The Colonel's Corner Safe for Democracy Part 40 (42)

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0:00 to stay behind units, paramilitaries, and coordination at the highest levels of power. It is known as Operation Gladio. I don't know what happened. What the heck? Well, we're going to stop it right there. We'll go to our normal camera. Had a glitch in the matrix. There's Miss Bridget messing up my song. We'll wait till she gets up here.

3:55 Is it not letting you come up, Bridget? There she goes. Awesome. How are you today? Good. Good, good, good. I'm making dinner while during the show. Yeah, so John brought me dinner. This is a recipe I found online through Shipwreck. Oh. And, oh my God, it is so good.

4:30 creamy garlic chicken, and it tastes like something you would have at a fancy restaurant. Cool. Yeah, it is incredibly good. You already said way too many things for me. Creamy garlic chicken. That means you actually have to do something other than put it on the smoker. Yeah, but it's worth it. Oh my God, it is so worth it. Let's get into our lesson.

5:00 We're on page 464, concluding the chapter Rogue Elephant to Resurrection. We stopped when we were talking about Desert One and the Carter administration's and his Cyrus Vance talking about that operation.

5:32 General James Vaught continued leading the Joint Task Force, which prepared a larger scale plan, Honey Badger. Vaught had some of the best covert operations people around. His air commander, Brigadier General Richard Secord of the Iran-Contra fame, had worked on the operation where they were setting up the Kurds.

6:01 He also had worked in Laos and had special operations experience. I got the hiccup, sorry. So Kord had also been an air advisory group boss in Iran in 75 to 78, which means he was intimately involved in all of the covert operations in Iran where they were taking people to black site prisons and all kinds of nefarious stuff like that.

6:35 Vought's chief operations planner, Colonel Robert Dutton, had three distinguished flying crosses for his operations in Thailand during the Vietnam War. Dutton had served under Secord in Iran, too. So this is like old home week. The Joint Task Force staff worked in unison. Individual will and desire to get the hostages out.

7:06 overcame Pentagon politics. In this case, the services demands that each be part of the task force. Some criticisms of Eagle Claw centered on inadequate planning. There had not been enough helicopters. The requirement to use the unit precluded a Pentagon-wide search for the best pilots. The beginning exercises

7:31 had never included a complete rehearsal of all of the phases of the operation, which is ridiculous. Honey Badger was to correct these deficiencies. Even worse than before, however, the problem was intelligence. The Iranian dispersed the hostages and redoubled their vigilance. In desperation and in hope, the U.S. turned to expatriate Iranians who flocked to volunteer.

8:02 who did this, the one who did this was Albert Hakim, to the extent of putting his multi-tech corporation, which still functioned in Tehran, at the disposal of the Americans. The degree to which Iranian exiles considered this patriotic may be gauged from the fact that Hakim

8:29 went to General Sikord after having been turned down by him for lucrative business contracts. Now Sikord put Hakim in touch with his Air Force intelligence. A flood of reports came from Hakim and other sources. General Sikord said there were hundreds, but no one ever pinned down the hostage location because there was no way to check the reports and because the Iranians began moving the hostages around Tehran.

8:59 I guess we're pretending that we don't have satellites, but whatever. Uncertainty continued. With the Joint Task Force in constant consultation with the CIA, in October 1980, Langley suddenly announced it had new information, presenting an elaborate briefing. Langley, the CIA, they've got the new plan. They got new intelligence. Secord called this Eureka briefing.

9:30 because of the abrupt claim that the CIA all of a sudden had all the answers. Joint Task Force Intelligence had no information to corroborate anything that the CIA said. General Secord actually escalated this dispute up the chain of command to the White House, where Carter policymakers were reminded of the intelligence problem in the rescue option. By comparison, the military side was in better shape.

10:01 The Honey Badger Force stood ready from August 1980. Whenever there was a fair consensus on the intelligence picture, Dutton and the operations staff put together a new plan. General Watt's forces conducted at least six major exercises rehearsing versions of the Honey Badger. The secret warriors also made a start towards filling the void of in-place assets with the Army's formation of a foreign operations group.

10:29 A unit to facilitate deep cover missions, soon renamed the Intelligence Support Activity. Air Force HH-53 helicopters with better avionics to navigate sandstorms were substituted for the Navy craft used in Eagle Claw. As preparations continued, costs melted. Honey Badger was of such importance, however, that General Vought spent the money and only then went to the services to tell them how much they owed.

11:00 They intended to go to Congress later to get a supplemental, but Honey Badger never went down. Instead, diplomatic prospects improved and an accommodation was arranged. And after 144 days of captivity, the Americans were released on January 20th, 1981. And of course, he leaves out all of the other stuff that happened in the middle. Subsequent debriefings of the hostages by the Joint Task Force Intelligence showed that the Eureka data

11:30 that the CIA just produced out of its rear end was completely wrong. But they were sure that it was correct. Fiasco in Iran hostage crisis crystallized opinions on the need to strengthen special warfare capability. The talent necessary to conduct covert action is available in the CIA and it must be preserved. That was the final answer.

12:01 Because the military had just screwed it all up. So we can't put it there. It has to stay in the CIA. But the first thing that they tried was also based on CIA intelligence. So did they set up the military to make their point? Because this is in the immediate aftermath of the mid-1970s.

12:28 year of intelligence. See, you can't give it to the military. At this juncture, as Washington began to reassert covert action, another international development intervened, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December of 1979. No mention that the CIA is already there baiting them in. Langley already was ready to go.

13:08 The first known Hill briefing on this subject took place on January 9th, 1980. Langley's representatives were Frank Carlucci and John McMahon. He was serving as the director of operations. Chapter 19. Tribes and clans exist not just as ethnic and national groupings, but like tribes of Afghanistan and Iraq, they were basically self-selection.

13:41 The CIA itself is a collection of different clans. Alan Fryer Jr., an agency Middle East specialist, put that thought well in the 1991 appearance before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. He said that the CIA is a family. The DO particularly is a family. That's the Director of Operations.

14:09 It's like broken into clans, he said. The Middle East clan, the Latin American clan, the Far East clan, the Soviet clan. The bonds of mutual experience aren't there outside the clan, except in all of these operations that we talked about. You know, the South American clan came basically from the Southeast Asia clan.

14:38 intersect, not even speaking the language, depending on the operation. So those clans are kind of interbred too, especially when it comes to covert operations. Friars ran into trouble during the Reagan years, and there are differing opinions on him among the quote unquote tribes at Langley. Often covert operations cut across clan boundaries. Yes, they do. The clan might not have the right tradition or skills.

15:11 some special qualifications becomes necessary. Yeah, like whether you ran a successful coup or not. The president's orders and the CIA director is to deploy his best people regardless of their clan. Paramilitary experts are a clan of their own and may be needed. Political action and propaganda more likely exist within each division.

15:42 The operations in Angola, Vietnam, and Laos, Congo, and the Bay of Pigs all involved bringing people in from outside the Klan. No kidding. Afghanistan would be unusual in being led almost exclusively by a particular Klan. In this case, the DO Near East Division. Moreover, that division developed the project in tandem with the Iranian hostage mission.

16:14 After April 1980, with growing criticism of the failed hostage rescue, the Klan had more of an impetus to succeed. Jimmy Carter recalls the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as a shock to the world. The background is more complex and perhaps more sinister than Carter's simple sentiment. The Russians had not simply invaded a neutral or enemy country. Rather,

16:45 A pro-Soviet regime had been in power in Afghanistan since 1973, when a prince of the royal blood carried out a coup d'etat against a king traveling in Europe. Even before, under the monarchy, Afghanistan had had a close trading relationship with Russia. It was an important commercial partner. That doesn't... If you look at a map, Afghanistan...

17:15 is near Russia. So I find it interesting how they categorize this. Just because you have a trading partner does not mean you're pro-Soviet, but whatever. By the time of the Soviet quote-unquote invasion, there was aid coming to Afghanistan from Russia. Most of it had been economic. They gave them taxis.

17:53 And America also was in the aid business to Afghanistan during this exact same time. They were building dam projects and a national highway. Dwight D. Eisenhower once visited Kabul for an afternoon. Sadar Mohammed Dreyed, D-A-O-U-D.

18:22 assumed the title of president after the coup, but the Soviet Union and Afghan parties regarded him as pro-Western. There's a lot of story behind this whole coup, by the way. As early as June 1975, tribal rebel forces attempted to overthrow him, staging an uprising in the Panjshir Valley.

