200 troops Mubato sent to Angola deserted, his army turned back after suffering only 50 casualties.

56:46 The secret warriors also tried to substitute propaganda for boots on the ground. Fully a third of the feature task force was PSYOP's specialist. Their effort codename was CADMUS, Project AI CADMUS. In Kinshasa, they planted stories in the two major newspapers. The same thing happened in Lusaka, the Zambian capital.

57:15 Whatever favorable development could be seized upon was converted into leaflets and distributed. Planes dropped the leaflets in Angola, in at least one case in PLA radio in Luanda, took CIA leaflets and broadcast them over the radio verbatim. At Langley, a committee compiled press guidance for the State Department, several paragraphs each day with a theme that should be...

57:47 pushed. Often the stories were completely made up. In one instance, a lurid tale of Cuban soldiers raping and pillaging, complete with accounts of victims. The Cubans were supposed to have been taken and executed by firing squads of women. Another story told of UNITA capturing Soviet advisors when they took a village. Looking for evidence of communist presence, the ignorance

58:14 of African superstition about spirits, Stockwell believes that women especially would never have participated in killings. The press gave such stories great play. And again, this is propaganda that the CIA is feeding to the State Department that they know 100% is false, and it's being shared with US media, not foreign media. This is propagandizing us. While

58:44 The propaganda law was still in effect, which is why I say every time somebody says about the Smith-Munn Act needs to be reactivated, it didn't matter. When journalists, more than 50 of them, tried to follow up on stories, they found no evidence of any of it. Savimbi admitted to reporters that United had no Cuban or Russian prisoners and had never been near the village named in the accounts.

59:17 the propaganda war that the CIA and State Department was waging on Americans was falling apart. The station chief in Lusaka, Robert Holtzlander, dealt with United. Despite liking Savimbe, Holtzlander eventually came to agree with the U.S. consul in Luanda that the MPLA were in fact better qualified to govern the country. Theoretically,

59:48 No American were to work inside Angola, but Hutzlander got a special forces training team to instruct UNITA recruits. This would be critical since at the onset of Project Feature, Savembe's forces numbered only a few hundred. CIA comms experts were also located with both UNITA and FNLA, handling not only

1:00:16 Cable traffic betraying rebel operators. More ominously, South Africa, both through its armed forces and its intelligence services, the Bureau of State Security, BOSS, intervened as well. Early on, South African troops occupied the hydroelectric dam in southern Angola. Then BOSS, the Bureau of State Security, quickly sent money.

1:00:49 and arms to UNITA. This is the stuff that Hand was involved in. This meant that the CIA and secret warriors of the white minority regime worked hand in hand in a covert operation in the heart of black Africa, which automatically put Washington on the wrong side of African nationalism and was devastating for decades afterwards. All of the propaganda the agency generated,

1:01:19 couldn't alter the reality on the ground. Because once the minority white government of South Africa got engaged, it rippled throughout all of Africa. Langley coordinated war strategy with BOSS, permitted high-level talks with BOSS officials in Washington, and sent UNITA some arms through South Africa. The CIA paid for gasoline to move

1:01:47 the South African military armored cars to help Savimbi. Plans in the process to procure a C-130 transport and helicopters that were going to be given to the South African military to supply UNITA. In October, the South Africans asked for help acquiring 155 millimeter artillery shells they claim were needed in Angola.

1:02:16 Stockwell's account maintains that the Africa division chief, Potts, entertained even wider cooperation with South Africans. These were stifled by staunch State Department opposition. Not really. The diplomats upheld the arms embargo on South Africa and squashed suggestions for major collaboration. That's a bold-faced lie.

1:02:41 The covert funds from Nugent Hand was moving weapons through South Africa at an alarming rate. Journalists confirmed the presence of South African troops with UNITA. Instant black African revulsion towards the Western supported factions followed. This dealt project feature a political irreparable blow. Ironically, one of the diplomats who closely questioned CIA plans for Angola.

1:03:13 was Frank Wisner Jr., son of the legendary Secret Warrior. Another cautious diplomat, Edward McCauley, state representative on the Colby Working Group, who quietly threatened to resign if Potts went ahead and worked with the South Africans. South Africa escalated its involvement in the fall of 75, sending a force that included armored cars plus associated logistics.

1:03:41 Task Force Zulu, its commander codename Rommel, and Afrikaner Colonel Koos van Heerden, was more powerful than Savembe's entire army at the time. Zulu became Savembe's spearhead. Typically, the South African Operation Savannah has passed off as a Unina offensive. If anyone asked, they were mercenaries.

