The Colonel's Corner Safe for Democracy Part 44 (46)

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0:00 okay wow welcome to part 44 of safe for democracy we haven't found any place safe for democracy yet but um we're gonna keep looking for at least another hundred pages or so um still looking all right where'd we leave off we left off in the middle of

0:34 the Contra fiasco in the 1980s with selling missiles to Iran through Israel. So we're going to keep going from there. I don't know where Bridget is. SR just pop in and let me know when she gets in so I can add her because we're going to go ahead and get going. Today will be a short day. It's Wednesday.

1:01 Before the CIA program began, the Contras merely played at war. Their most serious effort had been the attempted destruction of a Nicaraguan airliner in Mexico City in December of 1981. Now, there was a possibility of some real action because the CIA was going to get involved. Covert aid made all of the difference to the Contras. The transformation, visible on the ground, took the Contra bands to a new level.

1:31 In the early days of the anti-Sandinista 15th of September Legion, led by Pedro Ortez Sinetro, numbered fewer than a dozen men with shotguns and .22 caliber pistols. As a sergeant with the National Guard's Rattlesnake Battalion, Ortez took the suicide

2:02 Suicide, I guess that was his name, his nickname, suicide. Suicide liked to recount how they slipped across the border to assassinate Nicaraguan officials. But in fact, his contra acquired a reputation of only robbing the peasants. In the 18 months before July 1982, the Sandinista government recorded 45 gun battles. Most of them involved stealing.

2:33 cattle from ordinary farmers. According to the FDN Chief of Logistics Captain Armando Lopez, the first CIA weapons arrived in early 1982. This shipment consisted of 92 Belgium automatic rifles, four machine guns, and two mortars. We were all hugging. We were so excited.

3:05 The first serious strike occurred in mid-March when FDN units blew up two road bridges in northern Nicaragua. The next day, the government declared a state of emergency. By the end of the month, Managua could point to half a dozen instances of sabotage. Problems also proliferated along the Atlantic coast, which were mainly inhibited by indigenous Indians.

3:36 The minorities of this region were not well integrated into the actual country of Nicaragua, which is the case throughout all of Latin America. The FSLN figures themselves admitted grave errors, including the jailing of a number of the indigenous population. In January of 1982, Managua began resettling Indians from villages along the river to camps.

4:07 further from the Honduran border because they were being attacked. This led to a new anti-Sandinista force, MAZORA, which was an acronym from the first letters of the tribe and a later splinter group. Originally formed by the Sandinistas, MAZORA turned around after Manisco Stedman Fagoth Muller.

4:40 who fled to Honduras after revelations of his past service with Somoza, began to recruit his own band of rebels. Claridge and Spott had already been to Honduras to clear the way for the CIA base and the local government's cooperation. Claridge had promised an in-country unit by mid-January of 82, and he delivered.

5:10 The chief of station in Honduras capital would observe the CIA operators, but the Nicaraguan ops group was in charge. Still, the chief spent a great deal of time with the Contras in the Honduran capital. It was an all hands on deck moment. Station chief Don Winters, another veteran of the Chilean coup,

5:41 that killed Salvador Allende, ran interference with Ambassador John Negroponte. The capital was called Tegu in late 1981. Negroponte, a former aide to Henry Kissinger, conducted the diplomacy, but he also keyed Washington to Honduras' attitudes toward the Contras on ploys that might work on talking points to use with the Hondurans.

6:10 on military aid. In other words, he was working with the entire group. His cable traffic, which has been declassified, shows he tried to counter unrest in Honduras and stimulate Honduran military cooperation with the CIA and El Salvador, which is where they're growing the death squads.

6:37 including several times when he coordinated U.S. helicopters to ferry Honduran troops to blocking positions along the border of El Salvador and Nicaragua, and in response to a hijacking incident. In contrast, the ambassador seemed reluctant to intervene in human rights situations where they were murdering people, including where

7:08 One where an American cleric just disappeared. They weren't interested. Negroponte had a back channel for communications through the CIA, codenamed Red Baron. The embassy had about 150 people assigned. There was 176 military people, U.S. military people, helping the Honduran armed forces.

7:38 50 U.S. Air Force specialists staffed a radar station to watch Nicaragua from a site known as Carrot Top in the mountains. The CIA station, not large, and one of the bases used together had probably only a dozen CIA actual officers.

8:02 In its early stage, the entire Nicaraguan program is reported to have been staffed by fewer than 100 collective CIA people. That's not counting their contract people. Later, the personnel in Honduras alone would be reported at just that level. The agency also had significant representation in El Salvador, including officers who were part of the contra program. For example, liaison in El Salvador,

8:32 arranged the use of Salvadoran Air Force facilities to launch contra-attacks on the Nicaraguan communication center. That would be the Ipala Pango place where Felix Rodriguez was. The Aquacate base started as nothing more than a dirt airstrip. It was 4,300 feet long with a shed to the side of it because it had been used for drug trafficking.

9:02 When agency officers looked at the strip, they knew something needed to be done to improve it. The CIA rented the base from the Honduran Air Force, installed facilities, built a road to connect to the main contra camp at Las Vegas, and improved that as well. Ray Doty, D-O-T-Y, became the first chief of...

9:31 base at Aquacate. Langley's local presence with the Contras at that base. Like Claridge, neither Doty nor his chief engineer spoke Spanish. They had cut their teeth in Laos. In fact, Laos veterans permeated the paramilitary staff and provided the bulk of CIA leadership with the Contras. All three of the Aquacate base chiefs and two of the four Honduras

10:02 Station chiefs had all been in Laos running drugs, along the many, many subordinates had also done time in Laos. That Claridge found no difficulty mobilizing the requisite agency skills shows that Turner's cutbacks in the late 1970s had not crippled the CIA's capability because they just hired them all back.

10:29 On the other hand, the predominance of the Southeast Asia over Latin America experience would hinder the operation. Meanwhile, in Washington, the Sandinistas seem especially vulnerable to internal dissension, economic weakness, and the presence of contragroups across both northern and southern boundaries. American officials tried to deny international loans to Nicaragua.

10:59 and limit the impact of the Contradora group of Latin countries that sought to mediate because they weren't interested in negotiations. The U.S. air, naval, and ground units began extensive exercises in Honduras and off the waters of Nicaragua. Special forces participated, as did engineer units, which, by the way, while they were there,

11:28 just happened to be working on the CIA facilities under the pretense that they're conducting South Com training exercises. Great cover. Military aircraft flew Contra supplies to all of the locations. Headaches for Managua followed divisions among the Sandinistas themselves. Some, even Sandinista leaders, eventually joined the opposition.

