The Colonel's Corner Safe for Democracy Chap 24 (25)

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0:00 Hello, Miss Bridget. Hey, can I tell you something really creepy? Sure. Okay, this just happened. The reason why I like start off with that. Okay, so I ordered these organic preserves, right? Strawberry preserves. Because I like a little bit of jelly on my occasional bagel with a little cream cheese. Okay, so normal, just typical.

0:30 So the other day, I remember I was walking to put it back in the fridge or something. And, I mean, I had just opened the jar. So, like, it's brand new. And I, out of nowhere, somehow or another, drop it. Oh, it's in a glass jar. So it shatters everywhere. Nice. With gooeyness to follow. Everywhere. Yeah. And I'm like, oh, crap. So I put the dogs up. I cleaned it up. No big deal. I order another jar because I just have one on hand.

1:01 In fact, this time I even ordered two because I'm thinking, okay, I'll have two, then I'll have anything. Then I got back up. It just come in as I'm walking through the house to go put it in my pantry, the extra jar. I drop it in the exact same spot. Bridget. And it shatters to a million pieces in a gooey mess. And I'm like, no, there's something.

1:32 This is not normal, okay? I'm just saying. Bridget. I know it's just jelly. That's freaky as hell. That is creepy. I'm just like. Holy shit, girl. No, I mean, when I say, I mean the exact same spot on the floor. It falls out of my hand. I had a grip on it. Evidently not a good one. Apparently not. Apparently not for a good one, right?

2:05 But I'm like. That's crazy. So now I'm like, okay, so they still have, well, I had put them on other jar already in the refrigerator, even though it didn't necessarily need to be in the fridge. So do I throw that one away or what? No. I'm just like. But I think you need to put it like on a saucer and carry the saucer around. There you go. Or just open in the refrigerator and scoop out. Maybe.

2:36 And just scoop it out from the refrigerator. Don't take it out of the refrigerator. So would that make it possessed preserves? Preserved preserves? I don't know. Anyway, I just had to share that with you because it just happened and I just got done cleaning up. I'm like, this is bizarre. It is creepy bizarre. So today must be one of those days. So we didn't get to do.

2:59 the show today because John's at an electrical contractor conference today. So I had Jimmy by myself and my daughter arranged for one of her girlfriends to come over and watch him at noon for the duration of the show. And 1130 comes and goes and she's not here. So I call my daughter and I'm like, what's going on?

3:24 well, she can't take off work. She's a school teacher because they were in the middle of a lockdown because of a gas leak. So I texted War Hamster and I said, yeah, she's like, why do we even have gas here? And I told her, I said, I don't know, honey. So I texted War Hamster and I said, I am sorry that I have to cancel at this late moment, but here's the situation.

3:54 And he's like, okay, well, that's, I forget how he said it. But anyway, he was like, well, there's nothing you can do about that. So anyway, we've rescheduled it for Sunday at noon, just so everybody knows. What a crazy, what a crazy day. Right? Right. So there just must be something odd in the air. Just saying. There's something going on.

4:24 odd every day now right amen all right so we're on page 278 for those of you who's following along um cold war encounter revolution we were talking about um lumumba and the degree of cia complicity in the consequence murder of lumumba remains disputed not really

4:54 The CIA denies it, but we already have the real deal. But there was no doubt about the Belgians' role in it. They played a game of states, and Brussels had huge stakes in the Congo, especially in the Katanga area. By official counts, Belgium Intelligence Service spent $6 million to destabilize Lumumba's government, the one that they supposedly had just granted.

5:26 their freedom. So that's the European version of decolonization. They marked Lumumba as a liability and conspired against him. Researcher Ludo DeWitt pieced together much of the Belgium story in the 1990s in a publication of his book, Forced the Government Inquiry in a Parliamentary Investigation.

5:57 In February of 2002, the Belgian government issued an official apology accepting moral responsibility for Lumumba's death and establishing a democracy fund in his memory. The U.S., however, took no responsibility and did nothing. Lumumba was brutally beaten then killed on January 17, 1961. The CIA payroll included the Congolese official who signed the arrest warrant.

6:26 Lawrence Devlin told the church committee that the station had close connection to several sources who knew the truth about Lumumba because they made the decisions. But those people had not acted under CIA direction. Bullshit. The cable traffic reveals that the CIA had current information on Lumumba's condition and movement in captivity all the way.

6:57 till his death. The cables also show that Devlin feared an imminent coup in Lumumba's favor, making action urgent. Quick, kill him. He might get to stand in charge. He was moved by a plane. Lumumba was diverted in mid-flight to Katanga, where Maurice Shambi, formerly a

7:27 Lumumba supporter had switched sides. Base Chief David Doyle observes that Katanga leader, above all, was a quote-unquote realist, according to there. He was a murderer. He was an opportunist. Doyle expresses himself as frustrated at Lumumba's sudden materialization on the Elizabethville scene. Imprisoned or not, beaten or not,

7:57 When Doyle learned of the leader's presence, apparently two days later, he sent Devlin a dispatch, quote, thanks for Patrice. Had we known he was coming, we'd have baked a snake, unquote. The cable mistakenly noted that there was no plans to liquidate Lumumba, which was a bold-faced lie. The base chief missed the entire play on the unfortunate.

8:26 fortunate Congolese leader's death, and Doyle worried he would be sacked. Again, they were in on it. He didn't miss anything. But the message to Devlin apparently appealed to Alan Dulles' sense of humor. A political cartoon arrived in the pouch from Ed Wells. It showed two Texans baking a snake. Doyle then realized he was safe. I'm telling you, Alan Dulles is

8:58 Hands down, the most evil man that ever walked on this earth. He's just this side of the devil. The nationalist Patrice Lumumba had been tortured and killed the night after landing in Elizabethville. Belgian officers and Katangi's officials participated. Several Belgian soldiers were actually in the firing squad and Belgium officers.

9:29 with command of the police and security forces, did nothing to countermand anything that happened. Stories of CIA people such as Devlin driving around with Lumumba's body in the trunk is questionable according to the author, but there's many accounts of that. I mean, the one book we read talked about how they basically had to get rid of the car because of the stink in it.

10:00 A few days later, JFK became the 35th president of the United States. For almost a month after that, the Congolese leader's death remained the best kept secret in the Congo. JFK reacted with shock and anguish when he heard of his death. On February 13th.

10:24 Only two days before the 5412 group, now Kennedy's special group, had granted another half million dollars for the Congo project. Dealing with Patrice Lumumba had taken months. Exercising his ghost in the Congo required years of fighting and lots of dead bodies. Kennedy's State Department advisors proposed an activist role. The CIA left out protested to McGeorge Bundy.

10:57 Allen Dulles sent Bundy a letter on February 5th, warning that the agency's views had not been taken into account. Bundy reassured Dulles, President Kennedy, well aware of the circumstances, would ensure the CIA had a hearing. Author Schlesinger relates that JFK saw the UN in the Congo as filling a power vacuum, in the absence of which there would be a Soviet American.

11:27 confrontation. That view hinged on certain analysis of what the Soviet motives were, which of course was just for Lumumba to try to be able to arm himself against Belgium. The young president had an opportunity here to shift from Eisenhower's policy, removing Cold War context and crafting an American New Deal. Officials held divided views, even within the State Department. Some of the people

11:59 favored a softer approach than the European and Katanga lobby that existed in Congress and among the public. But JFK approved the activist program. Backing Leopoldville would be framed as supporting a reunification of Congo, no doubt more palatable to newly independent African states, but no different in substance than what Eisenhower may have done.

12:28 The road to democracy in the Congo did not lay through Washington. Mubato's ban on political activity expired with the new year. Soon, Kasavubu announced a new prime minister in cabinet while Mubato remained the strongman. This uneasy coalition prevailed for five years. The figurehead Kasavubu

12:56 plus the secession of prime ministers until Mubato emerged from the shadows with a coup that established his open domination. Surreal Adula, most prominent of the cabinet heads, would take the heat for the suppression of Katanga. In typical Congolese fashion, the emergence of Adula automatically alienated other factions and created separatist movements.

