The Colonels Corner Safe for Democracy Part 34 (36)

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Transcript

0:00 Hello, everybody. Welcome to part 34 of Save for Democracy. Nothing's safe anymore, especially over on Twitter. I tried to open the space today that I set up like a half an hour ago, and it crashed it when I came in. Wouldn't let me turn my mic on, wouldn't let me do anything.

0:29 So I had to basically build another one while the intro was running over on Rumble. So welcome to my world. Crazy, because we're not a democracy. No, we're not a democracy. But that is the terminology that they use to go do regime change. They deem something not a democracy, even though it has a democratically elected president.

0:59 Um, then they quote unquote, make it safe for democracy, except for they install a military dictatorship. So it's kind of a tongue in cheek title, just FYI. Um, there's Miss Bridget. Let me get her up here. All right. So having said that, I'm going to start and then, um,

1:25 When I get through the first couple of paragraphs of this, I'm going to read you something that I've been working on because it dovetails into this part. I've not published it, but I'm going to read it to you. We finished up with the first use of the Kurd population on Friday. So this is starting a new.

1:56 section of the Global Reach chapter, and we're on page 394. This period became a time for change for the secret warriors. James Schlesinger, a quote-unquote defense analyst with no intelligence experience other than his work on a management study from Nixon. Sorry about that, Amazon guys here. Hey, so

2:29 He did the management study for Nixon in 70 and 71. First, he replaced Richard Helms. Schlesinger then moved over to the Secretary of Defense after only five months. And that's going to make sense in a minute. Within the agency itself, the CIA, Schlesinger tried in a more measured way to fulfill the president's expectation for cutbacks. And remember, just for anecdotal purposes, Nixon's the president at the current time.

3:00 Convinced that much of the deadwood lay in the director of operations, the DCI concentrated there. Personnel began to fall as about a thousand officers retired, asked to resign, or were fired. So again, does anybody know that Nixon oversaw basically his own... Hold on. Hush! Who's there?

3:35 Oh, okay. Okay, so yeah, it's enlightening that Nixon oversaw that too, and he ended up getting cooed as well. The actual reduction amounted to about 7%, not the 40% Nixon had spoke of earlier. The covert action budget had been in decline since Laos funding had been taken away from the CIA.

4:12 and given to the Pentagon. The old Directorate of Plans disappeared. It became the Directorate of Operations, which is obviously more appropriate. Tom Casamacenas went into retirement, quote-unquote retirement, with his colleague and friend Richard Helms. Replaced as the Deputy Director for Operations was William Colby.

4:43 William Colby was swiftly moved on to be the DCI or the director of CIA. Another change began by Helms continued under Schlesinger to be completed by Colby. This was the reorganization of air proprietories, meaning Air America and those types of airlines.

5:11 that had served as proprietary operations under the CIA. The DCI directive in 1972 ordered that Air America be maintained only through the end of the Indochina War, that Southern Air Transport be sold, and its Pacific Division immediately liquidated. The CIA divested Air America in stages. The firm E-Systems, which was in Texas,

5:42 bought AirAsia, the massive Taiwanese maintenance facility. Air America planes and other assets were sold off one by one. By 1975, the parent Pacific Corporation had been reduced to 1,100 employees. Final disposition of Air America was completed by 1976. The CIA expected to realize a profit of $20 million from these transactions.

6:12 Now, those of us who have studied the CIA knows that they do a lot of things like this that isn't what it seems on the surface. So if you dig into e-systems, you're going to be fascinated by what I failed. This is from something that I've been working on. The restructuring of CIA-facilitated air...

6:41 in the mid-1970s, specifically the disillusion of Air America and its rebranding into firms like eSystems was a classic intelligence shell game designed to bypass congressional oversight during the post-Watergate church era. It was not a genuine divestiture, but rather a privatization of black budget operations.

7:10 when the Church Committee and the Pike Committee began poking into the CIA's proprietary empire, which began during the Nixon administration of serious questions being asked because of Vietnam. They formally started the commissions a little after this move, but now you're going to understand why they did it. They were facing a PR nightmare and a legal disaster.

7:40 Maintaining overt agency-owned airlines like Air America in Southeast Asia became a liability. The quote-unquote divestiture strategy served three main purposes. First, the shield of plausible deniability. By transferring assets, flight crews, and contracts to private contractors like eSystems, the CIA created a thick layer of corporate insulation.

8:05 When these entities showed up in subsequent operations, which they did, like the Iran-Contra and other missions in the Middle East and in Africa, the agency could claim it was merely hiring private firms. This created a reoccurring contractor model that persists to today.

8:29 where the state outsources kinetic and logistical military operations to entities like Blackwater Leader Academy to avoid political accountability. The core of Air America apparatus was not the airplanes, it was the personnel. By moving the assets to firms like eSystems, which was deeply tied to the defense and intelligence industrial complex already, so they had their assets already in place.

8:56 The CIA ensured that their specialized logistical infrastructure remained intact. These pilots, mechanics, and procurement officers were already seasoned professionals who understood the need-to-know culture. Keeping them in the fold under a different corporate leader was essential to covert logistical chains around the globe. The use of private contractors allowed the commingling of commercial revenue and classified federal funds.

9:26 eSystems in particular was a major defense contractor specializing in electronic warfare and signals intelligence. By folding CIA proprietary assets into this company that already had substantial DOD contracts, the agency made it significantly harder for auditors and investigative journalists to isolate black budget funding. It turned state-sanctioned operations into corporate.

9:55 trade, effectively hiding the movement of goods, people, and money behind intellectual property protection and non-disclosure agreements. This transition marked a shift from the CIA operating its own civilian fleets to the shadow state where

10:13 Intelligence agencies act as coordinators for a vast network of private military and intelligence contractors. The assets didn't disappear. They were just laundered through a corporate veil. Now, does it make sense why we move Schlesinger from the CIA and initiate this divestiture? And then after a few short months, he moves over to DOD to issue the contracts to these

10:43 laundered air operations using Department of Defense monies to do it because that's exactly what they did. Schlesinger was institutional and critical to the CIA's perpetuation of quote-unquote proprietary projects that were becoming increasingly difficult to hide.

11:13 As the legislative oversight climate worsened, he understood that the DOD had a much deeper and more complex, almost non-existent, accounting system that would absorb covert expenditures with far less scrutiny because the military is like this good guy operation, right? We don't do anything nefarious. He took the logistical requirements of covert operations with him.

11:41 The funding didn't vanish. It was just put under DOD support for contingency operation, which became much more harder for Congress to audit. The CIA was the primary focus of the 1975 Church and Pike Committee, but they had already moved it over to the Department of Defense to hide it. You see how that operates? Schlesinger represented the rise of a technocratic

12:13 the people who view war and covert operations and even political destabilization as a challenge. His transition from the intelligence office to the Pentagon signaled that the government was prioritizing industrial approach to intelligence.

12:30 It was no longer about local assets and bush pilots. It was about a massive signal intelligent global transport capability and seamless integration of private sector with a security state. And that was all done thanks to the move of Schlesinger from the CIA ahead of time from the commissions that are going to come up and hiding.

