The Colonel's Corner Safe for Democracy Part 22

1:39:40 · recorded 2026-03-24 · ▶ watch on Rumble

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0:00 has been overthrowing countries to steal their resources, using terror and false flag attacks to justify authoritarian crackdowns. Many of these coups were shrouded in a covert architecture with stay-behind units, paramilitaries, and coordination of the highest levels of powerful global agencies. It is known as Operation Gladio. Let's go. Let's get Bridget up here and get going.

4:32 um you guys it's getting harder and harder um the more information that comes out for me not just to lose my mind on people um self so much self-restraint required um we'll talk about that later anyway all right where are we left off

5:03 Bay of Pigs, failure at Playa Garan. And we're on page 242 of Safer Democracy in this series. Okay, where we left off. The Robert Amory stunned colleagues when he attended one of Kennedy's inaugural celebrations, a Camelot costume ball, as Fidel Castro.

5:34 Some secret warriors saw that as a serious security breach, but he didn't care. He had a point to make. Of course, one level of Amory could not break secrecy. As chief of the Directorate of Intelligence, he led a CIA unit with no official knowledge of the Cuba project, officially.

5:57 Roger Hilsman, whom Kennedy appointed to head the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, which again is the belly button into the State Department for the CIA, believes that both he and Emory were cut out of the loop on Cuba precisely because the secret lawyers feared that they would oppose the operation. And just FYI, the intelligence and research branch is never cut out of these operations.

6:30 Amory knew about all of this. The DI chief at that time held responsibility for the Photographic Interpretation Center. And what do we know about that from our U2 studies? We know that that's the area that processes all of the films from the U2. You see how these two stories meld together perfectly?

7:01 Its head, Art Longdahl, who we've read all about in our other U2 series, kept Amory apprised of the pictures passing through his shop. Photos of the Cuban coast were worthy of comment to the boss. Robert Amory Jr., a solid Republican, the type who would run for office in Massachusetts, a Democratic state, did not shrink from expressing doubts to

7:32 Democrats. Amory had already seen the depths of failure. Hungary, several years into his watch, had affected Amory deeply. In atonement, he and his wife Mary subsequently sponsored a Hungarian refugee into the United States. Let me get SR up here too. He had no desire for the same thing to happen to the anti-Castro Cubans.

8:03 He also had a lot more experience with invasions than anyone involved in the Cuba Project. In World War II, Amory had been a landing craft operator, finishing the war as a colonel in charge of a whole regiment of vessels. A veteran of 26 assault landings in the South Pacific, many of about the same dimension as those being used in the CIA operation against Cuba. Jack Hawkins

8:32 The actual invasion boss had participated in exactly two. The massive Irojimo endeavor, where the United States had held all the cards and put ashore many thousands of troops in operation in Korea. Amory thought Hawkins, quote, just didn't know beans about the small self-contained beachhead would be like, unquote. The Cuba plan failed Amory's smell test.

9:02 but no one consulted him. Amory, far from alone in his views, represented the element at CIA that was skeptical about the Cuba project. Some doubted the internal resistance could cripple Castro. Others questioned the outcome, even if the CIA sent in its exile brigade. In other words, they found the project dubious, even with CIA at the full stretch of it.

9:35 Another DI unit was the Office of National Estimates, which produced the community's flagship reports, the National Intelligence Estimates. Without bringing it into the circle of knowledge on the plan, Dulles and Bissell asked O.N.E. to assess Castro's grip on power, the Office of National Estimates, which is O.N.E.

10:02 memorandum in late January could not have been reassuring to the secret warriors. The analysts judged that time, at time was not on Washington's side, that Castro had successfully consolidated his control over the entire island. Barely a couple of weeks earlier, Director Dulles had participated in the final reunion of President Eisenhower and his hall board watchdog group.

10:31 The board had long complained that the director of operations did not incorporate intelligence and analysts into the covert planning. Dulles had defended his agency and did so again in January of 1961 meeting, responding that the DO used intelligence estimates in all phases of planning. But in fact, the ONE report had no discernible impact on the Cuba plan.

11:01 Equally important, there was no evidence Alan Dulles did anything to ensure that it did. Two days after the inauguration, Project ATE received its first airing before a gaggle of officials of Kennedy's men. National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, SecDef Robert McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and a host of others endured a long briefing where Brigadier General David Gray

11:30 went over the cuba project with eye-opening details for most of that day they brought their knowledge that the u.s had already created a secret army of cuban exiles gray had poster-sized charts and noted that the u.s participation was expected to be necessary again it's not allowed but they're telling them it's going to be necessary

12:03 President Kenney attended a full dress presentation a week after the inaugural. While his Palm Beach conversation had been exploratory, the White House meeting on January 28th was very specific. He listened, as Alan Dulles mentioned, what would soon be called the disposal problem, that the Cuban brigade had to get out of Guatemala soon. And what then, Dulles also told of Castro's growing military power.

12:33 and went on to say, quote, a great increase in popular opposition, unquote. There's no evidence that that's there. Discussions focus not so much on the invasion plan as on the comparison of that with six alternatives, including economic warfare or direct U.S. intervention. The official record notes the conclusion, quote,

12:58 no course of action currently authorized by the United States government will be effective in reaching the agreed national goal of overthrowing the Castro regime, unquote. It was very interesting, according to Bobby Kennedy, who recalled the meeting a few months later. But what stuck in his mind is that he remembered being told, quote, it won't be impossible to

13:25 Successfully overthrow Castro because of his control over his armed forces and the country in general, unless you had an invading force backed up by intervention of U.S. forces, unquote. JFK received the O&E estimate judging time to be on Castro's side. Kennedy ordered intensification of political action, sabotage over flights by CIA U-2 aircraft.

13:52 and State Department preparation for an anti-Castro propaganda plan to be implemented throughout Latin America. He discovered that the U.S. military had not considered the feasibility of Project ATE and directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to conduct the review. Evidence began to move swiftly. A few days later, Kennedy's orders

14:17 The JCS, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were officially briefed on the CIA's plan for a conventional invasion. This provided for a landing on the south coast near the town of Trinidad and the Escambray Mountains. The Joint Chiefs of Staff official opinion, after a few days of study by a committee led by Brigadier General Gray, appeared in a paper titled

14:44 military evaluation of the CIA paramilitary plan Cuba. The 17 conclusions of the joint staff paper indicated continuing differences. On one hand, the military judged that if an airdrop was successful, it would take several days for Castro to react to the landing. And thus, despite its shortcomings, the CIA had a small chance of success.

15:10 On the other hand, the chiefs concluded that the Cuban army could reduce the beachhead. What constituted a fair chance, Gray asked, he put it at best 30%. No one he heard went any higher than 40. Others estimated the chance against achieving success to be 85% that it would fail.

15:38 The military's warning implied the need for a rapid breakout from the landing site, but the CIA's own view, articulated by Jack Hawkins in a January 4th, 1961 report to Esterling, quote, policy decisions required for conduct of strike operations against government of Cuba held quite the opposite. According to the CIA,

16:06 Brigade 2506 should try to survive the beachhead and not break out until the time became opportune for the U.S. to intervene. Indeed, CIA planned to fly in Cuban politicians to form a provisional government while the agency planners arranged for supply landings for a month on the beachhead. They weren't planning to go inland. They were going to stay there.

16:36 And this is very emblematic of what they did back in the early 1900s when they stole Panama from Cuba. If you read that history, the conflicting views of military and CIA were not reconciled. And President Kennedy now lacked the supervisory staff to tell him that. Alan Dulles, meanwhile, curried favor among the Kennedy people. At several morning staff meetings, Dulles referred to the need to gain their confidence.

17:07 One confidence-building measure came early in February when Dulles, a member of the exclusive Alibi Club, used that venue to host a dinner for Key White House staff and CIA agents. Just over a block from the NSC staff offices, the Alibi Club, which was founded in 1884 by members of another Washington institution, the Metropolitan Club, had an unlisted

17:37 telephone on a stand with a list of excuses next to it and the price for each. The alibi prided itself on decorating with odd things donated by its members. Besides Dulles, future CIA directors Richard Helms, William Casey, and William Webster were all members. Helms commented that, quote, very little plotting goes on in the alibi club, unquote.

18:08 clearly does not apply to the evening in February of 1961. Bissell brought down the house at this basic get-acquainted session, introducing himself by declaring, I'm your man-eating shark. But even from this dinner, the secret warriors did not come away unscathed. Someone asked them why the United States had gotten into so much trouble in the Indonesian

18:37 Operation Hake. American intervention remained a sensitive matter. CIA understood the need to disable Cuban air forces that could disrupt the exile landing. Although a program of exile airstrikes had been laid on, the secret warriors knew that Castro's possessed fighter jets. The exiles had no comparable aircraft.

19:03 Support by jets, the most obvious form the U.S. intervention might take, had been mentioned by CIA officers Whiting Willauer. Kennedy rejected it, and the CIA knew he was reluctant. By February 9th, Admiral Robert Dennison, commander of the Navy's Atlantic Fleet, sought clarification. At a discussion with Kennedy, the admiral asked, am I likely to be involved in a bailout operation?

19:34 No, the president said emphatically. If there were any problems, the exiles would fade into the hitherland. American forces need not become overtly involved. The next day, Denison received a directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Lyman Lemesker, defining the scope and restrictions on Navy support. It clearly indicated it was minimal. By mid-February, Esserlein

20:07 knew that ATE could not make the planned invasion date of 5 March. Washington delayed it a month. The Guatemalans were asked to accept the delay. The military used this time to send three colonels to inspect camp tracks and other locations. They assessed the brigade to be in good shape, but the odds were against surprise. Why? Because they've already been talked about in the media.