13:28 The scale of the Congo project necessitated close cooperation between the CIA and the U.S. military. The effort was massive. By May 1961, the Air Force had airlifted 20,000 UN troops and 6,000 tons of equipment. The Navy had brought in another 5,000 UN troops while taking home 2,600. Assistance to Leopoldville

13:55 included 18 helicopters, 10 C-47 aircraft, and five larger C-119s. At its full stride, the CIA burned money at the rate of a million dollars a day because the little fuckers killed Lumumba. Lumumba could have paid for everything that he wanted to had Washington allowed him to renegotiate the uranium deal.

14:29 Instead, thanks to the CIA and Belgium, they stole hundreds of millions of dollars from the American people. So Belgium could make a profit off of uranium that wasn't theirs. Washington attained its goal, a friendly government in Leopoldville, but the price amounted to disintegration of the country. They had a partner.

15:02 In Lumumba, they chose not to use it. With the creation of yet another secessionist regime in the southern Kase province, there was no less than four nations in the Congo. The entire thing was broke apart. And that's what they do, just like in Yugoslavia. They love doing that. They loved to watch people die.

15:31 The U.S. role became one of reinforcing Leopoldville until the U.N. forces or the Congolese army could reunite the land. The U.N. peacekeeping force came under criticism as a cat's paw for the Americans. Intelligence reporting clearly showed that the Belgians, both in transit and engaged, with their own angle to play, the Mubato-Adula,

16:01 hoping to divert secessionists with temporary alliances while enlisting the UN to disarm Shambi, after which Mubato's own troops would clean up the European nations, uneasy with the international measures taken. For many months, the CIA analysts, perhaps kept in the dark by the DO, failed to perceive Mubato's power.

16:30 consistently identifying a doula as the main Congolese player. In weekly tracking reports on events, the analysts followed the separatist, quote unquote, nations, constantly fearing a doula was the instigator of the Leopoldville maneuvers to take them down. And again, they have CIA boots on the ground. They're not there to provide intelligence.

17:01 The analysts are flying blind back at headquarters because they're the ones orchestrating all of this. One element that helped keep Mubato in the background is that his Congolese National Army would not fight. Or more properly, that the army was driven by the same cross-cutting loyalties of tribe and clan and afflicted Congolese.

17:32 politics, with the result that it was often an instrument of secession rather than international integration. Katanga got most of the attention in the world's eye while the CIA turned its gaze elsewhere. Specifically, the agency feared Anton Gazenza, who laid claim to the mantle of Lumumba. Gazenza

18:00 had visited Russia and studied in Prague. Impressing Washington as Moscow's man in Africa, he led a secessionist regime based in Stanleyville, which is kind of Lumumba's home turf. Gazenga's nation fell to a combination of CIA action. The man's own, well,

18:33 The CIA was helped by a doulas. The agency soon appreciated that Gazenza's key weaknesses were money and arms. He bought the loyalty of the local units, the Congolese military with weapons and cash, making backing critical. Reports were that he had the best paid army in the Congo.

19:00 The CIA discovered that the Russians were sending him cash in U.S. dollars and weapons. Washington deliberated on blocking the flow. On June 8th, the special group considered an action proposal. Allen Dulles warned of political dangers while the state and the Pentagon wanted to move ahead. Again, I'd have to see that cable or those notes.

19:32 the issue to the president. Kennedy would eventually approve it. Gazenga's arms deliveries were disrupted by the agency cleverly and successfully. The CIA knew that Czechoslovakia had begun sending merchant vessels to the Sudan, unusual in that almost all Soviet bloc trade had previously gone to West Africa. The CIA also knew that much of the tiny

20:02 check merchant fleet consisted of ships transferred by Beijing and the Chinese crews and probably secretly under Chinese control. Beijing had taken a very friendly position towards African independence movements, especially in the Congo. This is, it's the irony of this.

20:33 Because there's other countries out there that will support them that happen to be communist. And we're basically trying to keep them colonial. Somehow, we're the good guys and the communists are the bad guys. The Sudan associated itself closely with Egypt's Nasser, who the CIA estimated wanted to play a leading role and favored Gazengas in the Congo.

21:02 And the CIA hates Nasser, hates him. Sleuthing established that a Czech ship, probably one that was crewed by Chinese, but they don't know, was carrying a cargo of arms to the Sudan, ultimately bound for Gazenska. Washington considered asking Sudan to embargo the shipment.

21:33 But given Nasser's connection, rejected that approach in favor of public exposure. With some judicial payoffs in the port, the crane unloading the Czech flag vessel slipped as it carried the second pallet, dropping it and showing the arms on purpose. The shipment consigned as refugee aid.

22:00 was revealed as weapons. The Sudanese confiscated it all, halting the arms supply. Meanwhile, in Cairo, where Gazenga maintained an office, the CIA discovered a Russian plan to send the Congolese $1 million in U.S. currency. Agents were able to learn the itinerary of the courier that was sent to pick up the money. Larry Devlin arranged a surprise, again in Sudan.

22:30 Thanks to more bribes, the courier carrying a third of the cash in a suitcase was summoned to customs for an inspection. Terrified, he contrived to leave the suitcase in a bathroom. The CIA recovered it, making a profit on the operation. Gazinga's difficulties were greatly magnified. When his soldiers began holding up tribesmen to get their money, his prestige diminished quickly.

23:00 to just call your attention to this. The CIA, who passes themselves off as bungling idiots, that they can't figure out anything about what's going on to Lumumba the whole time they're there. As this book describes, we don't know what's going on. We're flying blind. Was able to track weapons to Czechoslovakia in the ship.

23:29 tell you exactly who was piloting the ship, find out what port it ported in, and paid them off to expose them. Then they're able to track down a courier out of a million Africans bringing money to the Congo in Egypt. Just let that rest there for a second. Abdullah supplied the next maneuver, getting Gazenga.

24:04 to accept the offer of a vice premier in the government, apparently without thinking through the politics. This connection with the Leopoldville government tarnished his Lumumba credentials and enabled a doula to demand his presence in the capital. Gazinga went on the lam instead, disappearing from Stanleyville, living for weeks in the bush so no official papers could be served on him.

24:34 virtually halting his political career. A fall 1961 conference where Gazinga had hoped to form a new national party flopped as a result, and a doula was able to get the National Assembly to vote to summon Gazinga to the capital. The next phase was overshadowed by events in Katanga. Mubato's troops failed in an attempt to take the province outright.

25:04 In September came an outbreak of fighting between Shambi's Katanga troops and the UN forces. This led to a forgotten chapter in the sword story of the Congo, the death of UN Secretary General Dog Hammersholtz. And we've talked about that a couple of years ago. He was coming to mediate the civil war. Now, keep in mind, Katanga had declared itself.

25:32 own country just for the sake of getting rid of Lumumba. And the fighting of the forces that NATO was supporting in Katanga didn't want to give up. They now own all their uranium and everything else. So they don't want, unless they're going to be in charge of the entire country, they don't want to give up what the NATO put them in charge of. They created a monster. So the UN

26:02 is coming to negotiate between the Congo-recognized government and the Katanga-recognized government. Because they're dumb. Evil. The Secretary General, a Swede, worried about events and the degree to which the UN seemed compromised by taking sides. On one leg of his shuttle, Hammersold's, was to meet with Shambi. Approaching the airfield, just across the border,

26:33 In what is now Zambia, on September 17th, the Secretary General's plane crashed, killing Hammersald and 13 others. Subordinates believe that the Katanga mercenaries shot the plane down. Since the Belgian Union minister financed much of Shambi's mercenary forces at the time, this conclusion, again, implicates Belgium.

27:02 But there were NATO forces in Katanga. Others insist the aircraft crashed due to mechanical failure. Shambi had beaten Mubato's troops thanks to his Western mercenary force and a jet fighter that had been given to him and used to support his troops. President Kennedy reluctantly issued an order that the U.S. would supply jet aircraft if they could not be gotten elsewhere. But Washington was safe.