13:01 All of that in the Department of Defense. So I'm going to go back to the book now. A former owner of Southern Air Transport bid for the corporation and offered $5.6 million. Helms approved the sale during his last month as DCI. And the Southern Air Board concurred. But other air freight companies objected. And one offered $7.5 million. Schlesinger rejected the higher bid.

13:34 As acting director, Colby ordered final liquidation on July 31st, 1973, but the former owner made a further counteroffer. The sale closed on the last day of 1973. There were later repercussions when the owner himself then liquidated Southern Air, violating a contract clause about a windfall profit. More money laundering. The CIA sued and won a judgment.

14:03 In the course of the litigation admitting its ownership of Southern Air Transport, the ultimate losers were the employees. The CIA also liquidated Intermountain Aviation in 1973, selling its airfield complex to Evergreen Aviation Corporation. Again, just smoke and mirrors because Evergreen Aviation, the company I used to work for, was a CIA and DOD contractee.

14:35 In a clever touch, agency lawyers retained the same Phoenix firm that first took the Miranda case to trial for the legal work on the sale because Evergreen continued to do the same kinds of work as its predecessor, including for the CIA. It had never been cleared, never had been clear that this was not simply a fresh agency proprietary cover.

15:01 Evergreen invested some $24 million in the Marana base over the decades, turning it into the largest aircraft storage facility in the world. And I've been there, that's true. It's crazy how big it is. And of course, this is the same facility where they were retrofitting all of the former aircraft and putting guns on them.

15:29 all kinds of electronic, which is where this eSystems comes in, in order for the CIA to be able to contract to these proprietary, non-proprietary companies. Meanwhile, William Colby received the nod to follow Schlesinger as the Director of Central Intelligence. During Colby's confirmation hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the

15:56 West-style wanted posters sprouted up all over Washington. This mimicked a technique used in the Phoenix program. The posters featured the Ace of Spades used by Americans in Vietnam to annotate death or a killing, within which was a sketch of Colby's face. The DCI made sure the CIA's Office of Security did nothing about the posters. William Colby's agency still had a global reach.

16:26 but storm clouds were already gathering. The culminating revelations of CIA actions over the years, many of them controversial, built public concern about the Cold War functions of the CIA. For years, the public remained silent, sedate by the assurances that the presidents and the CIA acted in our best interest according to democratic values in combating the Russians on the Cold War battlefront, most of which was all a lie.

16:56 Mostly Americans had let it go at that, but the seeds that would bring those happy assumptions crashing down had already been sown. Not only could they not be recovered, but the reaping was about to begin. Colby took over just that moment, September 1973, and the unraveling began in Latin America. And we move on to chapter 17, which is the Southern Cone.

17:25 Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger's most malign covert enterprise took place in Chile, where they encouraged dictatorship over democracy, sanctioning a lapse in democratic rule that endured for 20 years. But in truth, the Chile case has broader meaning, for Nixon and Kissinger came on the stage late in the game, when U.S. intervention in Chilean politics had been underway for quite some time.

17:54 One of the more faceted aspects of Washington's effort to guide the political evolution of the entire continent. When Nixon and Kissinger did escalate the CIA involvement, this operation spanned the terms of three American presidents, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon. The crossover illustrates an important aspect of political action. Projects initiated for a particular purpose at a moment in time.

18:25 often turns into open-ended campaigns from which extraction becomes difficult. We have seen this phenomenon in Italy, Guyana, and many other places, to include the Congo. I mean, it's a whole laundry list. Indonesia, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia. But Chile provides the best documented example, as well as an illustration of the dangers associated with these activities.

18:53 The adventure in Chile set the stage for a challenge to the very existence of the CIA. Political action in Chile during the Johnson era had been known ever since the Nixon operation sparked intensive investigations in the mid-1970s. But the breadth of the earlier involvement had been obscured by its characteristic.

19:16 characterization as simply an intervention in the 1964 Chilean presidential election. You know, because we routinely do that. That's not that big of a deal. In fact, the CIA functioned as the U.S. government's action agency for a wide-ranging program to shape Chilean politics that went on for more than a decade.

19:45 They'd been in Italy since 1948 doing the same thing. That the CIA would lead a democracy into dictatorship, no doubt never occurred to the secret war managers, which is a bold-faced lie. They literally did that every single time. They knew exactly what they were doing. They had done Brazil in the 1960s. They did Guatemala in the 1950s. Again, the author kind of obfuscates.

20:17 the reality of what we all know. An American ally for many years, proud of the tradition of more than a century of democracy, Chile originally declared its independence from Spain in 1810. Several features distinguish the history of Chile. First, unlike most Latin American countries, where military rule and coups were quite common, the military in Chile found the climate inhospitable.

20:47 for interventions in politics. One coup in 1927 brought military rule for fewer than four years until the government discredited it and the dictator resigned and left. After ineffectual efforts to form a stable government, a couple of more coups happened in the 1932 timeframe. And again,

21:15 the military gave way to civilian administrations. From 1932 until the early mid-1960s, Chilean democracy remained vibrant. The second important factor is that Chilean democracy reigned in the face of economic problems. Large land holdings impeded agricultural growth, while lack of capital restricted the exploitation of

21:44 Chileans rich natural resources, especially copper, and opened the door to foreign investors who ended up with a major stake in the Chilean economy. Fluctuations in world prices prevented Chile, like Bolivia, from enjoying the full benefits of all of their mineral riches. Because again, the U.S. oligarchs has come in and through investments in these mines and the

22:12 Active measures to keep any of them from forming real unions to protect the workers had exploited these communities. These problems led directly to the third feature of the Chilean scene. Politicians promising radical reforms were the norm, not an aberration. Only one president in modern Chilean history had been elected on an openly conservative platform while between 1938 and 1953.

22:44 They had had socialist parties serving in the government this entire time. In short, when Kennedy took office, the Chilean politics had long had a reformist characteristic and represented a wide political spectrum. Author Schlesinger credits John Kennedy with sophisticated understandings of the evolution of Latin America.

23:12 Kennedy's biographer sees JFK as breaking down oligarchs and the impossibility of saving the old guard, even of avoiding traps of favoring regimes, as he finds Eisenhower was prone to do. Kennedy wanted to chart a different course. Schlesinger describes at length how Kennedy

23:39 created the Alliance for Progress for exactly that reason, to help democratically elected administrations in foreign countries do what they felt necessary, even if it wasn't a conservative government. He was not interested in the traditional characterizations that the CIA loves to use as labels. He just wanted everybody to prosper.

24:09 That, of course, pisses the CIA and the oligarchs off. Kennedy outlined this initiative and gave it a name in Tampa, Florida in October of 1960. Among the tenets of that speech, Schlesinger says, in a quote, unequivocal support for democracy and opposition to dictatorships.

24:31 Once established in the White House, President Kennedy gave substance to the initiative and sent a delegation to the Inter-American Gathering in Uruguay. This same conference became the setting for the confrontation already recounted between Che Guevara and JFK's Latin American man, Richard Goodwin. The conference joint declaration explicitly made the pledges, the first of them, quote,

25:01 democratic institutions through application of the principle of self-determination of the people, unquote. If you elect them, we will support them. Kennedy may have understood the realities of the Latin political development, but the language of promises stopped basically at the CIA. Washington counted its friends.