20:37 Everybody knows that they're in Guatemala to include Castro. The air evaluation stated that one Castro plane with .50 caliber machine guns would sink most, if not all, of the fleet. So if there were no surprise, the operation would fail. Without air superiority, the invasion would also fail. On February 17th, the brass had it out.

21:05 By now, the CIA had a paper arguing that the Cuban exiles could not infiltrate Cuba as guerrillas without huge losses, forfeiting effectiveness and being unable to rendezvous to conduct operations. Rendezvous where? They've already said they're not going to go out of the main landing area. They're just going to plant a flag and pretend like that's a legitimate government. In effect, the disposal problem.

21:37 could best be solved by sending the brigade to invade Cuba. Bissell later recalled talk of loading the Cubans onto a ship, which, if not able to sail for Cuba after a reasonable time, could be escorted to a U.S. Navy base like Guantanamo Bay or Roosevelt Roads in Puerto Rico, and the exiles disarmed and set loose in America. After you just trained them to overthrow Castro, do you think they're going to be a little pissed off?

22:09 No one wanted to think of the consequences of that. Jack Esserlein, years later, recorded that no one from JFK on down ever asked the WH4 task force to develop a stand down plan. At the February 17th meeting, Bissell stressed the need to decide when and how to surface the political leaders. Secretary Russ remained the main advisory and adversary.

22:40 questioning the schedule left him little time to stoke up OAS support for a regime change. They weren't going to give it to him anyway. Kennedy, having seen reports of Castro's jet aircraft, asked if there were a result of the CIA's efforts. Did you give Batista the jet airplanes that are now going to be used to attack your landing force? Castro's jet airplanes belong to Batista.

23:14 But if the U.S. waited long, long enough, the Cubans would be receiving Russian jets, the CIA told them. They had no proof that that was true. So the answer to JFK's pertinent question was, yes, those are our airplanes. In contrast to later decades when Congress and the CIA tussled endlessly over current notifications of covert operations, yeah, there's no indication Congress tussled at all with the CIA.

23:46 Allen Dulles told legislatures about the Bay of Pigs in advance. On March 10th, he appeared before a secret subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee and informed the overseers not only of the timing of the original decision, which had been a year ago, but of the CIA's efforts with the exile community. General Cabell followed to describe the exile Army and Air Force. Answering questions, Dulles added,

24:16 that resistance to Castro would have to be sparked from outside. Cabell claimed that increasing the size of the exile force would mean a lowering of military standards. The CIA deputy director also revealed the plan to seize and hold a position in Cuba rather than fan out to join the guerrillas that they hoped were there. Legislatures questioned the size and feasibility.

24:47 No one told the CIA it should forget about the invasion. Typical of Congress. How could the president interpret the conflicting reports that had reached him? In the Oval Office, one day Kennedy turned to Dulles asking him about the odds. Dulles alluded to his conversation with Eisenhower during Project Success. I stood right here at Eisenhower's desk.

25:14 Dulles said, and I told him I was certain our Guatemalan operation would succeed. And Mr. President, the prospects for this plan are even better than they were for that one. And that's a bold-faced lie as far as them being more apt to succeed. Bold-faced lie. Despite his doubts, Kennedy, McGeorge Bundy thought, kept looking for ways to make it work.

25:46 Allen Dulles encouraged the president, treating him to another round of the disposal problem. Quote, don't forget, we will have to transfer the Cuban exiles to the United States, and we can't have them wandering around the country telling everyone what we've been doing, unquote. Author Schlesinger believes that the Washington's desire to keep Project ATE going owed much of its embarrassment.

26:17 Much to the embarrassment that would attend that basically saying that if we canceled it now and this was the mantra during back then, if we cancel it now, how will you ever survive? Because these people were going to bring them back to the United States and they're going to tell everybody. It's like they're fencing JFK in at Bissell's full dressed presentation of the plan for the invasion of Trinidad in.

26:49 cuba on march 11th dean russ asked again voiced up objections russ wanted an airfield there big enough to handle the b-26 bombers so that strikes against castro bases could be said to be coming from trinidad told the field was not long enough russ wondered if the cia could airdrop a bulldozer and lengthen it if i ever made a suggestion like that to mr dallas esterling said

27:20 I should be summarily fired. The Cuban task force chief wore out his White House welcome that day. Just so that you guys who are not in the military, you might not know that we have quick reaction forces and we had them back in the 60s that can lay or extend a landing strip basically overnight. JFK saw a daylight landing.

27:52 out of Cuba City as a spectacular invasion and asked for an alternative, convincing some he sold out the Cubans that day. But Kennedy nevertheless issued a directive stating that he expected to approve the invasion. People outside the White House have a very different view of Kennedy's decision. Reducing the visibility of the invasion, an action tantamount to diminishing its chance of success, had roots in the president's ambivalence.

28:22 Kennedy's decision on the visibility of the invasion is the second of the choices that had marked him with authorship of the disaster. Commentators on the Cuba operation often write that the Trinidad plan as if it represented a solution, that is, Project ATE, would have been successful if only the Cuban exiles had gone into Trinidad instead of their eventual target.

28:51 was no panacea of solutions. In fact, the secret warriors overstated the possibility at Trinidad while underestimating Castro's defensive potential. An agent reported several thousand Cubans around the city ready to take arms up arms against Castro with no means to cross-check the credibility of that assertion.

29:21 The operatives took the dubious figure at face value. They literally had no intelligence of that at all. That was just something somebody made up. Meanwhile, Castro, who had no spies in Guatemala, but plenty in Miami, and whose security services carefully followed media accounts of exile activity, expected the CIA's invasion at Trinidad. And again, this author is saying that there's no spies in Guatemala.

29:51 It has already been reported at this point in the story that the Cuban exiles are training in Guatemala. To assume that he has no spies there is ridiculous. Where the Pentagon and CIA held that the nearest Castro militia or FAR troops were 100 miles away and evaluated their response capability as a single battalion on the first day.

30:20 Castro himself revealed at a 2001 conference that the FAR had concentrated two full brigades, six times the force, backed by 30 heavy cannons right at Trinidad, with observation points overlooking the bay and pre-registered artillery targets. Without counting Castro's reinforcements, Brigade 2506 would have been landing against a superior force.

30:50 in prepared positions. But Trinidad, a big town, violated President Kennedy's edict to reduce visibility. On March 12th, Esserling got orders to redraft. In a frantic all-night work session, Jack Hawkins surveyed the Cuban coast for localities that met three criteria, not easily accessible to Castro's forces.

31:15 having an airfield capable of accommodating B-26s and C-54 aircraft, one that could be captured on the first day, and suitable beaches. Only a few places matched those criteria, and just one met all of them, the Bay of Pigs, about 80 miles west of Trinidad. Two days later, the paramilitary planners presented the Bay of Pig options to the Joint Chiefs.

31:41 On March 15th, both options were outlined at the White House. JFK, to Schlesinger's mind, listened carefully, again rejecting Trinidad as a World War II assault operation. He ordered the Bay of Pigs plan to be reoriented for a night as opposed to a dawn landing. No one told Kennedy that the U.S. had never carried out a major nighttime invasion.

32:06 Other profile-lowering measures included halting rebel resupply flights at the end of March and cancellation of leaflet drops until after the landing. The CIA, whose chance of victory depended on mobilizing the Cuban population, foolishly accepted the flight stand down, stopping the supply flow to the resistance. JFK also wanted to be able to call off the invasion up to the day it was happening. Finally,

32:35 It all came down to the people Kennedy assembled in the cabinet room on April 5th, his last real opportunity to cancel the invasion. Kennedy went around the room to poll participants. Fulbright adamantly opposed ATE, but the center of gravity was Adolf Berle, a senior diplomat whom JFK had brought back to review Latin American policy. Esserling saw

33:02 Burl as a strong supporter. Earlier in a furious battle of memos, Richard Bissell had crossed swords with Tom Mann, the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America. Now, like Mann, Burl delivered a lengthy conversation with a lot of cons, but a good deal of pros as well. Asked where he finally stood, he said, I said, let her rip.

33:33 At this point, Task Force Chief Esterling returned to Guatemala for one final visit to the camps. As a morale booster, he brought along rebel leader Jose Mara Cardona. The men flew black out of Miami, crewed by some of CIA's Polish pilots. The secret flight became embarrassing when Cardona suffered a seizure as the plane neared Guatemala City.

34:03 Oxygen had to be administered. Esterling sweated bricks that they would need a hospital, which meant that there was a security risk to the plan. President Kennedy continued wrestling with the go-no-go decision for a few more days, consulting author Schlesinger again, but finally gave way. Kennedy even intervened with the New York Times when he learned the paper had a major expose of the Cuba plan.

34:34 by reporter ted zuzel ready to press go to press on april 10th the president persuaded author hayes slulsberger to downplay the story though he failed to get it spiked this to me is one of the most important things that no one ever talks about so if the new york times had the information about this plan who leaked it to him

35:05 the CIA. They do it all the time. And it's amazing because the CIA can pick up the phone and get a story spiked at the Washington Post, at the New York Times, anywhere. They just won't print it. But JFK intervenes and asks the New York Times not to print something and they print it anyway. There's definitely this undercurrent.

35:35 that they want this plan to fail because they want the U.S. military involved. The image of the U.S. in world opinion had to be considered. Self-determination had been the bedrock of American foreign policy since Woodrow Wilson. And I'm saying that tongue in cheek. That's ridiculous. Self-determination has never been our foreign policy ever. Well, in over 120 years.