1:04:08 Savannah became the most successful military action mounted against the MPLA. Rommel advanced rapidly, while another SADF, the military from South Africa, task force joined Savimbi at his headquarters. Within two weeks, Zulu captured a major part of southern Angola and threatened the port of Libeto and the railroad.

1:04:36 one of Angola's few major transport systems. The South African were good fighters. With them, United gained much of an entire province. Neto turned to his Soviet allies. Moscow increased its shipments, allowing MPLA troops to introduce potent artillery rockets during the summer.

1:05:04 The Cuban military mission became active in late August, planning to operate four training detachments. The Cuban advisors of one of these participated in combat towards the end of October. A few dozen men compared to the Zulu force of well over a thousand. Lobito fell on November 7th, four days before independence. The newspapers

1:05:32 praised the fighting forces of FNLA and UNITA when they weren't fighting either one of them. They were fighting Mubato and South African troops. The Zulu force represented one prong of a pincer attack on the capital. Roberto's FNLA was the other. Stiffened by more than 100 Portuguese mercenaries, their recruitment was financed by the CIA. The FNLA advanced on Luanda from the north.

1:06:03 Finally, inside Angola, Roberto got a bit of South African help too. They got advisors and munitions. South African sources report a small CIA contingent with Roberto as well. The American consul and all remaining U.S. diplomats had left. Through exhaustive research, Piero Gazilis

1:06:27 established that Fidel Castro decided to commit combat troops to Angola on November 4th, the same day Havana had sent hundreds of heavy weapon experts to Angola. Kissinger both greatly exaggerated the pace and timing of the Cuban commitment and wildly underreports any South African involvement. The first men of the elite battalion left for Luanda several days later aboard two aircraft.

1:06:56 The reporter believes that Castro moved when he heard that South Africa had intervened. The Cuban unit went into the lines defending Luanda from the FNLA. The MPLA and the Cubans blunted Roberto's attack. The South African advance stalled. There were ambushes by the MPLA. They destroyed bridges and then defended.

1:07:26 the city. Henry Kissinger cites a CIA report to the 40 committee on November 5th as showing that FNLA and UNITA were on the cusp of victory. But what he quotes showed a static picture, a list of ports and capitals controlled. The report itself notes the factor already beginning to swing against those forces. The commitment of Soviet

1:07:54 Equipment, armor, and trainers, plus Cuban combat troops. Kissinger adverts that we interpreted Moscow's move as harassment, not policy, and therefore judged that Moscow would recoil once the United States asserted its national interest. Kissinger miscalculated. On Independence Day, November 11th, there were about 700 Cubans in Angola in an emergency airlift and sea lift.

1:08:24 called Operation Carlotta. Cuban volunteers came in large numbers. The remainder of the elite battalion almost immediately was destroyed. Between the end of October and November, according to the CIA, more than 20 Russian aircraft delivered arms to MPLA. After Ford and Kissinger appealed to Moscow, the Soviet airlift halted on December 10th. It was not resumed.

1:08:56 for several weeks. Estimated Soviet aid had stood at $100 million by December of 1975 and formed four times that amount by March. Weapons delivered included tanks, artillery, and MiG fighter jets. Moscow always had this capability, but no reason to engage so deeply. The Soviet bloc's response anticipated in Washington's original deliberations had come to pass.

1:09:29 In northern Angola, the FNLA failed to capture the isolated enclave of Cabinda, seat of the oil production. Cubans and MPLA forces began to push back the FNLA. Holden Roberto tried to raise more mercenaries to stiffen his army. Roberto offered a million dollars for a parachute regiment. Soldiers of Fortune John Banks received advances to recruit in England.

1:10:00 In the U.S., the recruiter was David Floyd Buffkin, a former pilot and California crop duster. Various reported to have received cash from either Roberto or the CIA. Mercenary recruiting used the grapevine plus newspaper ads. Burkins also appeared on television and advertised in the magazine Soldier of Fortune. Roberto's parachute regiment ultimately received 140 British and seven American recruits.

1:10:30 some with no military experience at all. 23 arrived too late and were sent home. Another group was rejected because they weren't qualified. The CIA engaged in a parallel effort to recruit in Portugal, yielding several hundred men for the FNLA. Though French intelligence, which also contributed ammunition for helicopters and its own agents,

1:10:56 The CIA contracted longtime soldier of fortune, Robert Denard. And by the way, the Portugal people that participated, a lot of them were from Agenda Press, which is Portugal's Gladio people. Robert Denard recruited 20 mercenaries for UNITA. Another 40 went to UNITA from BOS, South Africa. Instructions prohibiting

1:11:26 Americans from working inside Angola were spurred by a fresh army mobile training team from FNLA headquarters. Washington viewed the worsening situation with alarm. On November 27th, Ford authorized another $7 million. That exhausted the CIA director's contingency fund. Any more would have to come from Congress.