27:34 From that escalation, when the Sweden and Indian sent planes of their own, incidents between Ashambi's troops and the UN multiplied. An uneasy truce lasted some weeks. Now CIA's Bronson Tweedy came to Katanga for a personal survey. He and Jim Doyle, long-term friends, their fathers had been at Princeton together, helped put out a fire burning.

28:03 a train filled with ammunition whose explosion might have destroyed much of Elizabethville. A December special national intelligence estimate found that the question of reintegrating Katanga had become so critical as to threaten the Adula government. Almost simultaneously, the truth collapsed as the UN went on the offensive. The peacekeeping troops.

28:35 went on the offensive. At the critical moment, Shambi was away on a trip to Paris and Brazil, where he went for a conference about rearmament, unwittingly observed by the CIA's political operatives. Washington sent a C-130 transport to move the UN reinforcements to Katanga. Shambi's troops and mercenaries fought a pitched battle for Elizabethville and were largely driven from the city.

29:05 but the UN was unable to secure much more than the headquarters, the airfield, and major installations. A fresh political accommodation would be negotiated among the UN, Shambi, and Abdullah. Shambi disputed and violated its terms for many months. Amid the horror of Katanga, Mubato and Abdullah took advantage of the unrest.

29:33 Gazinga, whom they had sent to jail, the Soviet media protested. In January of 62, UN forces captured Gazinga's capital at Stanleyville. Within the year, the topsy-turvy atmosphere of the Congolese politics, the National Assembly, would be demanding his release. In an April 1962 televised interview, former CIA director Alan Dulles

30:03 admitted that the CIA and the U.S. had overestimated the degree to which the Russians had involved themselves in the Congo. The premise of the entire venture had been a complete lie. That's how they sold it to Kennedy. The Katanga stalemate continued for more than a year. More dead bodies.

30:29 A special national intelligence estimate prepared at the agency in May of 1962 found the reintegration of Katanga essential for the future of the Congo, but the obstacles to action was unchanged. They are the ones that plotted the separation. That November, the State Department Intelligence Unit filled a lengthy research memorandum that made no judgment on the wisdom of military action, but warned against abandoning the UN forces.

30:59 The UN came up with a reintegration plan, but Shambi stalled it, then rejected it outright. In December, with Kennedy's National Security Council Executive Committee, the fabled EXCOMM, discussing Congo at the same meeting where it considered the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy demanded a fresh assessment of UN military capability in the context of a new operating plan for the Congo. Only a week later,

31:30 Fighting broke out between the UN forces and the Katanga forces again. Shambi's secessionist state collapsed. In his turn, he too went to prison. So we help him create his own state. We back him against Lumumba. They bring Lumumba to Katanga and murder him. And then we abandon him and they send him to jail.

32:02 And they wonder why people hate us. But as Cord Meyer explained to the President's Foreign Intelligent Advisory Board on 15 April 1963, the CIA's project in the Congo continued. The messy Coglandese affair boiled on. The Cuban operation represented the summit of a certain type of paramilitary action.

32:28 The Congolese project showcased a new style of combined CIA military activity. The frantic air of the operations branch of the CIA and the early CIA was gone. Paramilitary plans, they've matured. They're now going to basically drag the military into everything.

32:55 Paramilitary plans in Frank Wisner's time frequently involved grand schemes carried out against foreign governments. Kennedy's administration brought a shift towards operations in collaboration with established governments aimed at real or imagined domestic enemies. Well, the enemies the CIA told them were enemies. The Guyana Project, among the most prominent.

33:27 The failure in Cuba contributed to a change of emphasis, demonstrating a new resilience of target governments. Yet the change was in the wind before the first frogman stepped ashore at Playa Garan, propelled by a shift in view at the top level of the U.S. National security policy during Eisenhower administration combined the CIA's active paramilitary campaigns with military strategy.

33:56 That was radical in a different way. Eisenhower's policy rested upon the enormous power of nuclear weapons because he wanted to use them every time he turned around. The assumption that future wars would be nuclear and a desire to maintain the American economy, which Eisenhower felt could not grow in the face of large military budgets, then don't do this shit overseas and you won't have large military budgets.

34:26 Thus, his rigid and often arbitrary ceilings on budgets with atomic power emphasized, the ceilings required reductions elsewhere. These could only come from conventional forces. Eisenhower's period witnessed cutbacks in the strength of the Army and Marine Corps. Many opposed his policy, especially the Army.

34:56 one chief of staff resigned over it. With notable exceptions, other army generals also opposed Ike's new look. The CIA was the one shop with a common interest in the army's limited war capability. Paramilitary operations was limited war, possible contingencies for the employment of conventional force. As early as 1955, the CIA commissioned a study called Project

35:29 of the political, psychological, economic, and sociological factors that affected peripheral wars, meaning regime changes. The Center for International Studies, under economist Max Millikan of MIT, conducted the study, which is basically CIA, CIA, writing something that the CIA wants written.

35:59 Brushfire became one of the series of research contracts the CIA gave to MIT, which it had originally funded. On his copy of an information memo regarding Brushfire, Eisenhower's Joint Chiefs Chairman commented, I think the answers are so plain that it is a waste of money. That was probably Lyman Lemonsker. When Eisenhower, in early 1958, ordered a policy review on limited war,

36:30 versus full-scale conflict. The CIA wanted to be involved. John Foster Dulles sought to discourage Brother Allen's participation, saying the agency should be concerned with intelligence questions, not operational ones. Dulles allowed himself to be mollified by promises that the CIA would be permitted to look at it. Further limited war studies followed, and the CIA contributed.

36:59 but its interests were scarily known outside the government while army officers trumpeted their opposition to downsizing. The most prominent army spokesperson was General Maxwell Taylor. Specifically, Taylor asserted that the strategy of massive nuclear retaliation could not counter brushfire wars and that a strategy of flexible response could meet the

37:28 the threat at any level. At the CIA, which saw paramilitary action as a rung on the conflict ladder, the secret warriors undoubtedly cheered this approach. But at the White House, Eisenhower gave short shrift to Taylor's views. Again, they don't want to have a viable large military because they want the use of nuclear weapons to be their primary choice of weapons.

37:58 The general retired to write a book that advanced forces to meet the full spectrum of contingencies, including brush fire wars, as he called them. No doubt Tracy Barnes agonized over the Bay of Pigs, paid little attention when a letter crossed his desk on the last day of that disaster from James Cross at the Institute of Defense Analysis.

38:29 The letter commented on what Barnes had said about another CIA initiative, a study group on the deterrence of guerrilla warfare. Cross believed that officials already understood this problem. They had to be told how to make the most of assets in threatened areas. The study group had held a couple of working meetings. A draft paper on limited war written by CIA's Jim Critchfield already sat on the desk.

38:58 But Alan Dulles and Richard Bissell read it before the landing at the Bay of Pigs, and it received other circulation inside the CIA. One of Critchfield's recommendations provided for a survey of the assets for unconventional warfare and paramilitary operations. All this moved fast precisely because the CIA, in building bridges to the new president's inner sanctum,

39:25 had seen Kennedy's deep interest. Like two comments on intersecting trajectories, the rise of Maxwell Taylor would coincide with JFK's demand for action. After the Bay of Pigs failed, the inadequacy of efforts in the field of low-intensity warfare, basically guerrilla warfare, were glaringly evident. Fears that Russia would encourage wars of national liberation

39:58 What? Who would encourage liberation? Russia and not the democracy people? Good grief. This heightened concerns about the need to deter guerrilla warfare that would overthrow the Western friendly regimes. Kennedy wanted someone to answer a Khrushchev speech on which conflicts settled on his self-professed man of ideas, Walt.

40:31 Rostow, then the Deputy National Security Advisor. In mid-June, both the President and the NSC staff were watching over the proposed text of a presentation that Rostow would make at the Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Two weeks later, President Kennedy approved a directive providing a government-wide evaluation of paramilitary requirements.