36:08 Plausible deniability remained necessary precisely so that leaders might deny U.S. involvement. At an important forum for world opinion, the UN General Assembly, then in session in New York City, a Cuban debate already figured on the agenda. Kennedy had appointed Adlai Stevenson, his ambassador to the UN, and believed Stevenson's integrity to be a vital asset. Kennedy ordered

36:35 author Schlesinger, to brief the ambassador together with the CIA and State Department. Schlesinger arrived late for the meeting in Stevenson's suite at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel the morning of April 8th. As a consequence, Tracy Barnes, the CIA man, did most of the talking, steeped in the agency's need-to-know tradition, and despite close relationships with Stevenson's senior assistants and his own

37:06 acquaintance with the ambassador, Barnes imparted minimal information. This would be an all Cuba affair, merely helped by the U.S., not a word about the airstrikes or any other details. Bissell had told Barnes to say as little as possible, but Barnes made it impossible for Stevenson's to play his role effectively. Barnes was probably encouraged by the ambassador's reaction.

37:35 Stevenson doubted JFK had thought through the issues. Within days of the effort of Tracy Barnes' inadequate briefing, it became painfully apparent. Meanwhile, Project ATE accelerated. Two final postponements resulted in an invasion set for April 17th. On April 1st, Admiral Dennison received marching orders in a Joint Chief Memorandum.

38:04 The Navy reinforced Guantanamo in case Castro should move against it. And Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, quietly put two battalions of Marines on transports in the area just in case. Denison provided a flotilla built around a carrier Essex. Destroyers Eaton and Murray with superior navigation gear.

38:31 They would accompany the invasion fleet to the Bay of Pigs while amphibious ship San Marcos carried the exile landing craft to their vehicles with some supplies. A submarine would carry out a diversion at a point off of Pinar del Rio at the other end of Cuba. Denison's instructions were to avoid association with the exile fleet. The Cubans sailed not from Guatemala.

39:00 but from Porta Cabellas in Nicaragua. The code name for it was trampoline. The rebel navy began assembling early in April, starting with the CIA's Blager and Barbara Jay. Five merchant vessels of the Garcia shipping company, chartered by the CIA, carried the bulk of the brigades. When Grayston Lynch, whose ship arrived at port,

39:30 on April 1st, viewed the aerial photos of the new landing site at the Bay of Pigs and the nearby village of Playa Garon, he saw coral reefs. Photo interpreters told Lynch he was wrong. Cubans on his ship actually knew the reefs and confirmed to the CIA contract officer that they existed. A brigade doctor pointed out the reefs to Colonel Egan during the final briefings.

40:00 The Trex-based commander insisted that they were looking at clouds. The disaster proceeded to unfold with the scripted style of a Kabuki theater play. So don't believe the Cubans from Cuba that there's coral reefs there. Believe the Americans that don't know what the hell they're talking about. The secret warriors worried that JFK's inflexibility on the invasion.

40:31 they knew well enough the signs of an operation gone awry esterling section chiefs assembled on april 9th right after his return from guantanamo visit and just before hawkins went to uh porto cabanza for the brigade embarkment richard bissell had called the meeting at the last moment doris mirage his secretary phoned to say that the ddo would be delayed the group repaired

41:01 to an agency hangout, Napoleon's. It was a restaurant down the street. Jim Flannery, one of Bissell's special assistants, went with them. They began with martinis and went on to brandy before Task Force Operations Chief Richard Drain raised a forbidden question. Have any of you entertained the notion that this damn thing might not work? The last minute switch in the target area boded ill.

41:31 Drain suggested that they could just not go back to work. Had the Cuba task force walked off the job in the middle of the pre-invasion workshop, that surely would have ended Project ATE. Some looked very uncomfortable. Jack Hawkins was angry. No one said anything. Finally, Esterling said, let's go back to work. When one of the group asked why, the task force chief replied with great emphasis.

42:01 because you're good soldiers. That's why. Within a week, Esserling and Hawkins would be at Richard Bissell's house trying to resign. On April 10th, the exile force began moving from Trex to the other bases. At Trampoline 316, support personnel, excuse me, at Trampoline, 316 support personnel, including 159 Americans, assisted in loading. The ship, Rio

42:31 Candido, slowed by propeller damage from a log when departing New Orleans, sailed on April 11th, the fastest vessel on the night of the 13th and 14th. Tracy Barnes and a senior paramilitary man went to New York on April 12th to inform the Cuban politicians. By this time, the Cuban politicians had widened to include Manolo Rey, unacceptable,

43:02 to e howard hunt hunt finally had to be relieved and relegated to work with dave phillips in the propaganda unit president kennedy still reserved his final decision with an option to cancel the invasion up to 24 hours before landing although a military man sent to observe loading reported the situation was very chaotic and the shipping inadequate the president's qualms were resolved by a cable

43:32 from jack hawkins this is what the cable said my observations have increased my confidence in the ability of this force to accomplish not only the initial combat missions but also the ultimate objective the overthrow of castro the brigade and battalions commanders now know all details of the plan and are very enthusiastic no mention of the coral reefs these officers are young vigorous intelligent and motivated

44:01 with a fanatical urge to begin battle. They say they know their people and believe after they have inflicted a serious defeat upon opposition forces, the latter will melt away from Castro. I share their confidence. The brigade is more heavily armed and better equipped in some respects than U.S. infantry units. The men have received more firing experience than U.S. troops would normally receive.

44:30 I was impressed with the serious attitude of the men. It was that memorandum that resulted in Kennedy giving the go-ahead. And it is entirely a lie. When it was all over, the brigade leaders returned from captivity. Reporter Haynes Johnson showed them the cable. Unanimously, the exiles insisted that they were told nothing about the actual plan until the final

45:03 moment of embarkment. They literally were never briefed on what they were about to do. The effort to destroy Castro's Air Force was the first crucial action of Project ATE. It carried the code name JM Fury. If not eliminated, the FAR airplanes posed a tremendous threat.

45:28 Castro's inventory included six B-26 bombers, four T-33 jet trainers, modified to be fighters, and two to four British Sea Fury fighters. Principal bases were at Havana and Santiago. A surprised air attack scheduled two days before the invasion would seem to do the trick, and any remaining planes would be bombed at dawn after the landing. That was the plan.

45:56 A follow-up strike the day before the invasion dropped out of the planning. There was no lack of warning on the criticalness of this element. On their way to a late White House meeting, General Gray asked Tracy Barnes whether the senior officers had ever been told that the full air preparation was a necessity. Barnes admitted not, but told Gray not to worry, yet never did anything about it.

46:28 This is just crazy. Similarly, Richard Barnes brought in Air Force General Leo Geary for a last-minute assessment. Geary concluded that the air plan would be adequate only if implemented in all aspects. Bissell made choices that precluded that possibility. Bissell made changes. Not JFK. Bissell, the CIA.

46:55 The CIA hoped to conceal the exile's hand, claiming the airstrikes were by Castro defectors. To this end, the agency acquired two additional B-26 bombers simply to fly from Nicaragua to Florida, where the pilots would retell the cover story. 16 bombers would hit six Cuban air bases in a real attack.

47:22 So this is where that guy that comes in and lands in Miami comes into play. And if you remember, one of the two had to ditch his airplane because of mechanical issues. I'm pretty sure it was mechanical issues. I'm not sure if it's in this book or not. But the one that does land in Miami is the one where all the photographers were taking pictures of it. And somebody realizes it's not one of Castro's aircraft. It's one of ours.

47:52 And that's the first day of bombing, which is why JFK called off the second round of bombing because the cat was already out of the bag. Okay. When Kennedy continued insisting on reduced visibility, Richard Bissell on his own halved the initial airstrike. Again, not Kennedy, Bissell. Gar Thornsrud had to scale back targets to only main airfields.

48:27 to be hit by eight bombers. This reduction in the planned air mission was a major reason for doubts among Esterling's staff. The mission proved successful as far as it went. The exiled planes achieved surprise. Shortly after dawn on April 15, 1961, about half of Castro's Air Force was smashed. Jack Esterling telephoned Richard Bissell and said he and Jack Hawkins

48:54 absolutely had to sit down with him and talk. They appeared on Bissell's doorstep in his house. Esterling took the cutbacks in Project ATE to their logical conclusion. There remained no good faith estimates for success. No good faith estimates for success. He and Hawkins wanted to resign. Bissell questioned their loyalty and shamed them into staying.

49:24 In 1975, speaking to a CIA interviewer, Jack Plepper, Bissell confessed not to recall this at all. Of course, Esterling and Hawkins together did an interview with the historian Peter Kornblau in 1996. In it, the former task force chief declared, I was forced to be a very unhappy conclusion. And that is that he, Bissell, was laying down.

49:52 was lying down and lying up for reasons that I don't yet totally understand. Lying up and down, Richard Bissell. Almost immediately, the bombing cover story began to unravel. The exile planes from Nicaragua reached Florida as planned. One landed at Opelika, the other at Miami International Airport, where its pilot, Mario Zuniga, recited a pre-prepared tale.