1:11:54 except for the shit coming in from Nugent Hand. Langley prepared options for the 40 committee and the new price tag was in another $28 million. Then it went up to 60 million. Later, it went up to 100 million. Director Colby was now a lame duck. Ed McCulkey at State personally carried the option papers to Kissinger. Later, McCulkey...

1:12:29 Unable to tell the working group just what Kissinger had decided, said he read it. Then he grunted and walked out of the office. They were reduced to trying to figure out what was going on. Kissinger is silent about this exchange. He writes that he backed the $60 million option. Ford approved the CIA's recommendation. This revolved around reprogramming, taking money from one government account and moving it to another.

1:12:59 applied to amounts of less than $50 million and could be done with the approval and appropriation committee chairman alone. But the $28 million gamut was blocked. In the year of intelligence, Congress had ceased to be a rubber stamp. It also knew a lot more about Project Feature than earlier secret wars, a result of the Hughes-Ryan reporting requirement. The CIA first informed both the House and Senate members and staff.

1:13:30 beginning a week after Ford's presidential finding, though not the full eight committees as required. In particular, on August 4th, Director Colby briefed Democrat Senator Dick Clark from Iowa shortly before Clark left on a fact-finding mission to Africa. The senator, chairman of the African Affairs Subcommittee, feared the intentions behind the project. What Clark saw led him to suspect U.S. collusion with South Africa.

1:13:59 He returned determined to do something. South Africa intervention and the collapse of the rebel offensive only sharpened Clark's resolve. At just this time, the executive came to Congress for Angola money. Meanwhile, public exposure delayed by the secrecy of Colby's CIA briefings inevitably occurred. Congressmen had sworn silence on what they learned in the 35 briefings from the director of the CIA.

1:14:28 The first leaks appeared in the Washington Post and New York Times. In late September, they were muted by the continuing CIA manufactured propaganda, a case of blowback in which the agency's foreign affairs affected American politics. Even afterward, in his congressional appearance, Colby continued claiming no CIA weapons were going directly to the guerrillas and that no Americans were involved inside Angola.

1:14:57 The latter is a bold-faced lie. And the fact that you're dropping the weapons off in South Africa or Zaire first, again, is a lie. The fact that you're not flying them directly into Angola is not the point. The operative word, of course, is directly. Henry Kissinger lent his own hand testifying to the church committee on November 21st that CIA's involvement in Angola was...

1:15:26 Strictly negotiations. After everything I just read, Kissinger is sitting in Congress saying they're only involved in negotiations. Negotiations to bring in mercenaries, negotiations to bring in weapons, not negotiations to solve the problem. This all finally collapsed on December 5th. Ed McCulkey came late to a hearing at

1:15:56 Senator Clark's subcommittee. The CIA witness, William Nelson, went first. Nelson, a Colby protege, probably feared his own days were numbers, as Ford had suddenly fired Colby a month earlier. Having spent most of his career in the Far East Division, including a tour in Taiwan, knowing all about the operations going on in Taiwan,

1:16:20 Nelson knew the downside of covert action. By December, an insider could certainly view Angola trending in that direction. For whatever reason, Bill Nelson suddenly admitted the truth about Project Feature. Then McColkey arrived and laid out the agreed version that minimized U.S. actions. Senator Clark confronted him with Nelson's testimony, revealing the lie. Capitol Hill buzzed legislation to terminate the project was the result.

1:16:51 In 1994, a debate waged on the letters page of the Washington Post. Former CIA James Potts attributed the legislation to a complete outsider, the academic Gerald Bender. The true story revolves around California Democrat Alan Cranston, the Senate majority whip at the time. Cranston wrote an amendment in conjunction with his aide, William Jackson.

1:17:17 They relied on Bender for expertise in Angola history and politics. Other than that, he had no role. Meanwhile, Democrat John Tunney, junior senator from California, faced tough competition for re-election in 76, beginning with the nomination. Cranston permitted Tunney to present the provision in his own name, and they attached it to the Pentagon Appropriation Bill. Ford lobbied hard to defeat the Tunney Amendment.

1:17:47 He made telephone calls and newly promoted National Security Advisor Brent Scrocoff assembled a chronology designed to show how little had been done and threw his congressional liaison staff into the fray. Ford directed Kissinger to postpone a trip to Moscow in part to oppose the legislation, which prohibited expenditures of any money for Angola.

1:18:13 That had not been appropriated, thus ruling out reprogramming employee Ford was counting on. After debate in the Senate, Tunney's amendment passed by a considerable margin, 54 to 22. In a statement, Ford complained of the grave consequences of abandoning responsibility. Okay, that's enough. That went a little long, but I wanted to get the most of that out.