18:54 In April of 78, he was brought down by force by the People's Democrat Party of Afghanistan. Power in Kabul suddenly seemed limited when it came to solving thorny problems, not least the insurgency among Muslim fundamentalist groups and certain tribes that began soon after the coup. The first permanent rebel base coalesced as early as May of 70.

19:27 Meanwhile, the quote unquote communist faction had internal discontent, convinced itself that others did not know the way forward. One faction referred to as Parkham or Banner became isolated within the movement, neutralized during 1978. Its leader vanished to Prague as ambassador.

19:59 from Afghanistan. Parkham figures were accused of CIA connections and more than a dozen alleged conspiracies were discovered during this purge because the CIA had been involved in all of that. On February 14th, 79, the kidnapping of U.S. Ambassador Aldorf Dubs in Kabul set off alarm bells in Washington and experienced diplomat Dubs

20:30 had earlier been in Moscow under close surveillance by the KGB, according to Russian defector Mitrokhen. Soviet intelligence decided Dubs had CIA affiliations, as most ambassadors do. In any case, he was grabbed off the streets by persons who demanded the release of others from Afghan jails. Rather than negotiate, the Afghans launched an assault on a hotel where Dubs was held.

21:01 Their people went in with Russian equipment, including flak jackets and weapons, and with senior Soviet officials downstairs in the lobby, including a security chief that had been working with the Afghan police, and a second secretary of the Soviet embassy. Dubs was shot in gunfire.

21:33 The execution of surviving captors, preventing a forensic analysis of the crime scene, blocking access to American investigators. It is not possible to say whether this was a conspiracy or who actually killed the ambassador. Meanwhile, the purge of Parkhams.

21:59 did nothing to solve the power struggle. The two top leaders of the other factions remained at each other's throat. The boss of the now Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, Noor Mohammed Tariqi, had been the original founder of KHALQ, which united a...

22:31 several factions of the party in 1965. Taraki had been a representative in their legislature. His deputy, these names are killing me, Harapi Zula Amin, given a supervisory role over the secret police, became a key instigator in a purge. Amin concentrated control over the army and security forces.

23:03 as well as the government. The Russians scrambled to save their Afghan agents that they considered vital. In the summer of 79, the Soviets learned that Amin also sought authority over the $400 million Afghanistan bank that had outside money in it. The tribal insurgency continued unabated, leading the government to ask for Russian help.

23:34 In Washington, the Carter administration saw Russian aid as quote-unquote adventuresome. Then he invokes the arc of crisis. With a Russian client state in trouble in Afghanistan, it appeared an ideal moment to repay the Soviets in what Carter saw was their own coin. The dub's murder seemed to demand a response.

24:08 And Brzezinski was standing right beside Carter, elated. He quickly instructed the CIA to produce options on how to deal with Afghanistan. When Langley reached into their bag of tricks, it would not be whistling in the dark. The CIA had liaison relationships with the Pakistani military that went back forever to include their intelligence.

24:37 and through them, access to many Afghan tribesmen. Other U.S. agencies were filling around too. As early as January 79, an officer in the DEA met with Afghan resistant figures at Lahore. Subsequent encounters took place in other Pakistani cities. So Afghanistan, you know, the opium capital of that area.

25:04 just so happens to have a great relationship with the DEA. Imagine my surprise. The DEA interest supposedly was stemming the flow of heroin from Afghanistan, which we absolutely know is not true. Ambassador Dubs cautioned Washington, before he was killed, that it might lose more associating with rebel warlords than could be gained from those contacts.

25:35 But in February, the CIA reported new signs of unrest just in time. By March 5th, Admiral Turner had a list of options for Brzezinski. The next day, the NSC discussed how to aid Afghan rebels, even though the ambassadors told him it's not a good idea. Ten days later, on March 18th, during a visit to Moscow by the Prime Minister of Afghanistan,

26:06 They first asked for direct Soviet intervention. The Kabul government, facing new uprisings, including a revolt of elements of the Afghan army, made a series of pleas to the Russians, even though Russian advisors were killed in the uprisings. And Washington, on March 30th, the NSC Special Coordination Committee, Carter Special Group, revisited the question of using CIA paramilitary.

26:36 Pentagon official Walter Slocum told the restricted meeting there might be value in doing that. A week later, the full committee met to consider it. The CIA, meanwhile, fleshed out the initial plan. Just a couple of days after that session, White House staffer Paul Hintz began complaining of foot tracking at Langley. You're not working fast enough.

27:05 On April 6th, the special group went over a gamut ranging from minor propaganda to a high-end initiative that included training and support. The consensus favored non-lethal action. Langley prepared a draft presidential finding and returned it to the White House. By the end of April, the CIA had completed a set of data on Afghan ethnic and religious groups, which could be used to study the resistance.

27:37 On July 3rd, Carter signed the finding. The American program began with supplies of food and clothing, helping the resistance without greatly committing the U.S. Brzezinski wanted more, but with Carter, due to see Russian leaders in Vienna, a forceful course in South Asia had to wait. The summit took place and Carter signed an arms limitation treaty with the Soviet leader Brezhnev.

28:06 Shortly after his return, CIA military options came forward. Paramilitary. Brzezinski bragged to French reporters in a 98 interview that on the day of Carter's finding, he wrote the president a memo predicting that a paramilitary program in Afghanistan would force the Russians into a full-scale intervention. Just what they wanted. They wanted to give

28:39 the Soviet Union, their Vietnam. The initial take of just half a million dollars lasted barely six weeks. They wanted more money. Agency officers picked up the DEA channels to the resistance and were, DEA channels to the resistance are DEA channels to the opium growers. Agency, let's see, so they could give the money to these groups.

29:12 By September 28th, the CIA station in New Delhi had cabled Langley more than once about recruiting suitable fighters, soon to be known as the Mujahideen. So again, these are the people producing the opium. Authorization for the CIA to engage in a covert action also meant informing Congress. That happened on July 19th when officials briefed the Senate Intelligence Committee on the finding and what they were going to do.

29:42 in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Moscow had sent the DRA government armed helicopters and transport models, but resisted appeals for troops. In May, Mujahideen mounted armed uprisings in several provinces, with government troops hard-pressed to meet them. Moscow worried about the safety of its aircraft, and after lengthy deliberations, sent a battalion of paratroopers to Bagram.

30:12 near Kabul. Washington learned of this from cables. They wanted to know how many military advisors, how many troops were at Bagram and recording that the Russians either sported civilian clothes or Afghan uniforms. On July 20th, despite aid, the rebels in one province threatened Kabul.

30:43 Two Russian advisors were killed in early August. An Afghan airborne regiment rebelled in Kabul. Its mutiny suppressed with difficulty. Only a week later, a full Afghan division was bloodied in a pitched battle with insurgents. The evidence inability to cope with the resistance concerned Moscow and Kabul.

31:09 The Russians advised the government to get rid of Amin, the minister who was concentrating so much power in his own hands. There were doubts whether Amin, who had studied in the U.S. at Columbia University, had in fact been a CIA asset the entire time, which most books say says that he was, which is the whole reason we bring people here and send them to places like Columbia.

31:40 Other Russians thought he was mentally unstable. While Taraki visited Moscow and heard Brezhnev's direct warning, Amen alleged an assassination attempt by ministers, he called in an anti-party group. Instead of Amen being forced out on September 14th, he carried out a coup, placing President Taraki

32:09 under house arrest, and later moved him to a prison, where he would be strangled to death a few weeks later. Mr. CIA just orchestrated a coup. At the time, there were further coup attempts by Afghan army. According to some Russian accounts, the Amin government understood the difficulties of defeating the rebellion and tried to settle with some resistance groups, in particular, Hek Martyr.

32:43 The coup attempt, the October counter coup and the Mujahideen talks was evidence of Amin's lack of responsiveness viewed by many. The Soviet general staff anticipating a Politburo decision began preparing for intervention. Those senior generals counseled the leadership against it. Meanwhile, by October, Washington had already begun to seek foreign support.

33:14 For a broader covert action, in Saudi Arabia, the U.S. ambassador learned the Saudis were ready to extend assistance with the Mujahideen. Previously, it had been withheld. The Americans and Saudis agreed that Riyadh would match CIA funds. On December 17th, the Special Coordinating Committee met to formalize the next stage of the Afghan project. The CIA would furnish weapons.

33:43 improve rebel communications and logistics, and conduct worldwide propaganda, saying that the government was basically backed by the Soviet Union. This occurred a week before the Soviet invasion. During the long months of 79, the Soviet Politburo considered a massive commitment of ground troops to Afghanistan almost a dozen times, repeatedly rejecting it. Now the reaction would be different.

