The Colonel's Safe for Democracy Part 37 (39)

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0:07 Okay. Let's get this party started. Happy, happy birthday. Happy birthday. Happy birthday to you. Happy, happy birthday. Happy birthday. Happy birthday to you. You rock. Thank you. That's so sweet. Just in case nobody's saying to you yet.

0:29 Yeah, you know, my kids all call and sing it to me. And yeah, but I appreciate it. Thank you very much. Wonderful day yesterday. Went to dinner with my kids last night and my grandson. So cool day. My hair looks a little crazy. I just got out of the pool with my grandson. He just got picked up. So anyway.

1:00 It is what it is. He's learned how to splash. So you're not getting in with straight hair and coming out with straight hair anymore. I always think your hair looks good, though, that way. I mean. Curly. Yeah, it looks pretty. It's kind of, yeah, it's a mess. But anyway. All right. We're going to keep going. Save for democracy. We're on page 424.

1:30 We are talking about the Chilean coup, and we're going to start there. Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, chief of naval operations in the first Nixon administration, retired believing that the manner in which Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger conducted foreign policy shrouded their personal motives in secrecy and chicanery, left booby traps everywhere.

2:01 Chile was a prime example. Almost every aspect of the secret war against Chilean democracy contained seeds for controversy, both over policy and over the tactics of Americans' Cold War agency, the CIA. The Nixon people were sitting on a basket of hand grenades with loose safety pins, and they were doing this in a climate.

2:30 in which other political and national security developments, Watergate, Vietnam, the Phoenix program, Laos, revelations of CIA's use of private institutions had already eroded the credibility of official denials in the faith of the American people. The first break on Chilean operations began with columnist Jack Anderson.

2:55 The journalist acquired copies of ITT memos and cablegrams, some of them cited earlier, demonstrating the multinational corporation had intervened with the Nixon White House and acted in concert with the CIA. On March 21, 1972, Anderson published the first in a series of syndicated columns on CIA, ITT, and Chile. Suddenly, the issue of political intervention in democratic elections appeared on the public agenda.

3:23 Some secret warriors adherence to the cult of secrecy like to believe that each time revelations like these come forward in the public, the act is traitorous. And the actor, someone that was out to get the CIA, you know, just for simply reporting what they're actually doing.

3:48 The reality is that leaks come from the inside, usually from the top, and are fueled first by officials seeking to push policy in a certain direction or by persons embarrassed by government actions and unwilling to be a party. The ITT Chilean documents are a case in point. By several accounts, they had been floating around Washington for a year and a half.

4:19 Foreign Relations Committee, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and to many journalists, not just Jack Anderson. He used the documents for articles attacking Salvador Allende originally. What changed between 70 and 72 was the public perception of the Nixon administration as manipulators of information.

4:52 Richard Helms quotes Bill Fulbright as warning him about that same time of track one and two, that if he learned of that kind of thing, he would blow it wide open. Yet Fulbright did nothing. We've already discovered, by the way, that Fulbright is compromised. The Fulbright scholarship program is something that the CIA used to vet.

5:24 potential recruits. Fulbright did nothing with the ITT documents or with the Pentagon Papers, which he had received during that same period. Again, Congress is a crime scene, but Nixon and Kissinger's cavalier treatment of the Foreign Relations Committee inquiries into the role in Laos, plus their handling of various congressional resolutions designed to limit U.S. activity in Vietnam, consumed

5:56 all of the remaining tolerance. In 72, when Jack Anderson brought the CIA-ITT connection into the open, Fulbright was basically pushed into action. He sanctioned an inquiry into the role of multinational corporations by a subcommittee under Frank Church. That inquiry zeroed in on Chile's, where the church

6:25 One, chairman of Fulbright's subcommittee on Latin America had a particular interest. The net result was that the CIA's destabilization of Chile proceeded in the field while that very initiative came under public spotlight. The subject of congressional inquiry at home to say the situation was explosive merely acknowledged the facts.

6:52 After his 72 re-election, Nixon's appointment of Helms as ambassador to Iran effectively got the CIA spymaster out of the way. Nevertheless, Helms and William Breaux were obliged to testify in early 73 to the church subcommittee. Breaux by this time was the inspector general of the CIA. He seemed so consumed with the confrontation that his work suffered.

7:22 Richard Helms came under additional questioning in both public and closed hearings as the Fulbright Committee considered this nomination for ambassador. Always loyal to the chain of command, Helms, in view of Nixon's instructions about secrecy on Chile, denied and sworn testimony that the CIA had ever tried to overthrow the government, blatantly lying.

7:49 In his memoirs, Helms speculates that Fulbright was trying to push his way into an oversight role in intelligence, previously denied by Senator Russell and President Johnson, as shown earlier. Helms is probably right that Fulbright's desire contributed to his stance in 72 and 73, but more important was the deteriorating relationship between Congress and the Nixon White House.

8:22 Scott Breckenridge of the CIA's Inspector General Office points out that the senators violated guidelines their staffs had set with Langley for heel appearances, a further indication of the breakdown. The Helms testimony began yet another series of hand grenades threatening to explode, both at Langley and the White House.

8:52 By no means completely ignorant of the CIA involvement in Chile, Congress had been told of the Chilean activities at various times. Some were large-scale briefings that included Chile. Sometimes individual members, senators, or staff were informed. In all, the subject had come up around 40 times between 1964 and 73. Half of those included talk of money, relate.

9:21 released for Chilean covert operations. Congress already had data contrary to Helms' assertion of innocence. The church subcommittee got more from ITT representatives. They swiftly asked Langley to respond to five specific questions. The agency took the line that Helms' testimony had been accurate, anticipating the response would be inadequate.

9:51 Theodore Shackley recommended outflanking the criticisms by privately approaching Senator Henry Jackson on the Armed Services Committee to intervene on grounds CIA sources and methods needed to be protected, which was, again, absolute crap. Agency leaders rejected this course. Instead, James Schlesinger and Bill Colby sat together in March.

10:22 affirming Helms' original declaration. That begged the question of the agency's role in the destabilization. Another hand grenade had been put in the basket. Through the summer of 73, Washington boiled over, even as the Chilean trucker strike took Allende's presidency to the edge. Media speculation on CIA backing became a continuing theme, to which Congress responded with more questions.

10:51 A dozen more CIA briefings on Chile took place between March 73 and December of the next year. Bill Colby, now DCI in his own right, sat in the hot seat on October 11, 1973 to deny the House committee that the CIA had any role in the strike or the coup. Another bold-faced lie. Among those dissatisfied with Langley's description was Massachusetts Representative Michael Harrington.

11:21 The congressman demanded more open discussion. Langley tried to walk a tightrope between contending demands of Congress and the Nixon White House. In an effort to be able to say that Congress had been properly briefed, CIA Director Colby went to a friendly contact, Representative Lucian Nedzey, a Democrat from Michigan and chairman of the CIA subcommittee on the Armed Forces Service Committee.

11:53 He arranged for an appearance in front of that committee. On January 22nd, Colby and Latin American David Phillips appeared at a quote-unquote hearing of that subcommittee. Director Colby danced around the issues, according to Harrington, spending a third of his time on the Kennedy-Johnson era programs and most of the rest of the time discussing generic tactics.

12:22 not the substance of the Nixon project. Though it is evident Colby gave up some budget figures. In the end of the session, Colby privately told NEDC of track two, keeping it out of the written record. The CIA would be able to say it had fully informed Congress after the fact. In June, Harrington...

12:46 read the proceedings and used them for letters to colleagues and to Senator Fulbright advocating full-scale public hearings on the CIA activities in Chile, and also wrote a letter for the editor of the New York Times. Agency defenders accused Harrington in using Colby's information of breaking House rules against publication without prior approval. The material given

13:18 Congress in closed executive session. In fact, a congressman filed a formal complaint against him for doing what he did. Again, this is just mind-blowing. When the House of Representatives looked into the matter, however, the charge had to be dismissed. Netze had been the sole member present to take Colby's testimony. He had not officially called a hearing and had no quorum to close the hearing.