50:24 of being a disinfected cuba castro cuba pilot photographs by the press pictured his b-26 were flashed almost immediately to new york where the un had turned to cuba the pictures clearly showed far markings which the cia had thoughtfully painted on the aircraft adelaide stevens exhibited them in a debate using the photos to deny u.s complicity but the photos showed too much

50:52 The Miami B-26 had a special nose assembly with machine guns devised for the Indonesia operation. Castro's B-26 had plastic noses as bombardiers. An enterprising reporter discovered that the bomber guns were taped up and thus could not have been fired. It also strained credibility that a group of spontaneous defectors could launch a simultaneous strike at different bases. In addition,

51:20 Henry Raymont, the UPI reporter in Havana, saw the attack planes and confirmed they had no markings on them at all. Exposed as a fabrication, Stevenson's statements flopped. The ambassador realized that Tracy Barnes had deceived him. Embarrassed, Kennedy sent McGeorge Bundy to New York for a fuller account for Stevenson's.

51:47 President Kennedy tamped down the next round of CIA bombings to avoid a U.N. debacle. Then he directed McBundy to issue fresh orders to Dulles, Rusk, and McNamara, prohibiting any employment of U.S. forces. In addition, the specific plan for a paramilitary support, Nester, had been rejected, and the president does not wish further planning of any operation for an invasion of Cuba.

52:17 There will be quiet disengagement from associations developed in connection with Nestor. But Kennedy was too late to cancel the next part of the CIA plan, a diversionary landing at the Orient province that night. So the CIA, after Kennedy has told them basically to stand down, that the plan has been exposed, continue to go ahead. And we're supposed to believe that.

52:48 Somehow that word didn't make it to the people in charge of the invasion. Meanwhile, Stanley Beerly at the CIA's Air Operations Center planned a follow-up airstrike to neutralize the remainder of Castro's Air Force. Communications intelligence indicated that Castro's last aircraft had regrouped at San Antonio Base. Beerly and his assistants selected targets from the latest U-2 photographs.

53:19 Then fate again intervened in the person of CIA Deputy Director Charles Cabot Bell. This was his moment. In seven years at the agency, Cabot had seen good times and bad. He had helped create the CIA as we know it. General Cabot had come from the Air Force, a long service reconnaissance man and one of its early photographer interpretation experts.

53:46 At one time, he had been in charge of setting up intelligence requirements for his service, and he had headed the Air Intelligence 2. Cabell had twice worked for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including during the Korean War, so he knew the inter-service arena. A master pilot, he had briefly commanded a bomber group in a campaign against Germany. Somehow,

54:10 Central Casting had come up with Cabell as the prototype for a figure that became a fixture at the CIA. The officer who could fill in the intel types on what they needed and get the CIA the things that they needed. A down-home kind of guy, Cabell liked Western movies, the tropics, and Mexican cooking. Cuba should have...

54:39 and right up his alley. Instead, he presided over one of the project's key operational failures. Alan Dulles was part of the cover. As part of his cover, he had a speaking engagement in Puerto Rico. So Cabell had command that weekend. His arrangement with Dulles provided for the two to be interchangeable, each cognizant of all aspects of CIA business. In addition, Cabell chaired the CIA Watch Committee.

55:08 and could comment authoritatively on current intelligence. He considered himself on top of it. Returning from an April 16th golf date, General Cabell heard that they had gotten the final go for the invasion by telephone. At 1 p.m., Cabell reviewed the plans. He learned of Beerly's latest airstrike, asking if it had been approved.

55:35 Aware of the UN embarrassment, Cabell wanted to check with Dean Rusk, even though Barrow insisted everything was fine. About 9.30 p.m., McGeorge Bundy, alerted by Rusk, called with JFK's decision that no further strikes be launched until Brigade 2506 captured an airstrip inside of Cuba. That net, um, let's see.

56:00 That net effect cut air support to missions already flown rather than 40-odd flights once programmed, but not in fact proposed to the president, who had only been asked to approve strikes on D-2 and on D-Day. So two strikes, one two days before, and then while they were landing. The order struck Cabell like a falling bomb.

56:29 He thought the go-ahead included all subsidiary measures such as airstrikes. At this point, Richard Bissell entered. The DDO demanded reconsideration. He and Cabell rushed to Russ' office, appealing to him. General Cabell knew air like a cook knows beans and advanced a series of reasons why Castro's airfields should be struck. Russ rejected their

56:57 attempts except for allowing the Exile Air Force to fly support over the beaches. But CIA officials protested vigorously. Rust finally phoned the president and put their arguments to him. Cabell concedes that Rust rendered his points accurately. JFK again rejected the airstrike. In history, this refusal became the third factor in assigning Kennedy full blame for the Cuba failure.

57:26 But at this point, again, the entire world knows that it's the United States airplanes flying these missions. It's literally all over the wire. Revealed at the UN and embarrassed our ambassador to the UN. A veteran of bombing campaigns, General Cabell, knew their weaknesses and, well steeped in the JMATE plan, knew that it hinged on...

57:55 on success in taking out the Air Force. He also recounts his understanding that the invasion could no longer be called off. With the strikes, he believed the operation was risky, but still he thought it was feasible. Now the president wanted to reject a measure Cabell considered vital, yet he declined Rusk's offer to speak directly to the president to make his own case. That was Cabell's error, not Kennedy's.

58:26 I don't think there's any point, the general said. Russ held out the phone to Bissell. I think I agree with that. So neither one of them had the balls to talk to Kennedy. Only later, in retrospect, did he ask himself if one says no when asked to speak to the president. In his memoirs, Richard Bissell would write, quote, Today I view this decision of Cabell's and mine as a major mistake. For the record, we should have spoken to the president.

58:57 and made a strong case as possible on behalf of the operation and the welfare of the brigade, unquote. Returning to the agency, the CIA officials went directly to the WH-4 offices to report the denial of the appeal. Bissell let Cabell tell the bad news. There's been a change in our marching orders, Cabell said. They would have to go headsy, headsy, unquote.

59:26 Esterling and others were dumbfounded. The room rang with frustration. Jack Hawkins hit the table with his fists. GD it. This is criminal negligence. Jack Esterling added tightly, this is a GD thing I have ever heard of. Tracy Barnes drafted a flash precedent cable to trampoline, canceling the air attack. Gar Thornsrud

59:53 received it just a half an hour before the strike aircraft were to launch. Some pilots were already in their cockpits. General Cabell is proud that no one suggested a bit of foot dragging to let the strike go through. By 4 a.m., he and Bissell were speaking to Rusk again on the phone, begging for authorization to have the U.S. Navy aircraft fly cover for the invasion fleet and support the beachhead. Cabell met Rusk in the later's apartment.

1:00:23 Rusk opened the door in his bathrobe. This time, Rusk insisted Cabell speak to the president, and the White House switchboard reached JFK at his Virginia estate. After a brief exchange, Rusk got on the phone, then conveyed Kennedy's refusal. Missions would be restricted to direct support over the beaches on the first day. There would be 13 Exile B-26 sorties, none of them

1:00:49 against FAR bases, Castro's Air Force got its chance. Okay, this is going to go on for quite a bit, so we're going to break there for today. This is the longest chapter in the book, so we'll probably be able to get through the rest of it tomorrow. SR, go ahead.

1:01:24 Thank you, Colonel, and thank everyone for attending here on Spaces and on Rumble. Hit that like button if you would. We appreciate all the support. I'm listening to all of this, and the more I'm thinking about what's going on, one of the things that I'm a little murky about at this point is whether or not, had this succeeded, our armed forces were at the ready to move in. Because it certainly does not sound like it.

1:01:56 Doesn't sound like our armed forces have been alerted. Doesn't sound like they had been moved into any kind of position to support what was to come out of this event. Am I wrong in assuming that? So there's Marines on, there's a whole plethora of Navy ships off the coast of Cuba. There's a submarine, there's Marines on the ship. But Kennedy made it clear.

1:02:23 And depending on who's telling the story, there's people that speculate the amount of military that was in the area was not known to JFK, the extent to which they went ahead and put Marines on there. Because again, Lyman Lemonsker is the guy in charge. And the speculation is that, which is why I want to go read Lyman Lemonsker's

1:02:53 All of his papers are at a place just outside of Philadelphia, and that is definitely on my agenda to go and see those for myself, because there is some authoritative sources that have said that Lyman Lemesker had basically moved those forces, not all of which were known to JFK. JFK's position all along.

1:03:22 was absolutely no u.s military boots on the ground period none no u.s military flying aircraft no um no anything um the u.s military role in all of this was like the trainers that they sent down to um guatemala it was and we also had people um

1:03:51 in the Air Ops area. But JFK was told that no Air Force pilots were flying any of those aircraft. And we know that the CIA, under the radar, had the Air Guard guy in Alabama supply Air Force trained pilots that were guardsmen through a CIA contract.

1:04:22 to fly those airplanes in addition to Cuban exiles, because at least four of them were killed during the operation. And that was, you know, you can make an argument because they're civilians and not on active duty that they are free to contract themselves with the CIA, but they are still fully qualified Air Force pilots.

1:04:50 It was very clear. So you can say that's a borderline call. I'm saying it's total bullshit that they should have never approached a guard unit to supply pilots for this operation, even on a contracted basis, but they did. So there were people there, but none of them had been given any authority to engage in any way in this operation.

1:05:21 Does that help? Yes, it does. It helps quite a bit, knowing that really their workforce is staged and there. Because what Allen Dulles had planned all along, by their own meetings, there's no way this operation as planned is going to succeed. And they were going to box Kennedy in into authorizing the pre-positioned military.

1:05:52 To aid in the invasion. That's what they're leading up to. They they have those forces staged there. And as soon as it starts going south, Alan Dulles immediately starts pressuring Kennedy to allow the forces that are prepositioned to follow up because they think, you know, it's just like, hey, if I can just kick the door in and.