12:00 One, Alfonso Robelo, another, E. Pastor Gomez, a C.I.A. commander. Claridge enlisted him in Acapulco in February of 1982. Pastora demanded a weapons drop in Costa Rica as a token of the C.I.A.'s sincerity. He's the guy that they eventually kill. Claridge returned to Washington going straight to Dulles Airport.

12:40 To Langley, to brief Casey, the deputy director, Admiral Bobby Inman, walked in on the conversation. He thought a weapons drop to rebel troops in a friendly country was a crazy idea. But Casey approved it. The drop took place within a month. Pastora and Robelo moved to Costa Rica. In April, Pastora announced forming his own opposition group, ARDE. Immediately afterwards,

13:07 Claridge brought Pastora to Washington for a secret session with Bill Casey. The former comandante, spirited into the DCI's office by the private elevator that connects to the underground parking facility, gave the CIA chieftain his own dog tags. Altoro Cruz Jr. also soon aligned himself with Pastora forces.

13:35 But as the paramilitary effort built steam, the U.S. lost its Argentine allies. This followed the 1982 Falkland War between Argentina and Britain, in which Reagan took British side. That May, Argentina withdrew from the Central American deals that they had with the U.S., including Battalion 601 with the Contras.

14:03 Argentina's involvement was documented towards the end of 1982 when Hector Francis, a Battalion 601 officer in Costa Rica, gave testimony on his country's activity. In October, Claridge visited Buenos Aires one more time with Jerry Gruner, his new task force chief, Don Winters, the Tegu chief, and Honduran commander General Gustavo Alvarez.

14:31 Argentina's departure didn't stop the CIA. They found the activities of the Battalion 601 leaders obstructive. Casey made a trip around that time to Japan, and about a year later, reports began of a mysterious Japanese presence among the rebels. I'm going to bet they weren't just Japanese.

15:02 Repeated allegations of Israel's assistance also surfaced. The Israels openly sold arms to Honduras. This is documented repeatedly. They had advisors in all of these countries to assist the CIA in all of these operations, to include Colombia. Hector Francis' revelations about the Argentine role stripped away much of the plausible deniability that remained.

15:30 In common with most large covert operations, Nicaragua was blown. As early as March 82, major U.S. newspapers were reporting on the operation and Reagan's ordering it. Washington was shaken in early November when Newsweek magazine published a cover story on the Nicaraguan operation, replete with details about the Contra camps.

15:57 mention of the CIA and speculation on the role John Negroponte was playing in it. This flap tied up both state and CIA wires with cable traffic and featured State Department denials, while Negroponte and his friends wrote letters to the editor and publishers of Newsweek protesting the way that he was treated, not challenging the truth of it. They're just being mean.

16:27 The ambassador met with Honduran president in November 4th to coordinate how each side would comment on the revelations. Even at the early date, the Honduran cautioned Negroponte and the Contras would never amount to much. Before the end of the year, New York Times reported Nicaraguan as Langley's biggest covert action in a decade. Journalists started flocking to Central America.

16:56 putting the Contras under scrutiny. At this stage, the CIA pressed for a broadened anti-Sandinista coalition. Even Claridge acknowledged that the prevalence of the Somocitas among the FDN senior leadership amounted to a negative because they were fat and lazy. Langley's original marching orders specified the use of Nicaraguans who were both anti-

17:24 Cuban and anti-Samosa. As a former National Guardsman, Colonel Bermudez failed the test in Miami in November 1982 because the entire National Guard that they're using worked for Samosa. In Miami in November of 1982, CIA officers contacted a number of Nicaraguan exiles to discuss revamping the leadership.

17:53 Exile leader Edgar Chamorro met with the chief gruner and his head of political operations, Joseph Fernandez, to plan a sort of Congress of perhaps about 20 Nicaraguans, in which Bermudez would merely be one voice. In early December, a new FDN leadership board of eight civilians and five military men was unveiled.

18:21 at a Miami press conference. Chamorro became FDN's public relations director, but all the exiles were primed first by CIA officers in a hotel room. In other words, they independently talked to them all and then pretended like it was a unilateral thing. The New York Times quoted Chamorro as saying, we want to give democracy a chance in Nicaragua. Right.

18:54 The FDN board selected a recent exile, Adolfo Calero, as its chairman. Calero was soon known to be the public face of the Contras. Dewey Claridge met the board a month later going to Miami with Gruner and Fernandez in tow. The FDN publicized a 12-point peace initiative that was actually written by the CIA, Joe Fernandez.

19:21 With or without other countries, Reagan plowed resources into the Nicaraguan project. The initial CIA stake had grown to 21 million in 1983. That's not counting what we spent before. That would grow in 1984 to 24 million. And before Congress blocked funding, at least 80 million.

19:51 appropriated dollars. That's not counting how much covert money was spent. Director Casey made his first visit to the front in June 1982. Soon after that began the military exercises in which hundreds of American troops and engineers for construction passed through Honduras. Green Berets reportedly numbered at least 114 by the summer of 1983. Delta Force operator Eric Haney

20:21 A Desert One veteran recalls Honduras as having been like a second home for his unit in the 1980s. Costs were paid from Pentagon accounts without charging the CIA. Although there's few difficulties with resources, allies, and base areas, and though Managua was vulnerable, the Contras achieved nothing in 1982. They succeeded only in building up their force.

20:52 The FDN claimed 7,000 troops in Honduras in early 1983. Others credited it at around 5,000. There were also a couple of thousand indigenous people in Honduras, while Eden Pastora had another 700 soldiers in Costa Rica. Internal reports show the figures much lower.

21:18 The indigenous people and Pastora's fighters actually counted in the statistics given out by the FDN strength. So they were just double counting people. The FDN put its troops into task force that spent their time in camp or on forays into Nicaragua. The basic contra plan to seize and hold territory inside Nicaragua, then declare a provisional government never materialized.