13:48 Hence, it had never been closed under House rules. Harrington had no obligation to seek approval. Langley had tripped over its own cleverness. This became the first Chilean hand grenade to explode. Harrington had no success on hearings, but a few months later, he put much of the same information into a pair of resolutions of inquiries he tabled in the House of Representatives.

14:16 That would have obliged the president and the secretary of state to produce data on the economic measures or economic warfare they had taken against Allende. The Harrington letters also gave Senator Fulbright an opportunity to press again for a joint oversight committee for Congress to monitor the CIA. In the meantime, Richard Nixon's Watergate problems was escalating to a fever pitch.

14:43 with the Supreme Court decision that required him to give up the Oval Office audiotapes, providing incontrovertible evidence that he had conspired to cover up his 1972 election issues. The House of Representatives voted on three articles of impeachment. On August 8th, Nixon resigned, 1974. Vice President Gerald Ford succeeded him.

15:13 By now, Langley's efforts at damage control were rapidly being overtaken by events. Shutting down the Harrington Inquiry could not have saved the secret warriors. In June, the New York publisher, Alfred Koft, released the book, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence by Victor Marchetti. And we definitely have to do that book.

15:40 As a result of a legal action by the CIA and the Nixon White House, the book appeared with more than 160 deletions, including roughly a third of its commentary on Chile. Among the deletions alleged to have been necessary for quote-unquote national security grounds was Henry Kissinger's remark disparaging the sovereign right of the Chilean people to their own election results.

16:10 Koft and the authors went to court to force release the material. Legal discovery, court arguments, and the to-ing and fro-ing surrounded the entire affair furnished many opportunities for more leaks. Seymour Hirsch, investigative journalist for the New York Times, then transitioning from reporting Watergate to covering intelligence issues at large,

16:36 acquired the story and the paper printed it on September 11th, including Kissinger's soon notorious comment. No doubt the Secretary of State hit the ceiling. Although Hirsch represented only the leading edge of a drumbeat of press coverage on Chile, his stories quickly became more hand grenades. So were those of Lawrence Stern of the Washington Post.

17:05 Both published pieces on September 8th, revealing Harrington's letters. On September 12th, Hirsch wrote that Senator Frank Church intended to press the Chile issue. A week later, when Henry Kissinger sat before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to testify on Russia, Church diverted the conversation to Chile. Kissinger had to work hard to keep the exchange innocuous.

17:35 On September 16th, the Times front page carried a Hirsch article portraying Kissinger as the chief strategist on Chile and the economic blockade. Four days later, the paper carried a second lead, which was written by Hirsch, linking the CIA to the strikes. That day, Director Colby spoke twice on the phone to Kissinger denying the story.

18:05 later warning him of Hearst's next article. On September 21st, Hearst's theme would be Kissinger in the present tense, that he had omitted CIA involvement in the Chilean labor and trade unions in briefings to Congress and to colleagues in the Ford administration in just the past week.

18:26 Three days later, Hearst reported that Nixon's administration had decided in 1971 to escalate the covert actions against Allende. To say that Hearst's reports raised eyebrows at the Ford White House would be an understatement. They forced President Ford into an official disclosure. At a September 16th news conference, Ford admitted that there had been CIA covert action.

18:58 was made to help to assist in the preservation of opposition newspapers and electronic media and to preserve opposition political parties. Again, that's a bold faced lie. We already know that the quote unquote opposition newspaper was basically owned and being paid for by the CIA. We also know that every single quote unquote opposition political party

19:28 was bought and paid for by the CIA. Ford carefully denied involvement in the coup. He characterized covert action as necessary to help prevent foreign policy and to protect national security. Again, a bold-faced lie. He justified them on the grounds of quote-unquote communist nations spent more on this kind of activity than the U.S. Again, a bold-faced lie.

20:01 William Colby followed with a letter to the Times two days later referring specifically to Harrington. Colby denied ever using the term destabilization, which the congressman had used. Scott Breckinridge, Nathaniel Davis, and others seized upon this point to discredit critics apparently unaware the word had first been used in Nixon's own cabinet on November 6, 1970.

20:31 So, obviously, you have some suck-ups in the media, not that that's a newsflash, for the CIA. And again, it's all about the wording. Focus on the word destabilization. They just orchestrated a coup. Of course, it preceded with destabilization. But, oh my God, we never used that word. Well, what word did you use? Kissinger's staff at Foggy Bottom.

21:05 and the White House went into high gear to counter the Chilean revelations. Deputy Secretary Lawrence Eagleburger told Kissinger that Hersh would continue and that Henry himself was the ultimate target. Eagleburger got Nathaniel Davis and former Santiago Deputy Ambassador Harry Schlaldman to draft a strong denial.

21:33 to be released by the CIA. Davis would separately put one out from the State Department. Eagleburger argued in another memo to Kissinger, it was an unusual gamut of bringing out the denial through the CIA and that that would likely not pacify the people that were interested in this story. Quote, Hill interest.

22:03 who want a series of hearings on the issue, unquote. Bill Colby volunteered to issue such a denial when talking to the Deputy National Security Advisor, Brent Scolcroft, on September 23rd. Langley ultimately did not issue that denial. Davis is silent about this episode in his own memoirs. Kissinger also says nothing about the attempt to counter Hearst in his.

22:33 By then, Director Colby had his hands full. For the matter of the Helms Chile testimony came to a head. One of Hearst's articles on September 17th noted that staff on Fulbright's committee were pressing for Richard Helms, William Breaux, and two state departments to be cited for contempt of Congress for their 1973 testimony because they bold-faced lied.

23:01 What Hearst did not know is that within the secret world of Langley, this dovetailed with completion of an inquiry by the IG that had begun when the CIA chiefs repeatedly had had to defend the testimony. Bro briefly, the IG could not be in a position to reject an inquiry that involved him personally.

23:26 and approved the study shortly before leaving the agency. The inquiry droned on for a year and a half. One participant came out of retirement for the task. Another, Thomas Lawler, an analyst from the Office of Current Intel, who had previously served on a detail with the IG, discovered papers from early reviewers that used the word perjury. Superiors gave more weight to the view that Helms

23:56 had been sandbagged when senators went beyond agreed upon guidelines. But Lawler did a straight review. After consulting with the general counsel's office on the legal definition of perjury, he decided the testimony before the multinationals subcommittee had indeed been problematic. On September 5th, 1974, a draft paper sent to the IG stated, quote, there is reason to believe that perjury was committed.

24:24 and that the agency was aware of that fact. Some of the statements in Mr. Helms' confirmation testimony seem not to be in full accord with the facts. Mr. Helms' testimony is significant here because it was subsequently cited by the agency as authoritative, unquote. Superiors tried to get the word perjury expunged from the paper and did get the analyst to remove passages pertinent to the ITT legal case.

24:52 attempting to recover its Chilean investment from the U.S. government. But the panel stood on its interpretation. The IG passed the paper to Colby with the comment that the general counsel, John Warner, should provide a second opinion. Warner asked for further examination by a three-officer panel, two lawyers plus Lawler. They agreed with the original review.

25:19 Warner added an analysis refuting that conclusion. Again, we've now got like 10 people saying that he committed perjury, but we're going to stick an addendum to their opinions. According to Colby's note for the record on September 25th, Warner found no clear evidence of perjury in the testimony. Colby decided not to refer the matter to the Justice Department. Okay, yeah.

25:51 All of the papers except for the last one said he committed perjury, but we're going to ignore those. The legal panel insisted on meeting with the CIA director and did so. Regulations require the referral, they maintained, so CIA's obligation was to let justice make the final determination. Hiding the issue only increased chance of later leaks and bigger explosions. In the climate of September 1974, that seemed a reasonable proposition.