34:15 The defense minister and Politburo members who specialized in ideological matters became key advocates for military intervention. On December 12th, in a series of consultations with Politburo members and various other people, Moscow made a decision to send troops to Afghanistan. Soviet sources argue that if either or both Brezhnev or Kosygin had been in better

34:45 contact at the time, the idea would have been rejected. The invasion began just after Christmas. Plans were for 52,000 troops to cross the border from the Southern Soviet Union. One target was Amin. On December 6th, the Russians set a lead element of special forces ahead to Bagram to carry out a secret mission.

35:18 to neutralize Amen in a commando raid. They were successful. Amen was murdered in the presidential palace in a bloody battle. The Russians were favorably disposed toward Amen's successor, Babrak Karmal, K-A-R-M-A-L. The Soviet intervention unnerved those who saw

35:50 the Russian imperialist reaching the Persian Gulf. Oh, no. Russian imperialist. The Shah once told Richard Helms that if it were a question of Russia reaching the Gulf, he would take over that area first. Thus, in the United States, who feared a blitzkrieg aimed at the Persian Gulf, saw it as a prelude to worse.

36:25 Basically the equivalent of what German had did in World War II. Not even close. President Carter came under wide criticism for permitting the Russians to surprise America like that. Carter told a reporter at a New Year's Eve event that the Soviet action affected his thinking more profoundly than anything during his time in the White House. Probably because he was lied to by his CIA.

36:57 This doesn't take into account the CIA's intelligence reporting and hidden U.S. policy of conducting CIA military operations because, of course, they were already contemplating doing this themselves. Because it could be argued that it was the CIA and Brzezinski that actually triggered the Soviet intervention by orchestrating a coup and installing a CIA puppet.

37:33 telescoped these developments when he told undergraduate students at Emory University in 82 that a covert program had been the best way to punish the Soviets short of going to war. The Soviet intervention represented not so much the blitzkrieg portrayed in U.S. news reports, but as a quagmire. The surprise displayed in the media was absent within the administration.

38:00 all along aware that both the CIA and State Department reporting of a number of Soviet advisors and commitment of troops disguised as Afghan government soldiers was going on. The U.S. detected the Russians being there prior to their invasion, their increased state of alert, and even the introduction of the Russians into Kabul.

38:30 American insight in the Soviets more extended to knowledge of ethnic composition of the Russian forces. The CIA reported the presence of a number of Chajiks, Uzbeks, and other Central Asian ethnic soldiers already there. The CIA's warning experts conducted a postmortem on the Russian invasion and concluded that while the agency did not predict its precise size or timing,

39:01 Because of the performance of communications and photographic intelligence, the CIA had provided at least 10 days advance notice. Now, again, you guys, we've already went over. We not only, by this time, have massive amounts of satellites. We have the U-2. We have the SR-71. There's not anything about this the CIA didn't know. None. They're watching it happen.

39:30 They know exactly what they're doing, but they want this so that they can go in and support the Afghans in order to control the opium. That's the piece that always gets missed. The American policy of acting against Russians continued and deepened. On December 79, the day the Russians intervened, President Carter signed a fresh finding permitting CIA to furnish more weapons.

40:03 Brzezinski held more than 20 sessions of their special group in the wake of the Soviet intervention, assembling an array of sanctions that Carter would add. Senior CIA analysts prepared a paper in January of 1980, which viewed Moscow as creating a zone of security around the Soviet Union. The paper suggested that the U.S. could make this expensive, supporting groups on the basis of ability to inflict

40:32 Russian losses. Written by a Soviet specialist with no Middle East experience, the paper warned that the failure in Afghanistan would result in the Middle East countries all becoming Soviet satellites. The initial shipment of CIA weapons, a cargo of old British rifles from Egypt, arrived in Pakistan on January 10th. Two weeks later, Carter

41:02 announced a doctrine that would bear his name. The U.S. would regard any attempt by outside powers, such as the Soviet Union, to gain control of the Persian Gulf region an assault on our vital interest. Brzezinski wrote later that his main concern had been to make sure that the Soviets paid a price for their invasion. It extended

41:29 to Brzezinski traveling to Saudi Arabia, where he confirmed the Saudi alliance with the CIA. His approach, combined with Carter's fury to exact a steep price, deep cuts in American grain sales to Russia, a U.S. boycott of the 1980 Olympics scheduled to be held in Russia, and a withdrawal of the SALT II nuclear arms control treaty,

41:57 from Senate ratification. Agency political action experts dreamed up a scheme to bring Afghan partisans to New York and testify at the UN, but this plan floundered on fears of violating the prohibition against CIA activities inside the U.S. because all the Afghan partisans were on the CIA payroll.

42:28 Meanwhile, Jimmy Carter paid a political price of his own, aside from any costs imposed by the Soviets. Afghanistan seemed one more hit to the Cold War imbalance painted by Republican leaders. Carter could not stem the tide that elected Ronald Reagan in November of 1980. Again, there's a lot more to that story. The CIA Afghan project belonged to the Near East Division.

42:57 Charles Kogan, the director of operations Middle East chief since 1979, had a dramatic flair along with his experience he had gained in India, in the Congo, and as station chief in Jordan in 1970 when the Palestinian forces tried to oust King Hussein. His horseback riding

43:29 With the Jordanian king, much like Ray Kline's, drinking with Taiwanese and Thai rulers helped forge close links between the CIA and the Jordanians. For Afghanistan, Kogan's marching orders was to provide parallel support and coordinate that from the Saudis and the Egyptians and even Chinese.

43:58 during the Iranian hostage rescue. Associate Deputy Director John Stein functioned as a top supervisor, previously chief of station in Libya. Stein emerged from the Iran disaster untarred. He had dealt with the Egyptians. The Afghan task force chief, John McGaffin, also came with extensive Middle East experience.

44:24 His unit, technically the South Asia Operations Group, gradually expanded. The CIA could not act through the U.S. embassy in Afghanistan because it was small and closely watched and with no possibility of contact with the Mujahideen resistance. Everything was going to have to go through Pakistan. Cabal function. CIA and U.S. diplomats there took the pulse of the Soviets in Afghan government war effort.

45:01 The action took place in Pakistan. Under John Reagan, the CIA station in Islamabad maintained close contact with the Pakistani government. In particular, its ISI, which is their intelligence service. It was headed by Lieutenant General Akhtar Abdul Rahman.

45:27 With the ISI, which had an Afghan branch in detachments along the border in Pakistan, the CIA did business with the Mujahideen through a base in Peshawar near the Khyber Pass, 40 miles from the Afghan border. The CIA base at Peshawar.

45:53 Always small, never resembled a huge base the agency had grown in Berlin or Frankfurt at the height of the European secret wars or like that in Miami. It was numbered only ever about 40 CIA officers. They had a task force at Langley plus Kogan's Near East People and even some analysts thrown in the mix.

46:25 John McMahon would be astonished at what presently occurred in the Hindu Kush. The agency's deputy director of operations, McMahon, knew nothing about the Near East. His baptism of fire had been the Iranian hostage crisis. He had earned good marks there for helping infiltrate Delta Force agents, but he knew the military.

46:53 feelings towards the agency. McMahon responded by turning energy to making sure Afghanistan went smoothly. Admiral Turner's successor, William Casey, later called him the father of the Afghanistan secret war. The sleekness of the CIA's commitment did not mean this project proceeded without major common paramilitary operations.

47:20 Rather, it would be the Pakistani ISI that provided the muscle. Its Afghan bureau consisted of officers posted throughout the Pakistani military. The bureau did much of the resistance. The ISI funneled the military aid allocating percentages to various Mujahideen groups. The Pakistani trans-shipped the aid from points of entry to the rebels, and the bureau gave

47:48 the Mujahideen intelligence to use inside of Afghanistan. The data came partly from the ISI and from the CIA and from the British intelligence. Under its most active director, Brigadier General Mohammed Yusuf, who served from 83 to 87, the Afghan Bureau opened camps to train Mujahideen.

48:20 These are the terrorist training camps. Yusuf also sent ISI commando teams on special missions with the Mujahideen and tried to coordinate forces from different rebel groups inside of Afghanistan against the Russian troops. Rebel bands typically formed from calls by clan elders or tribal leaders who appointed their commanders.