21:47 This is basically what they're trying to do is like what they did in Katanga and Indonesia and several other places, but it didn't work in Nicaragua. Meanwhile, the Honduran ally began to waver. John Negroponte repeatedly warned of this possibility, which he feared would convince Managua that the Sandinista revolution had become irreversible. In April of 83,

22:18 Negroponte advocated pushing Eden Pastora hard to activate a southern front, raising the visibility of U.S. contacts with Calero, and doing more to gain the confidence of the intelligence committees in Congress, encouraging members to go to Central America. When the FDN once tried to get all of its troops into the field,

22:44 Negroponte suggested that the State Department Intelligence Unit should draft a report specifically to be leaked, one that would say the Contra troops were in Nicaragua, not Honduras. In May, using a CIA back channel, he warned that peace talks under the Contradora initiative had adverse implications for their special project. Again,

23:13 We don't want to negotiate. We don't want peace. We don't want democracy. We want a covert war. Negroponte's idea of U.S. goals for talks agreed with those who favored Managua's surrender. Internal squabbling and shifting regional support were the true obstacles to progress. Pastora refused any National Guard volunteer.

23:44 because he knew they were all disciples of Somoza. And if anything, Pastora didn't like what was going on in Nicaragua by the Sandinista government, which is why he left. Not that he disagreed with their overall aims of kicking out Somoza, but he absolutely wanted nothing to do with the National Guard. He also refused to do much of anything else. Well,

24:13 He refused to do anything with drug money. The author may or may not know that. The CIA cooked up a propaganda coup, producing a video of Pastora speaking, which would be broadcast from a transmitter smuggled to a site near Managua. Then the transmitter would drown out and replace Sandinista TV. The task force executive assistant, Linda Flohr, directed the filming and sewed the ARDE flag.

24:42 on her own time at home. She could not even get Pastora to take off his fancy rings or Rolex watch for the taping. The FDN had its own problems and struggles between factions favoring Nicaraguan civilians and those preferring Somocita's leadership. There were delicate relations between the FDN and the indigenous groups.

25:11 shortchanged on supplies in favor of the Contras. In addition to Honduran government, feared both the FDN troops on his territory and Nicaraguan incursions to get to their base camps. Among the troops, Colonel Bermudez demanded fidelity, physical intimidation when he thought they weren't loyal enough. By the end of 82, though he spent little time in the camps, Bermudez

25:42 had become the unquestioned commander. Any remaining doubt concerning whether he would act independently was gone. In Honduras, the CIA-minted FDN board did not have the presence to exert any control. They made just one visit to the camp as a group. It was just basically for propaganda. It would be the CIA, not FDN, that told Edgar Chamorro to move to Tegu

26:12 and set up shop there. More often, individuals went, but then they seemed scattered, with Bermudez the reigning chief. On one occasion, several Contra intelligence officers actually told FDN commissioners that Bermudez and his chief intel, Ricardo Chino Lau, the colonel's best friend, were plotting to kill them. Yeah.

26:42 the commissioners that was also on the CIA's payroll. The FDN directors could do nothing to investigate the charges, which Bermudez just dismissed. Allegations of human rights abuses inside Nicaragua actually reflected widespread injury as Bermudez stepped up the scale of FDN operations. Nicaragua suffered.

27:06 12 disappearing in 1981, 11 in 82, and then 22 by February of 83 alone. In other words, they're just kidnapping people, the Contras are. Virtually all took place adjacent to the Honduran camps. Some say it was common to kill captured Sandinista soldiers. There were reports of looting and rape.

27:34 and action against coffee pickers, teachers, and officials, and anyone in a vehicle. Some trace these practices to Argentine advice, holding up the Operation Condor model that was waged in Argentina, also with the help of the CIA. Others saw contra-terrorism resulting from the predominance of the National Guardsmen, who were

28:03 used to doing this to their own citizens. So they were just continuing what they had done under Somoza. In a ploy to counter the negative human rights reports, John Negroponte decided to bring together the Contra leaders with American politicians. When a delegation from Representative Edward Boland's House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence visited in May of 1983,

28:32 Negroponte set up a meeting between the committee and Aldolfo Calero. But when television journalist Peter Collins of ABC News followed the congressional people around town, any possibility of meeting clandestinely disappeared. Ambassador Negroponte then invited the delegation and Calero to a dinner at the embassy. Furious when he learned of the event.

29:01 U.S. Ambassador Anthony Quanton in Managua cabled Negroponte on a CIA channel saying, I have my doubts about a dinner at the embassy residence for a man who is in the business of overthrowing a neighboring government. Negroponte defended the circumstances and explained his choice as best of several unpleasant alternatives.

29:30 The exchange confirms that whatever the CIA and the administration was telling Congress about the objectives of the secret war were very limited. Privately, no one misunderstood what was going on. Given the origins of the anti-Sandinista opposition, the Contras remained sensitive to accusations of association with the National Guard, which is hilarious because they were part and parcel of the entire operation.

30:01 Constantly striving to deny that, the rebels argued the only a small portion of the troops had been in the Somoza government. The FDN troops numbered about 2,000 in 1983, but they publicly claimed 7,000. Perhaps they had grown to 6,000 by 1984,

30:34 By then, they were claiming they had 15,000. In the spring of 87, Contra leaders claimed a strength of 16,000. Somoza's guard at its peak had 8,000. So who knows what the real numbers are? Reports were that several thousand soldiers remained in Nicaraguan prisons because the new Sandinista government had rounded up a bunch of them for torture and killing.

31:04 peasants in Nicaragua during the Somoza regime. These overall figures also obscure the leadership role of the Guard. Bermudez is the obvious example, but only the tip of the iceberg. When reporter Christopher Dickey visited FDN camps in the spring of 83, four of the five commanders were National Guard of the Rattlesnake Battalion. Column Commander Suicide, also a Rattlesnake veteran,

31:35 rose to command 2,000 FDN troops while boasting to journalists about having murdered people during the Somoza government. Ricardo Lau, the chief spy, had been notorious for cruelty under Somoza while working in the National Guard. Lau became an obstacle to Contra unity when Ed Eden Pastora cited him as an example.

32:05 of the worst kind of Somoza influence, refusing to join any united front in which he participated. Months after the FDN announced Lau's resignation, records propagandist Edgar Samaro noted, Lau was still the last person to talk to Bermudez at night and the first person to talk to him in the morning. In other words, he resigned, but he didn't.

32:36 authorities forced Lau to leave the country in late 1984. National Guard connections remained the Achilles heel of the Contras. Of all of the FDN directorate, Edgar Chamorro was in the best position to know the conditions in the field. Many directors spent time raising money for the cause, especially Aldolfo Calero. He spent

33:04 Hours every day in Europe, the U.S., and Puerto Rico generating funds. You know, talking to the drug dealers like we studied in Gary Webb's book. Calero took the CIA and the exiles as his constituency. Some directors stayed in Miami. Chamorro set up Tegu Galpa as the public voice of the FDN.