1:18:44 We'll finish up this chapter and then move on to Afghanistan. Okay, I got a quick question from over on Rumble. Okay. Lori Robino said, you've opened our eyes and taught us so much. Are we gaining ground on this fight? I'm being very sincere. Are we actually making progress? So I would tell you that we are.

1:19:14 From the perspective, number one, one of the very first things that President Trump said was that he no longer relies on the CIA for intelligence at all. The fact that so much of, you can just see how this infrastructure that has supported this whole thing is being peeled back.

1:19:44 I mentioned, and the reason why I bring it up all the time, both BCCI and New Japan Bank was money laundering, narco money. And the fact that President Trump has actually taken on the narco networks, there was just another major money laundering case brought last night. And like hundreds of millions of dollars. So they're dismantling this system.

1:20:13 And it's been fed from so many different directions. I mentioned Portugal and the French SDECE. So the fact that everybody in Europe, government-wise, is pissed off at Trump is a good sign. That means that he is taking this apparatus down. So I could talk at...

1:20:38 length about all of these, but just suffice it to say that I'm very comfortable with him at least attempting to disassemble this network. We can pray that he's successful in it, but it is at least being done. You can see in the past that it was a whole of government operation. That's not the case anymore. Go ahead, Bridget.

1:21:08 Okay, to put that in perspective, this is just kind of funny. This happened while the show was going on. My husband showed me a headline, and this really puts it in perspective. If you know you're doing the right thing, the CIA is going to start screaming and trying to run disinformation ops. So today's headline, Larry Johnson, a retired CIA analyst.

1:21:37 claimed that Trump tried to access nuclear codes but was stopped by chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff. So right off the bat, I don't know, I'm just saying, ex-CIA, which, as you've always pointed out, there is no such thing as an ex-CIA. And according to the article, a viral claim alleging that President Donald Trump attempted to use nuclear codes during a heated Saturday night meeting on blah, blah, blah.

1:22:06 Spread like wildfire across platforms, blah, blah, blah. A White House spokesperson told Newsweek the claim is false and criticized it for its circulation. So if they're trying to run against you, that means you're doing the right thing. Correct. Just to put it in perspective, that's like an indirect way of seeing whether or not we're making ground. Yes.

1:22:35 If the ones that are no longer in office, in power, are screaming and trying to run disinformation, that means apparently you're doing something right. Yeah, that's similar to, you know, the 51 Intel guys signing that letter that supposedly that Hunter laptop was disinformation. When those guys and the CIA's plot of Russiagate, the Ukraine phone call, all of that stuff.

1:23:05 They fear President Trump. There's no doubt about it. They have ran so many propaganda campaigns against him. They fear him. And if they fear him, they don't own him. They obviously didn't fear any of these presidents that we've talked about. Thank you, Bridget, for pointing that out. Yeah, it just kind of a funny, you know, happened right in the middle of the show. As soon as somebody had sent it to me, I was like, oh, there you go.

1:23:38 Yep. Perfect example. Yep. Perfect example. Well, and what you pointed out earlier today, which we pointed out, about suddenly, you know, we're getting a lot of flack on this MAGA, not MAGA, America First, not America First, and the Tucker stuff that's going on. As much as you have to enjoy Tucker's shows.

1:24:08 You always have to keep in your mind what his father did for a living and the organization that he was steeped in. Yeah. So long as you keep those things in mind, you know, go for it. Listen to him as much as you want. When he starts suddenly coming, calling out Trump is being bought and paid for it, don't be surprised. You know, he is part of the intel community.

1:24:40 Directly or indirectly. Yeah, potentially. But he could also be that person that is working on the inside. And that's why I try not to judge any of these people. I just watch this operation unfold. At the end of the day, we're not going to know. Well, maybe at the end of the day, we will. But right now, we're in the middle of it. You don't know.

1:25:08 any of those people that appear to be walking away from President Trump, they may be actually, to use the colloquial term, undercover, so that they are inside that network that they knew was going to pop up, and there is the potential that any one of them could be a good guy.

1:25:36 going along with the rest of them. And we're not gonna know that. That's why I always tell people to watch, try to stay at the 30,000 foot. Look, don't get involved in the emotional back and forth of any of this. And you will start seeing patterns. You will start seeing operations if you can stay.