48:47 When the CIA studied Afghan ethnic groups in the spring of 80, it found that the Pushtuns made up more than half of the population and the fierce animosity had split clans, including those between Sunni and Shia Muslims. The agency calculated that these divisions would impede a unified front. A September paper from the CIA's Office of Political Analysis

49:17 i.e. political warfare, reported literally hundreds of tribes representing more than a dozen major groups. One of the Russian problems was the very reforms Afghan leaders considered essential to bringing Afghanistan into the 20th century and minimizing the tribe concept.

49:44 Within months of the Russian estimated that hundreds of rebel bands were active with fighters totaling between 12 and 20,000. Before the end of the year, the Russian leader Brezhnev would say during a visit to India that the conditions that had forced his country to intervene had not disappeared. Afghan leader Karmal charged in November that his country

50:11 was being subjected to armed aggression from Iran and Pakistan. It was. The first CIA weapons entered the pipeline while time remained to prepare for their use. Nothing moves in Afghanistan during the early months of the year when the snows are deep and the winds are cold and people are just trying to survive. In 1980, the British sent some special air service soldiers

50:41 to observe Mujahideen operations. Huh, to observe them. Not long after taking office, the Reagan administration began moving on in Afghanistan. The new CIA director, William Casey, presented a project with covert actions. President Reagan approved all of them by March of 1981. At the time, Reagan used the term freedom fighters for the Afghan Mujahideen.

51:14 Later, he applied it to all rebel groups all over the world that had CIA support. They were all freedom fighters. Reagan's Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, quickly advocated more arms for the guerrillas. That spring, Director Casey made the first of what became an annual pilgrimage to the Near East. Casey visited the King of Saudi Arabia, his intelligence chief,

51:47 Turki al-Fasal, plus the leader of Pakistan, military strongman, General Mohammed Zia. The CIA's project cannot proceed if these men softened their commitment. The Saudis continued matching U.S. contributions to the rebels, and General Zia confronted for the CIA by equipping the Mujahideen.

52:17 With that eight, well, not exactly because he did exactly what all these other people do. He was giving them old trash and keeping a lot of the new weaponry. Chuck Hogan accompanied Bill Casey on every Near East trip during his time in charge of the division. He found General Zia a true believer. Zia feared Soviet encroachment, saw their intervention as such a move and dearly wanted.

52:47 to strike back. They're not in Pakistan. When Casey visited Zia at home, the Pakistani put a map on his coffee table and superimposed it with a triangle template to represent the Soviet thrust. Zia broke off only to play with his daughter when she wandered into the room. Casey came away more than impressed saying that the American media was distorting Zia's image.

53:19 He's just training terrorists, but he has a daughter. Unmentioned went the reasons the US concern with Pakistan, Zia's nuclear weapon program. Well, that's because we were helping them with it. That was an issue since Carter's day. Zia and General Akhtar of ISI, who lived next door, represented a common front. Casey left Islamabad.

53:49 if anything more convinced than Jimmy Carter had been of the Soviet being the bad guy. The CIA director ordered up a national intelligence estimate on the Soviet threat, not to Afghanistan, to Pakistan. Completed in August of 81, the paper foresaw Russia's political pressure on Pakistan, but analysts refused to predict anything.

54:21 like a Soviet invasion. They expected that the Russians, the Afghan government, or both, might make small raids against the insurgent camps where they were training the Mujahideen to go into Afghanistan. Yes, yes, they might. To pursue the Afghan project of new CIA secret wars, Bill Casey needed to put his own house in order. He believed John McMahon,

54:51 was not aggressive enough. When Richard Allen, Reagan's first national security advisor, ordered a covert operation to disable floating dry docks the Soviet had put on the Somali port of Berbera, McMahon objected to this as an act of war. And the DO chief, Starr, suddenly said, yeah, you're not allowed to say no.

55:19 He was shifted to head of the agency's analysis directorate, the one that they don't pay any attention to. At Langley, CIA insider favored John Stein for his replacement, but Casey put in Max Hoogle, a business associate with zero intelligence experience. Casey briefly made Hoogle a top advisor, then appointed him the deputy director of operations.

55:46 But before the job could be finalized, it evaporated in a controversy over him, Hoogles, being accused of this petty little thing called insider stock trading. You know, the kind of stock trading you might do if you're actually in charge of covert operations. Yeah, that kind of insider stock trading. In the end, the D.O., for the D.O., was that John Stein took over.

56:18 But John McMahon, whom Casey wanted to push aside, reappeared in a new incarnation, resulting in a different case of personnel turbulence. Casey had appointed a Navy Vice Admiral, Bobby Ray Inman, as his deputy director, second man for the entire CIA. Admiral Inman was restive, not so willing to cut corners as the CIA director.

56:49 much more dedicated to staying within the lines, closely connected to Senator Barry Goldwater. He watched Casey's secret wars with melting anxiety. In mid-1982, Inman resigned. Casey, by then already under attack as a covert action cowboy, suddenly saw John McMahon as a desirable deputy.

57:19 His presence suggested the agency would remain within legal bounds. Deputy Director McMahon would have further impact on the Afghan covert action. In its first year, the Reagan administration doubled the size of the previous CIA budget for the Afghan project. Once the Saudis matched that, Pakistan ISI was overflowing with money.

57:44 In August of 81, five of the largest rebel groups formed an alliance whose center of gravity resided in the Peshawar area. That was beyond the reach of the Russian enemy. Fearful of a unified command would impede its ability to manipulate the warlords, the ISI undermined this initiative. Yeah, no unity allowed. We want you guys all to be separate so we can control you all.

58:15 No synergy of forces allowed. It's crazy. By that summer, there were roughly 45,000 Mujahideen fighters. Through the year, the rebel groups averaged about 500 attacks a month. According to Soviet figures, more than 500 vehicles were destroyed in a year and 4,550 security troops killed.

58:47 In one province, the government controlled only 10% of the villages. The Soviet and Afghan group initially enjoyed greater success in their respective intelligence services. The Russian KGB, apprising the tactics in the decades prior to it, the most important of these, codenamed Cascade,

59:19 pretended to be Mujahideen bands. The 150 odd soldiers in each such security unit gained the confidence of rebels who revealed themselves only to be eliminated. The Afghan KHAD, K-H-A-D agency, tried to block trails into the country with some success. Using a 5,000 border troops, KGB officers were attached to the KHAD in increasing numbers.

59:48 First, the staff of headquarters and then groups. In 1981, the Russians received even greater powers to intervene in Afghan affairs. Najibullah, the CAD's chief, raised no objections. Towards the end of 81, in an effort to devise new tactics, KGB chief visited Kabul with the Soviet defense minister. Karmal also met top Russians at Kashkent.

1:00:19 In December, no one had a solution. The CAD grew enormously from 700 at the time of the Russian invasion to 16,082. The war sputtered on. Carmel continued with infighting and there was some goings on at the government level in the spring of 1982, but they had ultimately

1:00:52 been eclipsed by the CIA and the Saudis matching contributions. Iran gave significant aid to the Sunni Muslim groups. Iran. Iran. Aren't they Shia? Yeah. Yeah, but they don't care. Especially Hek Martyr. Egypt sold arms and donated some as well. Others put up money and permitted rebel groups to open offices and recruit for the Mujahideen in their countries.

1:01:26 The most fundamentalist groups, like Hek Martyrs, also had success in making direct approaches to Muslim countries for added support. Pakistan sustained its role with Peshawar and nearby cities. The ISI Afghan Bureau made allocations among the rebel groups at coordinating meetings. The ISI director, Akhtar, presided over these meetings.

1:01:59 The CIA and Saudi money went into ISI bank accounts. Aid in kind, such as weapons and donors purchased directly, brought into the country until 1985. It remained a firm rule that mostly communist bloc weapons would be given to the Mujahideen because they wanted them cheap and they were getting them from Bulgaria.

1:02:26 The amounts of cash and weapons given to each group varied depending on performance, but only two of the seven key groups in the rebel alliance were not fundamentalists. The ISI played favorites. One major rebel leader, Masad, Ahmed Shah Masad, in the Panjshir Valley,

1:02:50 was not in the alliance. The net effect was that roughly two thirds of the aid went to the most radical religious groups. And the Mossad guy that wasn't part of this alliance was the one guy that wasn't keen on having opium as their main product. And he was killed the day before 9-11. He wasn't gonna be allowed to be part because he knew all the secrets. He knew everything the CIA was doing. And the whole time,

1:03:21 He was the most, he was part of the Northern Alliance. He was the most effective fighter of all of them. And the CIA and the ISI would not help him at all. The CIA got weapons wherever it could. Most of these from European and Middle Eastern countries transited Saudi Arabia by air and entered Pakistan by the port at Karachi.