33:36 There he wrote the releases and organized the visits of journalists to the FDN camps. Soon his office alone was spending $2,000 a month to improve the Contra's image. One of Chamorro's projects began the drafting of a manual called the Blue and White Book, which discussed the meaning of social justice and democracy. He distributed this to the FDN soldiers.

34:04 Perhaps the political education can help counteract the brutality of the military leadership and the abuse that they were experiencing. Imagine somebody that beats the hell out of these people if they don't do what they're told, handing out a book called Democracy as they're trying to overthrow a government. Whoa. But the extortion the troops received from FDN

34:38 and the weekly newsletter, which Shamaro also ran, limited any meaningful material that was included in the manual because it was straight up hypocrisy propaganda. Meanwhile, the FDN, trying to clean up its act, was trying, according to the author, to instill a certain amount of discipline. It didn't work. In the summer of 83, a journalist

35:08 asked Chamorro about the FDN's assassinations. Knowing the troops often mulled over murders and other atrocities, the propaganda chief admitted that there had been some excesses. Human rights criticisms resulted. Contras grumbled about Chamorro's admission, but the propaganda chief felt that the FDN gained credibility by being forthright. The CIA took action after a Casey visit, initiating another manual for the Contras.

35:39 An agency contract officer, John Kirkpatrick, wrote it. Kirkpatrick worked with Shimaro in Taegu several hours a day for weeks. A former Green Beret and veteran of Korea and Vietnam, Kirkpatrick drank too much and denounced FDN leaders while praising the troops. Shimaro thought him a character out of a novel. The CIA manual called psychological operations in guerrilla warfare.

36:09 would lead to another major flap. Kirkpatrick relied on Vietnam experience and postulated approaches to insurgency. Psychological operations reprinted verbatim portions of several lessons that were instructed at Fort Bragg to Green Berets. The manual did not shy from advocating deliberate terrorism. One passage spoke of hiring professional criminals.

36:38 Another discussed of creating martyrs for the cause, if necessary, by arranging deaths of their own contra leaders. False flags. Other sections dealt with selective violence, as in assassinating Sandinista's officials in order to cow villagers. Later investigations disclosed that Ray Doty

37:07 Joe Fernandez and about a dozen other DO officers all approved the manual. No one objected. They supposedly, when they were asked, deleted some shit. But not the assassinations? Not the martyr piece? What the hell was in it if that's what was left? God only knows. Chamorro's doubts about Kirkpatrick were confirmed when in November of 1983,

37:39 2,000 printed copies of psychological operations arrived in his office. The FDN propagandists caught the reference to hiring criminals and to killing their own leadership. Upset, he locked up the manuals and hired two boys to razor cut the offending pages. A year later, the manual leaked. Psychological operations in guerrilla warfare with its text.

38:06 on neutralization implying assassination stunned Americans. Congressman Edwin Boland denounced it in a storm of criticism disrupted during Reagan's re-election campaign. Reagan felt obliged to order immediate investigation by the Presidential Intelligence Advisory Board and the CIA IG. Additional investigations followed by the House Intelligence Committee.

38:33 The Intelligence Oversight Board pretended to do an investigation. Again, Casey's methods were called into question. Casey escaped the heat by reprimanding a half dozen officers, including Chief of Base Doty and Political Action Chief Joe Fernandez. The reprimands meant nothing. Doty was promoted to head of the CIA's International Activities Division.

39:03 Again, no one held accountable. In the field, the Contra War continued. From Honduran base camp, the FDN mounted forays into Nicaragua with patrols of 80 troops and columns of a couple of hundred. Suicide became a top commander controlling five columns.

39:29 Possibly at the height of activity came in 1983 when the Contras sent in columns of 600 to 800. The indigenous were also active. The ARDE received new CIA aid, communication gear, supplies, and 500 AK-47 assault rifles. Eden Pastora and Alfonso Robelo raised nearly 2,000 ARDE troops before the end of the year.

39:59 while the indigenous rebel group peaked at around 3,000. Colonel Bermudez spent much of his time at the base, Tegu, where the FDN had radio stations and a hospital. He planned a big push for the summer and fall. Operation Marathon. At Langley, Dewey Claridge thought just two C-47s sufficient to resupply the FDN columns. Partisan warfare on the cheap.

40:30 Already clouds were gathering as the American public, never comfortable with the Contra operation and distinctly disturbed by the allegations of abuse and Congress suspicion of the administrative motives, were beginning to gather speed. At his briefing of the Senate Intelligence Committee on the late 1981 finding, Director Casey faced questions from Senator Daniel.

40:58 Patrick Moynihan from New York. A year later, the leak of an estimate predicting on how long Managua could hold out brought anger to the administration that they were aiming to overthrow the Sandinistas. Congress went so far as to pass a prohibition sponsored by Edward Bolin of Massachusetts, part of the 1983 military budget against any funds to overthrow the government in Nicaragua.

41:28 This became known as the Boland Amendment, the first one. Supposedly, the CIA recognized this with a cable instructing officers to avoid any of a series of activities that could be prohibited. Casey went to the National Security Advisor, William Clark, to say that he did not think an opinion from the Attorney General necessary, but that the CIA would agree.

41:55 not to initiate operations unless ordered to do so. The result would be a fancy footwork to evade the Boland Amendment, not to observe it. At the beginning of 83, Democrat Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont, a member of the Intelligence Committee, decided to explore the facts on the ground, taking staff director Robert Simmons and a couple others, escorted by both the CIA and military.

42:25 At the Tegu safe house from which he ran the war, Ray Doty told the party that his project focused solely on the interdiction of arms traffic, but the wall map displayed Contra maneuvers far into Nicaragua, nowhere near El Salvador, which supposedly was where that activity happened. Doty denied any aim at Managua.

42:55 Leahy heard at the embassy that the U.S. intended only negotiations. Then Honduran General Gustavo Alvarez told the senator the troops would be in Managua by Christmas. So the CIA is telling the senator that they were only there to have negotiations when on every occasion over the last two years, the negotiations were poo-pooed.

43:24 by the ambassador in the CIA every single time. Leahy went on to Panama, where Dewey Claridge, making a circuit of stations, had just visited. Leahy told the chief, former CATF boss Jerry Spott, that he wanted a briefing on the Nicaraguan program. Spott replied that Claridge had ordered him not to answer any questions, then refused to handle any message.

43:54 to Casey from Leahy or Simmons. Wouldn't send it. Just before the delegation had left Washington, John McMahon had pledged full CIA cooperation. And here they were, refusing to even communicate with the CIA director. Furious, Leahy threatened to call Casey on a non-secure phone. Spott finally relented, and a cable went out that night.