1:26:05 disengaged in an observation mode. I think that's critically important because the only way that you find out off the record things that people are going to say to you that in person, as opposed to over communications, which they know that the government has access to, the only way you're going to do that is with human sources. And so in order to

1:26:35 fit into that op you have to look like that op so just take that for whatever it is um all along go ahead hi colonel um can you hear me yeah i can hear you okay um yeah i'm just trying to like synchronize you know chronologically that in terms of the evolution of the cia national security state like the 19th

1:27:07 75 you know critically years versus now in in terms of like how is it different now you know and how is it the same and because i you know i probably like more chronological maybe i read things into because i just like to see you know changes over the over the years and um but one of the things that seems like now is like the politicians like the senators

1:27:36 of both parties but it's i really notice it more among the democrats because i've i'm able to compare them with earlier democrats and they're not saying anything and it's and you could say that in a general kind of way for a long long time but it's it's so glaring now and it's like one of the reasons that i think that this is happening it's almost you know

1:28:05 Where the whole Senate is basically, you know, it's called the greatest deliberative body in or whatever the heck their nickname is. They're like vestigial. They're like an appendix of the government. Yes. And that's become so clear. Yes. You know, now with the recent Iran shenanigans, they're just like trying to have a foot in each corner in order to, you know, just gain politically and not lose politically. Correct.

1:28:33 because and more and more people can see that you know that they're just like what do we even have a legislative branch and it's like for me like one of the variables that has enabled that almost total vestigial nature of the senate that we see now is that the media and changes in the media and that sounds like general as fuck but what i mean by that is like you know you used to see politicians kind of

1:29:03 They might have an association with this or that wing of the Democrats, for example, like the, you know, New Deal legacy wing of the Democrats or, you know, the Jackson wing of the Democrats for that. But it's like the media has so sliced and diced up people and so confused people by it with the one hand this.

1:29:29 increasing conformity like where the bigger media has just bought up all the little i'm talking about the the corporate media like from 50 down to five corporations controlling 90 percent of media by consumption and at the same time using the internet as this kind of illusion of you know disagreement and oh look at us we're democratic because we can disagree but at the same time now the later gets that's all that's gone and it's more just like oh

1:29:59 It's connected to the big five media. And it's like the politicians don't even try anymore because they themselves are reflecting the reality that they don't matter because the real this everything is done at media level. Right. Which is makes, you know, it again calls into question, how can we go on spending taxpayer money to teach kids explanations that don't explain?

1:30:28 you know right it's just like it's almost we might as well be teaching a fucking snow globe if you'll pardon my french you know because it's just not reality right and that is vastly expensive and it's something that i think people you know at a basic taxpayer level spending trillions of education dollars can unite about and yet paradoxically no the issue of media consolidation

1:30:56 is not even a phrase anymore right no one talks about it because it's like how could you talk about jail in jail you know what i mean and and and it's like with trump i mean i see it's almost like the cia is national security state is like they're you know ripping him the coalition right down the middle with this media dispute right with candace versus the candace team and this versus this other team and it's like again

1:31:25 Do the politicians really matter anymore? This is media programming, just like the Parallax View warned us. And it's like, yeah, media, media, media. I'm sorry. I can't disagree with that. All right, guys, I'm going to jump off here. I will be on Badlands Media at 6 o'clock to finish this book finally. We're almost at the end. We will be at the end tonight.

1:31:53 I'll see you there in the chat if you join us. Otherwise, I'll see you tomorrow at four. You guys take care.

Entities here

CIA36 FNLA27 Soviet Union25 Henry Kissinger25 Angola25 MPLA23 Gerald Ford21 UNITA20 South Africa18 Congo18 Holden Roberto16 Mobutu Sese Seko16 Project AFRIEND15 Cuba14 Jonas Savimbi13 William Colby12 Portugal12 Luanda11 Nathaniel Davis11 United States10 Donald Trump10 Angolan Civil War9 Committee of 408 Frank Church8 Church Committee8 South African Defense Force8 Kenneth Kaunda7 U.S. Congress7 Stuart Methven7 James Potts6 John Stockwell5 U.S. State Department5 Cabinda5 Nugan Hand Bank5 Chile4 France4 SDECE4 William Nelson Cromwell4 Pike Committee3 United Kingdom3

Claims made here

Frank Church headed Church Committee documented ▶ 4:56

“A liberal Democrat with presidential aspirations hoped to ride the intelligence investigations to national prominence, positioning himself as a dark horse for 1976 with a solid bid for a president's p…”

Richard Helms spied_on Chile documented ▶ 5:26

“But Senator Church knew where to look. The Idaho Democrat had been a member of the Foreign Relations Committee when the CIA basically withheld information back in 1966. He participated in the Laos hea…”

Church Committee exposed CIA documented ▶ 6:20

“Some witnesses were re-interviewed on the basis of later information that came to light. For its review of covert operations, the committee received 14 CIA briefings and conducted more than 100 staff …”