1:06:20 the president being new will be embarrassed enough not to allow us to fail. And Alan Dulles misjudged, um, JFK, um, completely on that front. Um, all along, go ahead. All along. Yeah. Pretty, uh, pretty rich show today in terms of details that.

1:06:54 need each need analysis and connecting but i think you know if you're to generalize you know the number of details you list talked about today in the book or the book talks about um have more in common with things that would really work well if the operation failed then yes things that needed to go right in order for the operation to succeed

1:07:24 Oh, what a coinkidinkie. It's a structural coincidence. And the point being, you know, I'm not just trying to be annoying here as usual. What I'm trying to say is the way that this cover-up was built into the failure. Yes. Right? Build the cover-up into the planning, and then you have distorted narratives exactly where you need them disconnected by professionals. Yes. And it's just, and also...

1:07:53 You know, there's so much there that needs to be analyzed, you know, for its implications in terms of basically whether or not the CIA or elected officials are actually running the government, not in 1963, but in 2026 as well. And so I think it's just essential. And on that, you know, Robert Mueller died.

1:08:23 right and he had two relatives who just happen to be family relatives i mean one is very close the other is not as close but extremely interesting if not more so to the two of the three cia personnel fired by john f kennedy as a direct result after a little lag time for the visuals of the failure planned failure of the

1:08:52 Bay of Pigs invasion. So the CIA is overtaking the old model of power. We still teach you 100% of the population right here. And that's what we need to understand. It's more a current event in many ways than the Gladio operations that NBC and Nelson Rockefeller call the news. Yes. I can't disagree with you. Ron, go ahead. Wow, this is...

1:09:22 This is my wheelhouse right now. I actually wrote a sub stack in October saying that the Bay of Pigs was designed to fail. It's a two-parter, and I put episode or part one in the pill. I believe that this was the moment that the military-industrial complex was revealed to the presidential leadership.

1:09:51 I still believe that Eisenhower's military-industrial conflict speech was basically a diversion to try to repair his – or deflect from his role in creating that. If you pay attention to what happened, this – I believe it was – Kennedy did not –

1:10:19 They didn't expect Kennedy to take responsibility nor to fire everybody. And immediately after he took responsibility, he went to the press club up in New York at the Waldorf Astoria and that's when he gave his secret society speech. And there's one line in that speech when he said, I will not allow anything to happen that is within my control.

1:10:47 That is that line right there tells you everything that you need to know that Kennedy realized he was not in control. And and I believe that the Bay of Pigs was designed to put Kennedy on his heels and to allow the CIA had never made really any visible mistakes, you know, that were out in the open. And so this happened literally like a month or two or six weeks after his inauguration.

1:11:16 So this whole plan was designed to put Kennedy or Nixon, whoever had won, on their heels right from the get-go. And Kennedy completely flipped the tables. So anyway, I'll leave it at that. Well, let me just say a couple of things. They had failed. They had failed in whatever it was, 1956 in Indonesia. I'm not saying they didn't fail. I'm saying that this was the first public failure. Well, I...

1:11:45 Indonesia was very public. The guy that was shot down was arrested. I mean, that was very public at the time. And it was revealed that he was CIA. Yeah, he had his papers on him, which is supposedly your strip search. He wasn't even allowed to have his papers on him. So I would just say I agree with the overall comment.

1:12:15 that it definitely was planned to fail. But I would also tell you that had Richard Nixon won that election, there's no doubt in my mind that Richard Nixon would have authorized the military to go in and overthrow Cuba. I agree. I agree 100%. Yeah. There wouldn't have been any even...

1:12:40 uh discussion at that point um they would have allowed the initial wave of it and um as weaker not weak as possible they would have framed the entire thing as a rebellion and um then they would have aided the quote-unquote rebel forces which were all of their own making and um it would have just been another um show but

1:13:07 wasn't wasn't nixon involved in some of the planning for that i mean well he knew about it because that was the big thing about um the debates in that he couldn't be as aggressive during the debates with jfk because he had access to the classified material and then jfk kind of showed him up during the debates of saying that he would be very aggressive against cuba and rick um nixon

1:13:34 accused Dulles of leaking classified material to JFK that put him in an awkward position for the debate. So he definitely knew a lot about what was going on. All along, go ahead. All along. Yeah, Colonel, I just can't help restating in my opinion. I mean, I agree with virtually everything that Ron is saying in this.

1:14:08 on this um at this time 1963 because um you know this is the this is the clearest time in u.s history when we can see you know the so-called older model three branches model of power doing one thing um in a variety of roles and the cia national security state doing something 180 different and to show that is to actually

1:14:38 free the u.s population from the syndicate corporate cartel syndicate media which which is i mean everyone talks about the importance of alternative media i don't disagree but what i do disagree on is if that alternative media is being manipulated by intelligence and other corporate influences into preserving the legacy media prison then into ending its biggest abuses

1:15:08 What you're doing is gift wrapping the entire population to the oligarchical syndicate that run both CIA parties. It's so critical to read in depth in this period. I really feel that emphatically. And I feel like this is the period now, one of the reasons that the population is so disoriented. The later we have gotten, the less time the teachers have for this stuff that really needs a kind of in-depth.

1:15:37 if you're not you know if you're not playing 5d chess on the bay of pigs you're not doing your job as a history teacher it's you know it's it sounds esoteric but it's not because it's the last you know are we going to be teaching again are we going to be teaching kids political alchemy or political chemistry it's decided right here it's decided in that national cia security state coup of late 1963 and that's why

1:16:05 The CIA has triple moated it, making it off limits, not only for the mainstream media, but for the fake alternative media that pretends to oppose it, but actually protects it. I can't agree with anything or disagree with anything you just said. Ron, go ahead. I was just going to say, I was unaware of this book when I wrote my article. And I think that after listening to some of the things that you said today, I need to go back and make some corrections.

1:16:35 But or some or some adjustments, because it was a lot of the stuff you said I was unaware of. So this is this is really good stuff. I just wanted to thank you for reading this. Yeah. And that's why I think and I just think it's so important. This whole journey over the last three plus years again.

1:17:03 I don't take credit for any of this. This was definitely divine intervention. Creating the foundation of Gladio kind of is jolting. It's like, you know, a parent shaking the shit out of a kid and giving them a different perspective. And when all of the scales get removed, you go back and read some of the books that I'd already read.

1:17:32 you see them completely differently. And we've walked through many of those. And the books then, now that I can see them for what they really are, I always gravitate to the footnotes of material that the other authors that we've covered use. And this Safe for Democracy book is used.

1:18:00 often as citations, which, you know, kind of moved it up on my list. But what I found very interesting is until I read this book, I didn't realize how much of the shit they left out of it. So we read other books about the JFK. I don't recall off the top of my head the book that we were reading where it exposed.

1:18:25 The second, the plane that came and the exposure and all of that stuff, we read that together. But one of the pieces that was footnoted in that book is this book. And that book left out a whole bunch of the pieces, the direct quotes of the different conversations and stuff like that. And so it's kind of like we're on this journey.

1:18:54 of putting all of this stuff together. And it's just, it's incredible because once you understand, to all along's point, once you understand history, it allows you to look at things today in a completely different way. You're not looking at anything that is sensationalized or the, you don't get the same,

1:19:24 whatever their false flag is or whatever their narrative is, you're able to look above that and say basically things like, who benefits from this story? Where did the story originate from? Because now we know how this whole system works. And I just find it incredibly empowering to be alive today going through this material.

1:19:51 And being able to assess, because what's going on today is so life-changing for people around the world. I think it's going to be a period of time where people look back and are just totally amazed. It's going to be kind of almost the same phenomenon of the people that lived, although we're not even going to go into the details of.

1:20:17 the whole impetus for it, but like World War II and the aftermath of that. And I think that's basically, there's basically a World War III scenario playing out today. And those of us who've been on this journey, not only can see

1:20:41 from a different perspective, all of the different pieces that are happening. But the more we go back and dig into history, the more we're going to be able to put things in their proper perspective today. So. Colonel, I agree. And I'd like to, if I may, I don't, I don't want to like derail anything. I just want to make a quick point because what you just said about who benefits, I'm.

1:21:10 It occurred to me the other day about looking at the origins of World War I, which is really the origins of all this crap. Who benefited from World War I? Who benefited the most? And it was Britain. It was Britain who benefited. And, you know, I've heard, and if you know of anything, by all means share it, but I've heard that Britain is the one who basically clandestinely paid for the Black Hand to kill Archduke Ferdinand.

1:21:39 and set all that chain of motion or set all that chain of events into motion. And then obviously, you know, obviously then the cascading with World War, interwar years, World War II, military industrial complex, and then where we are today. But you're a thousand percent accurate when you say who benefits. And if you come at it from the perspective of who benefits, it almost clears up so many things and you can look at it almost stoically.

1:22:06 And, you know, you're not emotional about it anymore, because right now people are so emotional about this thing with Iran. Oh, Trump said Trump's Trump's and he's doing this to appease Israel. And they're so freaking emotional about shit. They don't know nothing. I don't know anything. But but, you know, that question right there, Kibono, who benefits that? That should be the first question anybody asks when they see anything.

1:22:36 Yep, I agree. Okay, that's going to do it for today. Let's see. We did have some podcast drop with Crypto Rich, and he did text me the link, which I'll put it up as soon as the show's over.

1:23:07 And I also wanted to just check the calendar. Tommy's trying to monopolize the rest of my week. Can I compliment you on something real quick? If you guys aren't watching The Colonel or those podcasts, that is the only place that I feel like...