40:56 This led to a top secret summer study that combined the themes of deterring guerrilla warfare, limited war, counterinsurgency, and paramilitary operations. Rostow watched this exercise closely. Another spark plug, the study formal chairman was going to be none other than Richard Bissell. In early July, a luncheon took place at CIA where Bissell set the direction for his policy review. He told Rostow,

41:25 and Bissell's initial overview paper borrowed heavily from Walt's speech. Very well known, once Rusto gave the talk at Fort Bragg. At the Pentagon, Ed Lansdale also prepared a paper, the first of several, which recited in bold numbers the staffing levels of special warfare units. In mid-July, Allen Dulles reported that the CIA had begun coordinating with Lansdale.

41:54 which is basically CIA sheep dipped into the Pentagon. Closely watched at the White House, Bissell's study became almost his swan song at the CIA. In contrast to pre-Cuba days, he now listened hard to what the White House had to say. From the NSC staff, Robert Comer suggested language for portions of the report, while Maxwell Tyler's staff, Colonel Julian,

42:27 Ewell, the general's kind of strong-arm guy, soaked up Bissell's comments and gave back Taylor's responses. Bissell's paper grew odd tentacles in successive drafts over the fall of 1961, presenting an update on covert action procedures to Kennedy's Killian board.

42:53 Bissell suddenly spoke of regaining public confidence in the CIA's covert action by revealing the existence of the special group, much as Eisenhower had once revealed the Killian board. At another point, Bob Comer did a summary of Bissell's paper in which he inserted the recommendation to vest high-level authority in the special group, which Taylor headed. That measure did not appear in Bissell's original.

43:22 which his assistant, John Bross, distributed in November of 21, or on the 21st. Although Comer assured Bissell that his summary changes changed nothing in the paper, he told his boss, McGeorge Bundy, quote, I took advantage of Walt's imminent departure, Restow would leave the NSC staff for the State Department, to press for what I think is the most logical solution, tag Taylor.

43:51 and the special group with this task, unquote. Bissell let this pass without comment. Everyone had an agenda. Walt Rostow wanted to center U.S. thinking about dissident movements and insurgencies within the framework of stages of economic growth. The CIA's deputy focused his interest on the agency's role in these events.

44:21 So just to kind of reiterate this, dissident movements would be the Tupamarys in Latin America, right? They've installed a military dictator who's basically privatized everything and allowed Western corporations to come in and rape over the people. And anybody that opposes that is now considered a dissident.

44:47 And if they actually try to get rid of the dictator, they're called insurgents. And then us going in to support the dictator and thwart the people is called counterinsurgency. Although we were the insurgents that installed the military dictator to begin with. If you guys can follow that. It's absolutely ridiculous. This is a quote from Richard Bissell. A general problem.

45:17 in threatened underdeveloped countries is threatened underdeveloped countries. They're threatened by us, not their own people. Is that of developing and strengthening the basic governmental and social institutions that are prerequisites to modernization. But we're the ones that tear them down. We're the ones that infiltrate their social movements.

45:49 to use them to control the government. The CIA talking about strengthening and developing government and social institutions in a foreign country is one of the most oxymoron things I've ever read in a book. In some cases, as in the Congo, the local leadership is responsive to the need for change, but lacks the background and competence to take that needed step on its own. Yeah, no.

46:22 Lumumba didn't. He didn't lack any of that. He graduated from college. He knew exactly what he was doing. You didn't like what he was doing. He goes on. In other cases, a frustrating and exasperating problem in countries severely plagued by communist political and military subversion is the reluctance bordering on blind obstinacy of the government leaders to admit the need for reform.

46:55 We haven't found the communist one yet. And they're saying, I'm not a communist. I don't need the CIA's help. And the CIA then says, you're a communist and you're refusing our help. In these cases, the traditional and internationally accepted tools of government to government diplomacy are unlikely by themselves.

47:23 to provide the guidance or the resources to achieve the reforms and changes essential to winning broad-based popular support for the national regime. Let me dissect that because this is actually, it just gets crazier and crazier. They are unlikely by themselves to provide the guidance or the resources to achieve the reforms and changes essential.

47:59 to winning broad-based popular... They were elected fucking presidents and prime ministers. They already had broad support. You just didn't like them. In such situations, the broad range of covert action measures available to us offers our best and only chance of increasing our leverage and achieving needed change. This is one of the most damning passages.

48:35 that I've ever read in a book. And that's a quote from Richard Bissell. Bissell foresaw a suitable covert operational methodology that would involve funding and guidance channels of bona fide private, international, or regional organizations. You know, like USAID and National Endowment for Democracy. They wanted to focus on labor.

49:08 like they put in National Endowment for Democracy and the Labor Union International School in Washington, D.C. They also wanted to infiltrate youth movements, farm unions, veterans groups, and create confidential relationships with local political leaders. Buy them. Buy them. And covertly fund consultants.

49:45 in the local area. There could also be a CIA role strengthening internal security and defense. Yeah, just pay them, buy them off, control them. They would also recommend including cross-border operations like they did all over Latin America. With a finely honed sense of the dangers inherent in this, the paper admitted such tactics would become almost unpredictably

50:23 Dangerous. Dangerous for who? The people you intend to kill when you overthrow their government? Round up and put in black site prisons and torture them? It became very dangerous for those people. If the adversary believed there existed a possibility that he or she might be overthrown or lose their territory, they may take action and make it dangerous for the CIA.

50:56 He also added, quote, What the hell? I'm about ready to throw up. The advantage is lost if an offensive, meaning a CIA attack on a foreign country's government structure, against the aggressor.

51:30 That's the CIA, not that country. The CIA is the, see how they flip the words around? That country managing its own shit is not an aggressor to anybody. Another important theme, which fed back to Walt Rostow's advocacy, was that public expression would be given to the rationale. On December 8th, the final counter guerrilla warfare.

52:06 task force paper contained Richard Bissell's statement of the techniques the Kennedy administration imagined would make the world safe for democracy. The counter-guerrilla warfare task force is a guerrilla warfare task force attacking a foreign sovereign country.

52:32 It also met Robert Comer's agenda, saying that, quote, because of its responsibility in directly related fields and because the agencies chiefly concerned are already represented on it, expansion of the mandate of the NSC special group seems the most effective way to carry out the function, unquote. The special group would designate threatened countries and for each of them, Washington would form a task force. Again.

53:04 The countries are not threatened. The United States oligarchs are threatened. Bissell's last act would thus be to move Kennedy to reorganize his machinery for covert action. In fact, the special group talked over Bissell's report on December 14th. General Taylor formalized the early ad hoc procedures, drafting a directive that Kennedy approved on January 18th, 1962.

53:34 Because there has been confusion about Kennedy's leadership in the secret war, this structure is worth underlining. The president established a special group. The abbreviation stood for counterinsurgency. It was called Special Group CI to formulate plans on guerrilla warfare matters in any country so designated. The existing special group, formerly the 5412 group,

54:04 the matters continued and said the nomenclature had now been reversed. The 5412 group became the insider jargon. A third special group also appeared. The special group augmented. The difference was that Max Taylor chaired the 5412 group existing since Truman, while Bobby Kennedy chaired the special group augmented.

54:39 Identical, save for his addition and its specific focus on Cuba. Maxwell Taylor had been a paratrooper. In the Army in his time, paratroopers were considered military elite. Solidly cast in the airborne mold, Max Taylor was unusual, just as Kennedy thought. More typical was the Army officer who throughout the 1950s hindered the development of special forces.

55:10 The 10th Special Forces Group had been in place at Fort Bragg since June of 1952. The September 1953, it had been supplemented by 77th Group, which remained in the U.S. while almost 800 men of the 10th Group deployed to Western Germany, where they occupied an old German army barracks at Bad Tolls in Bavaria. You know, where...

55:39 Hitler's hanging out and the Galen organization. This expansion coincided with the return of the Korean War veterans, a major source of special forces recruits. Subsequent growth slowed to a small pace as anxious army generals preserved conventional units as best they could. Preoccupied with adjusting to nuclear war, the brass had little advocates.