1:03:51 The U.S. Air Force did the airlifting out of Duran and where a CIA officer acted as liaison, Dakran. When the Pakistani Air Force tried to participate, it had trouble in landing or overflight rights. In spite of Saudi Arabia's cooperation, the CIA presence at the air base, they still had problems. In other words, they didn't want the Pakistanis.

1:04:22 flying their shit. The contingent of three, later five, CIA officers monitored storage and shipment into Pakistan, certain items like rockets from China. Some came to Pakistan directly from their countries of origin. At first, rebel commanders went to ISI depot with pony trains to pick up equipment stockpiled for them, but the arrangement proved cumbersome.

1:04:52 The CIA bought and delivered animals to the rebels, but stocks of local ponies soon dried up. Langley sought the advice of mule expert Dr. Melvin Bradley of the University of Missouri and brought mules in his state to ship them to Pakistan. But the Missouri mules were not used to the climate and wore out too quickly. Some Chinese ponies were employed, but a better expedience.

1:05:20 The method proved to be mules from Argentina, where the Andrian Mountains had animals that were fit for the area. The Pakistanis eventually hired traders who provided their own animals for a fee. Of course, the fees rose every season. The ISI, because the CIA is paying, as well as the Saudi. The ISI transport department still had to bring the materials to the border.

1:05:49 A typical mule load was a couple of sacks of cornmeal and perhaps four rockets and recoilless rifles. Timing was also a problem. ISI officials complained the CIA never seemed to realize that when the snow melts each year in the spring around April, the pack trains could hardly move, so supplies needed to be brought in early to compensate. The traders crossed a highly permutable border.

1:06:19 more than 200 trails cut through the mountains. Neither Afghan troops in the 1980s nor the Pakistani guards in the war on terror of the 21st century have sealed the border ever. In November of 82, the DIA argued that even a major increase in Russian troops, 50,000, would not enable the Soviets to seal off a Pakistani or an Afghan.

1:06:47 permanent from outside world. In the 1980s, permeability worked in the CIA's favor. Later, it did not. The tribes on the land were the key to effective supply, and these took a cut of whatever moved through their territory. Fees that multiplied as supplies went further. Mujahideen, deep inside of Afghanistan, received barely half of what they had been consigned because the rebel leaders took it.

1:07:20 Almost 40% of the shipments crossed the border in the vicinity of Peshawar and another 20% near Qaeda. But far from the huge underground base, the rebels established in the caves. The sole alternative would have been to parachute supplies into the rebels. Brigadier General Yusof of the ISI maintained the airdrops were nonsensical. Drops meant using U.S. aircraft in a Russian war theater imposed danger.

1:07:52 It was a chance heightened by the number of flights that would be necessary. The parachute method also opened the possibility to U.S. aircraft losses in a war we're not even in. Lacking proprietary airlines like Air America, not even Langley could conduct projects on the scale they had in Afghanistan.

1:08:21 Chuck Cogan later characterized those who called the U.S. airdrops as living in a dream world. On the whole, the supply situation remained uneven. In late 82, the DIA reported that major rebel groups possessed ammunition and modern assault rifles, but lacked heavy weapons, especially machine guns, mortars, anti-aircraft guns and missiles, anti-tank weapons and radio equipment.

1:08:48 The difficulties were mainly that smaller rebel groups or those in isolated positions, they were at the end of the supply train, so they didn't get anything. This is consistent with the Pakistanis say about how they allocated the weapons. But ISI shortchanged groups not in its favor.

1:09:10 For instance, there are reports that rebels were given about 400,000 modern Soviet-style assault rifles. Yet, according to Washington lobbyists, for the Mujahideen, one of the main groups received just 4,000 modern rifles by 1983, along with almost twice the number of old rifles. This minor key firepower

1:09:35 compared poorly to what the Russians had or even what the other rebel groups were receiving. Over the same period, a rebel group had 13 machine guns in 1982 and had 250 of them not from Pakistan.

1:09:51 A major difference between the covert actions of the Reagan era and earlier CIA activities is that in 1980, varied rebel groups deliberately lobbied Washington not to build support to get what they viewed as a fair share of cash and weapons. Law firms or public relation consultants did some of this work, as did advocates. This was true for Afghan, Nicaraguan, Angolians, and on.

1:10:20 The Cubans had formed their activist group and solicited money and had been very successful. So they set a model that everybody could do it. Just get all of the immigrant populations to form a political group and lobby Washington to destroy your home country. We see it happening today. Only in the Reagan years were these public efforts to promote CIA programs.

1:10:52 So we're, yeah, we've got people in the immigrant population lobbying for more CIA covert operations. Crazy world. That's it for today. Oh, Bridget got dropped. There, I'll add you back. All right. What's going on? Are you back up, Bridget? Nope. There we go.

1:11:43 And they say everyone over on Rumble said that your show today on Redacted was outstanding. Cool. I'm sorry, but the Southern Poverty Law Center is such a crazy story. Such a crazy story. They said Alpha Warrior Show is also a lot of big bombs dropping. Yeah.

1:12:16 It was kind of weird because towards the end of the interview, you know, well, you guys probably don't know. I'll just tell you all the inside baseball here. So most of these interviews on those types of platforms are done over Zoom. So they send you a link. And because it's Zoom, I don't know how many of you guys have ever used Zoom. You have like the bullpen and...

1:12:45 the person running the Zoom call can either put everybody up there or can just select one person and mute everybody else. So they have links into their show and they tell people in the order of segments what time to log into the Zoom. So they had me on first, which was awesome.

1:13:15 So whoever's going to be in the next segment, and this has happened several times, they'll pop on where you can see them in the background. And so when you're looking at your Zoom call, there's the three of us, Natalie, Clayton, and me. And then off to the side is like their camera guy or whatever their...

1:13:39 behind the scenes guy. He's got a little profile up there. He stays there all the time. And then whoever's coming in behind you will pop in like five minutes before your segment's done. And of course I was followed by Alex Jones today. Yeah, but they said that he actually confirmed everything that you had just said. Well, here, let me just finish the story. So the funny part.

1:14:07 is his mic was open. And so his mic was on. Oh, funny. And so he's making all of these sounds like clearing his throat and stuff. So distracting. But the last time I was on, the guy that was following me was the guy's book that we did, the CIA guy that they tried to poison. So he was on.

1:14:39 He was on almost the entire time that segment was going on. And of course, you guys still don't talk about anything but the CIA. And so it was a little weird because I don't know that guy. We did his book, but I can't remember his name for the life of me right now. But anyway, it was funny having him listening to everything I'm saying about the organization that tried to kill him, that he used to work for.

1:15:06 I'm sure if his mic were on, you'd hear a whole lot of amen going on. Probably. Probably. But anyway. Okay. Travis, go ahead. A little bit about the former president of SPLC, Chinese-American Margaret Wang, president and CEO from 2020 through 2025.

1:15:40 Started out with sponsored by George Soros at NSD International, then quit there to go to work for the CIA at the Asia Foundation, then quit there to go to become president of SPLC. So from Soros to CIA to SPLC. Tells you everything you need to know, don't it?

1:16:09 Yes, ma'am. That's interesting. I saw her name and I have her name written down, but I haven't gotten to her yet. I'm going to have to take your notes and do a little bit of digging because I'd like to know what she did at the Asia Foundation. That's a great find, Travis. Thank you.

1:16:47 Women's rights. Of course. Okay. All right. I'll look and see if I can find any papers or anything that she wrote. That usually tells you a lot about their mindset. And when they're at those places, they have to write, they have to produce the propaganda. So I'm sure we can find something that she wrote. That's a great find. Thank you. There was one more thing.

1:17:22 One of the Green Berets that participated in removing Maduro? Yes, I just saw that. Oh, okay. Yeah, no, go ahead and tell everybody. Oh, he was just arrested for winning a bet that Maduro would be removed. So actually what he did was... He bet on it just before he went to do it. Yeah, so... He won the bet, collected $400,000.

1:17:53 And got arrested. Yeah, so he was in briefed into that mission and then went on that pro public, whatever that betting website is and bet that they were going to be successful in taking him out because he was on the mission and had already been read into it and came back.

1:18:22 and cleared $400,000 using compromised top secret information to bet on. And he just got arrested. That's like, now keep in mind, we have said this is exactly how this entire operation has worked. So from post-World War II, and this is the irony of all of this, every single

1:18:55 oligarch has conducted business by paying the CIA and many times employing, tasking the special forces to go overthrow governments to enrich themselves. And knowing that the operation was going to get approved because they put the pressure like ITT and Freeport and all them guys, PepsiCo in Chile.