1:23:34 What is really going on is being told. And I watched the thing that you did the other night with Kokenda and Luongo twice. It was fascinating. And so, I mean, I just want to say, you know, you are an amazing addition to that team and you bring so much rich content. And I just want to compliment you on that. Thank you. Thank you. I was just going to second that and say, if you weren't so darn interesting, everybody wouldn't want you on their podcast.

1:24:01 Yeah, I don't know about that. But anyway, thank you, Bridget. So we do have tonight the book club with Ash and CanCon at six. And I will be appearing on Thursday on Tim Gardner's JFK podcast. And Tommy has scheduled a noon show with a new guy.

1:24:28 who I don't really know. I don't know anything about him, at noon on Thursday. And then on Friday, we have Warhamster's podcast at noon. And then we'll be doing another normal kind of roundtable show.

1:24:52 on Saturday with the normal group on Tommy's podcast. So that got set up today as well. SR, go ahead, and then we'll go to why are you so mad? Thank you, Colonel. I just want to know, because I was out all day yesterday to begin with, but what's going on with Tommy's podcast and his ex-account? Do we have any other information on that?

1:25:18 No, other than they canceled it. And for the reason that they canceled it, I posted his comment, which was not, it was not a controversial comment at all. They just canceled his, they just suspended him. And it wasn't like you're in timeout for seven days or anything like that. They just suspended it. There was no time limit given or anything. So I don't know if he's permanently suspended or what.

1:25:47 um so uh why are you so mad go ahead uh i just want to remind you colonel that you are busy for a very good reason and getting used to being busy at least for a while i mean you are the the pinnacle of truth right now and i think that that needs to be i think you need to be busy you know that's all i guess yeah thank you um it is

1:26:17 Again, it's very frustrating because you have all of these people that have much bigger platforms and they come out and they make comments like, you know, oh, this is breaking news or whatever. And I'm like, no, it's not. That information has been out there forever and we've talked about it for years here.

1:26:43 but just because they stumble across it. And most of the people that say that, and I only get aggravated with the people that are pretending like something is breaking news when they follow me. And they know that we have not only discussed it, but done long in-depth threads that are readily available if you just search on the topic in our account.

1:27:10 Um, that's very, very frustrating to me. Um, I try to get over it. Um, but again, it's one of those eye rolling things that it's like, it's not new. None of this is new. And we, we spend, you know, probably 10 hours a day, um, uh, doing the research.

1:27:32 of this stuff and pulling together articles and threads and all of this other stuff um exposing this and how it's happened repeatedly um and the the other very frustrating thing is it's everybody but the cia oh my gosh china's doing this oh my gosh iran's doing this oh my gosh this this guy's doing this venezuela whatever no no it's still all the cia

1:27:59 And, you know, and the other intelligence agencies, not just the CIA. But again, it's just it's crazy. But we're able to see those kind of things because we actually have read the history relating to it. So anyway. Hang in there, Colonel. Hang in there. I will. I will. You guys are like my family, so I can say this to you.

1:28:29 um i don't i don't say that out loud to anybody else um all along go ahead um yeah colonel i think that um the this period you know between 61 and you know 65 when a you know we can most clearly see the cia and national security council joint chiefs of staff doing one thing and the elected official boss doing another thing are you know not only the most censored in

1:28:59 mainstream media but also the most censored in quote alt which is its fake opposite because most propaganda the essence of most propaganda is you know using the idea of the opposite or these binaries between like left and right or yes yes there's many of them to deceive yes the essence of all propaganda and we see it most intensely in these years for good reason

1:29:25 because so many professionals have so much to lose entire institutions fall including u.s academia and yes and the five corporations media cartel controlling 90 of media by consumption still even with the illusory freedom of the internet and your algorithm colonel you should you should have millions of followers and we also know exactly why you don't

1:29:54 My question for Mr. Elon Musk is if you're against the deep state, then I'm starting to understand why your cage match with Elon, I'm sorry, with Mr. Zuckerberg has been delayed for quite so long. It's like algorithmic pie in the sky. It's deception. It's agency deception. Well, and you know what's funny about that is I always laughed at the accounts that were saying that, you know, that until Bridget.

1:30:23 ran whatever that program was that she ran. And it actually says that our account is throttled. And there was another recent one that came out. Somebody said, you know, ask these questions in Grok and it'll give you an analysis. And Grok even said it was. So I now believe that I just thought it was people whining, but it isn't. It actually does happen. Ron, go ahead.

1:30:53 I'm sorry. I want to actually address that real quick. Elon Musk bought it, and I'm sure he has directives, but I don't know. He's not in control of the day-to-day function of that, and I tend to believe that there still is a tremendous contingent of purple-haired nose ring wearers at that facility.

1:31:23 I understand the frustration with the platform, but I think it's, you know, laying all the blame on Musk himself is the same thing as laying all the blame on everything that's going wrong in the country on Trump. I'm not saying it's wrong. I'm just saying, you know, there could be other factors that we don't know about because we don't know what we don't know.

1:31:49 Well, to your point, I mean, there's been a lot of people. I firmly believe that the things that are happening are happening in a staged fashion. I mean, if you look at the.

1:32:04 just like i was saying on that one show if you look at the crackdown of ice and then the venezuela where we now have an alternative source of oil into the united states and then going to iran and the closure so there obviously is some order of effects going on and um so it i have been told by some um

1:32:32 dear friends that we are all at the finish line we're the ones standing there understanding what is going on and that um so i i mean i i didn't mean to bring this up so you know to um i i just i get frustrated and not at twitter i don't even get frustrated at twitter i get

1:32:55 Frustrated at the people that have big accounts that follow me. Number one, they never engage with us. And number two, then they will turn around knowing, because some of these people I know personally, and then pretend by putting out a post that they're revealing something that's brand new when I know they know that it's not brand new.

1:33:25 I wanted to say what I have done is I've kind of taken a step back of I don't watch as much content anymore. I mean, you're kind of like a must-see. I like what the guys – I don't necessarily agree everything with the Promethean people, but I agree with a lot of what – I agree with most of what they say. And I really enjoy The Rich Show and some of the others.

1:33:50 I've really kind of tapered back because I feel like there's so much information. It's that fifth generation warfare thing where there's so much stuff out there you have to decipher and you can't really, you can't, if you're, if you're in taking too much, you're overwhelming yourself and you don't know, you don't know, you don't even know less. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. Thanks. War hamster. Go ahead. Howdy y'all. I was going to keep quiet tonight, but you hit on some topics that are important.

1:34:20 You talk about being throttled. I absolutely know that happens. But the flip side of that is you get accounts that come out of nowhere. They get boosted to the moon. And I'm going to be all over this quote-unquote Professor Jane guy for quite some time because, well, you know my thoughts on that. This is a guy that's getting platformed by people as big as Tucker Carlson.

1:34:47 He does not have the credentials or the quality of material. And what this guy says, he says some good stuff. That's what he doesn't say that it's so crystal clear. Yes. You know, what story he's telling. And that kind of leads into one of the things you said earlier is, you know, a lot of people, some people have been in this game of, you know, understanding what the real history is for quite some time. Others are newer to it. One of the biggest dangers is when people, they're learning a truth.

1:35:15 And they'll hit their entire wagon to that. Yes. We've got all kinds of examples of that. Epstein's a beautiful example. Epstein did not run the world, people. He was part of a cog in a really big machine. Yes. People get laser focused on one thing and they stop learning. Or they do what you say and they don't take a piece of truth and try to make it fit into their preconceived narrative. Yes. And it doesn't fit. And that's why it's so important.

1:35:43 Understand the patterns, the players, the long-term history, the philosophy, what their end goals are. And then you just watch it play out over and over again. And it gets really easy. You've been calling it Gladio glasses forever. I haven't come up with a better name, so I'm going to let you keep that. And I want you to play out in real time right now. This whole Joe Kent saga, there's more than one side. You can't just take one side or the other on this.

1:36:10 There's good and bad with what Joe's doing. I agree with him on some things and disagree on others. And the people criticizing him, I can agree with and disagree. But everything has gotten so darn black, white. Yes, yes. And we know, and we've known this for quite some time, that there are paid influencers who are deliberately trying to put a wedge into whatever we call this movement, whether you want to call it MAGA, the truth movement, what have you. There is absolutely intentional division. And I just implore everybody,

1:36:40 to, you know, don't accept everything at face value. Do your own research. Listen to people that have credibility and a track record of, you know, of actually looking deeper into things and asking questions instead of telling you how things are. Right. This is going to get harder and not easier as things go forward. I agree. All along, be quick. I got to run because I have a six o'clock. Yeah, Colonel. Just some of the things that Ron was discussing, I kind of disagree with is that you want Elon Musk in it.

1:37:09 And if you remember, I also mentioned his nominal counterpart, Zuckerberg. I think they're role players for both sides. And here's basically the reason is because the alternative media and Internet was held up for so long as, you know, an alternative to complete corporate media as that corporate media was eating each other up at a faster rate than ever before in terms of media consolidation. And now we see.

1:37:37 elon musk commenting on everything in the other yet when it comes to cia and media the history the long history of cia's operation mockingbird and his content you know continuity of that essential pattern it's it's worth noting you know where both zuckerberg and elon musk do not go yeah i mean you can you can definitely make um an argument and

1:38:05 that's that's the beauty of what we do we don't we're not all going to agree on every single um part of this um journey we're just not and that's why i love i i i love the content piece of this but i also love the interchange with all of you guys um because we're not all um on the same uh sheet of music in many aspects of the greater um

1:38:34 agenda that they try to push us into. And so I really welcome everybody's points of view on this. And you can certainly make an argument. And at the end of the day, we don't really know because we don't know these people personally. And all we can do is make assessments based on their actions. And we're not all going to have the same opinion about every player in this story.