56:10 for unconventional warfare. The German deployment became the first giant step. At bad tolls, the 10th Special Forces planned for partisan campaigns in Eastern Europe and showed that they could do NATO maneuvers. Detachments sent from the US and other nations to help training inaugurated a special force role.

56:40 That has endured ever since. A permanent presence in the Far East began in 1956 when provisional teams went to Hawaii, then to Okinawa. In 1957, this became the first Special Forces group. Special Forces began missions in Laos as early as 1959, and in 1960, they appeared in South Vietnam training Vietnamese Rangers. A wave of disillusionment swept through Special Forces

57:10 CIA when Eisenhower took no action during the Hungarian revolt. The unconventional warfare experts also smarted from their encounters with army bureaucracy, which banned the wearing of special forces headgear the green beret. Dedication was a valued attribute of special forces, but a person needed a lot to stay on the teams at the time. By 1960, the special forces group had tripled

57:38 and amounted to about 2,000. As military formations go, special forces group represented something new. One component, an administrative base, served the needs of many teams called operational detachments. From group headquarters, the C team provided control and intelligence for a large area, while the B team did the same for a region. The operational detachment A team

58:10 Ha ha ha, ODA, A-Team, Detachment A. These had a wide range of skilled experts, technical and medical, and combat leadership. The basic concept for the A-Team essentially led a large partisan force or a training cadre. Special forces recruited experienced officers and NCOs, selected only the best, and then cross-trained their team members.

58:40 in the required skills. The notion of special forces commands for regions and countries with a team for the field force clearly aimed at organizing resistance to an adversary's military advance or occupation. This essential function, similar to the CIA's stay-behind nets, weird that you'd be using A-teams which weren't the stay-behinds and marrying them to the CIA stay-behinds.

59:11 Oh, we're so good, you guys. We're so good. The latter became a key task in counterinsurgency. Actually, insurgency. Here, special forces at last found the role that sustained it through Vietnam.

59:27 This only became evident later. Good fortune came to Special Forces with the election of JFK. Within days, JFK's inauguration, one of the president's NSC staff, Walt Rostow, began questioning the adequacy of Varney's training for guerrilla warfare. Special Forces ran counterinsurgency courses at Fort Bragg. These emphasized the economic, social, political, and psychological origins of war.

59:55 Special forces seem to be on top of the subject. President Kennedy saw a major role for special forces knowledge in his redesign. Okay. I'm going to stop right there for the weekend. This is crazy. Bringing it home with the A-team, just got to say. I know. I mean, this is so crazy that we have figured all of this stuff out on our own.

1:00:28 And then as soon as we figure something out, we find a book that actually says it. It's crazy. Okay, Alon, go ahead. Okay, Colonel, I just wanted to mention, I didn't catch all of the show, but this is in the years where Congo and Indonesia were kind of paralleling each other in many ways.

1:01:05 You know, both in CIA history and to some degree in the United Nations history. And again, just... We lost you. Yeah, we lost him. Take him down, Bridget, please, and bring him back up. Ron, go ahead. A couple things. You know, you said, what was it, brush fire? When you said brush fire, I immediately thought of prairie fire. Do you know what prairie fire was?

1:01:46 Prairie Fire was the publication of the weather underground. Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah. Now, I'm just trying to draw a parallel there. I'm not saying it's exactly the same, but it's right around the same time. And I don't know if it's similar or not, but we're talking about all this stuff about we're telling everybody else that they're all communists when essentially what we're doing is we're putting people up that are communists everywhere. And I looked up.

1:02:15 rosto on amazingly jacobin.com and i actually put it in the purple pill and it literally says that he his he advocated for capitalism by virtue of brutal um uh by brutal war tactics against other other countries yes yes they're they're predators yeah 100 and you know max taylor

1:02:44 Max Taylor was head of the 82nd Airborne and the 101st Airborne. He actually would have been at Bastogne, but he was in D.C. at the time because they were figuring he wouldn't have been there. But the guy who said nuts to the Germans should have been – that was Taylor's subordinate because Taylor was in D.C. at the time.

1:03:04 But Taylor was, like Galen, Taylor was a guy who was running a lot of these spec ops guys in World War II. So, FYI, I didn't know if you knew that or not, but anyway. Yeah, Rusto, I've come across him several times. Everything to him was economics, and he was 100% kind of the,

1:03:33 mental thought between developing economic warfare as a policy in the early days. Can I ask a question? You said XCOM in there, and then you said something about, like, did XCOM continue after the missile crisis? Oh, yeah, they're not done. Yeah, they're not done. That was created because of the missile crisis, was it not?

1:04:05 Yeah. But then they just kept on going. Interesting. Looked up Rostow on Yandex. His original name is Rostowski. Well, I think his name was, they says Walt Whitman Rostow. And I'm like, what? Yeah. Yeah. His real name is, he's originally from Odessa in Ukraine.

1:04:40 His family, not him, his family migrated to the United States from the area of modern day Ukraine. His father and their name was Rostovsky. Do you know if he was CFR? I don't. I can't imagine he was not.

1:05:15 Because his big thing was he was very much in the anti-communist, everything anti-communist kind of thing. Let's see. He's a Yale. Yeah, he was. Yeah, he's a Yale at age 15. Rhodes Scholar. So he just fits all of the right squares. Every single box checked. Yeah.

1:05:50 Yep, yep, yep, yep. Okay. All along, go ahead and finish, and then I'll let Warhamster go. Yeah, Carol, can you hear me? Yeah. Okay, yeah. Two points. One about the parallel of Indonesia and Congo between 58 and 1963 and the ensuing genocides that happened in both countries. Yeah. Because...

1:06:24 UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold, they were his two focus, foci, I guess, plural, I hope, at the time of his death, right? Yeah. They were also key areas in the international mining cartel. Yep. Which also underwent extreme changes in the world mining cartel.

1:06:53 you know, with Brazil, Indonesia, and Congo, that's quite the tic-tac-toe, as it were, in international mining. So what I think would be worth looking at much more closely is, you know, changes in international mining, development of an internationalist syndicate cartel directly following in the five to eight years.

1:07:18 After the JFK assassination, because, you know, both we know that JFK and Hammerskjold were kind of on the similar pages regarding both Indonesia and Congo. And so, yeah, I think that's worth remembering that Dag Hammerskjold was just as focused on Indonesia as he was on Congo and JFK was as well.

1:07:47 And then both had sudden health complications. And also, the thing about Walt Rostow. They murdered him. That's the sudden health thing. Go ahead. Well, when you own the alphabet, it's always free to kick out three letters now and then. It makes for quicker reading. Also, regarding Walt Rostow, he is a very interesting figure.

1:08:15 You know, his whole shtick was modernization theory, right? Right. And he's the short and long of it is it's like try to apply a kind of uniform, what might be called state capitalist imperialist, or if you prefer military Keynesianism model that would work around the world, regardless of each country's national unique situation in their history. Right.

1:08:45 So in this model, look, if some people are interfering with your plans to relocate, I don't know, some zany North Vietnamese citizenry down in Saigon or in the suburb across the pond, hey, they're blocking the invisible hand itself of capitalism, which is really Keynesian.

1:09:13 military keynesianism it's planned out so in other words this is another way that you can just use mumbo jumbo theory to ignore a individual nation's historical circumstance and it's just another excuse you know to impose your will on a country perfect for cia's model of do whatever the fuck you want and call them communists right yeah

1:09:39 I agree. I also wanted to add that Rostow is also famous for his stance. He got pissed off at Eisenhower because Eisenhower would not commit to using tactical nuclear weapons in the French war in Vietnam. Warhamster, go ahead. Hey there. Happy Friday.

1:10:13 Our little Ukrainian friend, what I'd like to know is what his or his family's connections are to the Azov Battalion. And I say that because we already know that, in fact, they ended up CIA or CIA adjacent. We already knew that Alan Dulles had some great Nazi connections in the Nazis, of course, in the Azov Battalion. Yep. They were basically a farm system. If you find anything with the Azov Battalion, I'll be very interested. Yeah. Good point.