26:19 Colby nonetheless held the line for two more months amidst threats of resignation. The last offense was a 1954 CIA justice agreement governing what could be withheld from the Justice Department. Colby sought to discover whether that exempted Helms. On December 21st, he met with the acting Attorney General Lawrence Silberberg, Silberman, who asserted jurisdiction, making Langley yield up the case files.

26:50 Helms and a faction of stalwarts never forgave Bill Colby this betrayal. He didn't have a choice. He did everything he could. But even the internal mechanisms of the CIA wasn't going to allow him to sit on perjury. Indicted in 1977 for perjured testimony, Richard Helms pleaded no contest to the charges and got off with a two-year suspended sentence.

27:22 and a $2,000 fine. Another Chile hand grenade had exploded. In 1974, the atmosphere became superheated. Late in October, radio broadcaster Daniel Score of CBS reported that State had opposed the Chilean intervention, citing Ray Klein, which, of course, not the State Department Kissinger ran. Ray Klein, at the time,

27:54 had been in charge of the Office of Intelligence and Research, that belly button in the State Department. Contrary to what he wrote in later memoirs, at the time, Henry Kissinger ordered an immediate review of the 40 committee files and then leaked several documents to the media on which Klein's marginal notes indicated that he had favored stronger, not weaker action.

28:29 Yes, Henry Kissinger leaked information to refute what Ray Klein said. Kissinger himself gave SCORE an interview denying the allegation. Days later, Hearst reported, based on 40 committee documents, that the CIA had been asking for cash for Chilean opposition in the summer of 1973. Apart from anything else, current covert operation data.

28:58 had been deliberately leaked to settle a political score. So much for national security. Henry Kissinger's concern for his reputation certainly inflicted considerable damage on what the CIA referred to as quote-unquote national security. Forced to acknowledge CIA actions to congressional investigators,

29:26 Kissinger in his memoirs then castigated the bureaucracy for failing to execute the orders he initially denied having given. I didn't do it, but they didn't do what I said I didn't do. Kissinger's sensitivity is apparent even after decades. In 2003, a fresh account of the Chilean affair appeared, written by Peter Kornblum.

29:53 and based on the declassified records showing Kissinger in a very poor light. The former official now orchestrated efforts to discredit this work through negative reviews, pressuring the Council on Foreign Relations to influence the publication of letters commenting on its own view. Historian Kenneth Maxwell, author of the review in the Council's publication, Foreign Affairs, and editor of the journal's Latin American Review,

30:23 section for more than a decade resigned after being denied the opportunity to respond to Kissinger associates. Maxwell had liked the Cornball study more than Kissinger wanted. Nasty political infighting in Washington through the fall of 74 combined with Watergate in Vietnam created a tinderbox. Oversight of the U.S. intelligence and issue that stood in the wings

30:51 had already been suggested by the Chilean debate. When Seymour Hersh published a further revelation just before Christmas, the CIA had conducted domestic operations against anti-war movements in the U.S. It set fire to the hand grenade basket. Within weeks, a presidential commission, a Senate investigating committee, and another in the House of Representatives were all created to look into the CIA.

31:21 Called a rogue elephant, the CIA faced the fight of its life. A simple phone call triggered the fire. Seymour Hearst phoned Director Colby on December 18, 1974, to say that he had it from several sources that the CIA had carried out a massive intelligence operation against American opponents of the Vietnam War, including break-ins, mail intercepts, wiretaps, and surveillance.

31:50 Colby saw Hearst and tried to explain that his data reflected distorted fragments of a different project, all within the agency's charter. Sure. He insisted that such activities had ceased under the 1973 directives that made plain the CIA would not stay within the strict letter of the law. Or sorry, that they would stay within the strict letter of the law. Sure.

32:24 Colby felt Hearst had blown his information out of proportion. Hearst did not see it that way. His article was splashed across three columns on the front page of the Sunday New York Times on December 22nd. The headline read, huge CIA operation reported in U.S. against anti-war forces and other dissidents during the Nixon years. The immediate consequence, as Colby himself concedes, became a press and political firestorm.

32:52 He remembers the events as ruining not only the Christmas season for me, but nearly all of the next year as well. Aw, too bad. Colby arrived on the seventh floor of Langley just in time to face the explosion. The ground had been well prepared by the Nixon-Ford administration. Watergate, plus their disingenuous handling of explanations for the U.S. activities in Laos and Chile,

33:17 fueled what became a season of inquiry. The political controversy ushered in a decade of turmoil for the CIA. It should have ushered in their demise. In all the years since passage of the National Security Act of 1947, presidents had successfully warded off further legal codification of intelligence duties, responsibilities, and restrictions.

33:44 On a certain level, it is not surprising that Richard Helms had felt confident in deliberately misleading Congress on Chile. But the pressure built with each time the White House avoided reforms until 1974. The pot boiled over. The CIA's Cold War mystique had eroded, and with it, Langley's protection from scrutiny. William Colby's troubles had a lot to do with the White House.

34:10 attitudes began changing in the late 60s, but the pace accelerated in the Nixon years, and by now, public confidence had reached low ebb. Historian Catherine Olmsted had reported a 1975 polling data from Gallup, which showed barely 14% of the Americans held a favorable opinion of the CIA. I think we're down in the single digits today. Among well-educated college students, the level

34:40 was halved. Two years earlier, support already anemic had stood at 23%. The hand grenades from the Chile and South Asia were taking their toll. Despite occasional flaps, the CIA had been very lucky for a long time. None of the 200 legislative measures intended to oversee or restrict

35:09 it introduced before 1974 had ever passed. Now, however, bad feelings predominated the Congress. In an amendment to the foreign aid bill that year, Democrat Senator Harold Hughes of Iowa and Democrat Congressman Leo Ryan of California successfully sponsored legislation to require reporting of significant covert operations relevant to committees.

35:38 in Congress. In practice, this worked out to eight committees with more than 160 members plus senior staff. Commenting on the Hughes-Ryan amendment, President Ford focused on the dangers of leaks rather than the advantage of oversight. Then Bill Colby got another phone call from Seymour

36:10 The Jim Jones affair in California cost him his life. That's what happens when you take on the CIA. President Ford was flying to Vail, Colorado for some skiing when Colby warned him of an imminent hearse story on CIA domestic activities. The spy chief speaking to Air Force One over an open line, a radio patch through the White House switchboard, had to be circumspect.

36:39 Ford immediately demanded a report. Later that day, he responded to growing press inquiries by declaring that he had asked Kissinger as the former NSC advisor to obtain Colby's report. Bill Colby's bad year got off to a bad start that Christmas Eve. That evening, he crossed the Potomac to visit Kissinger at the State Department.

37:11 It had been two days since the Hearst article and the CIA director had assembled a memorandum describing how the New York Times story was exaggerated. But there were fire behind the smoke, as Colby had to admit. In fact, Hearst had uncovered some of the CIA's Family Jewels compilation that Jim Schlesinger had ordered.

37:36 This document gathered together allegations of illegal questionable activities observed by employees throughout the agency. It happened that Kissinger had never been briefed on the family jewels. Completed as Colby replaced Lessinger at Langley. At last, Colby went ahead with his briefing, then handed Kissinger a copy of the report.

38:04 It noted allegations of CIA assassination efforts against foreign politicians like Castro, Diem, Dominican dictator Trujillo. Kissinger flipped quickly through the pages, but slowed when he came to the part about assassinations. He stopped and looked up. Well, Bill, when her story first came out, I thought you should have flatly denied it was totally wrong. But now I see why you couldn't.

38:32 The next day, Kissinger wrote to Ford explaining that besides the items in Colby's report, there were other CIA actions that raised questions of judgment on moral issues. He took Colby's 30-page account to bail to show the president. Kissinger favored an inquiry, one confined narrowly. There were no House denials, and Ford said nothing to support the CIA. There were no official statements from the agency or Colby.