CIA funded Holden Roberto documented ▶ 16:16

“They sold the Portuguese B-26 bombers and permitted them to recruit Cuban exile pilots to fly them. They were paying Holden Roberto as an intelligence source. When the Portuguese coup took place, Lang…”

CIA funded FNLA documented ▶ 17:14

“This became the first time when the U.S. and communist China was actually working together on a covert operation. Imagine that. I thought we didn't like them. Within days of the Albor agreement, the 4…”

Mobutu Sese Seko funded FNLA host_asserted ▶ 19:52

“Mubato, who funded a separatist movement in Cabinda, began stirring up trouble there as well. It's just the CIA on a different front. As early as October 1974, Mubato's planes started flying FNLA sold…”

Soviet Union supplied_arms_to MPLA documented ▶ 19:52

Yugoslavia supplied_arms_to MPLA documented ▶ 21:30

“This is not the MPLA of the Soviet Union. It's gone. The breakaway communist nation, Yugoslavia, with which Washington had fairly good relations, became the sole socialist country to help MPLA during …”

Cuba supplied_arms_to MPLA book_quoted ▶ 23:04

“But most of it came on two ships, not the dozen or two dozen that Kissinger talks about. Two ships. The MPLA had long had friendly relations with Castro. And not long after the Soviets sent help, Hava…”

Henry Kissinger ordered_assassination_of MPLA host_asserted ▶ 28:56

“meaning increasing involvement, is recorded here. Quote, active support of the FNLA and UNITA could enable us to check the momentum of quote unquote leftist forces and to facilitate assertion of contr…”

Gerald Ford funded Project AFRIEND documented ▶ 39:01

“over the program and expected Davis to resign and the program to leak. Ford approved the initial $7 million the next morning. A million of that went directly to Mubato and Zaire, the corrupt CIA-contr…”

Mobutu Sese Seko laundered_money_for CIA host_asserted ▶ 39:01

Henry Kissinger ordered_assassination_of William Colby host_asserted ▶ 39:36

“Kissinger ploy with a quarry in Chile, Kissinger kept Davis on the reservation and out of the media hands by convincing him to become an ambassador to Switzerland. The CIA, which had advised against t…”

Henry Kissinger covered_up Project AFRIEND host_asserted ▶ 40:03

“that it proposed a plan at all was used by Kissinger in 1976 Senate testimony to argue that the CIA recommended the operation and supported it. And I do believe that part. This is in contrast to Kissi…”

James Potts member_of CIA documented ▶ 41:33

“its hands full of watching dozens of nations. In 71 policy review chaired by the State Department, according to a subordinate officer, concluded that the CIA had been useless in Africa and recommended…”

CIA supplied_arms_to FNLA documented ▶ 42:34

“went off to the FNLA via Zaire before Langley even formed a task force and before the Portuguese withdrew from the airfields to receive them. By August 9th, two more loads had been sent on C-141s, whi…”

William Colby headed Colby Working Group documented ▶ 42:34

Henry Kissinger objected_to William Colby documented ▶ 42:34

Gerald Ford funded Project AFRIEND documented ▶ 46:16

“Director of Operations William Nelson. Potts, his deputy George Costello, and Stockwell prepared the detailed plans right up to the last minute. On July 27th, President Ford upped the ante, giving the…”

John Stockwell spied_on Jonas Savimbi documented ▶ 46:42

“office to review plans for the Colby Working Group. When Costello suggested that the moment had come to determine how far the CIA should go, the deputy director of operations, Nelson, spoke up. Gentle…”

Alexander de Marenches member_of SDECE documented ▶ 47:11

“visited both Holden Roberto and Jonas Zimbimbi. The latter, Zimbimbi, seemed by far more credible as an opponent for the MPLA. French Intelligence Chief Alexander de Marcenas agreed. So did the Britis…”

SDECE front_for Operation Gladio host_asserted ▶ 47:42

“No one should be surprised by that. DeMarc Marincas, not so fortunate, had to send one of his SDECE officers on a trek of more than a thousand miles just to put key questions to the UNITA leader. And …”

Mobutu Sese Seko funded FNLA host_asserted ▶ 49:22

“in Zaire and resided there as well. He's not even in the country. In fact, Roberto showed no inclination to leave his villa to be on the front, something the U.S. was well aware of. Roberto had not be…”

Stuart Methven spied_on Tran Nolk Cha documented ▶ 50:52

“involving counter-terrorism teams, pacification teams, and political action. But Methvin had earned the greatest acclaims for recruiting Vang Pao for the secret war in Laos. He had been controller of …”