1:39:03 I'm just glad we're all here together. All right. I'm going to take off, you guys. Enjoy the rest of your evening. Join us on Badlands on the book club if you can at six o'clock. Otherwise, I'll see you here tomorrow at four. Take care. Okay. I got to run. You guys take care.

Entities here

Claims made here

John F. Kennedy appointed Roger Hilsman documented ▶ 5:57

“Roger Hilsman, whom Kennedy appointed to head the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, which again is the belly button into the State Department for the CIA, believes that both he a…”

Roger Hilsman headed Office of Research and Intelligence documented ▶ 5:57

Robert Amory Jr. headed Photographic Interpretation Center documented ▶ 6:30

“Amory knew about all of this. The DI chief at that time held responsibility for the Photographic Interpretation Center. And what do we know about that from our U2 studies? We know that that's the area…”

Art Longdahl headed Photographic Interpretation Center documented ▶ 7:01

“Its head, Art Longdahl, who we've read all about in our other U2 series, kept Amory apprised of the pictures passing through his shop. Photos of the Cuban coast were worthy of comment to the boss. Rob…”

Robert Amory Jr. born_in United States documented ▶ 7:01

Robert Amory Jr. carried_out_attack Hungary documented ▶ 7:32

“Democrats. Amory had already seen the depths of failure. Hungary, several years into his watch, had affected Amory deeply. In atonement, he and his wife Mary subsequently sponsored a Hungarian refugee…”

Robert Amory Jr. carried_out_attack United States documented ▶ 8:03

“He also had a lot more experience with invasions than anyone involved in the Cuba Project. In World War II, Amory had been a landing craft operator, finishing the war as a colonel in charge of a whole…”

Robert Amory Jr. carried_out_attack Hungary documented ▶ 8:03

Robert Amory Jr. member_of United States Navy documented ▶ 8:03

Robert Amory Jr. carried_out_attack Indonesia documented ▶ 8:03

Robert Amory Jr. carried_out_attack Poland documented ▶ 8:03

Robert Amory Jr. carried_out_attack Russia documented ▶ 8:03

Robert Amory Jr. carried_out_attack Cuba documented ▶ 8:03

Jack Hawkins member_of CIA documented ▶ 8:32

“The actual invasion boss had participated in exactly two. The massive Irojimo endeavor, where the United States had held all the cards and put ashore many thousands of troops in operation in Korea. Am…”

Robert Amory Jr. member_of CIA documented ▶ 9:02

“but no one consulted him. Amory, far from alone in his views, represented the element at CIA that was skeptical about the Cuba project. Some doubted the internal resistance could cripple Castro. Other…”

Richard M. Bissell Jr. member_of CIA documented ▶ 9:35

“Another DI unit was the Office of National Estimates, which produced the community's flagship reports, the National Intelligence Estimates. Without bringing it into the circle of knowledge on the plan…”

Allen Dulles headed CIA documented ▶ 10:02

“memorandum in late January could not have been reassuring to the secret warriors. The analysts judged that time, at time was not on Washington's side, that Castro had successfully consolidated his con…”

David Graeber member_of Joint Chiefs of Staff documented ▶ 11:30

“went over the cuba project with eye-opening details for most of that day they brought their knowledge that the u.s had already created a secret army of cuban exiles gray had poster-sized charts and no…”

John F. Kennedy targeted_for_regime_change Cuba documented ▶ 12:58

“no course of action currently authorized by the United States government will be effective in reaching the agreed national goal of overthrowing the Castro regime, unquote. It was very interesting, acc…”

John F. Kennedy ordered_assassination_of Fidel Castro documented ▶ 13:25

“Successfully overthrow Castro because of his control over his armed forces and the country in general, unless you had an invading force backed up by intervention of U.S. forces, unquote. JFK received …”

Allen Dulles member_of Alibi Club documented ▶ 17:07

“One confidence-building measure came early in February when Dulles, a member of the exclusive Alibi Club, used that venue to host a dinner for Key White House staff and CIA agents. Just over a block f…”

William Casey member_of Alibi Club documented ▶ 17:37

“telephone on a stand with a list of excuses next to it and the price for each. The alibi prided itself on decorating with odd things donated by its members. Besides Dulles, future CIA directors Richar…”

William Webster member_of Alibi Club documented ▶ 17:37

Richard Helms member_of Alibi Club documented ▶ 17:37

United States carried_out_attack Indonesia documented ▶ 18:08

“clearly does not apply to the evening in February of 1961. Bissell brought down the house at this basic get-acquainted session, introducing himself by declaring, I'm your man-eating shark. But even fr…”

Robert Dennison headed United States Navy documented ▶ 19:03

“Support by jets, the most obvious form the U.S. intervention might take, had been mentioned by CIA officers Whiting Willauer. Kennedy rejected it, and the CIA knew he was reluctant. By February 9th, A…”

Lyman Lemnitzer headed Joint Chiefs of Staff documented ▶ 19:34

“No, the president said emphatically. If there were any problems, the exiles would fade into the hitherland. American forces need not become overtly involved. The next day, Denison received a directive…”

Brigade 2506 trained Cuba documented ▶ 21:37

“could best be solved by sending the brigade to invade Cuba. Bissell later recalled talk of loading the Cubans onto a ship, which, if not able to sail for Cuba after a reasonable time, could be escorte…”

Allen Dulles funded Brigade 2506 documented ▶ 23:46

“Allen Dulles told legislatures about the Bay of Pigs in advance. On March 10th, he appeared before a secret subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee and informed the overseers not only of th…”

Adolf Berle member_of United States Department of State documented ▶ 32:35

“It all came down to the people Kennedy assembled in the cabinet room on April 5th, his last real opportunity to cancel the invasion. Kennedy went around the room to poll participants. Fulbright adaman…”

Tom Mann member_of United States Department of State documented ▶ 33:02

“Burl as a strong supporter. Earlier in a furious battle of memos, Richard Bissell had crossed swords with Tom Mann, the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America. Now, like Mann, Burl delivered a…”

Jose Mera Cardona member_of Brigade 2506 documented ▶ 33:33

“At this point, Task Force Chief Esterling returned to Guatemala for one final visit to the camps. As a morale booster, he brought along rebel leader Jose Mara Cardona. The men flew black out of Miami,…”

Adlai Stevenson II member_of United Nations documented ▶ 36:08

“Plausible deniability remained necessary precisely so that leaders might deny U.S. involvement. At an important forum for world opinion, the UN General Assembly, then in session in New York City, a Cu…”

John F. Kennedy appointed Adlai Stevenson II documented ▶ 36:08

Tracy Barnes member_of CIA documented ▶ 36:35

“author Schlesinger, to brief the ambassador together with the CIA and State Department. Schlesinger arrived late for the meeting in Stevenson's suite at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel the morning of April …”

Tracy Barnes briefed Adlai Stevenson II book_quoted ▶ 37:06

“acquaintance with the ambassador, Barnes imparted minimal information. This would be an all Cuba affair, merely helped by the U.S., not a word about the airstrikes or any other details. Bissell had to…”

Richard M. Bissell Jr. ordered Tracy Barnes book_quoted ▶ 37:06

Admiral Dennison received Joint Chiefs of Staff book_quoted ▶ 37:35

“Stevenson doubted JFK had thought through the issues. Within days of the effort of Tracy Barnes' inadequate briefing, it became painfully apparent. Meanwhile, Project ATE accelerated. Two final postpo…”

Arleigh Burke ordered U.S. Navy book_quoted ▶ 38:04

“The Navy reinforced Guantanamo in case Castro should move against it. And Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, quietly put two battalions of Marines on transports in the area just in case…”

CIA chartered Garcia Shipping Company book_quoted ▶ 39:00

“but from Porta Cabellas in Nicaragua. The code name for it was trampoline. The rebel navy began assembling early in April, starting with the CIA's Blager and Barbara Jay. Five merchant vessels of the …”

CIA denied Grayston Lynch book_quoted ▶ 39:30

“on April 1st, viewed the aerial photos of the new landing site at the Bay of Pigs and the nearby village of Playa Garon, he saw coral reefs. Photo interpreters told Lynch he was wrong. Cubans on his s…”

Grayston Lynch observed Playa Giron book_quoted ▶ 39:30

Richard M. Bissell Jr. called Esterling book_quoted ▶ 40:31

“they knew well enough the signs of an operation gone awry esterling section chiefs assembled on april 9th right after his return from guantanamo visit and just before hawkins went to uh porto cabanza …”

Richard Drain questioned Esterling book_quoted ▶ 41:01

“to an agency hangout, Napoleon's. It was a restaurant down the street. Jim Flannery, one of Bissell's special assistants, went with them. They began with martinis and went on to brandy before Task For…”

Esterling ordered Jack Hawkins book_quoted ▶ 41:31

“Drain suggested that they could just not go back to work. Had the Cuba task force walked off the job in the middle of the pre-invasion workshop, that surely would have ended Project ATE. Some looked v…”

Jack Hawkins attempted_to_resign_from CIA book_quoted ▶ 42:01

“because you're good soldiers. That's why. Within a week, Esserling and Hawkins would be at Richard Bissell's house trying to resign. On April 10th, the exile force began moving from Trex to the other …”