39:03 The only pushback came on Christmas Day from Richard Helms, a source who increasingly had zero credibility. Director Colby wished to save the agency, but without lying or doing anything illegal. That meant sitting tight for the inevitable investigations. The first would be Ford's, with parameters worked out among advisors Richard Chaney and Donald Rumsfeld.

39:34 along with Kissinger. Talk about the fox in the hen house. Yes, we're going to have advisors Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld and Kissinger together on a project. Taking the route of a White House investigation enabled President Ford to show leadership, but set limits. White House staff drafted an order for the panel.

40:06 gave Ford's list of prospective commissioners and sounded out those people on their willingness to serve. Most of that took place while Ford was still on vacation. Let's set up the cover-up. When the president returned to the White House, he saw the key people. On January 4th, 1975, in the Oval Office, he led off with Henry Kissinger, who told Ford that the outpouring of press accounts since Christmas represented merely

40:37 the tip of the iceberg. If they come out, blood will flow, Kissinger said. The National Security Advisor added that Richard Helms had confirmed the worst. In a veiled reference to Operation Mongoose and the plotting against Castro, Kissinger went on. For example, Robert Kennedy personally managed the operation on the assassination of Castro. Immediately afterward, Ford saw Helms.

41:07 The discomfort level, if anything, exceeded that of the president's talk the previous day with Director Colby. Aware of his exposure to criminal indictment in the Chilean perjury charge, Helms also knew of the proposed commission. Ford assured Helms he automatically assumed the CIA man had done the right thing. Helms responded that he would defend himself, perhaps threateningly, the former top

41:36 Spook warned, quote, a lot of dead cats are going to come out, unquote. But he used the phrase again later in the context of a more general controversy now raising. Ford admitted, frankly, we're in a mess. I think the mood of the country is ghastly, Helms said. I feel deeply for you, Mr. President. Helms supported the presidential commission and made the

42:08 constructive suggestion that FBI activities also be included in his purview. Ford replied he would think about that. But in fact, the commission stood ready to go and he gave it no instruction to look beyond the CIA. There was a lot of skeletons in the FBI closet too. Ford wanted the commission to stay within a narrow charter. Given the political climate, he did not think that he could guarantee this.

42:37 Publicly, Gerald Ford declared that he would not tolerate illegal activities by the intelligence agency. He said Colby had given assurances that no such activity still existed and announced a commission under Vice President, you get it, Nelson Rockefeller. Of course, and of course, all of these actions are being done to benefit the Rockefellers. So who are we going to put in front of this or in charge of this commission? Rockefeller, of course.

43:10 Rockefeller had been in charge of the subcommittee on covert operations. He knew all about all this stuff. He could be dependent on to keep people in line and that their mandate ended with the domestic abuses the press had reported. That's it. You're not allowed to look at everything.

43:36 Meanwhile, Colby testified before the CIA subcommittee of Senate appropriations on January 15th. Pressed for his response to the charges of skullduggery swirling around, Colby's opening statement reprised his report to President Ford. The committee, given the political climate, took the unprecedented step of releasing his testimony. Kissinger and others condemned Colby, essentially claiming the CIA.

44:06 Chief put out this material without White House approval, but the spy chief was simply recounting what Ford had known since Vail. Colby also undoubtedly went to Capitol Hill expecting that the statement would be tightly guarded. The secret subcommittee had never done anything like this. In the view of public opinion, Congress would not leave the field to the Rockefeller Commission. Very swiftly, it established its own investigative committees. The Senate

44:36 approved a panel on January 27th with a vote of 82 to 4, naming a select committee to study government operations with respect to intelligence activities. Frank Church would chair it. The House set up a 10-member panel in February, but this became embroiled in disputes and would be replaced months later with a slightly larger select committee on intelligence led

45:07 by New York Democrat Otis Pike. In his memoirs, A Time to Hill, Gerald Ford writes as if the year of intelligence should be blamed on journalists and congressional committees who wanted to look at everything in the files. Yeah, blame it on the journalists that exposed it, not on the people who did it. From the instant of first exposure to the family jewels, President Ford's major concerns remained leaks.

45:44 This is the one point he returns to repeatedly in his memoirs. Don't let the rest of the secrets out. In terms of reference for Rockefeller, we're carefully drawn in an effort to avoid the most sensitive areas like assassinations. But Ford and Kissinger had no such control over the congressional investigations, though the White House did develop lines to friendly members and staff.

46:14 That afforded some ability to influence committee activities or at least find out what they were up to. So even in investigations, the White House is trying to stick their fingers in them. It was a mistake to suppose the investigations were merely an annoyance and improper at that. In fact, the very existence of the CIA hung in the balance. Obviously, it would be impossible for the commission and committees to investigate without collecting data.

46:46 or for them to report without revealing details. The White House saw the inquiries as a major threat. The intelligence community at large beyond the CIA reacted in a like manner. Withholding documents and witnesses or restricting testimony by officials certain to arouse ire only encouraged leaks.

47:10 Yet that became the main tactic utilized by the White House and the CIA, arguing the need to preserve the secrecy of the agency's quote unquote sources and methods. Then stretching that category to cover every conceivable bit of information, the spooks fought a rear guard action through the corridors of Capitol Hill. Langley and the other centers of U.S. intelligence, Kissinger aligned himself with the most extreme.

47:40 keepers of the secret vaults. Director Colby, who saw more clearly the danger that the CIA might be swept away if it failed to give at least the appearance of cooperation, was vilified for his effort to ultimately and ultimately forced to resign. That plus his role in the Helms perjury case tarnished Colby's reputation for many secret warriors. Others frustrated.

48:09 that anyone would question the CIA's ability to carry out their assigned task. And Colby specifically felt he handled the grilling as best he could. The inquiries involved only certain persons at the agency, effectively compartmentalizing

48:36 Others at Langley, the inspector general actually commissioned a poll and interviewed a significant fraction of the agency employees, demonstrating that morale remained high, except at the very top, where they knew everything. The charges against the CIA became the stuff of lunchtime conversations in the agency cafeteria, but few expressed any real concerns for its future. One guy, Richard Holm,

49:07 who now headed China's operation for the recently renamed East Asian Division, recalls, quote, we did our jobs while struggling with the substance of some of the revelations, unquote. Staff working directly with the inquisitors were even more upbeat. Scott Breckenridge of the IG felt the agency was in good shape. Frank Nock, liaison to both the church and the Rockefeller entities,

49:36 told Breckenridge the job had cost him among colleagues, quote, I was proud to be among those who worked in defining the terms for improved oversight and accountability, unquote. His actual job was to make sure nothing really critical got out. Those who thought the CIA's wounds were self-inflicted objected to the inquiries. Dwayne Claridge,

50:02 For example, then chief of operations in the Near East and South Asian divisions said of Colby, quote, he betrayed his own because he didn't try, unquote. The coalescence of pro-Helms and pro-Colby factions at headquarters created a break. This was not the place for a full treatment of investigations in the year of intelligence, but it is important to understand the interplay as it affected covert operations.

50:33 Contrary to assertions that Director Colby said what he pleased and ignored the White House, Ford's staff actually kept close control. The president's political advisors looked after general attitudes while lawyer Philip Buchan followed daily developments. Controls became even tighter that fall when Ford set up a committee under John Marsh that met daily to coordinate strategy against the investigations.

51:03 Kissinger's NSC staff reviewed the release of every CIA internal history of the church committee. He reviewed everything that they were turning over to the church committee himself. Robert McFarland, then a subordinate on the NSC staff, ruled against church seeing many of the documents and expressed reservations about more, including some quite innocuous ones.