1:19:26 They place their own bets, not just in the stock market, but in their own companies to enrich themselves. And you have this guy, and all of that information is classified, but they know it's going to happen because they're the ones pressuring or ordering the CIA to do it. And at the same time,

1:19:53 growing immensely wealthy from it but you let an nco do it which is by far the exact same thing and his ass is going to go to jail and rightfully so but so should all the rest of them yeah no more business as usual yeah that's what it told me big time because normally thank you

1:20:23 Major Sarge is over here just helping me out big time on Rumble. Kevin Schiff is the name of the CIA agent turned author whose book we did. And Major Sarge tells me it's Polly Market. Thank you, Major Sarge. You are always there for me. Thank you, thank you, thank you. B. Clef, Colonel is killing it. Yeah.

1:20:54 There's a few people that need to go away. Yeah. Yeah, they're linked to everything. I just made a post. I was not, I didn't find this when I looked at them like a year and a half ago. I didn't realize how much control they have over prisons.

1:21:25 and education and all kinds of things in states, they actually file lawsuits. They'll find one crazy person in a prison that they charge didn't get enough crazy attention to help their craziness. Well, you've got a prison full of murderers.

1:21:55 In order to murder somebody, you're a fucking crazy person. I'm sorry, you just are. But they'll find one pathetic case of this one person didn't get enough mental health care. And they'll sue, this is what they did to Alabama. They sued Alabama and was given an award of $340,000 plus their lawyer fees.

1:22:20 Well, I'm sorry, but your lawyer fees are paid through the donations to your nonprofit. So you are having the governments pay for your lawyers to sue them. And they were also awarded like $340,000 as a result of that. And that may have been the lawyer fees, but they get those consent decrees.

1:22:49 That then says that the federal government, they go in with the federal government on these lawsuits as well, not just the Southern Poverty Law Center will do their own, but they also work hand in hand in the past with the Civil Rights Division of the DOJ.

1:23:12 And they'll get consent decrees where these little committees will be set up to further ensure compliance for like the next 10 years. And guess who gets a seat on all of those consent decrees? The SPLC. And then they get access to all of the inner workings of these prison systems and education processes.

1:23:42 teach in the prisons and do all this other stuff to create all of these crazy activist people if you ever eventually get released. It's really like the biggest self-licking ice cream cone I've ever seen. It's crazy. And I don't even think we've touched the tip of the iceberg yet. I think these guys...

1:24:08 are embedded. And I don't know how you can investigate the SPLC and not investigate the ADL because they do exactly the same thing. Exactly the same thing. As a matter of fact, every old article that I found on the SPLC doesn't ever use SPLC by itself. It always says the SPLC and the ADL, the ADL and the SPLC, it's like they're twins.

1:24:39 And they both feed off of hate. And we've already just seen demonstrated. And we've had many examples in the past of that one. I forget what the name of it is. I know Baker Sarge is going to write it down in a minute. The Jewish Defense League, which was basically their version of like the KKK for Jewish people. It was a terrorist organization.

1:25:08 And they would dress up and commit hate crimes. So this isn't new. None of this is new. But it's now at a time when there's heightened awareness and all of this is getting exposed, which is good. So that's it for today. Did you have anything else, Bridget? Well, two things. One was just that,

1:25:41 Over on Rumble, SD Gardner brought up one of the best insiders or the biggest insider trading type scenario, and that was on 9-11. Oh, yeah. But the other thing was Hugh just requested a mic, but I don't see his hand. Who? Oh, Hugh Mann. Did you have something you wanted to say? Nope.

1:26:19 Okay. There you go. All right, guys. So we have, we still have a little bit to go in this book. This is the longest book I think we've ever done. And again, I felt it necessary. You guys know, I usually just kind of summarize each chapter as we go through, but this has way too many names in it to even try to do that. I tried it in the first chapter and I was like, oh mess.

1:26:54 I'll mess all that up. So I just think it's so important getting on the record all of these people that are involved and how you see them time after time after time in the same operations. So I'm thinking that we're going to, when we get done with this book, I have a book,

1:27:18 Anglo American. It was by Carol Quigley. I'm not going to spend a lot of time on it, but I do conceptually want to walk through this because it goes to the heart of what Warhamster and I have been talking about. And you see it playing out so much today, just like today when I said on Redacted that, what's her face? Jocelyn Benson was a graduate of Oxford.

1:27:47 And I don't think that people understand the significance of that. And Carol Quigley, when you read his books, you get the distinct impression that he's like, because he was a part of this. He's not really criticizing them, but he is very in-depthly explaining to you what they are doing.

1:28:17 And I think it's very interesting because he doesn't try to make excuses for them, but he does make the point that they view that they are moral because this is their religion. And as long as they've decided this is their religion, then their adherence to their religion makes them moral.

1:28:49 Not moral like you and I moral, like a God mural moral, but moral to what they've decided their religion is, which is basically one world government. And that explains in real world today where people say, how could you do these things with a conscience? Because it's their religion.

1:29:15 And he makes several really, really profound points like that. So it's not a big book, but I do want to take a break and kind of just go through that principle-wise because it puts into context a lot of what we're seeing today. And I don't think most people realize this because they're stuck in their own dogma.

1:29:42 and can't see, because I mean, how many people are still talking about left and right? I mean, at this late date, that's just ridiculous. There is no left and right. They fund both sides of every issue in their little oligarch fan club. So anyway, and he explains how-

1:30:04 And you can just see the parallels. This stuff happened in the late 1800s and very early 1900s. But you can see the exact parallel, how they infiltrated the political parties, how they infiltrated all of the government agencies, how they infiltrated education. They have religious figures that are associated with them. It's just very, very revealing. And it shows.

1:30:33 how long this has been going on. So we're going to talk a little bit about that. And it falls in line with what Warhamster and I have been doing as well. So, because we're going to, you know, be talking about the Pilgrim Society and some of the bridges across. Okay. Brilliant. Sorry, I just wanted to say, I've been digging a bit into SPLC and CAIR, the Council for American Islamic Relations. Yeah, CARE.

1:31:04 Yeah, and it's got Gladio written all over it. And I'm still digging. I did a sub-sack yesterday or the day before, and I did another one today. I'll be doing more as I peel each layer of the onion. But it's interesting to me that the stats don't make sense. So they both get a lot of funding, tens and hundreds of millions of dollars.

1:31:32 and they spend nearly all of it every year, both of them. They support each other. So if SPLC has been, you know, propping up KKK and others, you know, these supposed, in inverted commas, right-wing extremist groups, but also this Islamic group, the CARE, that was, you know, mentioned in the lawsuit against the Holy Land Foundation. Right.

1:31:59 one of 246 unindicted co-conspirators, part of this huge network. I'm concerned about America because I've seen what the Islamic State has done to my country, and it's not good, and I don't want that coming here. Well, Hugh, let me ask you something, because the indictment indicates that a lot of their money isn't spent, that it is sitting in bank accounts in the Cayman Islands. So, yeah, they've built up some.

1:32:28 That's true. But the weird thing about SPLC is they had a jump in 2017. And they went from like, I forget the exact numbers, about 50 million a year or so to about well over 100. Right. And that strikes me as odd. And the revenue per employee is something like 300,000 or 250,000 per employee. No business.

1:32:54 I've never seen a business. I've been auditing and advising Fortune 500 companies all my life. I've never seen a company that has that much revenue per employee, which says to me that those employees, the kind of ghosts, as it were, they're not really producing anything or doing anything. It's just another conduit for money.

1:33:19 Yeah, could you tag me, post your sub stack, or if you've already posted it on X, tag me in it so I can see it. Yeah, absolutely. I'd love to read it. Yeah, thank you. Really good chat to say. Thank you so much. Thank you. Travis, go ahead. I'll just say that as far as I know, there have been either 15 or 16 care mosques busted in the last five years.

1:33:51 for having large weapons caches in their basements. That's all. So are you suggesting they're stay-behind units like the ones set up by the CIA? Yes, ma'am. I'm strongly suggesting that. Okay. That's what I thought you were suggesting. And it would make perfect sense since most of those original ones between...

1:34:26 1993 and 2001 was set up with funding by the CIA that they would also have weapon caches in them. I mean, come on. If not, they'd be slacking. Thanks for an awesome session. I'm going to go ahead and log off and I will see you at noon tomorrow and again at four o'clock. You guys take care.