25:31 And the CIA would ensure that the enemies were taken care of. There would be a second conference in early 1962 when the U.S. was already looking into what support to put where in Latin America. Chile, under President Alessandri, who was a moderate,

26:05 and had been in office since 1958, refused to participate. Just a few weeks later, suggestions for projects in Chile happened. These would be the first of many projects in the southern cone of South America. If the U.S. could get the right people elected, the right people elected, then they could control the outcome.

26:36 In early April 62, the CIA had put two fresh ideas before the special group. One to strengthen the organization of Chile's Christian Democrats. That is also the party that they favor in Europe. Initially, the special group had approved $50,000. That merely turned on the spigot. Before the summer ended, the group had approved more money to support the Christian Democrats.

27:09 A pair of decisions in 63 provided more cash. That failed to keep what CIA deemed radicals from losing their place as the country's largest political grouping in municipal elections. The Christian Democrats became the agency's main bet. And bet Langley did. On August 30th, the special group continued the Chilean political action.

27:40 They had even more proposals to get more deeply involved. One of the projects spoke, let's see, had guarantees of investments and involved Rockefeller. He had formed a business group for Latin America, which ultimately enlisted more than three dozen multinational corporations.

28:08 In the same way the CIA conducted relations with labor and cultural groups, Langley assigned a case officer full time to this business group. The business group would provide cover for the CIA officers for them to continue their political action. From the U.S. perspective, Chile no longer seemed a potential addition to Washington's anti-Castro mobilization.

28:39 You're either with us or you're against us. The existing Chilean government had presided over increasing foreign debt while huge inflation made the people's salary appear to be less. The influx of foreign investment seemed more like a fire cell. At the same time, there was a coalition that had barely been defeated in the previous election.

29:11 Another presidential election was quickly coming up. Suddenly, Washington saw CIA political action as a necessity. The opposition would be formidable. Salvador Allende was a very prominent person. He had studied medicine and loved politics. And in 1933, broke his family tradition of ties by helping found the Socialist Party.

29:42 Allende became the leader. He was first elected to the Chamber of Deputies, which is their lower house assembly, in 1937. Two years later, he appeared in national government for the first time as a minister of public health. Allende innovated public policy, creating a national health care system and contributing to the social security system. In 1948, he became secretary general of one of the large movements.

30:13 From the mid-1940s, Allende began broadening his coalition. Beginning with the presidential, they had basically, they were fighting because, of course, they positioned Allende on the left. And he was not involved. They did have what was labeled by the CIA a communist left.

30:45 but that was not inclusive of Allende's party. In 1952, Allende's first, he finished last of four candidates. In 1958 elections, Allende lost again, but barely. The margin of his defeat was razor thin. By 64, there could be no doubt he was going to be a fierce competitor. None of this came as any surprise.

31:22 The CIA put the groundwork in place late the year before. On December 19th, 1963, the special group approved a one-time payment to a Democrat front in Chile. At the same time, senior Christian Democrat party operatives were in Washington meeting with the CIA's J.C. King to tout their candidate, Eduardo Frey.

31:53 Montalva and begged for agency money to fund their campaign. Colonel King, receptive, on Christmas Eve sent Director McCone a proposal. The bid involved half a million dollars. That was going to be quite a big Christmas present. McCone wanted to hear more. Just before New Year's, Hank Nock, his executive assistant, asked King to clarify a few points.

32:24 They said that the Christian Democrat Party was the fastest growing party in Chile and the only one able to defeat Salvador Allende. The concept ruled out any possibility the agency might influence their policy because Langley's money would have to be unattributable and covert. But King nevertheless expected

32:52 Fry to move in directions that the U.S. favored. Washington's deliberation took time in part because of a set of decisions that happened when Kennedy was assassinated. As the secret war wizards deliberated, the price tag went up. When Fry's emissaries pursued their request again in Santiago at the U.S. embassy in March of 64, the Christian Democrats wanted a million dollars.

33:22 The White House viewed this with caution. Ralph Dugan, a Kennedy holdover and political advisor whose special interest was Latin America and who would soon go to Santiago as ambassador, told Mac Bundy that he would not balk at three quarters of a million dollars. Dugan promised to talk to Desmond Fitzgerald.

33:52 and find out exactly how much cash was at stake. The CIA now said it had no money for this project. The special group would have to approve the use of their contingency fund. Bundy convened the group in the White House sit room on April 2nd, but deliberations failed to settle a decision. The group did okay CIA's own plan for propaganda and political actions to interfere with the Chilean.

34:22 At this point, Fitzgerald, who had replaced King as the Latin American guy in charge, visited Santiago for a personal reconnaissance mission. He spent his time with the CIA station chief, Rudolph Gomez, reviewing CIA assets and operational possibilities apart from the Christian Democrat Party.

34:51 Formerly Colonel King's deputy had good lines to Langley and knew of King's earlier contact with politicians in Chile. He set up a meeting for Desmond to hear the party's needs directly that took place on May 5th. A few days earlier, while complaining to the U.S. diplomat of a blabbermouth associate, Eduardo Frey, revealed that he was not, after all, unwitting.

35:21 of the CIA activities. Richard Helms related that Fitzgerald had learned what he had learned to the special group, which met again on April 14th, directing McCone to disburse $1.25 million from his contingency fund to fund election interference in Chile. A small portion would be aimed at another group.

35:49 but primarily the Christian Democrat. There would be no CIA task force, but an interagency group that periodically reviewed political payments would monitor the election interference operation. At the CIA, Helms began daily sessions with Deputy Karaminis, familiar with political action from his days in Greece and many other places. Fitzgerald and the DO's Chilean branch officers

36:21 were there as well. When they swung into gear once the fresh money flowed, this indicates that Rudy Gomez had worked overtime to prepare this campaign. Television was not being well established in Chile at the time. Radio figured importantly. By June, a CIA propaganda group had produced a series of political advertisements, purchasing airtime to broadcast them 20 times a day.

36:54 in Santiago, and to local subordinate radio stations. Agency assets at several Chilean radio stations capable of direct action began inserting items in daily news broadcasts, reports picked up and recycled by dozens of other local radio stations. Cartoonists sketched anti-communist drawings, basically calling all of the opponents communist.

37:22 Several thousand of them went out every day. Hundreds of thousands of copies of a pastor's letter by Pope Pius XI, written years before, was reproduced with the annotation printed by citizens without political affiliation. Except that wasn't true.

37:45 In other countries, the CIA inserted more stories in media or solicited dire warnings from figures opposing Allende's rule or his presidency. Again, with the words. In Chile, these were reported as legitimate news items. There was black propaganda items purposely inserted to discredit anybody that supported Allende.

38:15 In all, the propaganda operations cost more than $3 million. Langley considered the scarce campaign the best part of the Chilean operation. Gomez conducted a second political project distinct from the CIA's help to the Christian Democrat Party. This effort tried to dissuade

38:36 anyone that was not in that party from serious participation in the election. The agency wished to avoid drawing votes away from Frey or the possibility of any of the other parties throwing their support behind Allende. Finally, there was a popular political mobilization enlisting blocks of voters, interest groups, and recognizing these groups as basically the way

39:07 they orchestrate election interference in the United States. The agency supported women's group and it pursued at least two projects with Chilean labor unions and another business group. Oh my gosh, quit texting me. They're getting ready for the show tonight for Badlands Media and they're like going back and forth. Stop it. Okay, sorry about that guys. Again,

39:47 If somebody can figure out how to make that not happen, please DM me on my Apple laptop. I have no idea how to stop it. Conversely, when rumblings of discontent arose within the Chilean military, among whom some officers might have opposed Allende taking office, the CIA monitored that situation.