Stuart Methven recruited Vang Pao documented ▶ 50:52

Suharto supplied_arms_to United States documented ▶ 51:21

“eventually jailed him. The CIA failed to protect Chow, and the young Turk blew Methvin's cover. That upset the spy's son, who learned his father's occupation in the New York Times. By then deputy chie…”

John Stockwell exposed Mobutu Sese Seko book_quoted ▶ 51:51

“John Stockwell fought alongside the Hmong in Laos and had also been in service with Methvin. But their relations soured over Project Feature. Stockwell saw Methvin as far too willing to pander to Jose…”

Stuart Methven overbilled_or_diverted CIA book_quoted ▶ 53:23

“In one instance, Methvin went along with Mubato's demands for $2 million from the CIA to buy a Ziaran C-130 worth less than a third of that, though Langley rejected the scam. The Americans also acquir…”

CIA supplied_arms_to FNLA documented ▶ 53:47

“The boat's 140 trucks, several hundred radios, and 70 mortars sailed on August 30th from Charlestown for Africa aboard a freighter. Project delivery to Zaire also included a dozen M113 armored personn…”

Mobutu Sese Seko diverted FNLA book_quoted ▶ 54:17

“1,500 tons. But corruption reigned. Imagine that. Zairen shipments to the rebels included no armored vehicles. They kept them. Fewer than half the number of modern rifles the CIA gave to Mobato and mo…”

Nugan Hand Bank financed_via Project AFRIEND host_asserted ▶ 55:42

“Nugent Hand Bank for financing of them into South Africa to bring across the border into Angola. We found that out when we were researching the Nugent Hand Bank. Langley fooled itself, supposing the Z…”

Mobutu Sese Seko supplied_arms_to FNLA documented ▶ 56:15

“Meanwhile, China continued to train the FNLA almost until Independence Day. When Roberto's troops failed to show much striking power in northern Angola, Mubato sent two of his paracommando battalions.…”

CIA carried_out_attack Angola documented ▶ 56:46

“The secret warriors also tried to substitute propaganda for boots on the ground. Fully a third of the feature task force was PSYOP's specialist. Their effort codename was CADMUS, Project AI CADMUS. In…”

Robert Holtzlander trained UNITA documented ▶ 59:48

“No American were to work inside Angola, but Hutzlander got a special forces training team to instruct UNITA recruits. This would be critical since at the onset of Project Feature, Savembe's forces num…”

BOSS supplied_arms_to UNITA documented ▶ 1:00:16

“Cable traffic betraying rebel operators. More ominously, South Africa, both through its armed forces and its intelligence services, the Bureau of State Security, BOSS, intervened as well. Early on, So…”

CIA cooperated_with BOSS documented ▶ 1:01:19

“couldn't alter the reality on the ground. Because once the minority white government of South Africa got engaged, it rippled throughout all of Africa. Langley coordinated war strategy with BOSS, permi…”

South Africa supplied_arms_to UNITA documented ▶ 1:01:19

CIA funded South Africa documented ▶ 1:01:47

“the South African military armored cars to help Savimbi. Plans in the process to procure a C-130 transport and helicopters that were going to be given to the South African military to supply UNITA. In…”

U.S. State Department opposed South Africa host_asserted ▶ 1:02:16

“Stockwell's account maintains that the Africa division chief, Potts, entertained even wider cooperation with South Africans. These were stifled by staunch State Department opposition. Not really. The …”

Nugan Hand Bank financed_via South Africa host_asserted ▶ 1:02:41

“The covert funds from Nugent Hand was moving weapons through South Africa at an alarming rate. Journalists confirmed the presence of South African troops with UNITA. Instant black African revulsion to…”

South Africa supplied_arms_to UNITA documented ▶ 1:03:13

“was Frank Wisner Jr., son of the legendary Secret Warrior. Another cautious diplomat, Edward McCauley, state representative on the Colby Working Group, who quietly threatened to resign if Potts went a…”

Task Force 157 carried_out_attack Angola documented ▶ 1:03:41

“Task Force Zulu, its commander codename Rommel, and Afrikaner Colonel Koos van Heerden, was more powerful than Savembe's entire army at the time. Zulu became Savembe's spearhead. Typically, the South …”

Task Force 157 captured Lobito documented ▶ 1:04:08

“Savannah became the most successful military action mounted against the MPLA. Rommel advanced rapidly, while another SADF, the military from South Africa, task force joined Savimbi at his headquarters…”

Soviet Union supplied_arms_to MPLA documented ▶ 1:04:36

“one of Angola's few major transport systems. The South African were good fighters. With them, United gained much of an entire province. Neto turned to his Soviet allies. Moscow increased its shipments…”