Esterling attempted_to_resign_from CIA book_quoted ▶ 42:01

Tracy Barnes informed Brigade 2506 book_quoted ▶ 42:31

“Candido, slowed by propeller damage from a log when departing New Orleans, sailed on April 11th, the fastest vessel on the night of the 13th and 14th. Tracy Barnes and a senior paramilitary man went t…”

John F. Kennedy reserved_decision_on Bay of Pigs Invasion book_quoted ▶ 43:02

“to e howard hunt hunt finally had to be relieved and relegated to work with dave phillips in the propaganda unit president kennedy still reserved his final decision with an option to cancel the invasi…”

Jack Hawkins sent_cable_to John F. Kennedy book_quoted ▶ 43:02

Jack Hawkins claimed Brigade 2506 book_quoted ▶ 43:32

“from jack hawkins this is what the cable said my observations have increased my confidence in the ability of this force to accomplish not only the initial combat missions but also the ultimate objecti…”

Brigade 2506 denied_knowledge_of Bay of Pigs Invasion book_quoted ▶ 44:30

“I was impressed with the serious attitude of the men. It was that memorandum that resulted in Kennedy giving the go-ahead. And it is entirely a lie. When it was all over, the brigade leaders returned …”

Haynes Johnson showed_cable_to Brigade 2506 book_quoted ▶ 44:30

Richard M. Bissell Jr. halved Bay of Pigs Invasion book_quoted ▶ 47:52

“And that's the first day of bombing, which is why JFK called off the second round of bombing because the cat was already out of the bag. Okay. When Kennedy continued insisting on reduced visibility, R…”

Gar Thornsrud scaled_back Bay of Pigs Invasion book_quoted ▶ 47:52

Esterling telephoned Richard M. Bissell Jr. book_quoted ▶ 48:27

“to be hit by eight bombers. This reduction in the planned air mission was a major reason for doubts among Esterling's staff. The mission proved successful as far as it went. The exiled planes achieved…”

Richard M. Bissell Jr. shamed Esterling book_quoted ▶ 48:54

“absolutely had to sit down with him and talk. They appeared on Bissell's doorstep in his house. Esterling took the cutbacks in Project ATE to their logical conclusion. There remained no good faith est…”

Richard M. Bissell Jr. shamed Jack Hawkins book_quoted ▶ 48:54

Jack Hawkins interviewed_by Peter Del Scott book_quoted ▶ 49:24

“In 1975, speaking to a CIA interviewer, Jack Plepper, Bissell confessed not to recall this at all. Of course, Esterling and Hawkins together did an interview with the historian Peter Kornblau in 1996.…”

Esterling interviewed_by Peter Del Scott book_quoted ▶ 49:24

Mario Zuniga landed_at Miami book_quoted ▶ 49:52

“was lying down and lying up for reasons that I don't yet totally understand. Lying up and down, Richard Bissell. Almost immediately, the bombing cover story began to unravel. The exile planes from Nic…”

Adlai Stevenson II exhibited United Nations book_quoted ▶ 50:24

“of being a disinfected cuba castro cuba pilot photographs by the press pictured his b-26 were flashed almost immediately to new york where the un had turned to cuba the pictures clearly showed far mar…”

Henry Raymont observed FARN book_quoted ▶ 51:20

“Henry Raymont, the UPI reporter in Havana, saw the attack planes and confirmed they had no markings on them at all. Exposed as a fabrication, Stevenson's statements flopped. The ambassador realized th…”

John F. Kennedy sent McGeorge Bundy book_quoted ▶ 51:20

John F. Kennedy rejected Operation Nestor book_quoted ▶ 51:47

“President Kennedy tamped down the next round of CIA bombings to avoid a U.N. debacle. Then he directed McBundy to issue fresh orders to Dulles, Rusk, and McNamara, prohibiting any employment of U.S. f…”

John F. Kennedy directed McGeorge Bundy book_quoted ▶ 51:47

Colonel Stanley Beerly planned Bay of Pigs Invasion book_quoted ▶ 52:48

“Somehow that word didn't make it to the people in charge of the invasion. Meanwhile, Stanley Beerly at the CIA's Air Operations Center planned a follow-up airstrike to neutralize the remainder of Cast…”

Allen Dulles had_speaking_engagement_in Puerto Rico book_quoted ▶ 54:39

“and right up his alley. Instead, he presided over one of the project's key operational failures. Alan Dulles was part of the cover. As part of his cover, he had a speaking engagement in Puerto Rico. S…”

Charles Cabell headed CIA book_quoted ▶ 54:39

Charles Cabell reviewed Bay of Pigs Invasion book_quoted ▶ 55:08

“and could comment authoritatively on current intelligence. He considered himself on top of it. Returning from an April 16th golf date, General Cabell heard that they had gotten the final go for the in…”

McGeorge Bundy conveyed_decision_of John F. Kennedy book_quoted ▶ 55:35

“Aware of the UN embarrassment, Cabell wanted to check with Dean Rusk, even though Barrow insisted everything was fine. About 9.30 p.m., McGeorge Bundy, alerted by Rusk, called with JFK's decision that…”

Charles Cabell demanded_reconsideration_from Dean Rusk book_quoted ▶ 56:29

“He thought the go-ahead included all subsidiary measures such as airstrikes. At this point, Richard Bissell entered. The DDO demanded reconsideration. He and Cabell rushed to Russ' office, appealing t…”

Richard M. Bissell Jr. demanded_reconsideration_from Dean Rusk book_quoted ▶ 56:29

Dean Rusk rejected Charles Cabell book_quoted ▶ 56:57

“attempts except for allowing the Exile Air Force to fly support over the beaches. But CIA officials protested vigorously. Rust finally phoned the president and put their arguments to him. Cabell conce…”

Dean Rusk phoned John F. Kennedy book_quoted ▶ 56:57

John F. Kennedy rejected Charles Cabell book_quoted ▶ 56:57

Charles Cabell declined_offer_from Dean Rusk book_quoted ▶ 57:55

“on success in taking out the Air Force. He also recounts his understanding that the invasion could no longer be called off. With the strikes, he believed the operation was risky, but still he thought …”

Dean Rusk held_out_phone_to Richard M. Bissell Jr. book_quoted ▶ 58:26

“I don't think there's any point, the general said. Russ held out the phone to Bissell. I think I agree with that. So neither one of them had the balls to talk to Kennedy. Only later, in retrospect, di…”

Richard M. Bissell Jr. agreed_with Charles Cabell book_quoted ▶ 58:26

Charles Cabell told Esterling book_quoted ▶ 58:57

“and made a strong case as possible on behalf of the operation and the welfare of the brigade, unquote. Returning to the agency, the CIA officials went directly to the WH-4 offices to report the denial…”

Tracy Barnes drafted_cable_to Operation Trampoline book_quoted ▶ 59:26

“Esterling and others were dumbfounded. The room rang with frustration. Jack Hawkins hit the table with his fists. GD it. This is criminal negligence. Jack Esterling added tightly, this is a GD thing I…”

Charles Cabell spoke_to Dean Rusk book_quoted ▶ 59:53

“received it just a half an hour before the strike aircraft were to launch. Some pilots were already in their cockpits. General Cabell is proud that no one suggested a bit of foot dragging to let the s…”

Richard M. Bissell Jr. spoke_to Dean Rusk book_quoted ▶ 59:53

Gar Thornsrud received_cable_from Tracy Barnes book_quoted ▶ 59:53

John F. Kennedy refused Charles Cabell book_quoted ▶ 1:00:23

“Rusk opened the door in his bathrobe. This time, Rusk insisted Cabell speak to the president, and the White House switchboard reached JFK at his Virginia estate. After a brief exchange, Rusk got on th…”

Dean Rusk insisted Charles Cabell book_quoted ▶ 1:00:23

Lyman Lemnitzer moved U.S. Navy host_asserted ▶ 1:02:53

“All of his papers are at a place just outside of Philadelphia, and that is definitely on my agenda to go and see those for myself, because there is some authoritative sources that have said that Lyman…”

CIA contracted U.S. Navy book_quoted ▶ 1:03:51

“in the Air Ops area. But JFK was told that no Air Force pilots were flying any of those aircraft. And we know that the CIA, under the radar, had the Air Guard guy in Alabama supply Air Force trained p…”

Allen Dulles planned Bay of Pigs Invasion host_asserted ▶ 1:05:21

“Does that help? Yes, it does. It helps quite a bit, knowing that really their workforce is staged and there. Because what Allen Dulles had planned all along, by their own meetings, there's no way this…”

Allen Dulles pressured John F. Kennedy host_asserted ▶ 1:05:52

“To aid in the invasion. That's what they're leading up to. They they have those forces staged there. And as soon as it starts going south, Alan Dulles immediately starts pressuring Kennedy to allow th…”

Richard Nixon targeted_for_regime_change Cuba host_asserted ▶ 1:12:15

“that it definitely was planned to fail. But I would also tell you that had Richard Nixon won that election, there's no doubt in my mind that Richard Nixon would have authorized the military to go in a…”

John Foster Dulles spied_on John F. Kennedy host_asserted ▶ 1:13:34

“accused Dulles of leaking classified material to JFK that put him in an awkward position for the debate. So he definitely knew a lot about what was going on. All along, go ahead. All along. Yeah, Colo…”

United Kingdom funded Black Hand speculative ▶ 1:21:10

“It occurred to me the other day about looking at the origins of World War I, which is really the origins of all this crap. Who benefited from World War I? Who benefited the most? And it was Britain. I…”

Black Hand assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand speculative ▶ 1:21:10