44:21 By 6 a.m. the next morning, Claridge stood at Leahy's hotel door. Claridge fed the senator a line on why he had denied the brief. It all hinged on Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega, but obviously this had nothing to do with arms interdiction. Claridge's memoirs are silent about any of this. The map Colonel Doty had exhibited

44:52 at the base, presupposed penetrations from the north and south to cut Nicaragua in half. But if the Contras were doing anything out of Honduras, Pastora in Costa Rica remained totally passive. The agency pushed for action. Pastora repeatedly demanded supplies. The ARDE leader complained about what he received.

45:20 In an odd throwback to the Bay of Pigs, the CIA dropped Pastora rice mix and beans instead of separately. That infuriated him, but he felt positively humiliated when the CIA drops of clothing. Pastora threatened to abandon the war. In other words, they weren't giving him guns. Claridge had to smooth ruffled feathers. He came to San Jose, Costa Rica, and found that Pastora had left for...

45:51 the bush. Claridge pursued up the San Juan River, but when Pastora found out, he moved further up country. Claridge finally caught up with the ARDE leader, who complained the uniforms were too big and the supplies he really needed were not there. Claridge shot back that they had been standard size. Pastora associate, Atora Cruz Jr., recounts what happened next.

46:21 Pastora glared at Claridge at best he could from his lesser height, a full foot shorter than Claridge. And then the guerrilla commander abruptly pulled off his American made pants to reveal his American made undershorts. Huge shorts tailored for an American body. Shorts so large that they billowed down to Pastora's knees.

46:50 Pastora stood in front of his men, underwear flapping to his knees. Claridge tried to mollify the ARDE commander playing Santa Claus, distributing watches and radios. Pastora agreed to resume the fight, but ARDE continued to do little. Claridge writes of Pastora's charges that he received inferior equipment, saying that is not true.

47:16 but it remained a constant refrain throughout his association with him. These operations made, and again, to Claridge's point, these were all basically mass bought. Pastora has actual fighting men. They're not fat. They're very trim. These uniforms were being bought for the fat National Guard, and they were fat.

47:49 The operations were made possible by aircraft the CIA procured through private companies. A McLean, Virginia firm called Invest Air Leasing was a fake company with an address of Dulles Airport. They bought five planes. Three were military O2As, version of Cessna-like planes. Suddenly declared surplus.

48:19 in December of 1983 and sent to Elephant Herd, a JCS multi-service tasking created specifically to provide weapons to the Contra at minimal cost. Two identical planes, like the O-2As, taken from the New York Air National Guard, were simultaneously sold to El Salvador.

48:45 In February of 84, the planes were armed with rocket pods by Summit Aviation, another CIA proprietary, in Delaware. Although there were claims that the elephant herd provided all manner of items to the Contra, in fact, the only aircraft, a high-capacity autocannon, and some night vision sights and scopes moved through that channel in terms of volume.

49:16 Israeli aid was far greater in what would be called Operation Tripped Kettle. In 1983, Tel Aviv furnished $10 million worth of equipment captured in Lebanon from the PLO the previous year, supposedly. The La Jolla, California company called Armerico had been linked with two light planes that crashed inside of Nicaragua.

49:48 one while raiding Managua in September of 83, and another O2A shot down, attacking Santa Clara a year later. AmeriCo is known to have bought Cessnas direct from the manufacturer. Established by a former Army major, AmeriCo had an East Coast branch called Shenandoah Air Leasing,

50:16 admitted that it may well do classified missions in Central America. All CIA proprietaries. The FDN also received two old C-47 transports and at least one went to ARDE. Edgar Chamorro was

50:38 derisive about these planes, telling a fellow FDN director to make sure to visit the National Air and Space Museum in Washington, where he would see the same old planes hanging from the ceiling. It was true that the C-47 had been flying for many years, but in 1980, they were still 1,200 of these planes in service, mostly by the CIA.

51:06 Still, Chamorro's fears proved justified in March of 84 when the ARDC C-47 crashed in northern Costa Rica. An unidentified Caucasian died in the crash that everyone suspected was CIA. There were confirmed CIA casualties in October of 84 when a twin-engine Cessna crashed outside a Salvadoran military airfield at Ilopango.

51:36 An agency officer and three CIA contract agents were killed. Crammed with equipment, the plane had been on a night flight to intercept Sandinista communications. Other flights were made by Army aviation detachments, and the code name Royal Duke was associated with the similar Air Force flights from Honduran airfields. An intimate relationship existed.

52:02 between the air ops, particularly the U.S. military assistance in Honduras. When General Paul Gorman took over SOUTHCOM and made his first trip to Tegu in June of 83, Honduran Commander Alvarez asked for help in improving eight airfields sufficiently to handle C-130 type aircraft. The fields were at San Lorenzo,

52:32 Jamestron, Aquagate, Marcala, and a whole bunch of other names I can't pronounce. The American forces on maneuvers in Honduras did the work. Nothing like building air bases for CIA to traffic weapons and drugs. The Hondurans wanted the airfields to respond to possible Nicaraguan incursions. Sure they did. Five of the eight fields figured in the CIA campaign.

53:04 not the least of which was the main base, Aquacate. The Contra Air campaign did not amount to much harassment rather than real interdiction, because they're really just flying drugs and weapons. Managua was raided a few times, once with key political effects in the U.S. Congress. Little significant damage occurred, but at least two FDN planes were lost.

53:31 Eden Pastora sponsored an air raid on Managua on September 8, 1983. Two planes bombed the airport, one flying so low it disintegrated in the blast of its own bombs. Two ARDE airmen were killed. Two U.S. senators, whom Bill Casey had encouraged to see Nicaragua for themselves, almost

54:00 fell in the bombing. Democrat Gary Hart from Colorado and Republican William Cohen from Maine, their plane late were in the air en route to Managua as the attack happened. Had the airliner been on time, they would have been at the Managua airport. The control tower and reception area where the senators had scheduled a press conference.

54:31 were damaged and dozens of people killed. Makes you wonder. Cohen discovered during his visit that the Sandinistas had greatly reinforced the anti-aircraft defenses at the airport just before the attack. The next day, a T-28 aircraft ineffectively bombed an oil storage tank at a major port. About a dozen T-28 planes were in the Honduran Air Force.