1:10:42 Yeah, it'd be interesting to look into his family a little bit more. Maybe I'll try to do that this weekend. The Azov Battalion would have been a great source of behind-the-iron-curtain intelligence if that connection is real. Obviously, we had some stay-behind units behind the Berlin Wall, but I don't think we've ever made that direct connection to the Ukraine as far as I know. Well, what connection?

1:11:09 Well, they actually, I mean, someone came out of Azov and then came over to the American CIA. I don't think we've... So at the time, they were not Azov. So they were Banderites. Okay, sure. Yeah. So at that time, we basically, because all of the stay behind, we had, obviously, Hitler had stay behinds in all of that area. Most of all of them relocated to Germany and hung out there.

1:11:39 And the CIA tried, not the leaders, not like Bandera and Leadbet and Stetsco, but the underlings, they tried to put them back into the Ukraine area and all of them were killed.

1:11:53 Every single time they inserted a unit back into Ukraine, they were decimated. The same thing happened to Ukraine that happened in Hungary, that happened in Albania, that happened in Poland. They would just like literally kill them as soon as they came across the line. So they basically abandoned that inserting those stay-behinds back in. They basically cultivated them in the US territory.

1:12:23 basically the NATO territory temporarily and didn't go back until much later. And when they went back and was able to basically rebirth the stay-behind capabilities through the Azov and right sector networks, that was much later. So just so everybody, if anybody's going to look that up.

1:12:53 You would want to actually look at all of that in combination. And a lot of them ended up here. Stetsco did. So anyway, all along. Go ahead. Yeah, Colonel. Relation to Walt Rostow, you know, and kind of the contradictions between national sovereignty versus kind of a one size fits all international.

1:13:32 internationalist, you know, theory of development that he called modernization theory, which was very much fashionable in the early 1960s and late 1950s in U.S. academia with their good buddies, the CIA. It's worth remembering, you know, that his brother, Eugene Rostow, was and I have him hitting second in.

1:14:02 as far as lineups of influences on Lyndon Baines Johnson and the formation of the Dulles Committee that we know as the Warren Commission, right? And I think for me, the number one influence would be Joe Alsop of the Washington Post and CIA. Yeah. Number two would be Eugene Rostow, Dean of Yale Law School in the, you know, extremely friendly state of Connecticut.

1:14:34 Morioga. And number three, I have as basically Dean Acheson, you know, the not exactly anglophobic guy, former Secretary of State. So, you know, Eugene Rostow, his brother, it might be worth noting that in relationship to Walt Rostow. Yeah. Okay. Anybody else got anything? Nope.

1:15:14 All right. We're going to finish a little early today. All right, everybody. Thanks for hanging in there. This week's been a crazy week. I mentioned at the beginning of the show that Warhamster and I will do our next session at noon on Sunday live. And just look, we're going to do another Tommy podcast with the normal.

1:15:46 folks tomorrow morning at 11. And let's see, let me go into next week. I don't have anything special on the calendar, so it all looks fairly normal next week. But anyway. Renee has her hand up. Okay, go ahead, Renee.

1:16:20 Hey, everyone. Good afternoon. Happy Friday. Just wanted to share, finally got a chance to watch you and Joaquin on Tommy's podcast. That was a hoot, especially when he lost connection. That cracked me up because if he were only with us in the beginning of this journey where that happened every single time.

1:16:47 It was like he was new to that whole experience. Yes. Yeah, it was great. So I'm curious. It was a great show. Where did Tommy encounter this Joaquin? Because he didn't have any links or information about him. So he's not on social media. He's not on X. He has a Telegram page, I'm told.

1:17:16 It was through other guests. So Tommy's the ultimate networker. He had other guests on that had came across him. And he had just recently had him on another show. And on the other show, he starts talking about the Albert Einstein Institute. And Tommy had written that down a few shows ago when I mentioned it.

1:17:41 And he was like, oh, holy shit, they're talking about the same thing. And so he reached out to me and said, hey, I just had this guy on my show and he's talking about the Albert Einstein. I think you guys are doing the same stuff. Do you wanna do a show together? And I said, sure, absolutely. And then I found out just prior to the show that he's over in Serbia and he acts as a Eastern Europe consultant on guarding yourself against

1:18:10 gladio shit um and that's i jokingly said to him you mean i could make money doing this um and so i'm not living in eastern europe to do it but um yeah so that's it was all on tommy um tommy is the ultimate networker when it comes to stuff like that so you should get paid to teach people to fight against the gladio shit right here in your own backyard well um

1:18:38 I can't even get the people that are in our network to even repost a post of mine, Warhamster. Well, that's a different conversation for another day. I'm just talking about commercializing all this knowledge. If they can do it in Eastern Europe, you can do it here because the Gladio operation we're witnessing right in front of our eyes coming out of D.C. is really easy to see. I know, but it doesn't get any traction. You know, you have your stuff. Huh? I repost your stuff.

1:19:07 Ron, how big is your ex-account? No, not very big. Okay, that's what I'm talking about. I'm talking about people with hundreds of thousands of followers that all follow me. And not a freaking one of them will repost a single post of mine. Not one. They won't comment on them. Yeah, but what they will do is they'll regurgitate the material and get it wrong. Yes, they do that all the time. Yeah, I've had more and more big accounts start following me lately.

1:19:37 And no interaction whatsoever. None. Not even people in our own network. And the really weird thing about that, again, I'm not complaining. I'm happy to do what I do. But people like Alpha Warrior will be invited to very high-level meetings. And people gush at him about the material.

1:20:06 that have very large accounts that follow me, but they'll talk to him about me, but not me. Well, obviously, I know the feeling. Yeah, it's very, very weird. Anyway, all along, go ahead. Yeah, Colonel, I think that what you're describing here is very important and worth analyzing. I know it can seem kind of fuzzy when you...

1:20:38 don't have access to things like details because so much of it is going on kind of sub rosa in, in terms of what is permitted dialogue in the overall media ecology. Again, I know that phrase media ecology sounds pretentious AF, but I still think it's necessary because what folks know, like the no fly zones.

1:21:08 You are no fly zone. I definitely am. And, you know, people sense that based on what you say versus what they don't see in other places. And the message is clear. Like, you know, if I post you, it works towards self-censorship and it really cuts down on, you know, political fluidity of of audience that's able to access some information. And it's like.

1:21:38 I see it everywhere now, this kind of self-censorship about, you know, especially like, I'm not going to name any names, but certain couple, three writers who know a lot about CIA history, deep state history, national security, state history, as its earlier name was. And it's like, you know, the trendy thing now is, you know, everything is Israel. Everything is Mossad.

1:22:08 Very little is CIA. And look, I mean, I, you know, try to overcome that binary by, you know, speaking about Israel the way they should be, in my opinion, genocidal Zionists. But at the same time, you know, and I try to be unequivocal about that, because if you don't, you're going to be called, you know, you're damned if you do and damned if you don't. But at the same time, I see all of these writers, you know, just going along with that.

1:22:40 The narrative that especially is targeting the controlled left. And I do mean controlled in terms of everything. Almost everything is emphasizing Mossad. And it's like, what the fuck happened to the CIA? You know, it's just, you know, it's a we know it's a cat's paw game. Yet when when you say when you only mentioned paw and never mentioned cat and then.

1:23:10 You correct them and they try to say, well, it's the same thing. Well, actually, it's not if you never call it that. If you only mention the paw and never the cat, it's actually not the same thing. It's psychological warfare that you are aiding the CIA in perpetuating. And I see it everywhere these days. Yeah. Yeah. Ron, go ahead. You know, I just want to say that, you know, I'm glad that Warhamster's here.

1:23:42 You know, Warhamster and you, Colonel, and, you know, a few others, I would consider to be experts in history and understanding. You know, and for some odd reason, you know, because I'm not nearly as knowledgeable as you guys. I can hold, you know, I can hold my own, but you got, I mean, you two are.

1:24:13 way better than me. I have my areas of strength. But it's interesting because, you know, we're the ones that actually get in there and dig deep and do the deep dives and do the research and whatnot. But nobody wants to hear what we have to say because we're too, maybe we're too deep. I don't know. But, you know, I can understand the frustration that you have. I absolutely understand the frustration that you have. But I would just, you know, I know I'm...