Entities here

CIA50 Afghanistan33 Pakistan25 Mujahideen25 Soviet Union25 United States24 Jimmy Carter18 Saudi Arabia14 William Casey13 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan12 Zbigniew Brzezinski9 Southern Poverty Law Center9 John McMahon8 Iran8 Hafizullah Amin8 Iran hostage crisis8 KGB6 Richard Secord6 Adolph Dubs5 Ronald Reagan5 Joint Task Force5 Charles Koch5 Egypt4 Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq4 Leonid Brezhnev4 1973 Afghan Coup4 Operation Honey Badger4 People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan4 Peshawar4 Babrak Karmal4 James Vaught3 China3 John Stein3 Council on American-Islamic Relations3 Operation Eagle Claw3 Nur Muhammad Taraki3 Akhtar Abdul Rahman3 India2 National Security Council2 Ford Foundation2

Claims made here

James Vaught headed Joint Task Force documented ▶ 5:32

“General James Vaught continued leading the Joint Task Force, which prepared a larger scale plan, Honey Badger. Vaught had some of the best covert operations people around. His air commander, Brigadier…”

Richard Secord member_of Joint Task Force documented ▶ 5:32

Robert Dutton member_of Joint Task Force documented ▶ 6:35

“Vought's chief operations planner, Colonel Robert Dutton, had three distinguished flying crosses for his operations in Thailand during the Vietnam War. Dutton had served under Secord in Iran, too. So …”

Albert Hakim funded CIA documented ▶ 8:02

“who did this, the one who did this was Albert Hakim, to the extent of putting his multi-tech corporation, which still functioned in Tehran, at the disposal of the Americans. The degree to which Irania…”

Richard Secord recruited Albert Hakim documented ▶ 8:29

“went to General Sikord after having been turned down by him for lucrative business contracts. Now Sikord put Hakim in touch with his Air Force intelligence. A flood of reports came from Hakim and othe…”

CIA covered_up Operation Eagle Claw host_asserted ▶ 11:00

“They intended to go to Congress later to get a supplemental, but Honey Badger never went down. Instead, diplomatic prospects improved and an accommodation was arranged. And after 144 days of captivity…”

Frank Carlucci member_of CIA documented ▶ 13:08

“The first known Hill briefing on this subject took place on January 9th, 1980. Langley's representatives were Frank Carlucci and John McMahon. He was serving as the director of operations. Chapter 19.…”

John McMahon member_of CIA documented ▶ 13:08

Mohammad Daoud Khan overthrew Afghanistan documented ▶ 16:45

“A pro-Soviet regime had been in power in Afghanistan since 1973, when a prince of the royal blood carried out a coup d'etat against a king traveling in Europe. Even before, under the monarchy, Afghani…”

Soviet Union funded Afghanistan documented ▶ 17:15

“is near Russia. So I find it interesting how they categorize this. Just because you have a trading partner does not mean you're pro-Soviet, but whatever. By the time of the Soviet quote-unquote invasi…”

United States funded Afghanistan documented ▶ 17:53

“And America also was in the aid business to Afghanistan during this exact same time. They were building dam projects and a national highway. Dwight D. Eisenhower once visited Kabul for an afternoon. S…”

People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan overthrew Mohammad Daoud Khan documented ▶ 18:54

“In April of 78, he was brought down by force by the People's Democrat Party of Afghanistan. Power in Kabul suddenly seemed limited when it came to solving thorny problems, not least the insurgency amo…”

Soviet Union assassinated Adolph Dubs host_asserted ▶ 21:01

“Their people went in with Russian equipment, including flak jackets and weapons, and with senior Soviet officials downstairs in the lobby, including a security chief that had been working with the Afg…”

Nur Muhammad Taraki founded People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan documented ▶ 21:59

“did nothing to solve the power struggle. The two top leaders of the other factions remained at each other's throat. The boss of the now Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, Noor Mohammed Tariqi, had be…”

Hafizullah Amin headed People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan documented ▶ 22:31

“several factions of the party in 1965. Taraki had been a representative in their legislature. His deputy, these names are killing me, Harapi Zula Amin, given a supervisory role over the secret police,…”

Zbigniew Brzezinski ordered_assassination_of Hafizullah Amin host_asserted ▶ 24:08

“And Brzezinski was standing right beside Carter, elated. He quickly instructed the CIA to produce options on how to deal with Afghanistan. When Langley reached into their bag of tricks, it would not b…”

Jimmy Carter funded Mujahideen documented ▶ 27:37

“On July 3rd, Carter signed the finding. The American program began with supplies of food and clothing, helping the resistance without greatly committing the U.S. Brzezinski wanted more, but with Carte…”

CIA recruited Mujahideen documented ▶ 29:12

“By September 28th, the CIA station in New Delhi had cabled Langley more than once about recruiting suitable fighters, soon to be known as the Mujahideen. So again, these are the people producing the o…”

Soviet Union supplied_arms_to Afghanistan documented ▶ 29:42

“in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Moscow had sent the DRA government armed helicopters and transport models, but resisted appeals for troops. In May, Mujahideen mounted armed uprisings in several provinces, …”

Hafizullah Amin overthrew Nur Muhammad Taraki documented ▶ 31:40

“Other Russians thought he was mentally unstable. While Taraki visited Moscow and heard Brezhnev's direct warning, Amen alleged an assassination attempt by ministers, he called in an anti-party group. …”

Hafizullah Amin assassinated Nur Muhammad Taraki documented ▶ 32:09

“under house arrest, and later moved him to a prison, where he would be strangled to death a few weeks later. Mr. CIA just orchestrated a coup. At the time, there were further coup attempts by Afghan a…”

Saudi Arabia funded Mujahideen documented ▶ 33:14

“For a broader covert action, in Saudi Arabia, the U.S. ambassador learned the Saudis were ready to extend assistance with the Mujahideen. Previously, it had been withheld. The Americans and Saudis agr…”

Soviet Union assassinated Hafizullah Amin documented ▶ 35:18

“to neutralize Amen in a commando raid. They were successful. Amen was murdered in the presidential palace in a bloody battle. The Russians were favorably disposed toward Amen's successor, Babrak Karma…”

Soviet Union installed Babrak Karmal documented ▶ 35:18

CIA spied_on Soviet Union documented ▶ 38:30

“American insight in the Soviets more extended to knowledge of ethnic composition of the Russian forces. The CIA reported the presence of a number of Chajiks, Uzbeks, and other Central Asian ethnic sol…”

Jimmy Carter funded CIA documented ▶ 39:30

“They know exactly what they're doing, but they want this so that they can go in and support the Afghans in order to control the opium. That's the piece that always gets missed. The American policy of …”

Soviet Union targeted_for_regime_change Afghanistan documented ▶ 39:30

Zbigniew Brzezinski headed CIA documented ▶ 40:03

“Brzezinski held more than 20 sessions of their special group in the wake of the Soviet intervention, assembling an array of sanctions that Carter would add. Senior CIA analysts prepared a paper in Jan…”

CIA supplied_arms_to Mujahideen documented ▶ 40:32

“Russian losses. Written by a Soviet specialist with no Middle East experience, the paper warned that the failure in Afghanistan would result in the Middle East countries all becoming Soviet satellites…”

Jimmy Carter funded Mujahideen documented ▶ 41:02

“announced a doctrine that would bear his name. The U.S. would regard any attempt by outside powers, such as the Soviet Union, to gain control of the Persian Gulf region an assault on our vital interes…”

Zbigniew Brzezinski funded Mujahideen book_quoted ▶ 41:02

Zbigniew Brzezinski funded Saudi Arabia documented ▶ 41:29

“to Brzezinski traveling to Saudi Arabia, where he confirmed the Saudi alliance with the CIA. His approach, combined with Carter's fury to exact a steep price, deep cuts in American grain sales to Russ…”

Charles Koch headed CIA documented ▶ 42:57

“Charles Kogan, the director of operations Middle East chief since 1979, had a dramatic flair along with his experience he had gained in India, in the Congo, and as station chief in Jordan in 1970 when…”

Charles Koch funded Mujahideen documented ▶ 43:29

“With the Jordanian king, much like Ray Kline's, drinking with Taiwanese and Thai rulers helped forge close links between the CIA and the Jordanians. For Afghanistan, Kogan's marching orders was to pro…”

John Stein headed CIA documented ▶ 43:58

“during the Iranian hostage rescue. Associate Deputy Director John Stein functioned as a top supervisor, previously chief of station in Libya. Stein emerged from the Iran disaster untarred. He had deal…”