51:34 Ford and his NSC reviewed Colby's proposed testimony on covert operations, and Colby went to the White House immediately after the hearing to report on what had been said. In June, the White House adopted explicit guidelines on dealing with covert operation data and then would modify them later. In May,

51:56 Ford's advisors, faced with the church committee's schedule of formal hearings on covert operations, decided the CIA director should brief only, not testify, and only the leaders of the committee. Deep in the hole, politically, Ford proved unable to make that stick. Instead, Colby was told that he could discuss Cuba, but only the Bay of Pigs, the Congo, but only the late war period. Chile, but not.

52:26 after 1971. Korea, but only until 1952. Russian, Greek, and Indonesian involvement apparently seemed non-threatening to the White House, and unfettered discussions of those were permissible, which is very, very interesting. Other covert operations were out of bounds altogether. Director Colby, far from being off the reservation, cooperated fully.

52:56 He wanted to sanitize documents given to the Rockefeller Commission only to be overruled by the White House. He assigned Scott Breckinridge of the IG office, an original author of the 1967 report on assassination plots, to dissuade the Rockefeller staff from looking too hard at it. Breckinridge ran afoul of David Belen, but judging from the absence of the subject in the commission's report, obviously was successful.

53:27 Because those assassinations were carried out on behalf of Rockefeller investments, so he didn't really actually have anything to worry about. For the congressional committees, Colby's original arrangements created four levels of increasing secrecy regarding materials. Only basic historical data would be given freely. More sensitive data would be sanitized before shown. The investigators could get only the redacted.

53:57 At the third level, the inquisitors had a visit to the CIA headquarters where fondling files were housed in the IG office. Investigators would make notes only, copying was prohibited, and notes were reviewed by the CIA before they walked out. The most secret data could be restricted to indirect reference. It could be used only for briefings.

54:25 This included everything from president's orders and much about the covert action. When inquisitors proved adept at identifying documents sourced in CIA histories asking to see them, Colby added word-for-word review to his restrictions, meaning you're not getting them. Proposing fresh guidelines to the NSC in late June, Colby anticipated that the investigators might want in-depth briefings.

54:57 But of just those programs the CIA selected, the agency would offer only a few documents to amplify oral presentations. Again, that could be read only at Langley. Everything pertaining to the President, 40 Committee, and the like would be removed from the files, and the White House could review each case before CIA made it available. Colby hoped to satisfy the examiners.

55:28 with the National Student Association case, Laos and Indonesia. President Ford agreed at the time. A key index of Bill Colby's basic approach is that he tried and failed to keep the family jewels out of play. The measure his detractors prefer is based on a comment Vice President Rockefeller made after a session with Rocky's commission.

55:59 Rockefeller asked whether Colby ought to be telling so much as if the CIA did not have an obligation to fully inform a presidential commission and as if the commission had no legal responsibility to conduct an actual inquiry. Indeed, it had already overridden CIA's attempt to redact documents given to it.

56:25 No one who makes this criticism notes Rockefeller's role on covert action at the Presidential Intelligence Advisory Board or the political vulnerabilities hanging over the vice president as a consequence. Because again, many of the covert operations were carried out on behalf of the Rockefeller family. By way of contrast, Gerald Ford himself was responsible for the leak that put the most sensitive covert action issue on the table.

56:56 At a luncheon with newspaper editors on January 16, 1975, Ford mentioned assassination plots in describing why he had given Rockefeller a narrow assignment. Television reporter Daniel Skor quickly picked up the gossip about this and confronted Colby with a direct question at the end of February. Colby could not deny the fact, though he did deny any plots in the U.S. and refused to discuss cases.

57:26 and a public uproar occurred. With Ford forced to expand the Rockefeller Commission to cover assassination allegations and the Senate was obliged to widen their scope as well as in the church inquiry. Reflecting Ford's interest, the entirety of the text on

57:48 assassinations that eventually appeared in the Rockefeller Commission report concerned whether CIA officers or contract employees had been given the role to murder JFK. This happened in spite of personal efforts of Staff Director David Belen, who conducted this portion of the inquiry, deposed a variety of witnesses, and pulled together documents from the agency and elsewhere. Belen's preliminary report, nearly 100

58:16 TypeScript pages ended up on the cutting floor. Its discussion of CIA plots against Castro, Trujillo, Lumumba, and Diem kept from the public. President Ford had the source materials all turned over to him. Like Bill Colby with the family jewels in the political climate of 75,

58:40 Jerry Ford could not hold the line. Instead, several days after he released the Rockefeller Commission report, the president told a news conference that he would turn the assassination files over to the church committee. Confining Belen's inquiry turned into a mistake. Ford had no control over the Ford committee's treatment of this subject. The CIA went to court to force the committee to remove certain names from its report, which in most cases,

59:09 instances, Church did voluntarily. On October 31st, President Ford wrote members asking that the entire report be classified. Several weeks later, during a debate on the Senate floor, the committee released the report on its own authority. Refusals to supply data often occurred in the open to be reported in the press. One of the worst instances happened when Henry Kessinger and the Pike Committee, which went to the full

59:37 House of Representatives to secure subpoenas. The subpoenas were voted. The CIA's own lawyer concluded that the documents at issue could not be protected, but Kissinger gave up the papers only when he was about to be cited for contempt of Congress. Before the end of the House voted seven subpoenas, but Ford's administration surrendered material on only a few. Three, it rejected, including one addressed.

1:00:08 to Kissinger to supply copies of all State Department recommendations. The second also concerned covert action, while the third related to intelligence on arms control. Ford's opinion is that the Pike Commission went out of its way to stick it to Kissinger. After consulting with an attorney general, the president intervened on November 19, 1975.

1:00:35 Writing Otis Pike that the subpoenaed documents had been legitimately withheld, the committee responded by voting to cite Kissinger for contempt, a measure that went to the full House. President Ford compromised, releasing some material. Counterattack came in early January 1976 when White House aides told the Congressional Committee that if they hoped to obtain information in the future as oversight panels, staff would have to be reduced and stiff penalties adopted for leaks.

1:01:06 Penalties would include expulsion from Congress. For its part, the CIA recommended numerous deletions in the Pike report for reasons of national security. A number were accepted, but Pike's committee rejected 150 of the proposed deletions. Ford prevailed upon the full House not to release the report. Some 246 representatives voted to repress it, 124 to release it.

1:01:36 When television reporter Daniel Score asked for his reaction, Speaker of the House Tip O'Neill said, quote, this is an election year and they're getting a lot of flack about leaks and they're going to vote their American Legion post, unquote. But the Pike report did leak and major portions appeared in the New York Weekly, the Village Voice. A couple of hundred copies of the report had gone to.

1:02:03 An assortment of congressional and executive offices, no culprit ever emerged. Though it was established the initial leak was Daniel Score. Again, Gerald Ford might have done better with the original House committee. The first chairman, Representative Lucian Negzi, came from the president's hometown, home state, and would have been the leader.

1:02:29 of the subcommittee. Netsky's position on the House investigation disintegrated, in fact, when it became known that Colby had briefed the Michigan congressman on the portion of the family jewels concerning assassinations, but Netsky had told none of his colleagues. Netsky would not even be a member of the panel that finally conducted the inquiry. So that's it for today.

1:03:03 We're going to talk about the church commission tomorrow. Boy, I tell you what, it's just the depth and the repeat of name. I mean, these people keep coming up over and over and over and over again. The deniability is long gone, long in the rearview mirror, just saying. It's just the whole thing's corrupt.

1:03:38 You know, we learned early on in looking into all of these things that all of these commissions, there is a lot that comes out in the church and Pike, but it's just as they said in the book, the tip of the iceberg. They were able to finagle keeping most of it. And then again, they tried to classify the report and not let it out at all.

1:04:04 We don't have a republic. We don't have an honest government that wants our executive branch held to account from the congressional side of it. The entire government, because of the people that are in it, has failed, has failed. And this isn't something that isn't happening, you know.