Cuba supplied_arms_to MPLA documented ▶ 1:05:04

“The Cuban military mission became active in late August, planning to operate four training detachments. The Cuban advisors of one of these participated in combat towards the end of October. A few doze…”

CIA funded FNLA documented ▶ 1:05:32

“praised the fighting forces of FNLA and UNITA when they weren't fighting either one of them. They were fighting Mubato and South African troops. The Zulu force represented one prong of a pincer attack…”

South Africa supplied_arms_to FNLA documented ▶ 1:06:03

“Finally, inside Angola, Roberto got a bit of South African help too. They got advisors and munitions. South African sources report a small CIA contingent with Roberto as well. The American consul and …”

Fidel Castro ordered_assassination_of Angola book_quoted ▶ 1:06:27

“established that Fidel Castro decided to commit combat troops to Angola on November 4th, the same day Havana had sent hundreds of heavy weapon experts to Angola. Kissinger both greatly exaggerated the…”

Henry Kissinger covered_up South Africa host_asserted ▶ 1:06:27

Cuba supplied_arms_to MPLA documented ▶ 1:06:56

“The reporter believes that Castro moved when he heard that South Africa had intervened. The Cuban unit went into the lines defending Luanda from the FNLA. The MPLA and the Cubans blunted Roberto's att…”

Soviet Union supplied_arms_to MPLA documented ▶ 1:08:24

“called Operation Carlotta. Cuban volunteers came in large numbers. The remainder of the elite battalion almost immediately was destroyed. Between the end of October and November, according to the CIA,…”

Gerald Ford funded Project AFRIEND documented ▶ 1:11:26

“Americans from working inside Angola were spurred by a fresh army mobile training team from FNLA headquarters. Washington viewed the worsening situation with alarm. On November 27th, Ford authorized a…”

Nugan Hand Bank financed_via Project AFRIEND host_asserted ▶ 1:11:54

“except for the shit coming in from Nugent Hand. Langley prepared options for the 40 committee and the new price tag was in another $28 million. Then it went up to 60 million. Later, it went up to 100 …”

Gerald Ford funded Project AFRIEND documented ▶ 1:12:29

“Unable to tell the working group just what Kissinger had decided, said he read it. Then he grunted and walked out of the office. They were reduced to trying to figure out what was going on. Kissinger …”

William Colby spied_on Dick Clark documented ▶ 1:13:30

“beginning a week after Ford's presidential finding, though not the full eight committees as required. In particular, on August 4th, Director Colby briefed Democrat Senator Dick Clark from Iowa shortly…”

CIA supplied_arms_to Angola host_asserted ▶ 1:14:28

“The first leaks appeared in the Washington Post and New York Times. In late September, they were muted by the continuing CIA manufactured propaganda, a case of blowback in which the agency's foreign a…”

Henry Kissinger covered_up CIA host_asserted ▶ 1:14:57

“The latter is a bold-faced lie. And the fact that you're dropping the weapons off in South Africa or Zaire first, again, is a lie. The fact that you're not flying them directly into Angola is not the …”

CIA covered_up Project AFRIEND host_asserted ▶ 1:14:57

Gerald Ford removed_from_power William Colby documented ▶ 1:15:56

“Senator Clark's subcommittee. The CIA witness, William Nelson, went first. Nelson, a Colby protege, probably feared his own days were numbers, as Ford had suddenly fired Colby a month earlier. Having …”

William Nelson Cromwell exposed Project AFRIEND documented ▶ 1:16:20

“Nelson knew the downside of covert action. By December, an insider could certainly view Angola trending in that direction. For whatever reason, Bill Nelson suddenly admitted the truth about Project Fe…”

Ed McCulley covered_up Project AFRIEND documented ▶ 1:16:20

Alan Cranston founded Tunney Amendment documented ▶ 1:16:51

“In 1994, a debate waged on the letters page of the Washington Post. Former CIA James Potts attributed the legislation to a complete outsider, the academic Gerald Bender. The true story revolves around…”

John Tunney founded Tunney Amendment documented ▶ 1:17:17

“They relied on Bender for expertise in Angola history and politics. Other than that, he had no role. Meanwhile, Democrat John Tunney, junior senator from California, faced tough competition for re-ele…”

Gerald Ford targeted_for_regime_change Tunney Amendment documented ▶ 1:17:17

Brent Scowcroft covered_up Project AFRIEND documented ▶ 1:17:47

“He made telephone calls and newly promoted National Security Advisor Brent Scrocoff assembled a chronology designed to show how little had been done and threw his congressional liaison staff into the …”

Henry Kissinger covered_up Project AFRIEND documented ▶ 1:17:47