55:05 October 3rd, the FDN supply flight was shot down by Sandinistas over northern Nicaragua. One man among the crew died, but two were taken prisoner. Both had been National Guardsmen under Somoza. Nicaraguan operations were indirectly responsible for other American deaths in Honduras. An Army warrant officer, Jeffrey Swab, died January 11th, 1984.

55:35 when the helicopter he piloted toward Aquacate went off course into Nicaragua and was shot down by Sandinista soldiers. The following month, maneuvers led to the death of four Americans, with six others injured, including Green Berets. Two Navy SEALs perished in a maneuver accident on December 1984. Six Americans and eight foreign journalists should be added to the deaths. Casualties inside Nicaragua in 1984.

56:04 totaled more than 12,000 when the Contra losses are not known because no one knows who they really were. All of those people died because the CIA, Reagan, and Casey decided to overthrow the government of Nicaragua and for no other reason. It literally had nothing to do with national security, but they died. So we're going to stop there.

56:39 Their murderous intent is just insane. You know, they really are bloodthirsty monsters. Just saying. Well, and what's interesting, and I don't remember if this guy talks about it because I read this book a while back. He's not talking anything about the drugs and the weapons trafficking.

57:10 cocaine being flown back into um i didn't catch it did they did he even mention about them throwing them out of the planes well that was in argentina so they're not really yeah they're not really covering that part although you know they were using argentina the same same guys that are throwing people out of planes um they were using those same people originally to train

57:41 these contra forces right so i was yeah yeah i'm missing mixing up my tom fuckery it's so easy to do um luckily i've been over these so many times at this point um i tend to keep most of them straight just don't remember all of the names um sr go ahead thank you colonel and thank everyone for attending here on spaces and on rumble

58:11 You did mention Doty, and that's the one thing that really I think is key here, Doty and his psychological operations manual. He was part and partial to that. He helped do all of the stuff that was in it. So when you look at what's going on in some of the recorded instances of what they did.

58:39 doty is the one to point a finger at thank you colonel yeah sure yeah um i've actually um read the um psychological operations and guerrilla warfare manual um a few years ago um it's it's hideous but you see the similarities um to basically what has gone on in the united states over the course of um all of these decades

59:09 on the psychological operation piece of this. But yeah, I mean, because there's been assassinations here. There's been all of the things that it outlined in there, hiring criminals. The FBI does it all the time. The DEA does it all the time. Those are the exact operations that are being done here. They just have a real fancy name for it called informants. They're fucking criminals and they hire them.

59:38 And they're perfectly fine with sacrificing one of their own in a false flag in order to engender sympathy. We probably should do a show on that manual, actually, just to illustrate how applicable it is to the operations that are done here. So anyway, I don't see any other hands.

1:00:07 If that's the material for today, I was just looking through here. We'll probably get done with this chapter tomorrow. And so I did my show this morning with the folks over in Thailand. It was awesome.

1:00:30 Very well-informed group. Great questions at the end. You can kind of see that dazed look in having, because I basically just kind of laid out the Gladio 101 that you guys have heard a million times. And it was a great group. I will definitely be having another meeting with them.

1:00:55 But I told him, I said, I highly encourage you. One guy had already bought Paul Williams' book who's been listening to us for a while. And I gave him, you know, Danielle Ganser's book. I told him, you guys are welcome to fast check me on anything that I said. And I'll happily entertain any doubting Thomases once you guys have a chance to digest this information.

1:01:25 But anyway, it was a great group of people. The guy that hosted it owns a resort in Thailand. They're all basically an expat community from many different places around the world that have basically retired there. But very interesting group. Okay, that's it. I will be on Apple Warriors show tonight at nine o'clock.

1:01:54 So make sure that you tune in. Do you have a link for that? A link for what? It's not out yet. The thing this morning? Yes. They said they would send it to me. A couple of them follow me on X and they'll send it to me. So I will post it as soon as I get it. Okay. With that, we're going to call it a day. You guys take care.

1:02:26 And I will see you tomorrow.

Entities here

CIA50 Honduras25 Fuerza Democrática Nacional25 Nicaragua25 Contras25 United States25 Eden Pastora19 Sandinistas18 Dewey Claridge17 William Casey13 National Guard (Nicaragua)12 Edward Chamorro11 John Negroponte11 Enrique Bermudez10 Anastasio Somoza10 Alianza Revolucionaria Democrática9 Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare9 Ray Doty8 Patrick Leahy6 Aguacate6 Managua6 Adolfo Calero5 Ronald Reagan5 Argentina5 Miami5 Pedro Ortiz Sanint5 Joseph Fernandez4 Tegucigalpa4 Ricardo Lau4 Taegu4 El Salvador4 U.S. Congress4 Israel3 Gustavo Álvarez3 Jerry Gruner3 House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence3 Costa Rica3 Battalion 3163 Jean Kirkpatrick3 Alfonso Robelo3

Claims made here

CIA funded Contras documented ▶ 1:01

“Before the CIA program began, the Contras merely played at war. Their most serious effort had been the attempted destruction of a Nicaraguan airliner in Mexico City in December of 1981. Now, there was…”

Pedro Ortiz Sanint member_of Rattlesnake Battalion documented ▶ 1:31

“In the early days of the anti-Sandinista 15th of September Legion, led by Pedro Ortez Sinetro, numbered fewer than a dozen men with shotguns and .22 caliber pistols. As a sergeant with the National Gu…”

Pedro Ortiz Sanint headed Legion of September 15 documented ▶ 1:31

CIA supplied_arms_to Contras documented ▶ 2:33

“cattle from ordinary farmers. According to the FDN Chief of Logistics Captain Armando Lopez, the first CIA weapons arrived in early 1982. This shipment consisted of 92 Belgium automatic rifles, four m…”

Contras carried_out_attack Nicaragua documented ▶ 3:05

“The first serious strike occurred in mid-March when FDN units blew up two road bridges in northern Nicaragua. The next day, the government declared a state of emergency. By the end of the month, Manag…”

Sandinistas founded Miskito Anti-Sandinista Resistance Front documented ▶ 4:07

“further from the Honduran border because they were being attacked. This led to a new anti-Sandinista force, MAZORA, which was an acronym from the first letters of the tribe and a later splinter group.…”

Manuel SeGura recruited Miskito Anti-Sandinista Resistance Front documented ▶ 4:40

“who fled to Honduras after revelations of his past service with Somoza, began to recruit his own band of rebels. Claridge and Spott had already been to Honduras to clear the way for the CIA base and t…”