1:04:34 much more recently, as we've seen with the whole Russiagate hoax and all of that other stuff. That involved all of those same people, same entities. And when today you are still seeing people from the 1970s and 80s that are caught up like that Robert Sensei guy, you know, money laundering for the CIA and the Contras. And, you know, a few months ago, he was just arrested again for money laundering.

1:05:04 It's crazy. You're not going to have a tiger change his stripes if the tiger's never held accountable. It's just never going to happen. Warhamster, I see you. Howdy. My phone's been ringing off the hook, so I only caught part of the show. But I did hear enough to point out that, say it with me, all roads lead to Rockefeller. Yep. That's all I got today. That's crazy.

1:05:43 that not only was Rockefeller, Nelson Rockefeller in on the whole covert thing from being on the presidential, but then he's put in charge of the Rockefeller commission. It's just, it's literally crazy. And most people.

1:06:16 who don't know about Operation Gladio and the fact that the Rockefeller Foundation was the original seed money and that all of these coups was about resources where the preponderance of the benefit from many of them that we've looked into belonged to the Rockefeller family. Certainly, all of the ones in Latin America definitely benefited the Rockefeller family.

1:06:45 The Iranian one in 53 benefited them because Standard Oil got 34% of the concession for picking up the phone and calling Allen Dulles and telling him to overthrow Mossadegh. So it's just literally crazy. Literally crazy. All right. Well, that's it for today. Like I said, we'll go into the church commission part of it.

1:07:18 um tomorrow and um let's see we this is a pretty long chapter um i'm not sure we'll get through we'll try to get through all of it tomorrow um and then we get to move on to um afghanistan in the 80s all right so you guys have a nice evening and i will see you tomorrow take care

Entities here

CIA50 Chile25 Gerald Ford25 William Colby25 Henry Kissinger25 Richard Helms23 Richard Nixon17 Trump administration16 Seymour Hersh13 U.S. Congress12 Nelson Rockefeller9 Rockefeller Commission9 Frank Church8 Michael Harrington8 U.S. State Department7 The New York Times7 William Fulbright7 Langley6 Otis Pike6 Vietnam War6 Pujo Committee6 International Telephone and Telegraph6 Family Jewels6 Watergate scandal6 Daniel Schorr6 Church Committee6 Lucian Nedzey5 United States House of Representatives5 1973 Chilean coup d'état5 Defense Office of Inspector General4 Scott Breckenridge4 United States Navy4 Nathaniel Davis4 Salvador Allende4 Manhattan3 United States3 James Schlesinger3 David Bell3 Laos3 National Security Council3

Claims made here

International Telephone and Telegraph financed_via CIA documented ▶ 2:55

“The journalist acquired copies of ITT memos and cablegrams, some of them cited earlier, demonstrating the multinational corporation had intervened with the Nixon White House and acted in concert with …”

Jack Anderson exposed International Telephone and Telegraph documented ▶ 2:55

William Fulbright covered_up International Telephone and Telegraph host_asserted ▶ 5:24

“potential recruits. Fulbright did nothing with the ITT documents or with the Pentagon Papers, which he had received during that same period. Again, Congress is a crime scene, but Nixon and Kissinger's…”

Frank Church exposed CIA documented ▶ 5:56

“all of the remaining tolerance. In 72, when Jack Anderson brought the CIA-ITT connection into the open, Fulbright was basically pushed into action. He sanctioned an inquiry into the role of multinatio…”

CIA targeted_for_regime_change Chile host_asserted ▶ 6:25

“One, chairman of Fulbright's subcommittee on Latin America had a particular interest. The net result was that the CIA's destabilization of Chile proceeded in the field while that very initiative came …”

Richard Nixon appointed Richard Helms documented ▶ 6:52

“After his 72 re-election, Nixon's appointment of Helms as ambassador to Iran effectively got the CIA spymaster out of the way. Nevertheless, Helms and William Breaux were obliged to testify in early 7…”

Richard Helms covered_up CIA host_asserted ▶ 7:22

“Richard Helms came under additional questioning in both public and closed hearings as the Fulbright Committee considered this nomination for ambassador. Always loyal to the chain of command, Helms, in…”

William Colby covered_up CIA host_asserted ▶ 10:51

“A dozen more CIA briefings on Chile took place between March 73 and December of the next year. Bill Colby, now DCI in his own right, sat in the hot seat on October 11, 1973 to deny the House committee…”

Michael Harrington exposed CIA documented ▶ 13:48

“Hence, it had never been closed under House rules. Harrington had no obligation to seek approval. Langley had tripped over its own cleverness. This became the first Chilean hand grenade to explode. Ha…”

Gerald Ford succeeded Richard Nixon documented ▶ 14:43

“with the Supreme Court decision that required him to give up the Oval Office audiotapes, providing incontrovertible evidence that he had conspired to cover up his 1972 election issues. The House of Re…”

Victor Marchetti founded The Craft of Intelligence documented ▶ 15:13

“By now, Langley's efforts at damage control were rapidly being overtaken by events. Shutting down the Harrington Inquiry could not have saved the secret warriors. In June, the New York publisher, Alfr…”

Alfred Knopf funded The Craft of Intelligence documented ▶ 15:13

Henry Kissinger ordered_assassination_of Salvador Allende book_quoted ▶ 15:40

“As a result of a legal action by the CIA and the Nixon White House, the book appeared with more than 160 deletions, including roughly a third of its commentary on Chile. Among the deletions alleged to…”

Seymour Hersh exposed CIA documented ▶ 16:36

“acquired the story and the paper printed it on September 11th, including Kissinger's soon notorious comment. No doubt the Secretary of State hit the ceiling. Although Hirsch represented only the leadi…”

Frank Church exposed Henry Kissinger documented ▶ 17:05

“Both published pieces on September 8th, revealing Harrington's letters. On September 12th, Hirsch wrote that Senator Frank Church intended to press the Chile issue. A week later, when Henry Kissinger …”

Larry Stern exposed Michael Harrington documented ▶ 17:05

Seymour Hersh exposed Frank Church documented ▶ 17:05

Seymour Hersh exposed CIA documented ▶ 17:35

“On September 16th, the Times front page carried a Hirsch article portraying Kissinger as the chief strategist on Chile and the economic blockade. Four days later, the paper carried a second lead, whic…”

Seymour Hersh exposed Henry Kissinger documented ▶ 17:35

William Colby covered_up Henry Kissinger documented ▶ 17:35

William Colby covered_up Seymour Hersh documented ▶ 18:05

“later warning him of Hearst's next article. On September 21st, Hearst's theme would be Kissinger in the present tense, that he had omitted CIA involvement in the Chilean labor and trade unions in brie…”

Seymour Hersh exposed Richard Nixon documented ▶ 18:26

“Three days later, Hearst reported that Nixon's administration had decided in 1971 to escalate the covert actions against Allende. To say that Hearst's reports raised eyebrows at the Ford White House w…”

Gerald Ford covered_up CIA documented ▶ 18:26

Richard Nixon ordered_assassination_of Salvador Allende host_asserted ▶ 18:26

CIA funded Salvador Allende host_asserted ▶ 18:58

“was made to help to assist in the preservation of opposition newspapers and electronic media and to preserve opposition political parties. Again, that's a bold faced lie. We already know that the quot…”

CIA funded Chile host_asserted ▶ 18:58

Gerald Ford covered_up 1973 Chilean coup d'état documented ▶ 19:28

“was bought and paid for by the CIA. Ford carefully denied involvement in the coup. He characterized covert action as necessary to help prevent foreign policy and to protect national security. Again, a…”

William Colby covered_up Michael Harrington documented ▶ 20:01

“William Colby followed with a letter to the Times two days later referring specifically to Harrington. Colby denied ever using the term destabilization, which the congressman had used. Scott Breckinri…”