40:19 Also, the agency supported the groups that this business group under the Rockefellers had set up. In late July, the 303 Committee, Johnson's renamed special group, released a further half million dollars to maintain momentum. The U.S. government also received offers from a private corporation of cash to use against Salvador Allende.

40:55 but supposedly the 303 committee rejected those offers. And it's weird that the author doesn't put those in because they're well-established by the time this book was written. That's PepsiCo, Anaconda slash Freeport Mining, and ITT. We know that from other readings. Before the campaign ended, the CIA would spend $2.6 million in direct support of Fry's Christian Democrat Party.

41:23 The cost per favorable vote cast in the Chilean election came in higher than what the combined Democrat and Republican parties in the U.S. spent per vote in the U.S. election of 1964. In September election, Fry won 55.7% of the vote, outpolling Allende's 39%. The CIA emerged triumphant.

41:49 The dust had barely settled when, less than a month after the victory, the secret war managers argued over whether the use of the leverage gained by the support of Fry. At the State Department, the CIA brainstorming session on October 1st, Fitzgerald confessed his displeasure with rumors that the departing U.S. ambassador had advised Rusk against any such maneuver. Fitzgerald apparently had no specific...

42:18 agenda in mind, quote, it's the atmosphere of mistrust that bothers me, unquote. Sure it is. But the State Department Assistant Secretary Thomas Mann says, don't worry about it. The CIA's investment in Chile, ever growing, had to be protected. With the National Assembly elections impending, the 303 Committee bought a few fresh proposals to the table. They were produced by Ralph Dungan.

42:49 and his agency station chief to help selected candidates. On February 5th, 1965, the group allocated another $175,000. Richard Helm recorded this as half a million dollars for covert assistance in the March elections. Again, the results were pleasing. More than a dozen of the earmarked seats for basically the congressional

43:19 piece of this, had been defeated by Christian Democrat politicians. The vote gave the Christian Democrat more senators than anyone else in the absolute majority of the deputy, the chamber of deputies. Too many Chileans knew something about what the CIA had done. Probably no one, Fry's top person included, knew everything, but so many had been enlisted.

43:47 That plenty held some piece of the puzzle. Inevitably, suspicions found expression. Termination of the latest project in the June of 1965 did not end the danger. The agency shut down lines to Jesuit priests who had been considered very useful in the CIA operation. Jesuit priests. Weird.

44:17 The ongoing CIA project included both the Christian Democrat funding and a separate attempt to induce other deputies towards softer goals. It continued. The agency also dealt with a cabinet-level official, and the CIA, in its persistent effort to blunt Allende and his comrades, conducted an urban project among the slums in Santiago.

44:48 Any of these could have been broached, blowing Langley's cover. In other words, they were doing surveys to figure out how those people were leaning and whatever factions they could find to keep divided and fight among themselves. Journalists in Chile speculated on what the CIA had been up to. By late 1965, Salvador Allende had heard enough that he felt confident.

45:17 when interviewed by the New York Times in charging outside forces, including the U.S., with responsibility for interfering in the Chilean election. For many months, Chilean politics reverberated with charges and countercharges of election interference. For the CIA, this could have been dismissed as unimportant, but it threatened to break into major controversy if the right information came into play.

45:45 Revelation of Project Camelot illustrated the problem. A Pentagon social science research effort, Camelot tried to identify factors that could be exploited in counterinsurgency. It triggered instant dispute when first uncovered in Chile. Events elsewhere in Latin America sharpened the threat. Widespread but unconfirmed charges that the CIA had backed the military coup in Brazil.

46:14 in 1964, caused suspicion because they did. And there were reports of CIA action against Che Guevara in Bolivia. Again, true. More concrete charges from Bolivian cabinet minister Antonio Argandas soon gave form to Chilean shadowy fears. The next CIA project initiated in Chile

46:43 aimed at countering the threat of exposure. It expanded the agency's capability to generate countervailing propaganda. So if you're about to get exposed, go in harder. Station Chief James Nolan merged early and propaganda units into a new structure in 1967, which increased their efficiency and the security of the operation.

47:13 Fresh leadership now came to the American embassy in Santiago. In June 1967, Edward Corey, K-O-R-R-Y, took over as ambassador. His marching orders direct from Johnson, Corey later said, were to prevent Salvador Allende from being elected president. But the ambassador had particular ideas on America's role. He had no desire to play pro-consul, telling

47:46 that directly to Fry. He wanted nothing to do with the Praetorianism. Corey radically cut back the U.S. military mission, heavily restricted CIA contact with the Chilean military, and at certain points ordered this station to seek his personal approval of all contact. Later, Corey extended the rule to the agencies dealing with cabinet members, too. You know that's not going to last, right?

48:16 Shortly after Corey's arrival, the agency's Jim Nolan gave way to Henry Hexter, moving over from Tokyo as station chief. Hexter, something of a CIA legend, had done it all. Soviet operations in Berlin, covert action in Guatemala, nation building, yeah, not nation building, tearing down nations in Laos, working with the Cuban exiles.

48:45 media manipulation in Japan, he was a pro. Santiago was a prestigious post. It would be his last before retirement. Arrogant though resourceful, Hexter had a difficult time with Ed Corey, himself something of a prima donna. Hexter, who saw the Fry government as moving

49:10 In the wrong direction, disdained Corey's view that Fry, the Christian Democrat Party, was the best deal the U.S. could achieve. The station chief also had another more elemental problem. By the close of 1967, not a single officer remained in Santiago who had worked on any of the earlier projects or knew the background. As Ambassador Corey took up the reins, the agency began moving again. The 303 Committee laid out another 30,000.

49:41 to interfere and prop up a political party. Keith Wheelock, one of the new CIA officers, became the field man on the initiative. Corey himself instigated another. Looking ahead to congressional elections in 1969, he proposed a classic support operation. The 303 Committee put $350,000 in July 1968.

50:08 Later in 1970s, Corey contended that all CIA projects had been paired to the bone just before Richard Nixon entered office. That does not track with the 303 decisions. The largest single addition to the CIA Chilean budget happened after Fry's election. Hexter chose the race to play in and the candidates to back. Then the CIA did its thing.

50:37 In eight months of intensive politicking, the agency used the methods that had served it well. But the thread had run out. Chile's gross national product did not grow at all in 1967. And in the next year, when the cost of living rose almost a quarter, the international aid, both U.S. and multilateral, faltered. The GDP increased less than 1%. This was Fry's doing. And he...

51:06 had to pay a price. Hexter's project became an interesting challenge. It considered an operational success because it targeted races when the CIA's backed guy won. The election yielded a net loss of Christian Democrats, though. Both the National Party and the

51:38 Salvador Allende's party gained seats, leaving the Christian Democrat party very vulnerable. Hexter, no doubt, was further alarmed when Fry reopened the terms of the trade with U.S. copper companies, settled two years earlier. Fry also canceled a much-anticipated visit by Governor Nelson Rockefeller, who by this time was on the Presidential Advisory Board for Intelligence.