1:24:41 I know I'm just a small account, but, you know, I have so much respect for you and your knowledge and your thirst, your insatiable.

1:24:52 desire to understand this and to expand and to go places and to have an open mind. You know, that is, it is, it is, it is exceedingly rare, but you come, you combine that with the fact of your military, uh, uh, knowledge, you know, there are so few people that I'm, my humble opinion, there are so few people that have your credentials and understanding of how the world works. And, you know, it's, it's, it's there.

1:25:21 It's their – the people who don't want to have you on, it's their loss. And I know that sucks, but it's their loss. And, you know, I love the shows that you go on with the colonel, the guy in Arizona, the one you did yesterday. Steven. Steve. Steve. Steve Maria. Yeah. He was on my show the day that – what's his name?

1:25:49 I know. So, but, you know, I mean, he's amazing. I love his group. I love Rich's group and Tim's group. That little circle that you're in, you know, in my humble opinion, that's going to keep growing. And I believe you're going to bear some fruit from that. But I just, you know, just keep doing what you're doing. Oh, we already have. I mean, a lot, actually. And I don't.

1:26:17 mean to come across, I'm not frustrated. I just call a spade a spade. It was very eye-opening to me because my expectation was that if you do the work, then the people that are quote unquote on our side would elevate that.

1:26:40 message, not me, the message, the material. I don't take any of this personal. It's very revealing to me that what I observe. So please don't misunderstand. I echo that sentiment. Listen, you're not the crybaby type, okay? And I wasn't suggesting that by any stretch of the imagination.

1:27:09 I understand your frustration, I guess, is the point I'm trying to make. Ron, what I see happen all the time is, first of all, we don't do this to make a living, and some others do. And they've got years of telling a story, and they're not going to let their little fiefdom hear that their story was wrong. They're going to try to add to it gradually at their own pace so it makes it look like they discovered these things. But when you're trying to do this for a living, they get very jealous about guarding.

1:27:38 You know, their fiefdom and their little audience. And, you know, you're not going to, they just won't bring in somebody who knows this topic better than them if it challenges what they've been doing. And they should be doing just the opposite. If the whole mission. Right. That's the point. Go ahead. If the whole mission is truth. Yes. Then I don't care where it comes from. Yes. That's my point. Yeah. Check your ego at the front door, please. Because, but again, you know, you have to look at a lot of these people, you know.

1:28:05 Well, if I may, both you and Colonel are two of the very few people who do check your ego at the door and only care about the truth. And I respect the hell out of both of you guys. Yeah, that's a much better way of saying it, Warhamster. Thank you for adding that. That's the thing that amazed me. It actually was astonishing to me that they spend every day.

1:28:34 talking about the truth movement and stuff like that, but then they don't encourage the people that are actually breaking ground with truth that no one has ever heard about, especially on the military side. It's just very interesting to me, just an observation. So anyway,

1:29:04 You definitely feel that there's a lot of inorganic things going on. And I'm just an observer of things like that. I take note of things as they happen. And I'm much more sensitive to watching how these things play out only because of the knowledge that I've gained over the last...

1:29:34 three and a half years. And please don't misunderstand anything that I said. I would not be where I am reaching the people that I am without all of you. It is every single one of you guys that repost anything has elevated our message across the board. All of you guys that log in and watch the Rumble shows.

1:29:58 the people that go over to Substack and read it. I mean, at one point, I don't even check it anymore as far as, because I didn't even know they did this, but our Substack account was like number 10 of international, I forget even what the category was called. I think I screenshotted it and sent it to Bridget. It was like a year ago on international.

1:30:21 I don't know, something, something, political commentary or something like that. I don't know. But it's just because you guys go there and you read the material, you share it. And that's what this is all about is getting the message out. And I do realize just because I pay attention to, as a premium member, they post things about.

1:30:49 the algorithms and stuff like that. And they definitely pick and choose. They basically said that of the different accounts that get more traffic. So we have only gotten to where we are because of all of you. And Renee, go ahead. Yeah. And to add to that, I truly don't understand.

1:31:18 I'm not a techie person. But joining the ex-Twitter whole platform, which is Elon's operation, I just don't understand. He's such a beacon of truth and transparency and against censorship. But it seems we get a shadow ban, block all this funky business for the past couple of years with you.

1:31:47 And I'm like, what the hell is with this platform? It's like we need a John McAfee to create a backdoor to go into their backdoor to see what the hell's going on here. Because it's kind of hypocritical that Elon, who takes over X and goes to other countries, you know, pissing off their governments about censorship. And then this platform, there's still bugs and issues. I have a big issue with that. But I also have...

1:32:14 A lot in my heart for you and all you're doing and Bridget and Warhamster, everybody here. And I'm sure we feel privileged to be on this journey with you and are grateful for you sticking with it.

1:32:32 It's, yeah, it's not, it's a jagged little pill. There's the red pill, the blue pill, the black pill, but there's a lot of, they don't talk about the jagged little pill of being on this platform and all this nonsense that you've gone through. Yeah. I think one of the things that Elon's facing are corporate stay-behind units. Just like we see it in the bureaucracy that Trump's facing. It's the exact same playbook over and over again. They do have stay-behind units.

1:33:00 You know, you've seen Elon get pissed at stuff going on with Twitter over the last, you know, three or four years. And, you know, he fears someone got ousted. But there's all kinds of bad actors still left behind at that company. Yep. Yeah, I mean, and that just happened to, you know, Tommy. The day after he had Joe Kent call into that show, his account got suspended. And it was for something that was...

1:33:27 completely ridiculous. And oh, by the way, the day after we did that show, my Twitter, whatever, Bridget showed me how you can look at the analysis of your account. It like dropped to probably 20% of the activity, like overnight and has not recuperated.

1:33:54 So there's definitely stay behind at X, definitely. First in the pudding. You can't deny, you know, they gave us the ability to look at the analytics. Yes. And the analytics tell the story. Yes. You get a million views on one post, and then it craters. And it's like a governor, and it governs for a certain number of days. It's never the same.

1:34:25 And then all of a sudden you'll see it release. And the release has got to be because of the followers. It's teamwork. That's what's happened in the past. Yeah, that's what happened in the past. When Bridget would bring that to my attention, I would put a post out there, which I hate doing, that basically says, you know, the governor's back on. And then you guys go crazy and it breaks. And then it stays fine for several days.

1:34:56 until I say something I'm not supposed to. And then you'd see it happen again. It's just, it's crazy. But just, you know, because we're on this journey together, I want to share that stuff with you guys. Definitely not complaining. I appreciate all of you guys being here. But I want you to understand the...

1:35:21 the atmosphere, the surroundings of what is going on. But there's so many people that are good. Crypto Rich is one of them. Tommy's one of them. War Hamster that we have and Steve on his round table that I've started doing. It's an amazing group of people. I'm very blessed.

1:35:49 that the people that do hear the message have been so supportive. And it definitely keeps me motivated to keep doing what I'm doing. So I'm not going anywhere. Okay. We need to get one of those Doge kids or Elon's rocket scientists onto this nonsense. Well, you know, again, I know that...

1:36:16 There's mechanisms, and I know that other people do it, the big accounts. You can pay X to promote your post. I just refuse to do it. There's all kinds of things. People hire companies that will help promote their, I just, I'm not going to do any of that.

1:36:39 Our stuff is organic. Our stuff is going to always be that way. I'm not at all involved in that. We've done this together and we're gonna stay in it together. We're not allowing our platform to be used for stuff like that. So anyway, what you see is what you get. All right, you guys have a wonderful weekend.

1:37:08 And I will, like I said, tomorrow there will be a Tommy show first thing in the morning. I think we do it at 11. And then as soon as he releases it, I'll repost it. I did see that he made another account. I don't know that you're supposed to do that. But so I will promote his new account.

1:37:33 at the right time. And then Warhamster and I will be on Sunday at noon. So you guys have a wonderful weekend. Talk to you later.