Lawrence Eagleburger covered_up Henry Kissinger documented ▶ 21:05

“and the White House went into high gear to counter the Chilean revelations. Deputy Secretary Lawrence Eagleburger told Kissinger that Hersh would continue and that Henry himself was the ultimate targe…”

Nathaniel Davis covered_up Henry Kissinger documented ▶ 21:33

“to be released by the CIA. Davis would separately put one out from the State Department. Eagleburger argued in another memo to Kissinger, it was an unusual gamut of bringing out the denial through the…”

William Colby covered_up Henry Kissinger documented ▶ 22:03

“who want a series of hearings on the issue, unquote. Bill Colby volunteered to issue such a denial when talking to the Deputy National Security Advisor, Brent Scolcroft, on September 23rd. Langley ult…”

Seymour Hersh exposed Richard Helms documented ▶ 22:33

“By then, Director Colby had his hands full. For the matter of the Helms Chile testimony came to a head. One of Hearst's articles on September 17th noted that staff on Fulbright's committee were pressi…”

Seymour Hersh exposed William Breaux documented ▶ 22:33

Thomas Lawler exposed Richard Helms documented ▶ 23:56

“had been sandbagged when senators went beyond agreed upon guidelines. But Lawler did a straight review. After consulting with the general counsel's office on the legal definition of perjury, he decide…”

William Colby covered_up Richard Helms documented ▶ 25:19

“Warner added an analysis refuting that conclusion. Again, we've now got like 10 people saying that he committed perjury, but we're going to stick an addendum to their opinions. According to Colby's no…”

John Warner covered_up Richard Helms documented ▶ 25:19

William Colby covered_up Richard Helms documented ▶ 26:19

“Colby nonetheless held the line for two more months amidst threats of resignation. The last offense was a 1954 CIA justice agreement governing what could be withheld from the Justice Department. Colby…”

William Colby covered_up CIA documented ▶ 26:19

Lawrence Silberman exposed Richard Helms documented ▶ 26:19

Richard Helms covered_up Chile documented ▶ 26:50

“Helms and a faction of stalwarts never forgave Bill Colby this betrayal. He didn't have a choice. He did everything he could. But even the internal mechanisms of the CIA wasn't going to allow him to s…”

Richard Helms covered_up CIA host_asserted ▶ 26:50

Daniel Schorr exposed Henry Kissinger documented ▶ 27:22

“and a $2,000 fine. Another Chile hand grenade had exploded. In 1974, the atmosphere became superheated. Late in October, radio broadcaster Daniel Score of CBS reported that State had opposed the Chile…”

Ray Cline exposed Henry Kissinger documented ▶ 27:22

Henry Kissinger covered_up Ray Cline host_asserted ▶ 27:54

“had been in charge of the Office of Intelligence and Research, that belly button in the State Department. Contrary to what he wrote in later memoirs, at the time, Henry Kissinger ordered an immediate …”

Henry Kissinger covered_up Chile host_asserted ▶ 27:54

Peter Kornbluh exposed Henry Kissinger documented ▶ 29:26

“Kissinger in his memoirs then castigated the bureaucracy for failing to execute the orders he initially denied having given. I didn't do it, but they didn't do what I said I didn't do. Kissinger's sen…”

Henry Kissinger covered_up Peter Kornbluh host_asserted ▶ 29:53

“and based on the declassified records showing Kissinger in a very poor light. The former official now orchestrated efforts to discredit this work through negative reviews, pressuring the Council on Fo…”

CIA carried_out_attack Vietnam War host_asserted ▶ 31:21

“Called a rogue elephant, the CIA faced the fight of its life. A simple phone call triggered the fire. Seymour Hearst phoned Director Colby on December 18, 1974, to say that he had it from several sour…”

Seymour Hersh exposed CIA documented ▶ 31:21

William Colby covered_up Vietnam War host_asserted ▶ 31:50

“Colby saw Hearst and tried to explain that his data reflected distorted fragments of a different project, all within the agency's charter. Sure. He insisted that such activities had ceased under the 1…”

William Colby covered_up Seymour Hersh documented ▶ 31:50

William Colby covered_up CIA host_asserted ▶ 31:50

Seymour Hersh exposed CIA documented ▶ 32:24

“Colby felt Hearst had blown his information out of proportion. Hearst did not see it that way. His article was splashed across three columns on the front page of the Sunday New York Times on December …”

William Colby covered_up CIA host_asserted ▶ 32:24

William Colby headed CIA documented ▶ 32:52

“He remembers the events as ruining not only the Christmas season for me, but nearly all of the next year as well. Aw, too bad. Colby arrived on the seventh floor of Langley just in time to face the ex…”

CIA spied_on Chile documented ▶ 32:52

CIA spied_on Laos documented ▶ 32:52

Richard Helms headed CIA documented ▶ 33:44

“On a certain level, it is not surprising that Richard Helms had felt confident in deliberately misleading Congress on Chile. But the pressure built with each time the White House avoided reforms until…”

Richard Helms spied_on Chile documented ▶ 33:44

Harold Hughes founded Hughes-Ryan Amendment documented ▶ 35:09

“it introduced before 1974 had ever passed. Now, however, bad feelings predominated the Congress. In an amendment to the foreign aid bill that year, Democrat Senator Harold Hughes of Iowa and Democrat …”

Leo Ryan founded Hughes-Ryan Amendment documented ▶ 35:09

William Colby succeeded James Schlesinger documented ▶ 37:36

“This document gathered together allegations of illegal questionable activities observed by employees throughout the agency. It happened that Kissinger had never been briefed on the family jewels. Comp…”

CIA carried_out_attack Rafael Trujillo documented ▶ 38:04

“It noted allegations of CIA assassination efforts against foreign politicians like Castro, Diem, Dominican dictator Trujillo. Kissinger flipped quickly through the pages, but slowed when he came to th…”

CIA carried_out_attack Ngo Dinh Diem documented ▶ 38:04

CIA carried_out_attack Fidel Castro documented ▶ 38:04

Robert F. Kennedy ordered_assassination_of Fidel Castro host_asserted ▶ 40:37

“the tip of the iceberg. If they come out, blood will flow, Kissinger said. The National Security Advisor added that Richard Helms had confirmed the worst. In a veiled reference to Operation Mongoose a…”

Henry Kissinger ordered_assassination_of Fidel Castro host_asserted ▶ 40:37

Gerald Ford appointed Nelson Rockefeller documented ▶ 42:37

“Publicly, Gerald Ford declared that he would not tolerate illegal activities by the intelligence agency. He said Colby had given assurances that no such activity still existed and announced a commissi…”

Gerald Ford funded Rockefeller Commission documented ▶ 42:37

Nelson Rockefeller headed Rockefeller Commission documented ▶ 42:37

Nelson Rockefeller member_of Rockefeller Commission documented ▶ 43:10

“Rockefeller had been in charge of the subcommittee on covert operations. He knew all about all this stuff. He could be dependent on to keep people in line and that their mandate ended with the domesti…”

United States Navy funded Church Committee documented ▶ 44:36

“approved a panel on January 27th with a vote of 82 to 4, naming a select committee to study government operations with respect to intelligence activities. Frank Church would chair it. The House set up…”

Frank Church headed Church Committee documented ▶ 44:36

United States House of Representatives funded Pujo Committee documented ▶ 44:36

Otis Pike headed Pujo Committee documented ▶ 45:07

“by New York Democrat Otis Pike. In his memoirs, A Time to Hill, Gerald Ford writes as if the year of intelligence should be blamed on journalists and congressional committees who wanted to look at eve…”

Trump administration covered_up CIA host_asserted ▶ 47:10

“Yet that became the main tactic utilized by the White House and the CIA, arguing the need to preserve the secrecy of the agency's quote unquote sources and methods. Then stretching that category to co…”