52:10 Thus was the stage set for a new Chilean presidential election and for the Nixon administration to confront it. To some degree, Washington feared Salvador Allende's victory in Chile. Conversely, among some officials in the new Nixon administration, the apprehension of Allende went farther than the possibility of it. The CIA component responsible for drafting the national intelligence.

52:41 intelligent estimates captured this well. In a 1969 national intelligent estimate, the board of the national estimates considered the prospects for Chile. Abbott Smith, chairman at the time, had a reputation as a generalist, a former professor who had written American political history. Smith had an excellent analyst.

53:09 at his command, plus an office of draftsmen, among who resided the best expertise. At the time, Washington was consumed with a different dispute over estimates, one about the Soviet nuclear missiles. So initially, there were few with stakes in the Southern Cone. The 1969 estimate on Chile thus emerged with little scrutiny. The paper concluded that any new

53:36 Chilean president would move in the direction of expanding relations with other neutrally aligned countries, possibly including the Soviet Union. Obviously, that's going to feed into what they want the end state to be. The estimate believed that he had a 50-50 chance of winning and Allende administration might move faster.

54:05 But the estimate also found that Salvador Allende specifically needing to preserve his relationship with the U.S. as well as Chilean nationalism would hesitate to move too far. Ambassador Corey strongly disputed this and protested the estimate's conclusion in a series of cables to Washington. There was more. Another estimate a year earlier, the estimate had surveyed conditions in Latin America.

54:37 That pent-up desire for improvement, the beginning of development, and the weakening of oligarchs and military regimes had already made trends irreversible. As an assistant to Director Helms put it, quote, forces for change in the developing Latin American nations were so powerful as to be beyond outside manipulation, unquote. In other words, no matter how much money you throw at Chile, democracy.

55:07 It's going to be a waste of your time because the people in Latin America had already suffered through many installed dictatorships and they were done with it. And they all knew that they were there because of the CIA's meddling. To listen to top analysts, a laid back approach might have been the best course, but that certainly would not have pleased Corey or Hexter and Santiago, nor anyone in the CIA.

55:37 where Branch Chief Tom Gilligan had been grinding out papers warning of Allende, not to mention those at the White House. Helms aide Victor Marchetti noted, as, quote, as is so often the case within the government, the most careful and advanced analysis was either ignored or simply rejected when the time came to make a decision, unquote.

56:06 In other words, if you were actually honest about an assessment and it didn't fit where they wanted to go, you were ignored. The opportunity for choice arose in the spring of 69, about six weeks after Chile's March elections. The 303 committee met to discuss the Chilean project. The group decided to end CIA's efforts in Santiago's slums.

56:32 The agency simply could not compete with Salvador Allende's popular front. The alliance between the Chileans in those neighborhoods were basically tamper-proof. At this 303 session, CIA Director Helms asked what the U.S. intended to do about the coming presidential election. The agency carefully noted that political action, if desired, needed to be prepared immediately. The 303 committed.

57:02 committee ordered a propaganda workshop to determine what possibilities there were. The agency reassigned Tom Gilligan to Portugal. One reason the 303 committee came to no decision was opposition from the State Department. Henry Kissinger accused State's Latin American Bureau of living in a world to which it could not bring itself to face Chileans' political realities. Kissinger asserted that no Chilean

57:32 Christian Democrats stood any chance in the upcoming election. Fry, though personally popular, could not succeed himself under the Constitution. But Kissinger's account misleads by what it fails to say. Far from not facing Chilean realities, the State Department's reluctance stemmed from a different reality. It had very much thought about, acutely conscious of the Chilean sensitivities to U.S. political interference.

58:01 State worried that any whiff of a CIA operation would make an Allende victory inevitable because they already knew they had been inserting themselves into the quote unquote democratic process. They just didn't write that part down. If any skullduggery took place in connection with the Chilean election, far better it would be for internal Chilean affairs. Kissinger dismisses this view with a comment.

58:37 a great college term paper could have been written on that subject. In fact, the differences demonstrated that when policy came down to concrete question of which leader in a country a U.S. administration preferred, Washington was never able to resolve the contradiction between its methods and the American international commitment to democracy because we're not committed to it. Henry Kissinger accepts some blame for Chile, but not for

59:06 reconciling the policy contradictions. Kissinger feels that he should have been forced into action sooner. The Washington Cold War agency, the CIA, should have been more on the ball. He admits to failing to focus on Chile until late in the game, 1970. As usual, Kissinger pleads the press of other events.

59:33 The truth was, as he had told Chilean diplomats the year before, quote, I am not interested in nor do I know anything about the southern portion of the world from basically the equator down, unquote, which is just hogwash. Kissinger indulges these disinformation statements on what went on in the 303 committee.

1:00:01 to buttress a claim that he somehow didn't know of any of the suggestions of the covert war that was ongoing in Chile. According to Kissinger, the CIA proposed issues, but deferred placing them in settling differences with the State Department. It is true the CIA prepared the 303 proposal papers based on conversations with the state. So that defies logic. The implication for the Latin America

1:00:30 Latin American Bureau foot dragging at stake kept Chile off the agenda. That was the statement that was made and it's completely inaccurate. Kissinger admits the agendas were fixed after consultations with him. The CIA warned more than once that Chile's preparation needed to be made in advance, but Kissinger was making sure they didn't get on the agenda. He put Chile

1:01:02 when he put it on the agenda, it was at the point of crisis so that no one could say no. Richard Helms affirms that Langley spoke loudly and often on the need to prepare. Since the subject did come up at 303 within months of Nixon taking office, the question becomes, why didn't it continue to be added? And of course, there's the fault based on the paperwork and evidence.

1:01:34 falls in the State Department on Kissinger. Attributing the failure, and he was at the National Security Council too, which ran the group. Attributing the failure to Charles Meyer, State's Latin American Assistant Secretary, isn't sufficient. Kissinger demanded that the department's outgoing cables get his clearance. Former diplomats and the NSC staff have commented.

1:02:03 in many contexts, on the awkwardness of this process, under which they spent long hours in Kissinger's office waiting for approvals. Thus, Meyer's dispatches to Corey, answering the ambassador's repeated warnings about Allende, came through Kissinger. Another aspect is the hostility between Corey and the CIA chief, Hexter, who, for a very long time, could not agree on a covert action proposal.

1:02:33 Hexter heavily favored Alexandre, who could not get a hearing from the ambassador. He wore Corey down only in December of 1969, using the argument that unless they did something, they would have to answer to Salvador Allende's victory. The two then suggested an election project. At this point, State Department's qualms did figure. The department nixed the proposal.

1:03:00 because it envisioned supporting the Christian Democrat Party again, which they believed did not have a practical chance, and because it thought mere money insufficient to help Alexandria. Corey and Hexter revised their plan, which State Department and CIA reviewed. They wrote a paper with both agencies' views. On March 25, 1970, it came before the 40 Committee. Henry Kessinger suddenly swung into action, startling the group. Quote,

1:03:30 I don't see why the US could stand by and let Chile go, quote unquote, communist. Again, Salvador Allende is not a communist. He went on, merely due to the stupidity of its own people, unquote. So Chileans are too stupid to vote for their own president, according to Henry Kissinger. And that's a direct quote. Sounds like they.