Dewey Claridge headed CIA documented ▶ 4:40

John Negroponte member_of United States documented ▶ 5:41

“that killed Salvador Allende, ran interference with Ambassador John Negroponte. The capital was called Tegu in late 1981. Negroponte, a former aide to Henry Kissinger, conducted the diplomacy, but he …”

Donald Winters member_of CIA documented ▶ 5:41

CIA funded Contras documented ▶ 6:10

“on military aid. In other words, he was working with the entire group. His cable traffic, which has been declassified, shows he tried to counter unrest in Honduras and stimulate Honduran military coop…”

United States supplied_arms_to Honduras documented ▶ 6:37

“including several times when he coordinated U.S. helicopters to ferry Honduran troops to blocking positions along the border of El Salvador and Nicaragua, and in response to a hijacking incident. In c…”

John Negroponte member_of United States documented ▶ 7:08

“One where an American cleric just disappeared. They weren't interested. Negroponte had a back channel for communications through the CIA, codenamed Red Baron. The embassy had about 150 people assigned…”

United States supplied_arms_to Honduras documented ▶ 7:08

United States supplied_arms_to Honduras documented ▶ 7:38

“50 U.S. Air Force specialists staffed a radar station to watch Nicaragua from a site known as Carrot Top in the mountains. The CIA station, not large, and one of the bases used together had probably o…”

CIA funded Contras documented ▶ 8:02

“In its early stage, the entire Nicaraguan program is reported to have been staffed by fewer than 100 collective CIA people. That's not counting their contract people. Later, the personnel in Honduras …”

CIA funded Contras documented ▶ 8:32

“arranged the use of Salvadoran Air Force facilities to launch contra-attacks on the Nicaraguan communication center. That would be the Ipala Pango place where Felix Rodriguez was. The Aquacate base st…”

Felix Rodriguez member_of CIA documented ▶ 8:32

Ray Doty headed Aguacate documented ▶ 9:02

“When agency officers looked at the strip, they knew something needed to be done to improve it. The CIA rented the base from the Honduran Air Force, installed facilities, built a road to connect to the…”

CIA funded Contras documented ▶ 9:02

Ray Doty member_of CIA documented ▶ 9:31

“base at Aquacate. Langley's local presence with the Contras at that base. Like Claridge, neither Doty nor his chief engineer spoke Spanish. They had cut their teeth in Laos. In fact, Laos veterans per…”

Dewey Claridge member_of CIA documented ▶ 10:02

“Station chiefs had all been in Laos running drugs, along the many, many subordinates had also done time in Laos. That Claridge found no difficulty mobilizing the requisite agency skills shows that Tur…”

United States targeted_for_regime_change Nicaragua documented ▶ 10:29

“On the other hand, the predominance of the Southeast Asia over Latin America experience would hinder the operation. Meanwhile, in Washington, the Sandinistas seem especially vulnerable to internal dis…”

United States supplied_arms_to Honduras documented ▶ 10:59

“and limit the impact of the Contradora group of Latin countries that sought to mediate because they weren't interested in negotiations. The U.S. air, naval, and ground units began extensive exercises …”

United States supplied_arms_to Contras documented ▶ 11:28

“just happened to be working on the CIA facilities under the pretense that they're conducting South Com training exercises. Great cover. Military aircraft flew Contra supplies to all of the locations. …”

Dewey Claridge recruited Eden Pastora documented ▶ 12:00

“One, Alfonso Robelo, another, E. Pastor Gomez, a C.I.A. commander. Claridge enlisted him in Acapulco in February of 1982. Pastora demanded a weapons drop in Costa Rica as a token of the C.I.A.'s since…”

William Casey ordered_assassination_of Eden Pastora host_asserted ▶ 12:00

Eden Pastora founded Alianza Revolucionaria Democrática documented ▶ 12:40

“To Langley, to brief Casey, the deputy director, Admiral Bobby Inman, walked in on the conversation. He thought a weapons drop to rebel troops in a friendly country was a crazy idea. But Casey approve…”

William Casey funded Contras documented ▶ 12:40

Altoro Cruz Jr. member_of Alianza Revolucionaria Democrática documented ▶ 13:07

“Claridge brought Pastora to Washington for a secret session with Bill Casey. The former comandante, spirited into the DCI's office by the private elevator that connects to the underground parking faci…”

Dewey Claridge recruited Eden Pastora documented ▶ 13:07

Argentina funded Contras documented ▶ 13:35

“But as the paramilitary effort built steam, the U.S. lost its Argentine allies. This followed the 1982 Falkland War between Argentina and Britain, in which Reagan took British side. That May, Argentin…”

Dewey Claridge member_of CIA documented ▶ 14:03

“Argentina's involvement was documented towards the end of 1982 when Hector Francis, a Battalion 601 officer in Costa Rica, gave testimony on his country's activity. In October, Claridge visited Buenos…”

Gustavo Álvarez member_of Honduras documented ▶ 14:03

Donald Winters member_of CIA documented ▶ 14:03

Hector Francis member_of Battalion 316 documented ▶ 14:03

Jerry Gruner member_of CIA documented ▶ 14:03

William Casey member_of CIA documented ▶ 14:31

“Argentina's departure didn't stop the CIA. They found the activities of the Battalion 601 leaders obstructive. Casey made a trip around that time to Japan, and about a year later, reports began of a m…”

Israel supplied_arms_to Honduras documented ▶ 15:02

“Repeated allegations of Israel's assistance also surfaced. The Israels openly sold arms to Honduras. This is documented repeatedly. They had advisors in all of these countries to assist the CIA in all…”

Israel supplied_arms_to Contras documented ▶ 15:02

Hector Francis exposed Argentina documented ▶ 15:02

CIA funded Fuerza Democrática Nacional documented ▶ 35:08

“asked Chamorro about the FDN's assassinations. Knowing the troops often mulled over murders and other atrocities, the propaganda chief admitted that there had been some excesses. Human rights criticis…”

Edward Chamorro admitted Fuerza Democrática Nacional documented ▶ 35:08

Jean Kirkpatrick worked_with Shimaro documented ▶ 35:39

“An agency contract officer, John Kirkpatrick, wrote it. Kirkpatrick worked with Shimaro in Taegu several hours a day for weeks. A former Green Beret and veteran of Korea and Vietnam, Kirkpatrick drank…”

Jean Kirkpatrick founded Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare documented ▶ 35:39

Joseph Fernandez approved Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare documented ▶ 37:07

“Joe Fernandez and about a dozen other DO officers all approved the manual. No one objected. They supposedly, when they were asked, deleted some shit. But not the assassinations? Not the martyr piece? …”

Ray Doty approved Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare documented ▶ 37:07