Henry Kissinger covered_up CIA host_asserted ▶ 47:10

Frank Nock member_of CIA documented ▶ 49:07

“who now headed China's operation for the recently renamed East Asian Division, recalls, quote, we did our jobs while struggling with the substance of some of the revelations, unquote. Staff working di…”

Dewey Claridge member_of Near East and South Asian divisions documented ▶ 50:02

“For example, then chief of operations in the Near East and South Asian divisions said of Colby, quote, he betrayed his own because he didn't try, unquote. The coalescence of pro-Helms and pro-Colby fa…”

Philip Buchan member_of Trump administration documented ▶ 50:33

“Contrary to assertions that Director Colby said what he pleased and ignored the White House, Ford's staff actually kept close control. The president's political advisors looked after general attitudes…”

John Marshall headed Trump administration documented ▶ 50:33

Robert McFarlane member_of National Security Council documented ▶ 51:03

“Kissinger's NSC staff reviewed the release of every CIA internal history of the church committee. He reviewed everything that they were turning over to the church committee himself. Robert McFarland, …”

CIA spied_on Cuba documented ▶ 51:56

“Ford's advisors, faced with the church committee's schedule of formal hearings on covert operations, decided the CIA director should brief only, not testify, and only the leaders of the committee. Dee…”

CIA spied_on Korea documented ▶ 51:56

CIA spied_on Congo documented ▶ 51:56

CIA spied_on Soviet Union documented ▶ 52:26

“after 1971. Korea, but only until 1952. Russian, Greek, and Indonesian involvement apparently seemed non-threatening to the White House, and unfettered discussions of those were permissible, which is …”

CIA spied_on Vietnam documented ▶ 52:26

CIA spied_on Greece documented ▶ 52:26

Scott Breckenridge member_of Defense Office of Inspector General documented ▶ 52:56

“He wanted to sanitize documents given to the Rockefeller Commission only to be overruled by the White House. He assigned Scott Breckinridge of the IG office, an original author of the 1967 report on a…”

Trump administration covered_up Rockefeller Commission documented ▶ 52:56

CIA covered_up Rockefeller Commission documented ▶ 52:56

William Colby covered_up Rockefeller Commission documented ▶ 52:56

CIA financed_via Nelson Rockefeller host_asserted ▶ 53:27

“Because those assassinations were carried out on behalf of Rockefeller investments, so he didn't really actually have anything to worry about. For the congressional committees, Colby's original arrang…”

William Colby spied_on National Student Association documented ▶ 54:57

“But of just those programs the CIA selected, the agency would offer only a few documents to amplify oral presentations. Again, that could be read only at Langley. Everything pertaining to the Presiden…”

CIA spied_on National Student Association documented ▶ 54:57

Donald Rumsfeld spied_on Committee of 40 documented ▶ 54:57

Dick Cheney spied_on Committee of 40 documented ▶ 54:57

John Marshall spied_on Committee of 40 documented ▶ 54:57

Robert McFarlane spied_on Committee of 40 documented ▶ 54:57

Philip Buchan spied_on Committee of 40 documented ▶ 54:57

Scott Breckenridge spied_on Committee of 40 documented ▶ 54:57

CIA spied_on Committee of 40 documented ▶ 54:57

Frank Nock spied_on Committee of 40 documented ▶ 54:57

Richard Helms spied_on Committee of 40 documented ▶ 54:57

William Colby spied_on Committee of 40 documented ▶ 54:57

Henry Kissinger spied_on Committee of 40 documented ▶ 54:57

Gerald Ford spied_on Committee of 40 documented ▶ 54:57

William Colby covered_up Family Jewels host_asserted ▶ 55:28

“with the National Student Association case, Laos and Indonesia. President Ford agreed at the time. A key index of Bill Colby's basic approach is that he tried and failed to keep the family jewels out …”

Nelson Rockefeller member_of Presidential Intelligence Advisory Board documented ▶ 56:25

“No one who makes this criticism notes Rockefeller's role on covert action at the Presidential Intelligence Advisory Board or the political vulnerabilities hanging over the vice president as a conseque…”

Gerald Ford exposed Family Jewels host_asserted ▶ 56:25

CIA financed_via Nelson Rockefeller host_asserted ▶ 56:25

Gerald Ford covered_up Family Jewels host_asserted ▶ 56:25

Daniel Schorr exposed Family Jewels documented ▶ 56:56

“At a luncheon with newspaper editors on January 16, 1975, Ford mentioned assassination plots in describing why he had given Rockefeller a narrow assignment. Television reporter Daniel Skor quickly pic…”

David Bell headed Rockefeller Commission documented ▶ 57:48

“assassinations that eventually appeared in the Rockefeller Commission report concerned whether CIA officers or contract employees had been given the role to murder JFK. This happened in spite of perso…”

CIA carried_out_attack Patrice Lumumba documented ▶ 58:16

“TypeScript pages ended up on the cutting floor. Its discussion of CIA plots against Castro, Trujillo, Lumumba, and Diem kept from the public. President Ford had the source materials all turned over to…”

CIA covered_up Church Committee documented ▶ 58:40

“Jerry Ford could not hold the line. Instead, several days after he released the Rockefeller Commission report, the president told a news conference that he would turn the assassination files over to t…”

Gerald Ford covered_up Church Committee documented ▶ 59:09

“instances, Church did voluntarily. On October 31st, President Ford wrote members asking that the entire report be classified. Several weeks later, during a debate on the Senate floor, the committee re…”

Henry Kissinger covered_up Pujo Committee documented ▶ 59:37

“House of Representatives to secure subpoenas. The subpoenas were voted. The CIA's own lawyer concluded that the documents at issue could not be protected, but Kissinger gave up the papers only when he…”

Gerald Ford covered_up Pujo Committee documented ▶ 1:01:06

“Penalties would include expulsion from Congress. For its part, the CIA recommended numerous deletions in the Pike report for reasons of national security. A number were accepted, but Pike's committee …”

Tip O'Neill headed United States House of Representatives documented ▶ 1:01:36

“When television reporter Daniel Score asked for his reaction, Speaker of the House Tip O'Neill said, quote, this is an election year and they're getting a lot of flack about leaks and they're going to…”

Lucian Nedzey member_of United States House of Representatives documented ▶ 1:02:03

“An assortment of congressional and executive offices, no culprit ever emerged. Though it was established the initial leak was Daniel Score. Again, Gerald Ford might have done better with the original …”

Daniel Schorr exposed Pujo Committee documented ▶ 1:02:03

Lucian Nedzey covered_up Family Jewels documented ▶ 1:02:29

“of the subcommittee. Netsky's position on the House investigation disintegrated, in fact, when it became known that Colby had briefed the Michigan congressman on the portion of the family jewels conce…”

Robert Vesco laundered_money_for Contras host_asserted ▶ 1:04:34

“much more recently, as we've seen with the whole Russiagate hoax and all of that other stuff. That involved all of those same people, same entities. And when today you are still seeing people from the…”

Nelson Rockefeller headed Rockefeller Commission host_asserted ▶ 1:05:43

“that not only was Rockefeller, Nelson Rockefeller in on the whole covert thing from being on the presidential, but then he's put in charge of the Rockefeller commission. It's just, it's literally craz…”

Rockefeller Foundation funded Operation Gladio host_asserted ▶ 1:06:16

“who don't know about Operation Gladio and the fact that the Rockefeller Foundation was the original seed money and that all of these coups was about resources where the preponderance of the benefit fr…”

Rockefeller benefited_from 1953 Iranian coup d'état host_asserted ▶ 1:06:45

“The Iranian one in 53 benefited them because Standard Oil got 34% of the concession for picking up the phone and calling Allen Dulles and telling him to overthrow Mossadegh. So it's just literally cra…”

Standard Oil ordered_assassination_of Mohammad Mosaddegh host_asserted ▶ 1:06:45

Allen Dulles overthrew Mohammad Mosaddegh host_asserted ▶ 1:06:45