1:04:02 Think of Chileans like they think of Americans. He complained in his memoirs that the CIA state private exchanges had kept him in the dark about the proposal for four months. And then that the 40 committee approved this grand sum of just a miserly 135,000. As if Henry Kissinger hadn't been reviewing every single cable because they weren't allowed to communicate without his review. It's a bold face lie.

1:04:37 Kissinger's ultimate objection reeks of hindsight. This is a quote. Unquote. Again.

1:05:07 A bold-faced lie. Richard Nixon exhibited concern and also responded to U.S. corporations. Again, he doesn't list them. In danger of losing their guaranteed investments and highly agitated, Kissinger was also sensitive to Nixon. Roger Morris, a sort of handyman at the National Security Council staff at the time, believes that Kissinger actually saw Allende as a greater threat than even Fidel Castro.

1:05:40 He said, I don't think anybody in the government understood how ideological Kissinger was about Chile. And yet he let it simmer until it became a crisis. On the other hand, Henry had been quoted at least twice in 1969, essentially telling the Chileans that their hemisphere was of no importance to him.

1:06:06 Kissinger was also bent on dominating the State Department, concentrating control in the White House office at the National Security Council. And Chile could be used to that end. With a failed anti-Alende operation, one insured by underfunding, Kissinger could argue the dangers of leaving policy at the State Department. Whatever the original motive, Washington was soon carried away by polling data that showed

1:06:38 Alessandri ahead of Allende, with the supposition he might be defeated. On June 27th, the 40 committee added another $300,000 to the pot. State still argued against Corey's latest idea, a two-phase proposal, which included a contingency plan in case the election went to the Chilean Congress, required if no one got above 50%. State also, with other

1:07:04 agencies on the special group approved cash. Langley ordered Hexter to sharpen his propaganda and aim it more directly at Salvador Allende. The late hour did not prevent the CIA from accomplishing a great deal in Chile, nor did the 40 committee stance against backing a specific candidate preclude exactly that activity. Oh, now we get to it. The International Telephone and Telegraph, ITT Corporation,

1:07:33 put in $350,000 of its own money into the election. John McCone, former CIA director, just so happened to be sitting on the ITT board at the time. What interesting information. John McCone sitting on the ITT board while the ITT is advocating to Nixon and...

1:08:05 interfering in the Chilean election. Huh. He was well aware of business offers to help in 1964. He knew exactly whom to talk to at Langley, still an agency consultant. McComb met Richard Helms twice at the CIA and another time in California. He put ITT board chairman Harold Greenan in touch with CIA Western Hemisphere Division Chief William Breaux.

1:08:38 Other corporations matched funds as well. In ITT's case, its representative in Santiago dealt directly with Hexter. Bill Brough told the other companies where to put their money, which amounted to the same thing as the CIA backing candidates. More than $1.1 million went for political action in the 1970 Chilean election. Not on par with their previous effort, but it was not insignificant.

1:09:08 It was more money than any of the other candidates had. Kissinger maintains that he maintained ignorance of all of this, which again is a bold-faced lie. Okay, so we're gonna stop right there for today because I do have our six o'clock show with finishing up this irritating, stupid book called Stolen Elections, which is even another lie. So anybody have anything?

1:09:42 I see Bridget lost her co-host again. Yeah, this is very aggravating. So if you guys joined us a little late, when I went to open the space, X basically crashed it immediately. Wouldn't let me unmute my mic and I had to start the space over again. And I do know how to fix that. I will screen, you have an iPhone, correct? Yeah.

1:10:12 Okay, I will screenshot and send them to you. Okay. To show you how you can turn on and off notifications in a group text. Okay. And you can always, it's not something that's permanent, so you can always turn it on and off. Well, it's not my iPhone. It's my laptop that's doing it. I know how to do it on my iPhone. Oh, okay. It's my laptop that keeps dinging. It's an Apple laptop, right?

1:10:38 Yeah, they're actually synced. And I was told that if I do it on my phone, it'll do it on my computer. And that's not true. Maybe I can figure that out. Yeah, figure that one out. I know we have IT experts in here. Bridget does a great job. I push through. Except for when I lose my co-host. It's like, ooh, ooh. Yeah.

1:11:09 Okay, so that's the lesson for today. Does anyone have any comment? I have one question slash comment. You know how we were talking earlier about how, well, I guess they think of them that they are as stupid as Americans. Now, don't you think it's just the, you know, since we've gone all the way back to the Fabian society, that it is the ruling class that thinks pretty much,

1:11:42 Everybody else outside of there is essentially subpar human. Yes. Okay. That's what I thought. It's like. We're all stupid. Right. Right. Yeah. Or subhuman or something along those lines. Useless eaters. There you go. Yeah. Well said by Clinton herself. Yeah. Yeah. They definitely do not hold us in high regard. So.

1:12:15 That becomes very true. Okay, just going through here on Rumble, wanna say, give a shout out to Stavarino saying hello to me. Flying Storm, the Unholy Alliance. Yeah, I'm familiar with that. Yeah, and he brings up the point of the Pope Leo,

1:12:47 launching the attacks against President Trump and him coming from the stronghold of our former guy we talked a lot about, Archbishop Marcinkus. And no, that is not a coincidence at all. So, all right. Warhamster, I don't see your speaker. I don't know if you can talk. I'm not sure. There you go. I'm not sure. Can I? Yep.

1:13:18 I hear you. So not too long ago, I looked up how to silence all the dings when you're in the Twitter spaces. And I will email that to you in the morning. Okay. We'll get done here. Okay. I'm going to catch like half an hour of your book tonight because I'm going live on the Untold History channel at 630 with Ron and Doug because they're doing The Age of Exploration. It's sort of a continuation of what you and I have been talking about on our Friday shows.

1:13:47 That's what I'm doing tonight. So when you get done watching the Colonel's six o'clock shows. No, no. When you get done watching her, jump on over to ours, to my show. Okay. All right. I'm not stealing your, I'm not stealing your. Yeah. Obviously Warhamster always puts out wonderful content and we definitely need to absorb all of this material. And there's almost not enough hours in the day.

1:14:16 because there's so much really good content out there these days that we've been able to uncover. So absolutely always support Warhamster in his endeavors. What's the name of it again? That'll be on Ron Partain's channel. Is Ron here today right now? I don't see him. It's the Untold History channel on Rumble. They normally just do the Constitution, but Doug and Ron decided they'd gone through the Constitution three straight times.

1:14:45 Over the last couple of years. So they figured they'd go into a little pre-constitutional history. And Doug's a pretty darn good researcher. But because they're going to Age of Exploration and you and I have been all over that, I'm going to invade their show. Awesome. Speaking of your spaces just now, did I just hear my boy Rockefeller jumping into the act again? Yes. Yes. All roads lead where? Rockefellers. Uh-huh. Nelson Rockefeller was a very busy guy.