Edward Chamorro removed_from_power Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare documented ▶ 37:39

“2,000 printed copies of psychological operations arrived in his office. The FDN propagandists caught the reference to hiring criminals and to killing their own leadership. Upset, he locked up the manu…”

Ronald Reagan ordered_assassination_of Presidential Intelligence Advisory Board documented ▶ 38:06

“on neutralization implying assassination stunned Americans. Congressman Edwin Boland denounced it in a storm of criticism disrupted during Reagan's re-election campaign. Reagan felt obliged to order i…”

Edwin Land denounced Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare documented ▶ 38:06

Ray Doty promoted_to International Activities Division documented ▶ 38:33

“The Intelligence Oversight Board pretended to do an investigation. Again, Casey's methods were called into question. Casey escaped the heat by reprimanding a half dozen officers, including Chief of Ba…”

William Casey reprimanded Ray Doty documented ▶ 38:33

William Casey reprimanded Joseph Fernandez documented ▶ 38:33

CIA supplied_arms_to Alianza Revolucionaria Democrática documented ▶ 39:29

“Possibly at the height of activity came in 1983 when the Contras sent in columns of 600 to 800. The indigenous were also active. The ARDE received new CIA aid, communication gear, supplies, and 500 AK…”

Eden Pastora headed Alianza Revolucionaria Democrática documented ▶ 39:29

Alfonso Robelo headed Alianza Revolucionaria Democrática documented ▶ 39:29

Dewey Claridge supplied_arms_to Fuerza Democrática Nacional documented ▶ 39:59

“while the indigenous rebel group peaked at around 3,000. Colonel Bermudez spent much of his time at the base, Tegu, where the FDN had radio stations and a hospital. He planned a big push for the summe…”

Enrique Bermudez planned Operation Magic documented ▶ 39:59

William Casey faced_questions_from Daniel Patrick Moynihan documented ▶ 40:30

“Already clouds were gathering as the American public, never comfortable with the Contra operation and distinctly disturbed by the allegations of abuse and Congress suspicion of the administrative moti…”

Edwin Land sponsored Boland Amendment documented ▶ 40:58

“Patrick Moynihan from New York. A year later, the leak of an estimate predicting on how long Managua could hold out brought anger to the administration that they were aiming to overthrow the Sandinist…”

William Casey consulted_with William Clark documented ▶ 41:28

“This became known as the Boland Amendment, the first one. Supposedly, the CIA recognized this with a cable instructing officers to avoid any of a series of activities that could be prohibited. Casey w…”

Ray Doty lied_to Patrick Leahy documented ▶ 42:25

“At the Tegu safe house from which he ran the war, Ray Doty told the party that his project focused solely on the interdiction of arms traffic, but the wall map displayed Contra maneuvers far into Nica…”

Patrick Leahy visited Taegu documented ▶ 42:25

Gustavo Álvarez told Patrick Leahy documented ▶ 42:55

“Leahy heard at the embassy that the U.S. intended only negotiations. Then Honduran General Gustavo Alvarez told the senator the troops would be in Managua by Christmas. So the CIA is telling the senat…”

Dewey Claridge ordered Jerry Spott documented ▶ 43:24

“by the ambassador in the CIA every single time. Leahy went on to Panama, where Dewey Claridge, making a circuit of stations, had just visited. Leahy told the chief, former CATF boss Jerry Spott, that …”

Jerry Spott refused_to_communicate_with William Casey documented ▶ 43:24

Dewey Claridge lied_to Patrick Leahy documented ▶ 44:21

“By 6 a.m. the next morning, Claridge stood at Leahy's hotel door. Claridge fed the senator a line on why he had denied the brief. It all hinged on Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega, but obviously thi…”

Eden Pastora complained_about CIA documented ▶ 44:52

“at the base, presupposed penetrations from the north and south to cut Nicaragua in half. But if the Contras were doing anything out of Honduras, Pastora in Costa Rica remained totally passive. The age…”

CIA supplied_arms_to Eden Pastora documented ▶ 45:20

“In an odd throwback to the Bay of Pigs, the CIA dropped Pastora rice mix and beans instead of separately. That infuriated him, but he felt positively humiliated when the CIA drops of clothing. Pastora…”

Dewey Claridge visited Eden Pastora documented ▶ 45:51

“the bush. Claridge pursued up the San Juan River, but when Pastora found out, he moved further up country. Claridge finally caught up with the ARDE leader, who complained the uniforms were too big and…”

Invest Air Leasing supplied_arms_to Operation Elephant Herd documented ▶ 47:49

“The operations were made possible by aircraft the CIA procured through private companies. A McLean, Virginia firm called Invest Air Leasing was a fake company with an address of Dulles Airport. They b…”

Invest Air Leasing front_for CIA documented ▶ 47:49

Summit Aviation front_for CIA documented ▶ 48:45

“In February of 84, the planes were armed with rocket pods by Summit Aviation, another CIA proprietary, in Delaware. Although there were claims that the elephant herd provided all manner of items to th…”

Summit Aviation supplied_arms_to Fuerza Democrática Nacional documented ▶ 48:45

Israel supplied_arms_to Fuerza Democrática Nacional documented ▶ 49:16

“Israeli aid was far greater in what would be called Operation Tripped Kettle. In 1983, Tel Aviv furnished $10 million worth of equipment captured in Lebanon from the PLO the previous year, supposedly.…”

AmeriCo front_for CIA documented ▶ 49:48

“one while raiding Managua in September of 83, and another O2A shot down, attacking Santa Clara a year later. AmeriCo is known to have bought Cessnas direct from the manufacturer. Established by a form…”

Shenandoah Air Leasing front_for CIA documented ▶ 49:48

Alianza Revolucionaria Democrática carried_out_attack Managua documented ▶ 53:31

“Eden Pastora sponsored an air raid on Managua on September 8, 1983. Two planes bombed the airport, one flying so low it disintegrated in the blast of its own bombs. Two ARDE airmen were killed. Two U.…”

Sandinistas shot_down Fuerza Democrática Nacional documented ▶ 55:05

“October 3rd, the FDN supply flight was shot down by Sandinistas over northern Nicaragua. One man among the crew died, but two were taken prisoner. Both had been National Guardsmen under Somoza. Nicara…”

Sandinistas shot_down Jeffrey Swab documented ▶ 55:35

“when the helicopter he piloted toward Aquacate went off course into Nicaragua and was shot down by Sandinista soldiers. The following month, maneuvers led to the death of four Americans, with six othe…”