Entities here

CIA21 Walt Rostow18 Richard M. Bissell Jr.14 Maxwell D. Taylor11 Vietnam7 John F. Kennedy7 National Security Council6 Dwight D. Eisenhower6 Congo5 Project Brushfire5 Ukraine5 Allen Dulles5 Azov Battalion4 Fort Bragg4 Robert Komer4 Eugene V. Rostow3 20th Special Forces Group3 Department of Defense2 Mossad2 Operation Gladio2 Cuba2 Israel2 Washington, D.C.2 National Endowment for Democracy2 Dag Hammarskjold2 Albert Einstein Institute2 Roman Shukhevych2 Hungary2 Tracy Barnes2 James Crosby2 U.S. Intelligence Board2 James Critchfield2 Bad Tölz2 Warren Commission1 Okinawa1 Albania1 Serbia1 Bavaria1 Yale University1 The Washington Post1

Claims made here

CIA funded Project Brushfire documented ▶ 34:56

“one chief of staff resigned over it. With notable exceptions, other army generals also opposed Ike's new look. The CIA was the one shop with a common interest in the army's limited war capability. Par…”

Center for Strategic and International Studies headed Max Millikan documented ▶ 35:29

“of the political, psychological, economic, and sociological factors that affected peripheral wars, meaning regime changes. The Center for International Studies, under economist Max Millikan of MIT, co…”

Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered_assassination_of Project Brushfire documented ▶ 35:59

“Brushfire became one of the series of research contracts the CIA gave to MIT, which it had originally funded. On his copy of an information memo regarding Brushfire, Eisenhower's Joint Chiefs Chairman…”

Maxwell D. Taylor opposed Dwight D. Eisenhower documented ▶ 36:59

“but its interests were scarily known outside the government while army officers trumpeted their opposition to downsizing. The most prominent army spokesperson was General Maxwell Taylor. Specifically,…”

Dwight D. Eisenhower rejected Maxwell D. Taylor documented ▶ 37:28

“the threat at any level. At the CIA, which saw paramilitary action as a rung on the conflict ladder, the secret warriors undoubtedly cheered this approach. But at the White House, Eisenhower gave shor…”

James Crosby wrote_to Tracy Barnes documented ▶ 37:58

“The general retired to write a book that advanced forces to meet the full spectrum of contingencies, including brush fire wars, as he called them. No doubt Tracy Barnes agonized over the Bay of Pigs, …”

James Critchfield wrote Project Brushfire documented ▶ 38:29

“The letter commented on what Barnes had said about another CIA initiative, a study group on the deterrence of guerrilla warfare. Cross believed that officials already understood this problem. They had…”

Richard M. Bissell Jr. read James Critchfield documented ▶ 38:58

“But Alan Dulles and Richard Bissell read it before the landing at the Bay of Pigs, and it received other circulation inside the CIA. One of Critchfield's recommendations provided for a survey of the a…”

Allen Dulles read James Critchfield documented ▶ 38:58

John F. Kennedy approved National Security Council documented ▶ 40:31

“Rostow, then the Deputy National Security Advisor. In mid-June, both the President and the NSC staff were watching over the proposed text of a presentation that Rostow would make at the Special Warfar…”

Richard M. Bissell Jr. headed National Security Council documented ▶ 40:56

“This led to a top secret summer study that combined the themes of deterring guerrilla warfare, limited war, counterinsurgency, and paramilitary operations. Rostow watched this exercise closely. Anothe…”

CIA coordinated_with Edward Lansdale documented ▶ 41:25

“and Bissell's initial overview paper borrowed heavily from Walt's speech. Very well known, once Rusto gave the talk at Fort Bragg. At the Pentagon, Ed Lansdale also prepared a paper, the first of seve…”

Robert Komer suggested_language_for Richard M. Bissell Jr. documented ▶ 41:54

“which is basically CIA sheep dipped into the Pentagon. Closely watched at the White House, Bissell's study became almost his swan song at the CIA. In contrast to pre-Cuba days, he now listened hard to…”

Julian Ewell conveyed_responses_for Maxwell D. Taylor documented ▶ 42:27

“Ewell, the general's kind of strong-arm guy, soaked up Bissell's comments and gave back Taylor's responses. Bissell's paper grew odd tentacles in successive drafts over the fall of 1961, presenting an…”

Richard M. Bissell Jr. proposed National Security Council documented ▶ 42:53

“Bissell suddenly spoke of regaining public confidence in the CIA's covert action by revealing the existence of the special group, much as Eisenhower had once revealed the Killian board. At another poi…”

Robert Komer recommended Maxwell D. Taylor documented ▶ 42:53

Robert Komer reported_to McGeorge Bundy documented ▶ 43:22

“which his assistant, John Bross, distributed in November of 21, or on the 21st. Although Comer assured Bissell that his summary changes changed nothing in the paper, he told his boss, McGeorge Bundy, …”

Richard M. Bissell Jr. wrote National Security Council documented ▶ 53:04

“The countries are not threatened. The United States oligarchs are threatened. Bissell's last act would thus be to move Kennedy to reorganize his machinery for covert action. In fact, the special group…”

Robert F. Kennedy chaired National Security Council documented ▶ 54:04

“the matters continued and said the nomenclature had now been reversed. The 5412 group became the insider jargon. A third special group also appeared. The special group augmented. The difference was th…”

Maxwell D. Taylor chaired National Security Council documented ▶ 54:04

20th Special Forces Group deployed_to West Germany documented ▶ 55:10

“The 10th Special Forces Group had been in place at Fort Bragg since June of 1952. The September 1953, it had been supplemented by 77th Group, which remained in the U.S. while almost 800 men of the 10t…”

20th Special Forces Group trained_in Laos documented ▶ 56:40

“That has endured ever since. A permanent presence in the Far East began in 1956 when provisional teams went to Hawaii, then to Okinawa. In 1957, this became the first Special Forces group. Special For…”

20th Special Forces Group trained Vietnamese Rangers documented ▶ 56:40

Dag Hammarskjold focused_on Congo guest_asserted ▶ 1:06:24

“UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold, they were his two focus, foci, I guess, plural, I hope, at the time of his death, right? Yeah. They were also key areas in the international mining cartel. Yep. …”

Dag Hammarskjold focused_on Vietnam guest_asserted ▶ 1:06:24

John F. Kennedy focused_on Vietnam guest_asserted ▶ 1:07:18

“After the JFK assassination, because, you know, both we know that JFK and Hammerskjold were kind of on the similar pages regarding both Indonesia and Congo. And so, yeah, I think that's worth remember…”

John F. Kennedy focused_on Congo guest_asserted ▶ 1:07:18

Walt Rostow opposed Dwight D. Eisenhower guest_asserted ▶ 1:09:39

“I agree. I also wanted to add that Rostow is also famous for his stance. He got pissed off at Eisenhower because Eisenhower would not commit to using tactical nuclear weapons in the French war in Viet…”

Allen Dulles had_connections_to Azov Battalion caller_asserted ▶ 1:10:13

“Our little Ukrainian friend, what I'd like to know is what his or his family's connections are to the Azov Battalion. And I say that because we already know that, in fact, they ended up CIA or CIA adj…”

Azov Battalion front_for Banderites host_asserted ▶ 1:11:09

“Well, they actually, I mean, someone came out of Azov and then came over to the American CIA. I don't think we've... So at the time, they were not Azov. So they were Banderites. Okay, sure. Yeah. So a…”

Azov Battalion front_for Right Sector host_asserted ▶ 1:12:23

“basically the NATO territory temporarily and didn't go back until much later. And when they went back and was able to basically rebirth the stay-behind capabilities through the Azov and right sector n…”

Eugene V. Rostow member_of Warren Commission host_asserted ▶ 1:14:02

“as far as lineups of influences on Lyndon Baines Johnson and the formation of the Dulles Committee that we know as the Warren Commission, right? And I think for me, the number one influence would be J…”

Eugene V. Rostow member_of Yale Law School documented ▶ 1:14:02