1:15:15 Yeah, I just think it just cracks me up so much that he gets beat by Nixon in 68, even though both were on the Council of Foreign Relations earlier on. And then somehow he ends up almost becoming president when they got rid of Nixon. Yes. Funny how that works. Yes. We're going to have so much fun when we start getting into the foundations and the period between the 60s and 70s, everything the Rockefellers were up to is just going to absolutely – it's going to be the best shows we ever do. It's not even close.

1:15:45 Our entire thesis on how the world really works is going to be made so crystal clear. And I cannot wait to get there. Yep. I agree. Okay. I'm going to jump off here. I don't see any other hands. And grab something to eat before the 6 o'clock show. And you guys take care. Have a good evening. And we'll be back tomorrow. Take care.

Entities here

CIA50 Salvador Allende25 United States25 Chile25 Henry Kissinger19 1970 Chilean Presidential Election18 National Security Council17 Richard Nixon14 Edward Koch12 U.S. State Department11 Richard Helms11 James Schlesinger11 Santiago10 Eduardo Frei10 Henry Hexer9 Pentagon9 Christian Democratic Union9 eSystems7 Christian Democrats (Chile)7 John F. Kennedy7 William Colby6 Desmond Fitzgerald5 Air America5 Washington, D.C.4 J.C. King4 1965 Chilean Congressional Elections4 Soviet Union4 First Indochina War3 Nelson Rockefeller3 Rudolph Gomez3 John McCone3 Church Committee3 Evergreen Aviation Corporation3 Laos3 Committee of 403 International Telephone and Telegraph3 Trump administration3 Bolivia3 Southern Air Transport3 McGeorge Bundy2

Claims made here

James Schlesinger replaced Richard Helms book_quoted ▶ 2:29

“He did the management study for Nixon in 70 and 71. First, he replaced Richard Helms. Schlesinger then moved over to the Secretary of Defense after only five months. And that's going to make sense in …”

James Schlesinger appointed Pentagon book_quoted ▶ 2:29

Richard Nixon ordered_assassination_of James Schlesinger host_asserted ▶ 3:35

“Oh, okay. Okay, so yeah, it's enlightening that Nixon oversaw that too, and he ended up getting cooed as well. The actual reduction amounted to about 7%, not the 40% Nixon had spoke of earlier. The co…”

Pentagon funded Laos book_quoted ▶ 4:12

“and given to the Pentagon. The old Directorate of Plans disappeared. It became the Directorate of Operations, which is obviously more appropriate. Tom Casamacenas went into retirement, quote-unquote r…”

William Colby succeeded James Schlesinger book_quoted ▶ 4:43

“William Colby was swiftly moved on to be the DCI or the director of CIA. Another change began by Helms continued under Schlesinger to be completed by Colby. This was the reorganization of air propriet…”

eSystems bought Air America book_quoted ▶ 5:42

“bought AirAsia, the massive Taiwanese maintenance facility. Air America planes and other assets were sold off one by one. By 1975, the parent Pacific Corporation had been reduced to 1,100 employees. F…”

James Schlesinger rejected Southern Air Transport book_quoted ▶ 13:01

“All of that in the Department of Defense. So I'm going to go back to the book now. A former owner of Southern Air Transport bid for the corporation and offered $5.6 million. Helms approved the sale du…”

Richard Helms approved Southern Air Transport book_quoted ▶ 13:01

William Colby ordered_assassination_of Southern Air Transport book_quoted ▶ 13:34

“As acting director, Colby ordered final liquidation on July 31st, 1973, but the former owner made a further counteroffer. The sale closed on the last day of 1973. There were later repercussions when t…”

Evergreen Aviation Corporation front_for Pentagon host_asserted ▶ 14:03

“In the course of the litigation admitting its ownership of Southern Air Transport, the ultimate losers were the employees. The CIA also liquidated Intermountain Aviation in 1973, selling its airfield …”

Evergreen Aviation Corporation bought Intermountain Aviation book_quoted ▶ 14:03

John F. Kennedy founded Alliance for Progress book_quoted ▶ 23:39

“created the Alliance for Progress for exactly that reason, to help democratically elected administrations in foreign countries do what they felt necessary, even if it wasn't a conservative government.…”

David Rockefeller founded Business Group for Latin America book_quoted ▶ 27:40

“They had even more proposals to get more deeply involved. One of the projects spoke, let's see, had guarantees of investments and involved Rockefeller. He had formed a business group for Latin America…”

Salvador Allende founded Italian Socialist Party book_quoted ▶ 29:11

“Another presidential election was quickly coming up. Suddenly, Washington saw CIA political action as a necessity. The opposition would be formidable. Salvador Allende was a very prominent person. He …”

Salvador Allende member_of Chamber of Deputies (Chile) book_quoted ▶ 29:42

“Allende became the leader. He was first elected to the Chamber of Deputies, which is their lower house assembly, in 1937. Two years later, he appeared in national government for the first time as a mi…”

J.C. King recruited Christian Democrats (Chile) book_quoted ▶ 31:22

“The CIA put the groundwork in place late the year before. On December 19th, 1963, the special group approved a one-time payment to a Democrat front in Chile. At the same time, senior Christian Democra…”

J.C. King proposed John McCone book_quoted ▶ 31:53

“Montalva and begged for agency money to fund their campaign. Colonel King, receptive, on Christmas Eve sent Director McCone a proposal. The bid involved half a million dollars. That was going to be qu…”

Ralph Dungan appointed Chile book_quoted ▶ 33:22

“The White House viewed this with caution. Ralph Dugan, a Kennedy holdover and political advisor whose special interest was Latin America and who would soon go to Santiago as ambassador, told Mac Bundy…”

Desmond Fitzgerald recruited Rudolph Gomez book_quoted ▶ 34:22

“At this point, Fitzgerald, who had replaced King as the Latin American guy in charge, visited Santiago for a personal reconnaissance mission. He spent his time with the CIA station chief, Rudolph Gome…”

Desmond Fitzgerald replaced J.C. King book_quoted ▶ 34:22

CIA funded Christian Democratic Union book_quoted ▶ 35:21

“of the CIA activities. Richard Helms related that Fitzgerald had learned what he had learned to the special group, which met again on April 14th, directing McCone to disburse $1.25 million from his co…”

Desmond Fitzgerald member_of CIA book_quoted ▶ 35:21

Rudolph Gomez member_of CIA book_quoted ▶ 36:21

“were there as well. When they swung into gear once the fresh money flowed, this indicates that Rudy Gomez had worked overtime to prepare this campaign. Television was not being well established in Chi…”

CIA carried_out_attack Salvador Allende book_quoted ▶ 37:45

“In other countries, the CIA inserted more stories in media or solicited dire warnings from figures opposing Allende's rule or his presidency. Again, with the words. In Chile, these were reported as le…”

CIA funded Christian Democratic Union book_quoted ▶ 40:55

“but supposedly the 303 committee rejected those offers. And it's weird that the author doesn't put those in because they're well-established by the time this book was written. That's PepsiCo, Anaconda…”

Eduardo Frei succeeded Salvador Allende documented ▶ 41:23

“The cost per favorable vote cast in the Chilean election came in higher than what the combined Democrat and Republican parties in the U.S. spent per vote in the U.S. election of 1964. In September ele…”

National Security Council funded Christian Democratic Union book_quoted ▶ 42:49

“and his agency station chief to help selected candidates. On February 5th, 1965, the group allocated another $175,000. Richard Helm recorded this as half a million dollars for covert assistance in the…”