CIA funded Mujahideen documented ▶ 44:24

“His unit, technically the South Asia Operations Group, gradually expanded. The CIA could not act through the U.S. embassy in Afghanistan because it was small and closely watched and with no possibilit…”

John McMahon headed CIA documented ▶ 46:25

“John McMahon would be astonished at what presently occurred in the Hindu Kush. The agency's deputy director of operations, McMahon, knew nothing about the Near East. His baptism of fire had been the I…”

William Casey funded Mujahideen documented ▶ 46:53

“feelings towards the agency. McMahon responded by turning energy to making sure Afghanistan went smoothly. Admiral Turner's successor, William Casey, later called him the father of the Afghanistan sec…”

CIA funded Mujahideen documented ▶ 48:47

“When the CIA studied Afghan ethnic groups in the spring of 80, it found that the Pushtuns made up more than half of the population and the fierce animosity had split clans, including those between Sun…”

Babrak Karmal headed Afghanistan documented ▶ 49:44

“Within months of the Russian estimated that hundreds of rebel bands were active with fighters totaling between 12 and 20,000. Before the end of the year, the Russian leader Brezhnev would say during a…”

Ronald Reagan funded Mujahideen documented ▶ 50:41

“to observe Mujahideen operations. Huh, to observe them. Not long after taking office, the Reagan administration began moving on in Afghanistan. The new CIA director, William Casey, presented a project…”

William Casey funded Saudi Arabia documented ▶ 51:14

“Later, he applied it to all rebel groups all over the world that had CIA support. They were all freedom fighters. Reagan's Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, quickly advocated more arms for the …”

Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq supplied_arms_to Mujahideen documented ▶ 51:47

“Turki al-Fasal, plus the leader of Pakistan, military strongman, General Mohammed Zia. The CIA's project cannot proceed if these men softened their commitment. The Saudis continued matching U.S. contr…”

Saudi Arabia funded Mujahideen documented ▶ 51:47

William Casey funded Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq documented ▶ 51:47

Richard Allen ordered_assassination_of Soviet Union documented ▶ 54:51

“was not aggressive enough. When Richard Allen, Reagan's first national security advisor, ordered a covert operation to disable floating dry docks the Soviet had put on the Somali port of Berbera, McMa…”

John McMahon removed_from_power CIA documented ▶ 55:19

“He was shifted to head of the agency's analysis directorate, the one that they don't pay any attention to. At Langley, CIA insider favored John Stein for his replacement, but Casey put in Max Hoogle, …”

William Casey appointed Max Hoogle documented ▶ 55:19

Max Hoogle removed_from_power CIA documented ▶ 55:46

“But before the job could be finalized, it evaporated in a controversy over him, Hoogles, being accused of this petty little thing called insider stock trading. You know, the kind of stock trading you …”

John Stein headed CIA documented ▶ 55:46

William Casey appointed Bobby Ray Inman documented ▶ 56:18

“But John McMahon, whom Casey wanted to push aside, reappeared in a new incarnation, resulting in a different case of personnel turbulence. Casey had appointed a Navy Vice Admiral, Bobby Ray Inman, as …”

Bobby Ray Inman removed_from_power CIA documented ▶ 56:49

“much more dedicated to staying within the lines, closely connected to Senator Barry Goldwater. He watched Casey's secret wars with melting anxiety. In mid-1982, Inman resigned. Casey, by then already …”

William Casey appointed John McMahon documented ▶ 56:49

Ronald Reagan funded Mujahideen documented ▶ 57:19

“His presence suggested the agency would remain within legal bounds. Deputy Director McMahon would have further impact on the Afghan covert action. In its first year, the Reagan administration doubled …”

Saudi Arabia funded Mujahideen documented ▶ 57:19

KGB carried_out_attack Mujahideen documented ▶ 59:19

“pretended to be Mujahideen bands. The 150 odd soldiers in each such security unit gained the confidence of rebels who revealed themselves only to be eliminated. The Afghan KHAD, K-H-A-D agency, tried …”

Soviet Union funded Afghanistan documented ▶ 59:48

“First, the staff of headquarters and then groups. In 1981, the Russians received even greater powers to intervene in Afghan affairs. Najibullah, the CAD's chief, raised no objections. Towards the end …”

Najibullah headed KGB documented ▶ 59:48

Iran funded Mujahideen documented ▶ 1:00:52

“been eclipsed by the CIA and the Saudis matching contributions. Iran gave significant aid to the Sunni Muslim groups. Iran. Iran. Aren't they Shia? Yeah. Yeah, but they don't care. Especially Hek Mart…”

Egypt supplied_arms_to Mujahideen documented ▶ 1:00:52

Bolivia supplied_arms_to Mujahideen documented ▶ 1:01:59

“The CIA and Saudi money went into ISI bank accounts. Aid in kind, such as weapons and donors purchased directly, brought into the country until 1985. It remained a firm rule that mostly communist bloc…”

CIA funded Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin documented ▶ 1:02:50

“was not in the alliance. The net effect was that roughly two thirds of the aid went to the most radical religious groups. And the Mossad guy that wasn't part of this alliance was the one guy that wasn…”

CIA supplied_arms_to Mujahideen documented ▶ 1:03:21

“He was the most, he was part of the Northern Alliance. He was the most effective fighter of all of them. And the CIA and the ISI would not help him at all. The CIA got weapons wherever it could. Most …”

CIA funded Ahmad Shah Massoud host_asserted ▶ 1:03:21

China supplied_arms_to Mujahideen documented ▶ 1:04:22

“flying their shit. The contingent of three, later five, CIA officers monitored storage and shipment into Pakistan, certain items like rockets from China. Some came to Pakistan directly from their coun…”

CIA funded Mujahideen documented ▶ 1:04:52

“The CIA bought and delivered animals to the rebels, but stocks of local ponies soon dried up. Langley sought the advice of mule expert Dr. Melvin Bradley of the University of Missouri and brought mule…”

Argentina supplied_arms_to Mujahideen documented ▶ 1:05:20

“The method proved to be mules from Argentina, where the Andrian Mountains had animals that were fit for the area. The Pakistanis eventually hired traders who provided their own animals for a fee. Of c…”

CIA funded Mujahideen documented ▶ 1:05:20

Soviet Union supplied_arms_to Mujahideen documented ▶ 1:09:10

“For instance, there are reports that rebels were given about 400,000 modern Soviet-style assault rifles. Yet, according to Washington lobbyists, for the Mujahideen, one of the main groups received jus…”

Margaret Wang member_of Southern Poverty Law Center host_asserted ▶ 1:15:06

“I'm sure if his mic were on, you'd hear a whole lot of amen going on. Probably. Probably. But anyway. Okay. Travis, go ahead. A little bit about the former president of SPLC, Chinese-American Margaret…”

George Soros funded Southern Poverty Law Center host_asserted ▶ 1:15:40

“Started out with sponsored by George Soros at NSD International, then quit there to go to work for the CIA at the Asia Foundation, then quit there to go to become president of SPLC. So from Soros to C…”

Margaret Wang member_of Ford Foundation host_asserted ▶ 1:15:40

PepsiCo targeted_for_regime_change Chile host_asserted ▶ 1:18:55

“oligarch has conducted business by paying the CIA and many times employing, tasking the special forces to go overthrow governments to enrich themselves. And knowing that the operation was going to get…”

Freeport-McMoRan targeted_for_regime_change Chile host_asserted ▶ 1:18:55

Southern Poverty Law Center funded Alabama host_asserted ▶ 1:21:55

“In order to murder somebody, you're a fucking crazy person. I'm sorry, you just are. But they'll find one pathetic case of this one person didn't get enough mental health care. And they'll sue, this i…”

Southern Poverty Law Center member_of Department of Justice Civil Rights Division host_asserted ▶ 1:22:49

“That then says that the federal government, they go in with the federal government on these lawsuits as well, not just the Southern Poverty Law Center will do their own, but they also work hand in han…”

Jocelyn Benson member_of Stanford University host_asserted ▶ 1:27:18

“Anglo American. It was by Carol Quigley. I'm not going to spend a lot of time on it, but I do conceptually want to walk through this because it goes to the heart of what Warhamster and I have been tal…”

C. Wright Mills founded Anglo-American Establishment host_asserted ▶ 1:27:18

Southern Poverty Law Center front_for Council on American-Islamic Relations host_asserted ▶ 1:31:32

“and they spend nearly all of it every year, both of them. They support each other. So if SPLC has been, you know, propping up KKK and others, you know, these supposed, in inverted commas, right-wing e…”