CIA covered_up Christian Democratic Union book_quoted ▶ 43:47

“That plenty held some piece of the puzzle. Inevitably, suspicions found expression. Termination of the latest project in the June of 1965 did not end the danger. The agency shut down lines to Jesuit p…”

CIA targeted_for_regime_change Salvador Allende book_quoted ▶ 44:17

“The ongoing CIA project included both the Christian Democrat funding and a separate attempt to induce other deputies towards softer goals. It continued. The agency also dealt with a cabinet-level offi…”

CIA carried_out_attack Brazil host_asserted ▶ 45:45

“Revelation of Project Camelot illustrated the problem. A Pentagon social science research effort, Camelot tried to identify factors that could be exploited in counterinsurgency. It triggered instant d…”

CIA targeted_for_regime_change Che Guevara host_asserted ▶ 46:14

“in 1964, caused suspicion because they did. And there were reports of CIA action against Che Guevara in Bolivia. Again, true. More concrete charges from Bolivian cabinet minister Antonio Argandas soon…”

James Nolan headed CIA book_quoted ▶ 46:43

“aimed at countering the threat of exposure. It expanded the agency's capability to generate countervailing propaganda. So if you're about to get exposed, go in harder. Station Chief James Nolan merged…”

Edward Koch appointed United States book_quoted ▶ 47:13

“Fresh leadership now came to the American embassy in Santiago. In June 1967, Edward Corey, K-O-R-R-Y, took over as ambassador. His marching orders direct from Johnson, Corey later said, were to preven…”

Henry Hexer succeeded James Nolan book_quoted ▶ 48:16

“Shortly after Corey's arrival, the agency's Jim Nolan gave way to Henry Hexter, moving over from Tokyo as station chief. Hexter, something of a CIA legend, had done it all. Soviet operations in Berlin…”

National Security Council funded Christian Democratic Union book_quoted ▶ 49:41

“to interfere and prop up a political party. Keith Wheelock, one of the new CIA officers, became the field man on the initiative. Corey himself instigated another. Looking ahead to congressional electi…”

Henry Hexer member_of CIA book_quoted ▶ 50:08

“Later in 1970s, Corey contended that all CIA projects had been paired to the bone just before Richard Nixon entered office. That does not track with the 303 decisions. The largest single addition to t…”

Eduardo Frei removed_from_power Christian Democratic Union documented ▶ 51:06

“had to pay a price. Hexter's project became an interesting challenge. It considered an operational success because it targeted races when the CIA's backed guy won. The election yielded a net loss of C…”

Eduardo Frei traded_network_to United States book_quoted ▶ 51:38

“Salvador Allende's party gained seats, leaving the Christian Democrat party very vulnerable. Hexter, no doubt, was further alarmed when Fry reopened the terms of the trade with U.S. copper companies, …”

Nelson Rockefeller member_of Presidential Intelligence Advisory Board book_quoted ▶ 51:38

Abbott Smith headed Office of National Estimates book_quoted ▶ 52:41

“intelligent estimates captured this well. In a 1969 national intelligent estimate, the board of the national estimates considered the prospects for Chile. Abbott Smith, chairman at the time, had a rep…”

CIA targeted_for_regime_change Salvador Allende book_quoted ▶ 55:37

“where Branch Chief Tom Gilligan had been grinding out papers warning of Allende, not to mention those at the White House. Helms aide Victor Marchetti noted, as, quote, as is so often the case within t…”

National Security Council removed_from_power CIA book_quoted ▶ 56:06

“In other words, if you were actually honest about an assessment and it didn't fit where they wanted to go, you were ignored. The opportunity for choice arose in the spring of 69, about six weeks after…”

National Security Council reassigned Tom Gilligan book_quoted ▶ 57:02

“committee ordered a propaganda workshop to determine what possibilities there were. The agency reassigned Tom Gilligan to Portugal. One reason the 303 committee came to no decision was opposition from…”

Henry Kissinger targeted_for_regime_change Salvador Allende book_quoted ▶ 57:32

“Christian Democrats stood any chance in the upcoming election. Fry, though personally popular, could not succeed himself under the Constitution. But Kissinger's account misleads by what it fails to sa…”

Henry Kissinger covered_up CIA host_asserted ▶ 59:33

“The truth was, as he had told Chilean diplomats the year before, quote, I am not interested in nor do I know anything about the southern portion of the world from basically the equator down, unquote, …”

Henry Kissinger ordered_assassination_of Salvador Allende book_quoted ▶ 1:03:30

“I don't see why the US could stand by and let Chile go, quote unquote, communist. Again, Salvador Allende is not a communist. He went on, merely due to the stupidity of its own people, unquote. So Chi…”

Committee of 40 funded Christian Democratic Union book_quoted ▶ 1:04:02

“Think of Chileans like they think of Americans. He complained in his memoirs that the CIA state private exchanges had kept him in the dark about the proposal for four months. And then that the 40 comm…”

Roger Morris member_of National Security Council book_quoted ▶ 1:05:07

“A bold-faced lie. Richard Nixon exhibited concern and also responded to U.S. corporations. Again, he doesn't list them. In danger of losing their guaranteed investments and highly agitated, Kissinger …”

Henry Kissinger targeted_for_regime_change Salvador Allende book_quoted ▶ 1:05:07

Committee of 40 funded Christian Democratic Union book_quoted ▶ 1:06:38

“Alessandri ahead of Allende, with the supposition he might be defeated. On June 27th, the 40 committee added another $300,000 to the pot. State still argued against Corey's latest idea, a two-phase pr…”

International Telephone and Telegraph funded Christian Democratic Union book_quoted ▶ 1:07:04

“agencies on the special group approved cash. Langley ordered Hexter to sharpen his propaganda and aim it more directly at Salvador Allende. The late hour did not prevent the CIA from accomplishing a g…”

John McCone member_of International Telephone and Telegraph book_quoted ▶ 1:07:33

“put in $350,000 of its own money into the election. John McCone, former CIA director, just so happened to be sitting on the ITT board at the time. What interesting information. John McCone sitting on …”

E. Howard Hunt member_of CIA host_asserted ▶ 1:08:05

“interfering in the Chilean election. Huh. He was well aware of business offers to help in 1964. He knew exactly whom to talk to at Langley, still an agency consultant. McComb met Richard Helms twice a…”

E. Howard Hunt recruited Harold Green host_asserted ▶ 1:08:05

William Breaux member_of CIA host_asserted ▶ 1:08:05

Pope Leo XIII targeted_for_regime_change Donald Trump caller_asserted ▶ 1:12:47

“launching the attacks against President Trump and him coming from the stronghold of our former guy we talked a lot about, Archbishop Marcinkus. And no, that is not a coincidence at all. So, all right.…”

Monsignor Marcinkus member_of Pope Leo XIII caller_asserted ▶ 1:12:47

Nelson Rockefeller member_of CFR host_asserted ▶ 1:15:15

“Yeah, I just think it just cracks me up so much that he gets beat by Nixon in 68, even though both were on the Council of Foreign Relations earlier on. And then somehow he ends up almost becoming pres…”

Richard Nixon member_of CFR host_asserted ▶ 1:15:15